Pathway to Peace: 
Canada’s Re-engagement with UN Peace Operations
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<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CAF</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces</td>
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<td>CCIC</td>
<td>Canadian Council for International Cooperation</td>
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<td>CDS Directive</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Staff Directive</td>
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<td>CHAT</td>
<td>Canadian Humanitarian Assistance Team</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Canadian Police Arrangement</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<td>DART</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration</td>
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<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>The European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Unit</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GBA+</td>
<td>Gender Based Analysis Plus</td>
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<td>GENAD</td>
<td>Gender advisors</td>
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<td>GPSF</td>
<td>Global Peace and Security Fund</td>
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<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations</td>
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<td>HNP</td>
<td>Haiti National Police Force</td>
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<td>IAs</td>
<td>Immediate action drills</td>
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<td>IEDs</td>
<td>Improvised explosive devices</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>MINUSM</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilizing Mission in Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSN</td>
<td>Mediation Support Network</td>
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<td>MTCP</td>
<td>Military Training Cooperation Program</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>OMLT</td>
<td>Operational Mentor and Liaison Team</td>
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<td>PCPO</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Peace Operations</td>
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<td>PCRS</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System</td>
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<td>PSTC</td>
<td>Peace Support Training Centre</td>
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<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Standby High Readiness Brigade</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>START</td>
<td>Stability and Reconstruction Task</td>
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<td>TTPs</td>
<td>Training, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>UN General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>UN Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
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Executive Summary

This report examines Canada’s engagement in United Nations (UN) peace operations. It reflects on past and present contributions and proposes specific recommendations for improving Canada’s engagement in preventive action and mediation, peace enforcement, and post-conflict peace operations.

We begin with the preamble, an introduction that offers the rationale behind recommending Canada’s re-engagement in UN peace operations. The preamble outlines recent changes in the policies of the Canadian government, and the current shift from the traditional to the multidimensional nature of peacemaking, before explaining Canada’s capacity to implement peacekeeping recommendations.

The first section of the report, Conflict Prevention, How Canada Can Contribute to Mediation and Rapid Response Initiatives describes Canada’s proposed role in mediation and rapid response initiatives in support of United Nations peace operations. Conflict prevention is a critical component of peace operations as it reduces loss of life, instability, and use of valuable UN resources. Under Canada’s new Liberal leadership, Canada is in a favorable political position to strengthen the mediation and rapid response initiatives that are highlighted in this report. We recommend that Canada join international mediation networks, such as the Mediation Support Network and the Group of Friends, apply for membership in the Group of Friends of Mediation, and facilitate Canadian NGO’s involvement in international mediation networks. We also propose that Canada create a public database of all available public and private mediation organizations and join the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System. Additionally, this section proposes the creation of a rapidly-deployable Canadian civilian-military unit to improve humanitarian assistance delivery in conflict zones.

The second section of the report, Peace Enforcement, How Canada Can Contribute to Robust Peacekeeping and Stabilization Operations, details the evolution of security threats present in modern peace operations. An increased security risk to peace operation personnel now exists and threatens the efficacy of UN peace enforcement missions. We recommend that Canada provide pre-deployment and embedded training to help protect UN troops while they fulfill their mandates and protect the lives of civilians.

The third section, Post-Conflict, How Canada can Augment its Current Contributions at the End of Conflict, details Canada’s participation in past and current post-conflict peace operations and initiatives, and outlines ways of augmenting Canada’s contributions to these missions. The section also answers the question of how and why our expertise in the areas of Security Sector Reform and the Protection of Human Rights - areas identified by the UN as priorities in post-conflict peace operations - makes Canada particularly poised to increase its contributions in this area of peace operations. Finally, the authors speak to why and how Canada should better incorporate gender-focused initiatives and programs into post-conflict peace operations. We recommend that Canada focus on Security Sector Reform, the Protection of Human Rights, and on facilitating transparency and accountability for missions that Canada supports financially or through personnel contribution.
Preamble

In 2015, the Liberal Party of Canada led by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made re-engagement with the UN in general, and peace operations in particular, core aspects of Canada’s new foreign policy. Canada’s past engagement in peace operations was largely devoted to first generation, or traditional peacekeeping, which was made up of units of “blue helmets” that were armed only for self-defence. The nature of peace operations has developed past these simple principles, as outlined in the 2015 UN High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report. The HIPPO report acknowledged a need for more robust and multidimensional peace operations that addresses existing gaps in preventing conflict and mediating peace, protecting civilians, using force for peace and protection, and sustaining peace.¹

Canadian academic Cristina Badescu notes that Canada’s role in peace operations is not limited to deploying large numbers of military personnel. Canada is in a position to contribute specialized expertise and equipment, as well as skilled planning, administration, and training personnel. Canadians might also take on more senior leadership roles in UN missions.¹ Although Canada has disengaged from peace operations in the last decade, Canada’s peacekeeping past remains a part of its national identity and guides its “national role”, as communicated by the Canadian government and its citizens.³ Today, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his Cabinet continue to articulate a clear desire to re-engage in peace operations in a meaningful way. Canada’s unique role as a middle-power, impressive training capacity, and the quality of Canadian personnel, position Canada to effectively support several recommendations outlined in the HIPPO report, which calls on member states to implement these recommendations without further delay.⁴

The authors of this report investigated peace operations through three of its distinct phases: peacemaking, peace enforcement, and post-conflict operations. By taking a deeper look at the progression of UN peace operations and the various setbacks that they have faced, the shortcomings of past and present peace operations become clear. The setbacks of the different peace operations have been identified both internally within the UN and externally by think tanks and other related groups. By cross referencing these identified shortcomings with Canada’s capabilities, this report recommends various ways Canada can contribute to the continuing evolution of UN peace operations.

² “National roles” are deeply held assumptions about the functions a state is expected to perform in international affairs.
SECTION ONE

How Canada Can Contribute to Mediation and Rapid Response Initiatives

Canadian Participation in Conflict Prevention and Mediation
  - Canada’s Role in International Mediation Networks and Partnerships
  - United Nations Peacemaker Processes
  - Canada’s Role in Gender Inclusion in Prevention and Mediation

Canada’s Role in UN Rapid Response Operations
  - Joining the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System
  - Canada’s Role in Gender Inclusion in Rapid Response
  - Canadian Humanitarian Assistance Team (CHAT)
Conflict prevention and mediation are widely recognized as essential for effectively dealing with violent conflicts in the coming decades. Yet, international contributions to conflict prevention are lacking according to the United Nations (UN) and independent experts. In 2014, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Security Council Resolution 2171, reaffirming an international commitment to the effective use of “negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and resort to regional and sub-regional organizations and arrangements, as well as the good offices of the Secretary-General.” Debates around UNSC 2171 echoed calls among experts that the UN and member states need to pay greater attention to conflict prevention. The 2013 Human Security Report makes clear that conflict prevention is extremely effective in reducing the number of casualties from armed conflicts. This is supported by the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre in a 2013 report, which recommends strengthening conflict prevention activities in accordance with global need. The United States Institute of Peace similarly argued that “new wars will continue to erupt unless new efforts are made to prevent them.” Lower costs are a benefit of conflict prevention. In 2011, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon emphasized that prevention can bring a high-return investment, both in human lives and from an economic standpoint. This argument is supported by the World Bank, which estimated that “the average cost of civil war is equivalent to more than thirty years of gross domestic product growth for a medium-size developing country.” Prevention is cheaper, in the end. However, according to the HIPPO Report, prevention and mediation capacities do not yet exist to their full potential in the UN. In the 2014 UN General Assembly High-level Thematic Debate, the General Assembly emphasized the need for expanding participation among regional and sub-regional organizations.

In the coming years, Canada should play a role in strengthening the UN’s conflict prevention mechanisms to avert and reduce civilian casualties, mass displacement, and atrocities. Romeo Dallaire recently highlighted Canada’s capacity to contribute to prevention efforts through its role as a peacebuilder:

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10 Ibid.
Our approach to peacekeeping post-Cold War has mostly been that of crisis management and lessons-learned. However today, with the change in not only the reasons conflict is being waged but also the means in which it is being waged, we need a change in this approach; we need new tools with which we pursue peacekeeping. Today, we need tools for preventing conflict; tools that bring together and coordinate the vast array of existing actors in peacekeeping. Canada is the eleventh most powerful nation in the world, therefore we hold a global responsibility to prevent conflicts from taking place through innovative means of preventive action.12

- Romeo Dallaire

Canada’s re-engagement with UN peace operations provides Canada with an opportunity to move preventive action forward. The following section recommends two ways in which Canada can contribute to conflict prevention by first participating in conflict mediation initiatives, and also by contributing to a rapid deployment capability for the UN.

Canada’s Role in Mediation Networks and Partnerships

The Canadian government should seek to actively participate in conflict mediation in the coming years because it has both the capability and administrative momentum to pursue this sphere of peace operations. Canada continues to advocate for the complete implementation of the UN High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), which includes an emphasis on conflict prevention and rapid deployment among other aspects of peace operations.13

However, Canada’s personnel contributions to UN peace operations decreased drastically since the 1990s.14 Canada currently ranks seventy-first out of 124 contributing countries, with 116 uniformed personnel deployed worldwide.15

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13 Ibid.
According to a poll conducted by Pew Research Center in 2013, Canadians have the most favorable view of the UN out of thirty-eight surveyed countries, with 62 percent holding a positive opinion towards the UN. In a report issued by the Canadian Chapter of the World Federalist Movement, Walter Dorn explains this phenomenon by stating that “UN peace operations provide unparalleled legitimacy to international efforts. That’s why Canadians, as shown in many polls, continue to support peacekeeping, even when Canada is at an all-time low in contributions of personnel.”

Canada should utilize its comparative advantages and its international reputation as an honest broker and promoter of peace and human security. For example, Canada should leverage its comparative advantage and gear its efforts toward providing experts, initiating mediation support services, tabling dialogues, and acting as the liaison between the UN and various organizations to improve cooperation. Canada is also in a strong position to champion international laws and treaties through the UN and other regional and international bodies because it is respected internationally for being a promoter of peace and human security.

We recommend that the Canadian government pursue conflict mediation in two ways. First, by taking part in the UN Peacemaker process and, second, by acting as a liaison between various actors in the conflict mediation network.

19Ibid.
United Nations Peacemaker Processes

The UN Peacemaker is an online mediation support tool developed by the Mediation Support Unit in the Policy and Mediation Division of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). Intended for peacemaking professionals, it includes an extensive database of peace agreements, guidance material and information on the UN’s mediation support services.20

The UN Peacemaker draws on the DPA’s leadership and experience in peacemaking and preventive diplomacy, which makes it an important platform for the exchange of information and expertise between peacemakers and mediators in the international community. The UN Peacemaker is made up of member states, regional organizations, civil society, non-governmental organizations and national mediators. Canada should increase its involvement in the UN Peacemaker to enhance its engagement in the international community in general, and mediation networks specifically. Below are ways that Canada can become involved in the efforts of the different bodies of the UN Peacemaker.

Mediation networks are an integral part of the UN Peacemaker. Networks such as the Mediation Support Network (MSN) and the Group of Friends of Mediation are important spaces for collaboration and partnership among the different actors involved in mediation worldwide. These networks allow for the exchange of knowledge and expertise between actors with different comparative advantages, and foster coherence and coordination between them. The following are ways in which Canada can be involved in these networks.21

The MSN was established in 2008, with the goal to promote and improve mediation practice, processes, and standards to address political tensions and armed conflict.22 The MSN offers a platform that allows for cohesive information sharing between international mediation actors. Since 2008, the network has grown and new member organizations, especially from the Global South, have joined the initiative. Eighteen organizations from different regions around the world, primarily Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the UN Mediation Support Unit, are current members of the MSN. It is important to recognize that nongovernmental and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are key actors because they are “active at different levels and engage in activities that feed into all tracks. Compared to other mediation actors, such as the UN, regional governmental organizations

or states, NGOs are often faster and more flexible, and often engage on more than one track.”23

Therefore, networks such as MSN are vital in connecting mediation NGOs under one cohesive umbrella where information sharing is simultaneous. Despite NGOs being active in international conflict mediation, they still have their limitations. Some of the challenges and constraints that NGOs face include a lack of democratic legitimacy, political leverage, and resources.24 These constraints can be addressed through government engagement in these types of networks.

Current efforts to involve more NGOs in the process are premature; therefore, there is room for improvement. Due to the critical role that NGOs play in global mediation, it is necessary to take steps towards such efforts. NGOs frequently take a stronger lead role early in the mediation process, for example, by facilitating the pre-negotiation phase as well as providing technical support during the actual negotiations. Furthermore, NGOs have taken on the role of mediator in high profile peace negotiations in recent years, which leads some states to prefer NGOs to take on the role of mediator.25 This is exemplified in Turkey’s recent initiative to bring its NGOs to the negotiating table. Turkey’s new foreign policy agenda notes the country’s efforts to rise as a mediator in regional and international crises zones. These efforts include Turkey’s reliance on a multitude of actors to support its mediation initiatives, most notably its vibrant civil society and NGOs.26 Canada’s involvement in engaging Canadian peacebuilding and peacemaking CSOs and NGOs can emulate Turkey’s approach.

Currently, Canada does not have an NGO participant in the eighteen member Mediation Support Network. The Canadian government should facilitate a connection between the national and international capacitates to help NGOs fill the UN needs of international mediation. Canada should pool its mediation experts from its NGOs and CSOs in an effort to link its civil society organizations to the international community through this outlet.

Some Canadian NGOs are interested in participating in international networks such as the MSN and would welcome the Canadian government’s efforts to facilitate their involvement in international mediation networks. Catherine Morris of the Canadian NGO Peacemakers Trust highlighted this point in a recent interview:

There is no facilitation on the federal level for NGOs; however, looking forward, facilitation by the federal government may be welcomed by NGOs, especially for collaboration with international

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
organizations such as the United Nations, and opening platforms of dialogue and exchange between academics worldwide. However, the federal government would need to ensure that the independence of NGOs was assured. For example, any selection of funding mechanisms may need to be multilateral with beneficiaries selected by a UN body or other agency independent of the government of Canada.27

Catherine Morris
Founder and Managing Director of Peacemakers Trust
Adjunct professor at University of Victoria, BC
Research Director at Lawyers Rights Watch Canada

Canada can also play an enhanced role in the peaceful mediation of conflicts by joining the Group of Friends of Mediation. This can assist Canada in defining itself as a middle power on the world stage, ready to re-engage and take action in this field. Founded on 24 September 2010 by the governments of Turley and Finland, the Group of Friends of Mediation aims to “promote and advance the use of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution, as well as to generate support for the development of mediation.”28 The Group of Friends mediation network involves state representatives and meets in front of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to pass its collective resolutions on mediation. The work of the Group is the most recent development in UN diplomacy through mediation. During the sixty-fifth session of the UNGA, the Friends of Mediation tabled what would become resolution 65/283 on “Strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution.”29 The UN Secretary-General described the Resolution in his recent report as “a groundbreaking development that positions the Organization as a standard setter for mediation.”30 The Group has forty-three member states that work together with seven regional and international organizations. However, Canada is not among those members. In seeking membership in the Group of Friends of Mediation, Canada can contribute to this network of states working towards conflict prevention through mediation.

Despite being an organization that is only five years old, the Group of Friends has great potential. Its strengths lie in its many members including the UN, numerous regional partners, and forty-three UN member-states. Prevention through mediation is a field that is of increasing importance. As a result of various non-state global security threats, the UN’s role as the sole international mediator is no longer

27 Catherine Morris, Peacemakers Trust, interview by Razan Masad, March 11, 2016.
sufficient. Turkey and Finland have jointly pointed out a need for mediation as a solution for conflicts.\textsuperscript{31} Canada can access many regional partners to work constructively on peacemaking efforts by obtaining a membership with the Group.\textsuperscript{32} This will help Canada become an active part of international mediation. Canada should seek to engage existing platforms for conflict prevention and mediation. Therefore, the Group can be a way for Canada to increase involvement with the UN Peacemaker processes.

The Group of Friends of Mediation can also serve Canada in its efforts to work more closely with regional organizations and NGOs. Political will is one of the greatest obstacles to intermediation between regional organizations, national governments, and the United Nations. These parties may be skeptical of cooperation, often due to a lack of education and information being shared between the potential partners.\textsuperscript{33} The UN report “Guidance for Effective Mediation” states that there is a significant need to help all stakeholders, national, regional, and otherwise, engage with each other more effectively.\textsuperscript{34} Regional organizations that have the mandate to work alone often lack cohesion with other international groups. From this information, it is clear that there is a need for consolidation and effective engagement between national governments and regional organizations in order to support UN mediation initiatives. The Group of Friends recognizes and is focused on the enhancement of the UN’s partnerships with regional organizations to increase dialogue on mediation efforts. “There was a clear consensus in the Group that interaction between the UN and regional organizations should be further enhanced. Memorandums of understanding and a regular dialogue can be a useful tool. This could also assist in having more clarity of the role of each organization in a given conflict.”\textsuperscript{35} Furthermore, the Group of Friends can work toward the inclusion of civil society actors, whose importance to the process was reiterated recently on behalf of the Group of Friends of Mediation by Finland’s UN Deputy Permanent Representative: “The involvement of civil society is fundamental in a mediation process. There should be more engagement with track II actors. The starting point of this engagement process is to respect these actors and their comparative advantages.”\textsuperscript{36} Track II actors such as NGOs and civil society possess a comparative advantage in the field. However, civil society groups have encountered difficulties in obtaining consent from national governments to engage national actors in mediation efforts. Similar to the issues of regional organizations, there is an information and

\textsuperscript{31} Aras, 1-7.
\textsuperscript{32} Arab League, ASEAN, AU, EU, OAS, OIC, OSCE.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
coordination gap between national governments and civil society that can be bridged by increased communication and cooperation. A renewed Canadian effort to act as a liaison for future mediation mechanisms through the Group of Friends can help NGOs engage in mediation efforts in the future.

The growing influence of various NGOs, regional organizations, and other global actors in international affairs also highlights a possible Canadian liaison role to help build capacity for institutional change in mediation efforts. Improved partnerships between national governments and global actors motivates change at the UN level due to increased joint response capabilities. “Global Regional Partnerships” between the UN, national government, and regional mediation organizations are of particular importance. The European Union (EU), the Southern African Development Community, and the East African Community have all expressed their willingness to cooperate with the UN to improve international mediation. However, there has yet to be a national government willing to take the leadership role regarding international mediation. In this regard, the United Nations has a demonstrable need that Canada should address. The UN “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations and Conflict Prevention” states that if conflict prevention efforts are to have a substantial impact, they must be “nationally driven and nationally owned.” Canada is in a position to emphasize these conflict prevention efforts given its legacy as a third-party, impartial mediator.

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38 Together with Canada’s objective to strengthen its relationship to the United Nation mediation efforts, Canada should also tighten the loose web of partnerships in its mediation network. Canada’s mediation network includes governments, institutions, international NGOs, and civil society. Canada has the capacity to promote civil society establishments in several ways: by coordinating and connecting these establishments to other actors in the international community; by providing funding through government grants that support mediation training and education; and finally, by publicly supporting these activities in order to grant them state-level legitimacy. Such efforts would advance progress toward a “whole of government” approach to mediation that emphasizes the importance of partnerships, an approach promoted by the United Nations Association of Canada. Kristine St. Pierre, Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Lessons from the Past Building for the Future (Ottawa: United Nations Association in Canada, 2007), 73.
39 Ibid.
Recommendations

The Government of Canada should implement policies that promote international partnerships through cooperation with regional organizations and civil society. This should include international mediation networks such as the Group of Friends of Mediation and the Mediation Support Network. Primarily, Canada has the capacity to become a prominent international mediator through partnerships. The Government of Canada can also earn international distinction by organizing meetings and summits for international organizations to coordinate their activities. Furthermore, the Government of Canada should strengthen communications with regional organizations and civil society by providing policy briefings and up-to-date mission statements of their mediation work internationally. Through Global Affairs Canada, the Government of Canada should invest in the creation of a public database of available mediation organizations, as well as a complementary database for actors external to the government describing Canadian mediation initiatives.

Canada’s Role in Gender Inclusion in Prevention and Mediation

In October 2000, the UN passed the Security Council Resolution 1325 which mandated that member states ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in conflict prevention, resolution, and peace processes.42 However, there is still a need for greater gender inclusion in the area of prevention and mediation. The Canadian government has an opportunity alongside mediation initiatives to push forward its commitment to issues of women, peace, and security. This section puts forth recommendations on how the Canadian government can advance the Canadian National Action Plan (C-NAP) on women, peace, and security in a more transparent and accountable manner.

The goal of incorporating a stronger gendered perspective in the area of prevention and mediation has been reiterated in several other UN reports and resolutions, including the UN Development Programme’s 8-Point Agenda, Security Council Resolutions 1820, 1889, and 2122, and the HIPPO Report. Subsequent resolutions continue to call for the full implementation of Resolution 1325. In particular, UNSC Resolution 2122 requests the Secretary General, his Special Envoys, and Special Representatives to United Nations missions to regularly update the Security Council on progress in increasing women’s participation in all areas of the peace and security process.43 However, despite these positive developments, women are severely underrepresented in conflict mediation. It was not until March 2013 that Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed the UN’s first female lead mediator, Mary Robinson,

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as special envoy to the Great Lakes region. Currently, women hold just fourteen percent of senior UN mediation positions.\(^4^4\) While this ratio is an improvement (women represented only 2.4 percent of chief mediators in UN peace processes between 1992 to 2011), it still falls short.\(^4^5\) It is important to note that even slight progress in increased women’s participation has been contested. Mediators and parties to a conflict rarely seek out the inclusion of women upon their own initiative. Instead, gender equality is often achieved from concerted pressure and lobbying by women’s organizations.\(^4^6\)

Since the passing of UNSC 1325 in October 2000 and its subsequent resolutions, Canada has committed to progress on issues of women, peace, and security. Canada modeled its own action plan – the Canadian National Action Plan (C-NAP) - on the 2010 report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace, and Security (S/2010/173). The C-NAP focuses on five areas: prevention, participation, protection, relief, and recovery.\(^4^7\) The C-NAP’s call for preventive action ties directly to the UN need in conflict prevention and mediation efforts, by “integrating a perspective that takes into account the differential experiences of men and women, boys and girls in conflict situations into all conflict prevention activities and strategies; strengthening efforts to prevent violence, including sexual violence, against women and girls in peace operations, fragile states and conflict-affected situations.”\(^4^8\)

Future initiatives must build on progress to date. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have recently demonstrated a greater commitment to integrating gendered perspectives into the “analysis, planning, execution and evaluation of all CAF operations.”\(^4^9\) The CAF will also be establishing three Gender Advisor positions in the upcoming year who will work to support the Chief of the Defence Staff, Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command, and the Commander Canadian Special Operations Command.\(^5^0\) The CAF aims to align their measures on women, peace, and security with the Canadian Government, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the UN, thus demonstrating Canada’s ability to promote issues of women, peace, and security in conflict mediation.

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45 Ibid., 2.
48 Ibid.
The current Canadian National Action Plan will expire by the end of March 2016, thus providing a critical opportunity for Canada to make significant advancements in the area of conflict mediation in a new five-year action plan. While Canada’s commitment remains high, progress has been slow in translating commitments to realized objectives. A renewed Canadian Action Plan can incorporate increased action by partnering with UN and regional organizations to integrate gender in all aspects of conflict prevention and mediation. These efforts can build on recommendations by the Federal Government to re-engage the Canadian Armed Forces in UN peace operations.

In order for Canada to integrate gender considerations into conflict prevention and mediation, current Canadian shortcomings must be addressed. A 2015 report by Canada’s Women, Peace, and Security Network (WPSN-C) on C-NAP notes that only limited progress has been made in implementing C-NAP objectives. C-NAP’s last progress report from 2013-2014 notes that progress is uneven in achieving conflict prevention goals, demonstrating a lack of consistency among Canadian organizations. This is illustrated by records of Canadian personnel receiving pre-deployment training on the different impact of armed conflict on women and girls (Indicator 2-2). While 100 percent of Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Department of National Defence (DND) personnel received the training, only two out of twenty-one Stability and Reconstruction Task Force (START) missions and twenty out of sixty-five Canadian Fund for Local Initiatives personnel received such training. Pre-departure training on issues of women, peace, and security is crucial to the overall success of C-NAP, as well as to realizing UN resolutions on gender in the area of conflict mediation.

Achieving UN objectives on gender mainstreaming in peace operations requires that Canada realize its Action Plan objectives in the coming years, while simultaneously mainstreaming gender objectives in any new initiatives for UN conflict prevention. We recommend that Canada take the initiative in ensuring that items of women, peace, and security are included on the agenda when working with the Group of Friends and member states in conflict prevention and mediation operations. The new Canadian National Action Plan for 2016 should incorporate gender goals in Canada’s proposed partnerships with (1) Group of Friends of Mediation, and (2) Mediation Support Network, under the prevention section of the approach.

Recommendations


Tuckey and Woroniuk, 2-3.

Ibid., 56.
The Canadian government should ensure that indicators 1-1, 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3 from the Canadian National Action Plan are consistently and universally implemented in all Canadian conflict prevention and mediation operations to guarantee the appropriate training of all Canadian troops. When C-NAP indicators fail to be achieved, staff should identify the obstacles to completion and a path for resolution of the shortcomings as soon as possible. Such reforms will ensure transparency in the women, peace, and security agenda, and help realize progress on wider UN goals.

Canada’s Role in UN Rapid Response Operations

Joining the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System

The United Nations Secretary-General Trygve Lie initially proposed the idea of a rapid reaction force in 1948.\textsuperscript{55} Nearly seventy years later, United Nations still does not have a fully functioning rapid reaction force. As the nature of conflict continues to evolve, it is imperative that the international community be flexible and quick to respond to international security crises. This quick flexibility is especially vital in instances of mass loss of life. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) is charged with assisting countries torn by conflict achieve a lasting peace, yet the UNDPKO is often too slow to act.\textsuperscript{56} In 2015 alone, slow responses to UN operations in Mali, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic have increased the risk of loss of life of both civilians and peacekeeping personnel on the ground.\textsuperscript{57} In response to these shortcomings, we recommend that the Canadian government supplement the capabilities of the UN in order to create an effective rapid response team with a mandate for peace operations. In doing so, the Canadian government should pledge its commitment to the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS).

The implementation of an effective rapid response force would have humanitarian, economic, and organizational benefits. First, a rapid response force would support the protection of at-risk civilians in global conflict zones. Under international law, the displacement, murder, or sexual abuse of civilians during conflict is unacceptable. The UN has committed itself to this cause by including the protection of civilians in thirteen of its peacekeeping mandates to date.\textsuperscript{58} However, after evaluating the application of these mandates to reality, the UN has fallen short. Out of 507 incidents of civilian attacks reported to the Secretary-General from 2010-2013, only 20 percent were met with a rapid

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{57} Peter Langille, “Time for a United Nations Emergency Peace Service,” 3.
\end{itemize}
response. The lack of an effective UN response damages the organization’s credibility. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, a rapid response force could have potentially saved thousands of lives. As the world’s largest international organization, it is imperative that the UN’s commitment to upholding human rights be consistent and visible worldwide. The creation of an effective rapid response force would ultimately assist the UN in its commitment to the protection of civilians.

A rapid response to conflict also has the potential to decrease the overall cost of peace operations. Due to a lack of tangible evidence that supports this notion, international actors often hesitate to contribute to rapid response efforts. However, by de-escalating a conflict early on, the duration of conflict decreases as does the potential need for further investment. In a 2006 University of Bradford study, the predicted costs of war were compared to the predicted costs of preventive action in six conflict ridden areas. When calculated over long periods of time, the study concluded that in all six scenarios, “…conflict prevention is (or would have been) significantly cheaper than the cure.” Therefore, there is significant rationale that it is more cost-effective for member states to invest in preventative peacekeeping operations before the complete onset and aftermath of large-scale conflict.

Lastly, the creation of a rapid response force that provides both troops and supplies would contribute to more achievable mandates. In the past, missions have deployed without the proper capability to see them through. If an effective rapid response team were to enter into force, it would allow the UN to create mandates that could be implemented immediately with pledged supplies and troops at the ready. This rationale is historically supported by the UN mission in Bosnia, which would have significantly benefitted from such a force. The Bosnia mission was criticized not only for the lack of political will to deploy, but also for its lack of material resources. This caused frustration on the ground and led to the resignation of a general who claimed that the disparity between UN mandates and available resources was too great. This level of frustration on the ground undermines the effectiveness

59  Ibid., 7.
63  Conflict prevention would have paid significant dividends during the Rwandan genocide. Chalmer’s argues: “In Rwanda a conflict prevention package deployed in 1990 including mediation, an arms embargo, and a small peacekeeping force would have reduced the probability of genocide by ninety percent, the probability of civil war by 50 percent, and in turn would have saved the international community six billion dollars. Even after the civil war commenced, if a military intervention package granted the same funding was deployed in 1994, the probability of genocide would have decreased by 78 percent. These are two rapid response efforts that are different in nature, yet concluded to be highly effective.” Ibid., 20.
65  Ibid., 17.
67  Ibid.
of peace operations and the credibility of UN mandates. Today, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has emphasized the protection of civilians, the promotion of human rights, and the security of UN personnel in its mandate. \(^{68}\) Despite this mandate of protection, MINUSMA has been the target of many lethal attacks, resulting in fifty-three peacekeeper fatalities. \(^{69}\) The nature of these attacks is rapid and asymmetrical, and could be countered more effectively by a rapid response force that is prepared to support the mission’s mandate. In summary, a rapid response force would allow for the immediate implementation of robust, yet achievable mandates in order to protect civilians, promote human rights, and ensure the security of United Nations personnel.

By maintaining the status quo of current UN capabilities and initiatives, the UN is condemning victims of violent conflict abroad to death and displacement because responses are continuously delayed. Today, the UN lacks adequate capabilities and resources to deploy missions within a reasonable time frame. The Brahimi report asserts that in order for a mission to be effective, it needs to be deployed within thirty days of a Security Council Resolution. \(^{70}\) However, the average current deployment time of UN peacekeeping missions is six to twelve months. \(^{71}\) As outlined above, this delayed response ultimately escalates conflict, casualties, and displacement which in turn requires a greater monetary effort to resolve.

The immediate deployment of peacekeepers is a difficult, multifaceted issue that requires cooperation, coordination, and political will from member states. Although there is near universal acknowledgement that response times need to improve, member states have not put forward the necessary time and resources required to deploy missions within thirty days of a Security Council Resolution. \(^{72}\) The most recent effort to create a rapid response capability at the UN is the PCRS. The PCRS is an improved framework modeled after the United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), and it was established in 1994 to organize potential troop and supply pledges from member states to be deployable on short notice. \(^{73}\) While the two initiatives are similar in both objective and framework, the PCRS is intended to remedy the shortcomings of UNSAS.

Operational from 1994 to 2015, UNSAS was created to facilitate mission planning by using

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a database that organized potential troop and supply pledges from member states. UNSAS acknowledged four levels of commitment, from Level One to Level Four. Level One member states were simply required to provide a list of their capabilities, while Level Four committed member states had to provide adequate resources deployable within thirty to ninety days of mandate completion. However, the many shortcomings of UNSAS subsequently led to its replacement by the PCRS in 2015. One significant shortcoming was that UNSAS failed to attract new member states. In the final year of its operation, it received only one new pledge to its database, representing a grand total of ninety members in its lifetime.

Perhaps the largest shortcoming of UNSAS was its inability to perform when it was ultimately required. This was due to its structure, which was based on conditional pledges from member states and allowed national governments to have the final say on whether to deploy or not. Member states could not see the benefit in delivering Level Four commitment without any incentive to have troops at the ready. The authors of one recent study on the issue noted that,

For those Member states that understand the need for rapid deployment and the purpose of the RDL [rapid deployment launcher] however, there are few incentives to participate in that way. Why should a Member State pledge and then prepare and maintain resources for standby arrangements, rather than simply offer its capacities through regular means whenever it wants to? Standby—as opposed to standing—means that Member states are not compensated for capacities pledged to UNSAS while they prepare and train for a potential deployment at short notice from their usual home locations. Nor is an RDL compensated at a higher reimbursement rate if/when it is deployed to a mission. At the political level, as well, there seems to be little recognition for deploying more rapidly than another TCC [troop contributing country], or for completing the requirements to be at the RDL.

The PCRS came into effect in September 2015 to remedy some of the shortcomings of UNSAS. The PCRS puts forward an effective description of readiness that will be required from committed member states. The PCRS should also improve communication between member states and the United Nations Headquarters. Similar to UNSAS, there are varying levels of commitment:

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74 Ibid.
**CONFLICT PREVENTION**

**Level 1:** Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) make a pledge to PCRS along with a table of organization, list of equipment available, certificate of completion of training and caveats if any;

**Level 2:** Select TCC’s are elevated to this level after completing an Assessment and Advisory Visit (AAV);

**Level 3:** Following a satisfactory AAV, the TCCs are elevated to Level 3 after TCC provides a Load list as required by the DPKO;

**Rapid Deployment Level (RDL):** TCC’s pledge for RDL if capable of deploying within 30/60/90 days of a SC Mandate.

The restructured organization of the PCRS promotes informed membership and pledges from member states, thereby addressing critical problems with UNSAS. Although the final decision to deploy remains with national governments, governments are able to specify individual missions before pledging their troops and resources. The UN has also agreed to pay a premium to those that pledge at the higher levels of commitment, as well as those who pledge supplies that are in high demand. This should provide incentive for member states to commit to rapid deployment in a capacity that UNSAS could not incite.

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81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

**Recommendations**

Despite various commitments from major powers towards a global rapid reaction force, for the past seven years, Canada has been apprehensive about participating in UN missions or contributing to the UNDPKO. Canada’s limited military contributions to the UN over the past decade have corresponded with meager financial support for UN peacekeeping. Canada ranks ninth overall in terms of financial contributions to the UNDPKO, financing just 2.98 percent of the budget in the 2015/2016 fiscal year. A firm recommitment to UN peace operations would revive Canada’s strong internationalist reputation and tradition, while also helping to fulfill an evident UN need. In multiple reports, the UN has outlined commitment requirements to its new Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System from member states. A recent report released before the latest UN Peacekeeping Summit in September of 2015 reveals specific technical gaps

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in ongoing peace operations that exist due to a lack of member-state commitment. With the departure of Canadian troops from Afghanistan in 2011 and the recent cessation of air operations in Iraq and Syria, Canada’s only significant foreign commitments are limited to training missions in Iraq and the Ukraine. Canada currently has the military resources to make a firm commitment to a UN rapid response system, and should therefore pledge its commitment to the PCRS. Canada currently has the military resources to make a firm commitment to a UN rapid response system, and should therefore pledge its commitment to the PCRS.

Canada could assist in filling specific technical gaps, which are identified in the aforementioned 2015 Capability Report. Canada’s most recent rapid deployment was its participation in the Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG). The Chrétien government, alongside six other middle-powers, established this rapid response initiative in 1996. SHIRBRIG operated internationally with varying degrees of success, but it was dissolved in 2009.

Canada played a major role in SHIRBRIG. For thirteen years, Canada was one of the most active contributors in the brigade, deploying to Ethiopia, Sudan, and Liberia under UN authorization. Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands also earmarked troops specifically for the function of the brigade. Furthermore, Canada held the presidency in 2003 and supplied the brigade’s Bridge-Commander from 2004-2006. At the time, there was notable support for a Canadian foreign policy that would engage abroad through SHIRBRIG. It was considered to be a way for Canada to participate on a global stage, maximizing its potential as a middle power, while simultaneously bringing more credibility to the UN. Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy worked closely with the Dutch and Danish ministers to promote widespread commitments to the brigade as a means of facilitating international security through preventive measures. The goal was to “fast-track diplomacy by the middle powers, in particular Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands,” to address the need for a global response capability that would guarantee civilian

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89 Ibid., 34.
safety and when conflicts erupted.90

Canada’s military contributions to SHIRBRIG delegated missions offer a model for future UN rapid reaction contributions. In 1998, at the request of the UN, Canada deployed a 450 soldier contingent as part of a SHIRBRIG force to Ethiopia and Eritrea to help calm political instability in the region. This six-month multilateral deployment included armoured reconnaissance troops, mechanized infantry, an engineer troop, and support elements.91 The 1998 SHIRBRIG deployment is strikingly similar to the gaps in the current United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) mission, outlined in the Secretary-General’s October 2015 report on UNDPKO capability gaps.92

The eventual dissolution of SHIRBRIG cannot be linked to one country directly; instead, it resulted from a combination of organizational and efficiency failures, as well as lack of political will among participating countries.93 Nonetheless, throughout its existence, Canada exhibited a strong degree of participation in the UN process. If Canada wants to re-engage in international peace operations, it should look at these past accomplishments as a guide for the most effective way forward.

The experience of Canada’s other major foreign military operations in the past decade - the United Nations Stabilizing Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) - offer lessons for future Canadian rapid deployment contributions to the UN. The UN Haiti Mission began in 2004 under Operation Hamlet and is still ongoing. Canada contributed both military and police units to Haiti, deploying several hundred troops from the Royal Canadian Regiment and dozens of Canadian police officers. The UN force provided a significant portion of the police work in Haiti and deployed one third of all international police unites involved in the UNDPKO to the country. Canada eventually deployed 126 police officers to

92 Ladsous, “Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Statement.”
93 The disbanding of SHIRBRIG’s in 2009 was a result of many factors. One of the major failures was the lack of a sufficient document archive and database when it was first created in order to make sure a complete framework was in place that could allow efficient coordination between participating member-states. Furthermore, at its outset there was a lack of clear guidelines for internal procedures, and a complete set of procedures was not created until 2005. This led to a great amount of operational inconsistency, especially with regards to finances. Joachim Koops, ed., “Military Crisis Management: The Challenge on Inter-organizationalism,” Studia Diplomatica 62 (2009): 89; “UN: SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report,” SHIRBRIG (June 2009): 85 & 94.
However, Canada’s contribution to Haiti has declined significantly. Troops from the RCR were eventually withdrawn, and after March of 2013, the police deployment was reduced to five officers to help serve in senior positions at mission headquarters. Nonetheless, important lessons were learned in Haiti. Canadians police officers increased their expertise in conducting police work in international peace operations. A renewed Canadian commitment to a rapid reaction force should emphasize a police component, and build on this recent experience of joint military-civilian deployments.

By contrast, Canada’s role in Afghanistan was substantial and multi-dimensional. The Afghanistan deployment demonstrates that Canadians have the capability as well as the resources to make important military commitments should the UN call for a member-state contribution. Various military units were deployed and significant aid contributions were made to help stabilize the country and promote elections. The Afghanistan mission was a large factor in improving Canada’s combat capability, particularly its counter-insurgency capability. Canada’s military operations in Afghanistan prove that the CAF are capable of engaging in major combat as well as peace operations in the future for the UN. This is explored in greater detail in section three.

One of the major advantages that Canada has over many other middle-powers is the bilingualism of our military and government personnel. French language capability is especially important for the UN at the moment because six of the current sixteen ongoing UNPKO missions involve French-speaking countries. Furthermore, Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon noted in a recent UN report on the status of current rapid deployment capability gaps that there is a clear lack of qualified francophone units available for the Mali mission. The report specifically noted a need for French speaking military observers as well as mechanized convoys. Canada’s Royal 22e Régiment is a well-equipped primarily francophone regiment that could effectively contribute to current UN missions in West Africa. Such missions would build on past Canadian contributions in the area, complimenting efforts of French forces by providing strategic assistance. For example, in 2003, Canadian forces conducted multiple airlifts to help Operation Caravan at the request of the UN. Canada also contributed airlifts to supply French operations in Mali in January of 2013. Recently, the Canadian government also provided four major airlift missions to help supply French military forces at the end of 2015. Such efforts build on past and current Canadian defence-related cooperation with France and should serve

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96 Tanner and Dupont, 666.
98 Badescu, 50.
as a model for future deployments to the region.\textsuperscript{101}

The absence of a colonial legacy in Africa shields Canada, to some extent, from the neo-colonial resentment that French forces sometimes face in the region.\textsuperscript{102} Given its language and operational capacities, Canada should consider the future of rapid deployment and conflict prevention activities in West Africa. The recent resurgence of radical jihadists in Western Africa and their specific targeting of western interests and citizens – including Canadian citizens – demonstrates the potential for further instability in the region and a possible role for Canada’s armed forces to operate with the UN in region.\textsuperscript{103}

Canada should contribute resources to UN-mandated efforts around the world, despite the decline in the country’s engagement with formal UN peace operations over the past decade. The Canadian government should carefully consider these recommendations for measured, specific contributions to current UN rapid deployment needs.


Canada’s Role in Gender Inclusion in Rapid Response

While the UN is deeply committed to increasing women’s participation in all levels of peace operations, it has yet to fully achieve gender equality. Therefore there is a potential role for Canada to help the UN pursue this goal in the area of rapid response upon joining the PCRS. The implementation of female participation in all levels of peace operations, more specifically rapid response, contributes to peace operations in many ways. Women in communities are often aware of the increase in tensions and may be able to share important military information, such as the accumulation of weapons, the location of arms caches, and the routes used to transport them.\textsuperscript{104} The increase of violence against women is also an important indicator of rising societal tensions. An increase in the abuse of women was an indicator preceding mass violence by Serbs against Kosovar Albanians in 1989, against Ethiopian women prior to the country’s war with Eritrea in 1998, and preceding the Rwandan genocide as early as 1990.\textsuperscript{105} By providing women

\textsuperscript{104} Pablo C. Diaz and Sunita Caminha, Gender-Responsive Early Warning: Overview and How-to Guide (New York: UN Women, 2012), 4.

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 5.
with channels to report increasing tensions and new patterns in community level dynamics, the UN could harness women’s knowledge to foresee conflicts in time to prevent them.

The increased participation of women can also directly improve the UN’s rapid response units. While women have many professional competences, there are specific areas in which their participation is especially useful. Women’s presence raises awareness on gender issues, and helps prevent sexual exploitation and abuse of the local population. Records show that female peacekeepers have never been accused of sexual exploitation or abuse on UN missions. Female personnel have also been known to have an advantage over male personnel in interacting with survivors of gender-based violence. Additionally, women serve to improve credibility of the mission with local populations, as they may appear less threatening. However, women continue to represent less than five percent of UN personnel for its current missions. With a current total of 107,076 personnel, there are only 5,109 women as of January 2016. This number has not risen since 1993, when women represented just one percent of peacekeepers. There is currently no publicly available data demonstrating women’s representation in UN rapid response units. Additionally, as noted by Surendrini Wijeyaratne, a policy analyst at the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), none of the UN mandates concerning rapid deployment explicitly include gender equality and equal rights. As recommended previously, the monitoring of the UN’s implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 must be improved, with a specific focus on rapid response and early warning systems.

One of the main causes behind the low representation of women in peacekeeping is the traditional nature of the UN election process. As identified by Carla Koppell from the Institute for Inclusive Security, many high-level positions require significant years of UN-based experience that have been hard for women from many countries to accumulate. As well, many of the major troop-contributing countries are states where women are considered to have a lower status. Thus they are less likely to be selected and less likely to have accumulated any UN-related experience.

106 Coomaraswamy, Preventing Conflict Transforming Justice Securing the Peace, 135.
107 Ibid., 141.
108 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Coomaraswamy, Preventing Conflict Transforming Justice Securing the Peace, 139.
113 Ibid., 29.
Canada’s commitment to incorporating gendered perspectives into all operations is outlined in the current Canadian National Action Plan on women peace and security. The approach states that “in the realm of peace operations, fragile states and conflict-affected situations, the purpose of this approach is to make missions more effective and to reinforce the Government’s consistent emphasis on accountability.” Joining the PCRS is an opportunity for Canada to re-engage in peacekeeping as well as further implement the C-NAP on women, peace and security. Canada can implement such recommendations through the Canadian Armed Forces initiative of Gender Based Analysis Plus (GBA+). GBA+ is an analytical tool used in the planning, execution, and evaluation of operations, that takes into account factors of gender and identity. The “+” includes the added examination of factors such as age, education, language, geography, culture, and income. This is highly important during the rapid response stage of peace operations, in order to ensure all gender perspectives are taken into consideration from the beginning and then carried out through the rest of the operation.


Recommendations

The PCRS must incorporate considerations of women, peace, and security to properly address the face of current conflicts. It is recommended that the new Canadian National Action Plan for 2016 incorporate how issues of women, peace, and security with regards to Canada’s proposed role with the PCRS. The Government of Canada should also promote and encourage the role of women in the PCRS with informed dialogue, in order to recruit a sufficient amount of women to take part in operations.

There are three ways in which Canada can engage C-NAP in the PCRS recommendation. First, forces could meet with women’s organizations within the first thirty days of deployment to understand the area’s specific gender needs. Second, pre-deployment training on issues of women, peace, and security should be necessary for all deployed Canadian troops. Finally, local women’s groups should be provided with information about how to engage in the peace process.

Lastly, when an indicator has not been completed on C-NAP, a justification must be provided in the next annual report for why it remains incomplete. The obstacles that contributed to the incompletion must also be identified so that they can be addressed in the following year. This will ensure that there is complete transparency in the women, peace, and security agenda, and that actions will be continually adapting and improving.
Canadian Humanitarian Assistance Team (CHAT)

The nature of asymmetric warfare, along with the rise of non-state actors, is changing the landscape of United Nations peace operations. Aid workers are increasingly under attack, most frequently in countries demonstrating serious humanitarian need. These threats impede humanitarian workers’ ability to deliver necessary aid. While analysts have begun to advocate that humanitarian missions shift from avoiding risk to managing risk, the UN has yet to adapt.

Humanitarian actors within UN peace operations are currently restricted to delivering aid in designated peace zones. Over the years, humanitarian aid groups have demonstrated their ability to deliver impartial, neutral and independent aid to those who are in dire need of assistance. Yet, given the volatile nature of conflicts, these agencies are neither willing nor able to deliver aid in areas where aid workers’ lives are in jeopardy. Delivering humanitarian assistance is thus often left to military groups that may not have the primary objective of providing effective and impartial aid to civilians in need. This situation can sometimes complicate efforts to reach those in need.

The case of Somalia is illustrative of the failures of the humanitarian assistance system. In 1991, a full-scale civil war and widespread famine erupted in Somalia. As a result, the UN deployed the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to broker a ceasefire and provide immediate aid to Somali civilians. However, factions began to target the distribution of aid in order to undermine their opponent’s ability to sustain warfare. UNOSOM I, unable to quell violence and protect the delivery of aid, was replaced with UNOSOM II, led by the United States Army (USA). Although initially successful in delivering aid, the USA was unable to remain neutral and supported certain factions in the war. NGOs working under the protection of the army were more effective at negotiating safe delivery of aid in civilian areas. After a fatal attack against US forces in Mogadishu, the USA withdrew its troops from Somalia, which compelled many humanitarian organizations to do the same. The lessons drawn from Somalia are significant: humanitarian aid cannot be

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118 Ibid.
121 Ibid., 153.
122 Ibid., 164.
125 Ibid., 160.
126 Bolton, 65.
safely delivered in high-intensity conflict zones without protection; however, without impartiality, military organizations are not well-suited for provided aid to the most vulnerable victims of conflict.

The negative effects of the humanitarian system are also evident in recent cases, such as South Sudan. In the 2012 UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the roles of civilian and military actors were not clearly outlined, causing confusion and overlap of tasks. The military troops assigned were expected to carry out their tasks related to humanitarian assistance in addition to carrying out tasks related to the mission in general, resulting in competing priorities and stretched capacities. Civilian actors were vulnerable to attacks because they were unable to rely on the protection of their military counterparts. In a report on South Sudan, the European Commission recognizes forty-one non-combatant fatalities since the beginning of the conflict. The European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Unit (ECHO) notes that the lack of access continues to be a major obstacle in South Sudan. Most of ECHO’s partners located in the eastern states of South Sudan were closed down by authorities, leaving very limited coverage for humanitarian aid in the conflict zones. As a result, ECHO and other partners have shifted their focus to the Darfur region where they are able to reach people in need, leaving high-intensity conflict zones devoid of support.

Therefore, as the need for humanitarian assistance in conflict zones is increasing, Canada has the capability to create a solution to these challenging crisis situations. One possible solution is the creation of a force composed of civilian and military actors, designed specifically to deliver humanitarian assistance in conflict zones, who also maintain robust capabilities to protect themselves from danger. A proposed Canadian Humanitarian Assistance Team (CHAT) would partly solve the problem of delivering inadequate humanitarian assistance in conflict zones by bringing together civilian humanitarian experts with military protection forces in one dedicated unit to fill this critical gap in UN peace operations.

The vision for CHAT builds upon Canada’s successful experiences with the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). The Canadian government traditionally supported humanitarian action in the form of financial support. However, in 1994, the Canadian government recognized the need to improve the delivery of urgent humanitarian aid by establishing DART. DART currently works as a disaster relief unit responding to emergencies such as hurricanes, typhoons, and earthquakes. DART is equipped to conduct emergency relief operations for up to forty days until national and international

128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
131 “South Sudan,” European Commission.
agencies are in a position to provide long-term assistance.\textsuperscript{133} Although the initiation of a DART mission is often at the request of the UN, operational and administrative oversight is done by the Canadian military, making DART outside the UN framework.\textsuperscript{134} While DART deployments have always included sizable units of combat troops for force protection purposes, DART’s mandate does not include delivering aid in high-intensity conflict zones. “DART deploys to “permissive environments at the request of an affected nation – that is, only to regions where the government supports its presence and where it will not face organized or armed resistance to its operations.”\textsuperscript{135} We propose to build on DART’s successes in natural disaster contexts by forming a more robust and diverse CHAT force that will be able to operate in higher risk environments to deliver a wide range of humanitarian capabilities, such as addressing issues like sexual violence, displacement, reunification of families, and child safety.

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.

Recommendations

The Canadian Humanitarian Assistance Team would be assembled to tackle the problem of delivering aid to high-intensity conflict zones. CHAT would be an integrated task force of civilian and military personnel situated within the Canadian organization Stability and Reconstruction Task Force (START). Similar to the deployment time of DART, CHAT would be promptly deployed to active conflict zones before most bilateral organizations or humanitarian aid NGOs reach the crisis zone. While maintaining a sufficient force protection component, CHAT would be focused to have humanitarian assistance capabilities as its core function. Like DART, CHAT would also distribute the kind of aid that DART delivers in disaster zones, such as basic medical treatment, food and water delivery, and engineering support; however, CHAT would seek to satisfy a broader range of humanitarian needs. START’s humanitarian branch would be tasked with supporting CHAT’s aid programming.\textsuperscript{136} Further, the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) would provide CHAT with the necessary funding to support its missions. According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, from 2008-2013, the government of Canada contributed $286,676,510 to GPSF alone.\textsuperscript{137} While it is unclear in more recent years how much the government of Canada has allocated to GPSF, START and GPSF have worked as effective mechanisms to provide aid in the past. As such, we expect such mechanisms could also effectively support CHAT. CHAT would be composed of both military and civilian personnel. Similar to the launch process for DART, CHAT will draw its personnel

\textsuperscript{136} See Appendix A.
from a list of standby members who volunteer to be part of the unit. Individuals on this list should have experience in an applicable field, such as medicine, dentistry, engineering, psychology, or languages. The hope is that CHAT would thus draw personnel from various relevant and experienced Canadian NGOs and humanitarian organizations. For example, Médecins Sans Frontières Canada and the Royal Canadian Dental Corps could provide CHAT with medical personnel, including physicians, mental health experts, and dental practitioners. Similarly, Engineers Without Borders Canada could offer engineers, while Oxfam Canada could provide water and sanitation experts. A standard of training would be applied to all personnel in CHAT, including cultural sensitivity, basic medical aid, food and water delivery, psychological understanding, protection, and basic engineering capabilities. These basic qualifications would support a successful immediate response to conflict zones where conventional UN or NGO administered relief is unable to intercede. Civilian volunteers might be induced to join CHAT by the creation of temporary contract positions similar to rotational tours in MSF. This would give potential employees flexibility in the duration of their employment and allow workers to choose when to join CHAT. Additionally, because CHAT would be situated within START, a federal government operative, CHAT employees should be issued the same benefit plans and competitive compensations as other government employees.

Canada currently has the capacity to create a force like CHAT, and could build on our peace operations’ training capabilities to enhance the capacities of civilian volunteers in CHAT. There are several institutions that provide training for Canadian peacekeepers, including the Royal Military College, the Canadian Army Command and Staff College, the Canadian Forces College, the Royal Military College Saint-Jean, and the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC). Particularly, the PSTC offers the ‘Peace Support Operator Course’, which is designed to train Canadian military and civilian personnel enlisted in the UN’s International Standby List. The course trains participants on “specifics of language, culture, and belligerent parties” on the basics of traditional peacekeeping skills such as “observing, reporting, manning observation posts, patrolling, negotiating” as well as on “mine awareness, first aid and ethics.” Similarly, other courses provided by PSTC such as ‘Psychological Operations’, ‘Civil Military Transition Team’, and especially the ‘Peace Support Operator Course’ can provide CHAT with the basic training required for immediate deployment. These courses and

142 Ibid., 24.
143 Ibid.
programs could serve as the foundation for more specified courses in humanitarian assistance operations that could be developed in the future.

Canada also possesses the administrative framework to support the establishment of CHAT. START acts as the Federal Government’s mechanism to contribute to humanitarian emergencies worldwide. We foresee START as an effective administrative structure to house CHAT. More specifically, CHAT would be included within START’s Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response Division in the Complex Emergencies Unit, which is responsible for coordinating Canadian and international responses to crises caused by complex emergencies. 145 Additionally, START has existing relationships with key bodies such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination, and the On Site Operations Coordination Center, which would facilitate CHAT’s ability to work within the UN system. 146 START’s experience coordinating and liaising between civilian, military, and international actors could ensure the smooth functioning of a hybrid force such as CHAT, and eliminate the need to create a new administrative body to manage the team. 147 Ultimately, by creating a hybrid force such as CHAT, Canada would play an important role in bridging the existing gaps currently handicapping one of the most crucial components of peace operations.

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146 Ibid.
SECTION TWO
How Canada Can Contribute to Robust Peacekeeping and Stabilization Operations

The Evolution of Peace Operations
Implications for the Security of UN Peacekeepers
Existing Gaps in Peace Enforcement
Canada’s Capabilities to Address Gaps in Peace Enforcement
Gender and Peace Enforcement
Financial Constraints on Canadian Troop Contribution
The Evolution of Peace Operations

When the UN created the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) on the basis of Lester B. Pearson’s proposal, the organization moved into uncharted territory. No precedent or established rules existed for such an intervention. The mission principles set out for UNEF shaped the future of UN peace operations — at least within the Cold War context from which they developed. The three guiding principles of UNEF and subsequent peace operations were the consent of all parties, impartiality, and the use of force for self-defense. Missions that abided by these rules are considered ‘traditional peacekeeping’ operations, and their primary duties include supervising ceasefires, monitoring post-conflict situations, and patrolling borders. These principles laid the foundation for a number of successful missions, and remained the dominant guidelines for peace operations for more than 30 years.

Up until the 1990s, most UN missions had been deployed to intervene or assist in interstate conflicts. However, with the end of the Cold War, intrastate conflicts predominate. Unfortunately, the UN’s forays into active intrastate conflicts, especially those that blurred the principles of consent, revealed some of the shortcomings of the traditional peacekeeping approach. The most notorious examples of such failures were the UN peace operations conducted in Bosnia and Rwanda, which failed to prevent mass genocide. Both of these missions were limited by a mandate that only permitted the use of force in ‘self-defense’, placing peacekeepers in a position where they were incapable of protecting civilians from violence.

In light of the public failures in Bosnia and Rwanda, the UN began to reconsider the validity of the principles that had guided peacekeeping missions since their inception. The most pressing concern was peacekeepers’ inability to prevent atrocities from being committed in their presence. In response, the UN relaxed their restrictions on the use of force to allow for the protection of civilians. These relaxed standards were codified in mandates that authorized the use of force to protect

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civilians under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As the United Nations progressed into the twenty-first century, these human-centric mandates became increasingly important features of peace operations.

The UN’s endorsement of the use of force to protect civilians, and its subsequent adoption of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine, seemed to gradually normalize the use of force in peace operations. In 2009, the UN’s New Horizon Report indicated a move towards using force by attempting to formalize the role of “robust” peacekeeping. Robust peacekeeping refers to the defense of the mandate through the “use of force at the tactical level with the consent of the host authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict”.155 By exploring the proper application of the traditional “defense of the mandate” clause, the report acknowledged the potential for peace operations to use force in ways that did not merely protect civilians or themselves.156 The report signaled the readiness to use force in new ways to ensure compliance with agreed upon mandates.

This shift towards a greater inclination to use force has been illustrated in the cases of three “stabilization” missions in Mali, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.157 These types of missions are particularly reliant on force to achieve the mandate. They also may violate the traditional peacekeeping principles of impartiality and consent of main parties to the conflict. Stabilization missions seek to restore “state authority”, which make them inherently partial to the state and unlikely to seek or receive the consent of non-state actors.158 In addition, the concept of stabilization implies that the mission is, by definition, deployed to active conflicts.159 Therefore, stabilization mandates effectively situate peace operations as partial actors in active conflicts.

The escalation of force involved in stabilization missions illustrates the growing proclivity towards the increased use of force in peace operations. Three of the six peace operations deployed since 2010 - and the two most recent operations - have been stabilization missions.160 By contrast, the only traditional peacekeeping operation to deploy since 2010 was the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS).161 However, after only four months peacekeepers were forced to withdraw from Syria when the existing ceasefire was violated, and warfare resumed.162 While this is far from concrete

162 Ibid.
evidence that more robust missions will dominate in the future, it seems that this will be the case.

However, disagreement remains over whether this is the direction that UN peace operations should take. In fact, even the recent 2015 HIPPO Report does not take a clear position on the use of stabilization missions. First, it states that the UN may not be properly suited for the robust tasks and complex environments and that ‘coalitions of the willing’ or regional organizations should be responsible for such armed interventions. However, it also recognizes that UN peace operations have the potential to be successful when they are deployed to active conflicts and forced to play a “conflict management” role. Therefore, the HIPPO Report’s assessment of stabilization missions does not give an explicit recommendation on the future of these robust missions. It does, however, give the impression that the UN may want to avoid these types of missions in the future.

While the recommendations made by the HIPPO report could be seen as an indication that stabilization missions will not be used in the future, the Security Council ultimately shapes the future direction of peace operations and the use of force. In its response to the HIPPO Report, the Security Council failed to acknowledge the Panel’s criticism of stabilization, and reiterated that the mandates they authorize are consistent with the core principles of peace operations. Furthermore, they gave no indication that they plan to scale back the existing stabilization missions. Instead, they renewed the mandate for the United Nations MINUSMA and reiterated their support for the mission’s efforts to restore stability. As a result, there appears to be a strong trend towards using stabilization mandates, and greater levels of force. In light of the shift towards peace operations that require greater force in more hostile environments, Canada’s re-engagement with UN peace operations should address the challenges that accompany these types of missions.

Implications for the Security of UN Peacekeepers

The growing tendency to intervene in active conflicts and use greater levels of force has created a host of new security challenges for peacekeepers. Chief among these challenges is an increased risk of attack on peacekeepers as they become active participants in conflict rather than mere bystanders. Stabilization missions not only involve the deployment of troops to active conflicts, but also their insertion into the conflict as actors that may be partial to...
one side. These two factors - combined with the increased use of force – have increased the chances that parties to the conflict will consider peacekeepers as enemies or as opposition forces. As one UN official stated, the UN has gone “from the crossfire to the crosshairs.”

The inherent risks associated with more robust peacekeeping in more dangerous environments are significant in their own right, but the risk of attack has proven to be substantially greater when violent extremist groups are involved in a conflict. MINUSMA is currently facing several violent extremist groups as they attempt to stabilize population centers within Mali. They have consequently been the targets of far more attacks than past or current operations. Despite being deployed for less than three years, MINUSMA has incurred fifty-six peacekeeper casualties. This figure matches the casualty numbers of MONUSCO, which has been deployed for nearly twice as long. It is worth considering that the threat of violent extremist groups will continue to challenge peace operations in the future, given the nature of the active conflicts in parts of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

Recent statistics on the threats to UN peacekeepers show that UN peace operations have become substantially more dangerous in the past few years. In 2013, 2014 and 2015, the numbers of fatalities caused by hostile incidents were the fifth, fourth, and sixth highest totals in the history of peace operations. On average, thirty-six troops were killed during each of those three years, compared to the average of fifteen per year between 1995 and 2012. This rise in fatalities was, unsurprisingly, also accompanied by a substantial increase in the perceived danger of peace operations. Between 2011 and 2014, the number of missions considered substantially dangerous rose from 25 percent to 42 percent. Clearly, recent experience suggests that peacekeepers are coming under greater threat of attack.

The UN acknowledged the increasing threat posed to peacekeepers on several occasions. In 2014, the UN’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping commissioned the Secretary-General to conduct a thorough assessment of the rise in attacks against peacekeepers. This assessment corroborated

172 Ibid.
the claim that peacekeepers were facing increased threats and stated that the UN should ensure the
security of its personnel.174 More recently, the HIPPO Report referred to the increased “scale” of threats
facing peacekeepers today.175 While these are far from specific descriptions of the problem and its
causes, they do recognize that peacekeepers have recently been confronted with increased levels of
risk in peace operations. The UN’s member states have also stressed the need to address the emerging
security threats faced by peacekeepers multiple times in recent years. The UN’s Special Committee on
Peacekeeping has been particularly critical of the attacks on peacekeepers. In 2014, they stressed that
these attacks pose “a major challenge” for peace operations, and asked the UN to take all necessary
measures to limit the risk of future attacks.176 That same year, the Secretary-General echoed their
concerns when he noted that the increase in attacks against peacekeepers was “a matter of grave
concern.”177 Such strong rhetoric has been present throughout UN discussions of peacekeeping in the
last several years, and indicates that the UN is searching for new ways to address these security threats.

Evidence from the field indicates that the threats that peacekeepers face today rarely come
in the form of direct combat. Instead, armed spoilers, particularly violent extremist groups, have
relied on the use of “asymmetric” warfare.178 Asymmetric warfare involves the use of guerrilla or
insurgent tactics to systematically attack the vulnerabilities of an opponent in an attempt to break
their will to fight.179 The asymmetric threats employed against peacekeepers often come in the
form of surprise physical attacks or abductions. More recently, improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
have also become a significant threat to peacekeepers.180 The HIPPO Report and the Secretary-
General’s related Implementation Report also identify asymmetric threats as the main danger to
peacekeepers. The HIPPO Report refers to convoy security, counter-IED, and counter-ambush tactics
as a “new basics” of modern peacekeeping.181 In addition, various field reports detailing these threats
provide abundant evidence that asymmetric threats are the primary security issue for peacekeepers.

A review of attacks against UN peacekeepers over the past several years further reveals how

174 Ibid.
175 Ban Ki-moon, “Report of the Secretary-General on The Future of United Nations Peace Operations:
implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations,” (pre-
176 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations,
177 Ibid., 9.
Defense University Press, 2001), 75.
179 Ibid.
180 Lisa Sharland, “Counter-IED Technology in UN Peacekeeping: Expanding Capability and Mitigating
asymmetric tactics have become the main source for peacekeeper casualties. According to a small sample of fatal attacks on UN personnel in 2015, these emerging threats were responsible for a large proportion of peacekeeping fatalities. Convoy attacks were responsible for seven fatalities in missions in Mali and the Central African Republic, including an incident where six peacekeepers were killed and five more were injured.182 Ambushes were responsible for five fatalities in missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Darfur region of Sudan.183 Ambushes, convoy attacks, and IEDs were responsible for thirteen of the eighteen peacekeeper fatalities listed in the incident reports.184 These reports are a random sampling of fatal attacks across a variety of missions released by the UN’s Staff Union, and demonstrate that asymmetric threats make up a large percentage of the attacks against peacekeepers.

There is a growing recognition that a hostile security environment has many serious negative implications for UN peace operations. One of the most obvious impacts of an unstable security environment is when forces experience “bunkerization”. Bunkerization is the process by which heavily threatened mission groups entrench themselves within their base to avoid the risk of heightened security threats.185 While these heightened force protection measures are effective in protecting peacekeepers, they limit the effectiveness of the mission. First, bunkerization restricts the ability of a peace operation to carry out its mandate in key conflict areas. Mission personnel are increasingly insulated from dangerous situations, and often forfeit their ability to intervene in high-risk areas. The recent actions of UNDOF illustrate this issue. UNDOF was mandated to maintain peace and order on both the Israeli and Syrian side of the Golan Heights. However, encroaching violence from the Syrian civil war forced them to abandon their post, and effectively, their mandate.186 The second consequence of bunkerization is that it limits engagement with the local population. Overly enhanced security measures limit interaction between UN forces, conflict actors, and civilians, alienating the population from the security forces.187 These measures include the use of unmanned technology or private security contractors, which impinges on the mission’s ability to gather intelligence or build relationships with local actors.188 Considering that peace operations rely heavily on forging positive relationships with local actors and maintaining legitimacy among the population, such a lack of engagement can seriously impact the effectiveness of a mission. For these two reasons, security threats

183 Ibid.
184 Ibid.
185 Artinano, Mauricio, et al., Adapting and Evolving: The Implications of Transnational Terrorism for UN Field Missions (Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2014), 20.
187 This alienation may cause non-combatants to sympathize with, and, in some cases join or actively support insurgent groups.
are beginning to limit the effectiveness of interventions as a whole. Without a suitable alternative for force protection, bunkerization will continue, and peace operations will remain limited in their ability to perform necessary tasks in hostile environments.  


190 Karlsrud, “The UN at War”, 45.

191 Ibid., 46.

192 Andersson and Weigand, “Intervention at Risk,” 531.

193 Ibid., 530.

194 Ibid., 529.
Existing Gaps in Peace Enforcement

"Whether providing basic or advanced levels of training or high level operational mentoring, military training assistance is a role at which the CF excels."  

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Mike Jeffery  
Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute

The UN and external bodies have made recommendations on how to remedy these new security challenges. Several recent statements from the UN suggest the need to enhance training and preparation of peacekeepers in order to perform in non-permissive environments. For example, the HIPPO Report’s identification of convoy security, counter-IED and counter-ambush tactics as the “new basics” of peacekeeping training is a clear indication that peacekeepers should be given specific training to address potential security threats. The member states themselves have also identified a need to prepare for non-permissive environments. Both the 2013 and 2014 reports by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping called for improved preparation for safety and security challenges. Several scholars have also elaborated on the value of training for potential security threats in UN peace operations. In his article, “Enhancing Peace Operations’ Capacity to Face Threats Against Peacekeepers,” author William R Phillips demonstrates how pre-deployment training is particularly useful at mitigating the personal risks faced by peacekeepers following deployment. Another report by the International Peace Institute suggests that specific security training is especially important for asymmetric threats. In all, there is considerable agreement among scholars and UN stakeholders that improved training reduces peacekeepers’ vulnerability to contemporary security threats. Nevertheless, none of these sources recommend any concrete and tangible initiatives to improve force protection and security training for peacekeepers.

Despite widespread recognition of the importance of training for enhanced security challenges, current training regimes for peacekeepers rarely address these threats. While the majority of troop-contributing countries do already have peace operation training programs, many do not have the capacity to train peacekeepers to face the new security threats of modern peace operations. Those countries that contribute the most troops have little experience dealing with these types of threats themselves, and thus focus training on more traditional peacekeeping skills. For example, a review

200 Ibid., 19.
of the courses offered by several prominent peace operations training centers reveals that there are a number of courses tailored to standard peace operation activities, such as the protection of civilians or civil-military coordination. Yet hardly any of these programs address force protection or asymmetric threats. As UN peace operations deploy to more hostile environments, it is clear that many troop-contributing countries are not equipped to educate peacekeepers about the security threats these missions face. As a result, peacekeepers typically deploy with little knowledge of how to protect themselves from contemporary threats.

Canada’s Capabilities to Address Gaps in Peace Enforcement

The Canadian Armed Forces are well-suited to help troop-contributing countries develop that capacity to respond to these contemporary challenges for two reasons. First, Canada has recently developed substantial expertise in protecting against the types of asymmetric threats that peacekeepers now face. Not only did the CAF gain firsthand experience addressing these threats in Afghanistan, but their involvement in that mission also facilitated a shift to include more training related to operating in harsh, asymmetric combat environments. Second, Canada has extensive experience training foreign militaries. This includes a long history of training for peace support operations, and recent involvement in a highly successful campaign to train the Afghan defense forces. As a result, Canada has the expertise and experience to train peacekeepers for the security challenges that they will face in modern peace operations.

From 2001 until 2014, Canada was a significant contributor to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The Canadian Armed Forces’ recent experience, including experience in combat, counterinsurgency, and countering asymmetric threats in Afghanistan, offers a variety of lessons that can be incorporated into current and future peace operations. The group that posed the greatest threat to ISAF was the Taliban, and the majority of operations conducted by the CAF in Afghanistan were an attempt to disrupt the ongoing Taliban insurgency. The Taliban relies primarily on guerilla warfare and insurgent tactics. When engaging in combat, they avoid direct confrontations in favour of quick asymmetrical attacks that surprise their enemy. These attacks often come in the form of ambushes, IEDs, and coordinated attacks on convoys - the same threats that endanger peacekeepers in modern peace operations. The military experience in Afghanistan has thus provided the CAF with extensive experience in responding to asymmetrical threats.

201 See Appendix B.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
Over the course of their time in Afghanistan, the CAF demonstrated a strong ability to adapt to changing security environments and threats over time and within changing areas of operation. For example, training, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and immediate action drills (IAs) were constantly being adapted or adjusted in response to changing operating environments and new threats. The CAF has proven effective at both implementing these changes themselves, as well as sharing them with local security forces. In addition to this field level experience and mentorship, the Canadian Armed Forces can offer lessons focused more on developing systemic and doctrinal aspects of military institutions. These can come from organizations like the Canadian ‘Army Lessons Learned Center’, which is designed to collect, analyze, and communicate key operational lessons from both Canadian and allied deployments. Observations and ‘Lessons Learned’ can then be translated into new TTPs and IAs in order to better prepare soldiers for deployment in changing environments, ultimately enabling peacekeepers to better protect themselves in the field. By reducing casualties and giving soldiers improved tools to protect themselves, problems such as ‘bunkerization’ will be less pronounced. To this end, utilizing and leveraging the CAF’s ability to adapt to dynamic threats will allow peacekeepers to better conduct operations in support of their mandates and contribute to more effective operations.

One example of adaptability within the Canadian Armed Forces was the development and effective implementation of counter-IED TTPs and IAs. As noted above, the training regimes of the countries currently contributing the most UN troops do not include extensive counter-IED or force protection training. ISAF, under the auspice of NATO, developed an effective counter-IED action plan that can be adapted for deploying peacekeepers. This plan consists of a three-step strategy: defeating the device, attacking the network, and preparing the force. Canada contributed to the development of this policy and has experience in implementing and teaching this program to its own forces as well as those of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Examples like this demonstrate the potential training value the CAF can bring to peace operations as a result of its experience in the hostile Afghan environment.

One result of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan was a shift in Canada’s defense strategy, to incorporate counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies. In order to ensure that Canada’s troops were properly equipped to carry out these operations, the CAF

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205 The Army Lessons Learned Center Offers detailed analyses of lessons that are compiled and disseminated as ‘dispatches’ and have addressed many issues and threats in the past such as: CIED, negotiations during peace operations, human intelligence during peace support operations, leadership in mixed gender environments; “Army Lessons Learned Centre,” Canadian Army, accessed March 23, 2016, http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/lessons-learned-centre/lessons-learned-index.page.


adjusted its training materials to better reflect the demands of these kinds of missions.\textsuperscript{208} This adjustment gave a greater number of Canadian troops more relevant skills, and ensured that Canada developed extensive training material on the subject. This is noteworthy, because those demands included some of the same threats that peacekeepers must prepare for today.\textsuperscript{209}

An example of the CAF’s ability to refocus its training towards counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is evident in the extensive revisions made to courses offered at the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in Kingston. Originally designed to expand peace operation training for Canadian Armed Forces, the focus of training shifted after Canada became heavily involved in the ISAF mission.\textsuperscript{210} The most telling indicator of this shift was the substantial changes made to the Centre’s flagship course, the Basic Peace Operations course. Initially, the course was meant to provide the necessary training for deployment to peace operations, but it was renamed and reformed in 2008. After 2008, it became the Individual Pre-Deployment Training Course, focusing heavily on ensuring that Canadian troops were prepared for battle.\textsuperscript{211} While this shift may limit Canada’s ability to deploy large contingents of personnel to peace operations, it actually bolsters Canada’s credentials in the context of addressing new security challenges in those operations.

Canada’s experience training foreign militaries should also guide Canada’s re-engagement with UN Peace Operations. Canada has an extensive history of providing pre-deployment training through the Military Training Cooperation Program (MTCP), which trains foreign militaries abroad and in Canada. Its current activities stretch across Latin America,\textsuperscript{212} Africa,\textsuperscript{213} and the Asia-Pacific Region,\textsuperscript{214} and over 70 countries are members of the program.\textsuperscript{215} The MTCP is particularly valuable because many of its current initiatives focus on providing training for peace operations. Key troop-contributing countries such as Bangladesh and Nepal are already members of the MTCP, and the program has partnered

\textsuperscript{208} Dorn, A. Walter, and Joshua Libben, \textit{Unprepared for Peace: The Decline of Canadian Peacekeeping Training (and What to Do About It)} (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and Rideau Institute on International Affairs, 2016), 23.
\textsuperscript{209} Recent reports indicate that there is some belief CAF training has become inadequate for peacekeeping operations and has reoriented for combat. This reporting is incorrect, the CAF has added higher level training to reflect the current threat environments—just as peacekeeping has evolved, so has CAF training.
\textsuperscript{210} Dorn, \textit{Unprepared for Peace}, 23.
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{215} Dorn, \textit{Unprepared for Peace}, 28.
with peace support training institutions. One partnership worth noting is Canada’s relationship with Indonesia. The MTCP named Indonesia training a “centre of excellence”, and has provided training to military personnel through courses and workshops throughout Indonesia. Considering the high concentration of troop-contributing countries in South Asia, this established connection allows Canada to make peace operations training accessible for some of the UN’s key contributors. The MTCP also has similar connections in Africa and Latin America. As a whole, the activities of the MTCP provide an excellent framework for the delivery of future training for UN peace operations.

Canada’s foreign military training experience during the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan also provides valuable experience for training foreign troops for UN Peace Operations. The mission’s focus was the development and training of Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), which are composed of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Canada was a significant contributor to the training mission with a number of Canadian instructors filling placements throughout Afghan military and police institutions. In total, the Canadian military trained approximately fifty thousand Afghan Army volunteers.

One particularly interesting element of NATO’s training in Afghanistan was the use of embedded training. In the field, each of the 109 Afghan battalions was accompanied by an Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT), which were composed of twenty to twenty-five personnel. Canada was one of the key contributors to the embedded training strategy, contributing the third largest number of OMLTs. In terms of objectives, the training focused broadly on the development and improvement of the ANA, but also focused specifically on advising Afghan troops on how to ensure their security in a hostile environment. This aspect of the training included a focus on how to address common threats such as IEDs and enemy attacks, and offered a more interactive method for enhancing force protection in the Afghan army.

The success of NATO’s training mission in Afghanistan is further evidence that Canada is capable of mentoring and training soldiers to operate in the types of hostile environments UN peace missions increasingly encounter. Despite some initial setbacks and continuing difficulties, the NATO training mission was able to significantly improve the quality of the Afghan forces. In 2013, one year before the training mission was scheduled to withdraw, the ANSF were conducting more than 85% of

216 “Canada’s Defence Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region,” National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces.
217 Ibid.
221 Ibid., 34.
the missions within Afghanistan.\footnote{Department of Defence, \textit{Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan} (Washington, DC: United States of America, 2013), 49.} One of the more relevant successes of the training mission is the counter-IED proficiency that Afghan forces have developed. Despite inferior capabilities, Afghan forces were reported to have higher “found and cleared” IED rates than ISAF forces.\footnote{Ibid., 102.} In addition, Afghan forces had considerable success holding dangerous outposts that had previously been inaccessible.\footnote{Ibid.} While this mission was largely US-directed and staffed, Canada was a key contributor.\footnote{“Fact Sheet: NATO’s Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs),” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 2010, accessed March 23, 2016, \url{http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf-f_2010_06/20110310_100610-media-backgrounder-OMLT.pdf}.} These successes demonstrate Canada’s ability to effectively train foreign military forces to operate in hostile environments with asymmetric threats; skills particularly relevant to modern UN peace operations.

Canada is ready to continue in its role as an in-mission military trainer. The Canadian Armed Forces are currently increasing the size of their training force in Iraq, and also maintain a training mission in Ukraine. These current operations indicate that future Canadian participation in UN peace operations can utilize the training experience of Afghanistan to maximize Canada’s contribution to international operations. OMLT training techniques are especially effective in contemporary counter-insurgency environments, and the CAF has shown its capacity to employ these methods.

### Gender and Peace Enforcement

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 renewed the UN’s commitments to women and acknowledged that gender mainstreaming is not just desired, but essential, for training in peace operations. There are unique challenges to incorporating gendered perspectives into military and police forces in peace operations. In most societies, the use of force has long been associated with the concept of masculinity.\footnote{Annica Kronsell, \textit{Gender, Sex and the Postnational Defense: Militarism and Peacekeeping} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 111.} Incorporating qualified women into the peace enforcement process and adequately training all peace enforcement personnel on the importance of gender equality should be a top priority for Canada’s re-engagement in UN peace operations.

C-NAP creates a government framework to support Canadian and UN implementation of these resolutions. The Canadian government has also developed gender-training packages to train peace operations personnel on gender dimensions in peace operations.\footnote{Patricia Fortier, “The Evolution of Peacekeeping,” in \textit{Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace}, Rob McRae and Don Hubert, eds. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 52.} Even with these changes and an increase in female peacekeepers, a gap still remains between the ambition of Canada’s...
commitments to UNSC Resolution 1325, its National Action Plan, and the country’s domestic reality. A lack of available research and data on the implementation and effectiveness of these plans and programs makes it difficult to determine the long-term impact of gender mainstreaming. Increases in female participation in peace operations seem unlikely to happen organically at the rate needed to address this issue.\textsuperscript{228} If peacekeeping missions are to respond effectively to the needs of the local populations, women’s engagement and consultation must be prioritized in the very design of a mission right through to its completion. A significant step towards implementation was taken in January 2016 with the release of the Chief of Defence Staff Directive (CDS Directive) for integrating UNSC Resolution 1325 and related resolutions into CAF Planning and Operations. The CDS Directive recommends policies to integrate the requirements of the C-NAP, UNSC Resolution 1325, and its related resolutions into the CAF by creating Gender Advisors, Gender Advisory Teams, and specific training modules aimed at integrating gender perspectives into all CAF actions.\textsuperscript{229}

The Trudeau government has already confirmed its commitment to gender equality in leadership, shown by the creation of Canada’s first gender-balanced Cabinet in 2015. Canada’s commitment to the ideals expressed in UNSC Resolution 1325 is further buttressed by the adoption of the January 2016 CDS Directive. This precedent provides an opportunity for Canada to become a global leader of gender-balanced peacekeeping and provides a benchmark for other troop contributing countries to work towards. With this goal, missions will signal from the start a commitment to and respect for women’s physical integrity, a prioritization of women’s security, and an investment in women led recovery.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{228} Coomaraswamy, 5. \\
Recommendations

Canada’s re-engagement with UN peace operations should focus on training troop contributions from member states to meet the contemporary challenges of UN deployment - operating effectively in dangerous environments in a manner sensitive to both force protection and gender needs. This report outlines below several specific recommendations for Canadian policy.

Increased Female Involvement in Canadian Peace Enforcement

Gender equality must influence the creation and implementation of peace enforcement missions for both Canada and the UN. Women remain the main victims of war due to sexism, oversight of female needs, and vulnerability to rape. Yet women are still unrepresented in peace operations. Based on UN peace operations in Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador, South Africa, and Namibia, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Gender Issues Adviser concluded that local women were more likely to confide in female peacekeepers, thus improving a mission’s ability to gather valuable intelligence. Peace operations with higher percentages of female personnel are also more likely to be sympathetic to gender sensitivities in the region.

As outlined in the January 2016 CDS Directive, female participation must go beyond its current level to integrate women into all aspects of peace enforcement activities. The January 2016 CDS Directive calls for full implementation of the C-NAP, which recommends the creation of gender based quotas or incentive programs to increase female participation in peace enforcement operations to twenty percent. According to the timeline set out in the January 2016 CDS Directive, this to be completed by December 31, 2016.

Implementing government rosters of female-only personnel would also be a way to ensure that the females chosen for operations are also qualified. While the January 2016 CDS Directive suggests the training and coordination of suitable candidates to fill positions such as gender advisors and other key personnel, the idea of female rosters is not specifically mentioned. The creation of a roster of female-only personnel could increase the ease with which qualified females are considered and selected for qualified roles.

231 Ibid., 53.
Gender Mainstreaming in Canadian Peace Enforcement Training

Gender equality must be a top priority in the training of Canadian peace enforcement personnel, especially if Canada is to become a leader in training foreign security forces. In order for Canada to provide the best training possible, this must involve instruction on women’s rights and the experience of women during conflict. The January 2016 CDS Directive recognizes this need and provides sound suggestions to ensure this training is carried out, including the creation of gender advisors (GENAD) and gender advisory teams. This is a commendable step in ensuring that gendered perspectives are incorporated in the training of and by the Canadian Armed Forces.

Training must ensure that the different ways in which conflict impacts males and females are understood and considered when implementing policy during military and peace operations. Bridging the gap between gender mainstreaming policy and implementation has been an issue for Canadian Forces in the past. For instance, in Afghanistan, Canada’s approach to training foreign security personnel on the importance of women’s rights and the effects of conflict on women and girls was perfunctory. In an eight-week period of training of ANSF by Canadian military and police in 2010, there was only a half an hour spent on the topic of women’s rights. Tasking GENADs and their teams with gendered perspectives will impact every aspect of a mission and thus the January 2016 CDS Directive will help to eliminate these discrepancies.

The January 2016 CDS Directive also makes progress in increasing transparency regarding the specific content of training on gender issues received by the CAF. Public access to online training modules is noted in the directive and included on Canadian government websites. However, the January 2016 CDS Directive only highlights training packages and online distance courses on gender training. While this is beneficial, training must move beyond general reading materials and online quizzes to interactive and mission specific gender training as well. This will provide peace enforcers not only with a solid background understanding of gender issues, but also with the tools to apply gendered perspectives to the unique situations of each mission. This comprehensive approach to gender perspectives in training will ensure Canada is appropriately qualified to train foreign security forces on the same issues.

An additional solution for the government is to adopt the recommendations of the November 2010 report from the Canadian Standing Senate Committee of Human Rights High Level Panel. The recommendations specifically call for the Canadian government to prioritize the inclusion of women automatically in every situation it participates in, including peace enforcement. The report provided two recommendations that can help prioritize gender

235 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
239 Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights, Women, Peace and Security: Canada Moves forward to Increase Women’s Engagement, xi.
concerns in future Canadian peace operations:

- The CAF and RCMP should develop time-bound strategies to increase the number of women that can be appointed to high-level leadership positions as part of international security deployments, and for retaining women at these ranks.
- The RCMP should consider forming and deploying an all-female or majority female police unit as part of a UN peace enforcement missions. The Government of Canada should also provide financial assistance to enable other countries with international civilian police capacity to deploy such units.²⁴⁰

Implementing the recommendations included in the January 2016 CDS Directive and the Canadian Standing Senate Committee of Human Rights High Level Panel will ensure gender mainstreaming becomes a priority in the training of Canadian military and police personnel, thereby better equipping us as we train others.

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²⁴⁰ Ibid., xii.

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Pre-Deployment Training

Pre-deployment training is essential in preparing peacekeepers to adequately respond to new and emerging threats. In order to maximize the impact of this initiative, Canada’s force protection training programs should be delivered to countries that contribute significant numbers of troops to peace operations. The training materials should draw upon lessons learned from combat in Afghanistan, established training materials from the CAF, and training materials used with ANSF. Materials should also include training related to gender mainstreaming, as outlined by the January 2016 CDS Directive. To carry out the training, Canada should utilize the existing MTCP model. This would involve “training the trainers” from major troop-contributing countries by inviting them to participate in courses that emphasize force protection and security in the face of asymmetric threats such as ambushes, convoy attacks, or IEDs.²⁴¹ As with the MTCP, these courses would take place in Canada and abroad.²⁴²

Pre-deployment force protection training programs are an ideal way for Canada to re-engage and improve UN peace operations without placing undue strain on Canadian resources. The training programs are a relatively cost-effective measure because Canada already has the relevant capabilities and institutions in place. First, Canada already possesses the expertise to offer improved force protection training. The Canadian Armed Forces’ experience training foreign militaries is extensive and the lessons learned in Afghanistan are crucially important for force protection training. Second, Canada has already established military training partnerships with a number of significant troop contributors, including four of the top five current contributors.²⁴³ These relationships should make countries more receptive to Canada’s involvement in force protection training.

²⁴² Ibid., 65.
²⁴³ Canada has established partnerships with Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and Nepal.
Third, Canada has recently made a substantial commitment to enhance peacekeeper training programs. Considering that peace operations programs are listed as a new priority for Global Affairs’ International Security and Threat Reduction program, the partnership should free up additional funding for the force protection training initiative. The Department of National Defense revealed that they will work closely with Global Affairs Canada to take the lead in training peacekeepers for UN peace operations. Fourth, and most importantly, Canada already delivers pre-deployment training to more than sixty countries through the MTCP. As a result, Canada already allocates fifteen million dollars per year to foreign military training and partially refocusing these funds on force protection training should help cover the costs. Given these four existing strengths, Canada is positioned to be a trusted force protection trainer for many countries without taking on undue costs.

In-Mission Training

To enhance force protection training efforts, Canada should consider deploying small contingents of qualified troops to perform an embedded, in-mission training role with foreign battalions in UN peace operations. Canada’s legacy in Afghanistan is largely defined by its contribution to the embedded training teams that deployed with Afghan battalions, which helped them develop their capacity to carry out independent, self-sustaining operations. The impact that embedded training had on the development of the Afghan Army demonstrates the potential of this approach as a model for training troops within peace operations. Canada’s contribution to embedded training proves that Canada has the capacity and the expertise to offer similar programs in a United Nations setting.

While embedded training in a peace operation is a novel concept, it improves foreign military performance in a unique way. Traditional pre-deployment training is a crucial aspect of skill development as it gives troops the knowledge to perform assigned tasks. Yet embedded training further augments their ability to perform those tasks by learning through experience. These two different methods complement each other because they ensure that troops acquire necessary tactical knowledge while also developing the ability to practically apply what they learned prior to deployment. Both approaches should be employed to maximize the efficacy of Canada’s force protection training program and further reduce the vulnerability of peacekeepers.

246 Dorn, Unprepared for Peace, 28.
Financial Constraints on Canadian Troop Contribution

Considering that Canada has the expertise to address the security threats of modern peace operations, it is worth noting why deploying substantial contingents of Canadian troops to UN Peace Operations is not a promising option. One of the most persuasive reasons is that large deployments may be financially unrealistic.

Given current fiscal and political constraints, it is more financially feasible to focus Canada’s re-engagement with UN peace operations through foreign military training. In recent years, there has been an increase in military budget deficit resulting in less National Air Force training, the early docking and retirement of ships, and delays in multiple procurement programs. Additionally, the escalation of the conflict in Syria and Iraq will further limit the Canadian government’s ability to freely allocate funding to peace operations. Henceforth, more cost effective efforts need to be pursued, such as conducting training for troops in countries that lack the necessary military and peace operation skills. This is highly beneficial due to its cost effectiveness. For example, Canada's total involvement in Afghanistan accumulated an expenditure of eighteen billion dollars, the majority

248 See Appendix C.
going towards military machinery, actively engaged troops, and multilateral military operations. Consequently, over the course of thirteen years, Canada spent an average of 1.4 billion dollars per year on its mission in Afghanistan. During this time, Canada’s military trained approximately fifty thousand Afghan Army volunteers. In 2009, Canada participated in a NATO training mission in Afghanistan under Operation ATTENTION, which ended in 2014. Based on records issued by the Department of National Defence, Operation ATTENTION cost 238,909,000 dollars between 2012 and 2013 and 220,505,000 dollars between 2013 and 2014. According to Canadian Joint Operations Commander Lieutenant-General Stuart Beare, Operation ATTENTION included entry into Afghanistan, training and extraction of troops, and eventually accumulated a cost of just over half a billion dollars from 2009 to 2013. Therefore, training costs from 2012 to 2013 and 2013 to 2014 ranged from 15.75 percent to 17 percent of annual expenditure, respectively. When considering current deficit prioritizing, the funding of training programs in lieu of other military efforts would benefit Canada financially, especially when considering future costs outlined by the incumbent government. The Trudeau government plans to implement a three-year humanitarian and two-year military commitment to combating ISIS, which will incur a minimum of 1.6 billion dollars in spending.

The issue is not whether Canada has the capability of conducting a myriad of military operations, but to reprioritize how best Canada can contribute to the international community. Currently, the military comprises of sixty-eight thousand regular troops and twenty-seven thousand reserve troops, but based on available information an estimated 2,056 personnel are in on-going operations. Therefore, we have an immense surplus of troops available to conduct training. However, with current levels of military spending there is a lack of funding available. Based on our skill capabilities in training and the increased expenditure, it is more feasible to refocus our efforts

on training. In conjunction with Canada’s current training agenda in Iraq, concentrating more on the cost effective training of troops rather than large-scale operations would ease the military and national deficit. Additionally, re-engaging with the UN through a training capacity would increase member countries’ military and peace operation capabilities within a UN and national framework.
SECTION THREE
How Canada can Augment its Current Contributions at the End of Conflict
Origins and Evolution of Peacebuilding at the United Nations
Post-Conflict Peace Operations (PCPO) and the United Nations Today
Post-Conflict Peace Initiatives and Gaps in Post-Conflict Peace Operations
Canadian Contributions to Post-Conflict Peace Operations
Origins and Evolution of Peacebuilding at the United Nations

Origins of Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding was first incorporated under the United Nation’s peace operations framework in 1992 when Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s report “An Agenda for Peace” advocated for the use of peacebuilding to prevent countries from relapsing into conflict. This reflected a broader recognition that traditional peacekeeping operations were becoming less effective in sustaining peace in the extremely fragile aftermath of conflict where violence is likely to reoccur. Adapting to the changing scope of violence, peacebuilding has become an integral part of multidimensional and multifaceted peace operations. In 2005, the UN established the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the UN Peacebuilding Fund and UN Peacebuilding Support Office to facilitate effective peacebuilding measures at the UN level. As one of the first countries to promote the concept of peacebuilding, Canada launched the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative in 1996, and established the Peacebuilding Fund within the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) two years later. In addition to its national peacebuilding initiatives, Canada has proven to be an avid supporter of UN peacebuilding institutions. Indeed, former Assistant Deputy at CIDA, Carolyn McAskie, headed the Peacebuilding Support Office as Assistant Secretary-General from 2006 to 2008 and helped to create the newly formed Peacebuilding Commission of the United Nations. Although peacebuilding did not enter UN parlance until 1992, it is an essential component of UN Peace operations today.

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260 Ibid.
Despite being part of the United Nations for over twenty years, peacebuilding remains under-prioritized and under-resourced. In 2015, the commitment to peacebuilding, including post-conflict peace operations, is waning even further. According to the UN, international stakeholders often turn their attention elsewhere following a ceasefire or peace agreement; however, this is a critical phase when paying attention to post-conflict peace operations is needed the most. Member states must understand that their failure to invest resources in post-conflict peace operations is condemning states to violent relapses of conflict. Efforts to sustain peace following a ceasefire or peace agreement also fail because they do not sufficiently consult local actors or address root causes of conflict. To this end, post-conflict peace operations must focus on addressing root causes and conflict drivers. These operations are also critical for upholding the UN’s charter vision of “saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” After two decades of steady decline, civil conflicts are now on the rise and are more devastating, fragmented, and complicated than ever before. As such, there is an even greater need to focus on the post-conflict recovery phase to avoid horrific relapses of conflict.


According to the UN, initiatives undertaken during post-conflict peace operations fall under the umbrella of “democratic governance”, which includes but is not limited to, security sector reform (SSR), Democratic Institution Building, and protecting Human Rights. SSR encompasses many activities, including training national military forces and police officers, as well as demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration (DDR). The UN currently acknowledges the need to ensure the
participation of women in the discussion and drafting of policies relating to SSR.\textsuperscript{270} Gender-sensitive security sector reform is also critical to enable women to safely re-engage in public spaces.\textsuperscript{271} In addition to its importance in SSR, gender-specific issues such as the protection of women from sexual violence are important areas of focus for UN efforts to protect Human Rights.\textsuperscript{272} Both the UN and the UNDPKO emphasize the protection and promotion of human rights as a core pillar of UN peace operations.\textsuperscript{273} The increasing attention being paid to women is particularly important given that women are explicitly targeted during war and recruited as participants, which requires immediate and extensive support to help these individuals move beyond war-time grievances and trauma.\textsuperscript{274} Ensuring that women participate in post-conflict peace processes is not only a question of fulfilling their rights, but is also vital because failing to include women in these peace processes heightens the dangers of states relapsing into conflict.\textsuperscript{275} Alongside this focus on women, the UN also acknowledges that the rights of men and children are equally important and carry their own challenges.\textsuperscript{276}

**Canadian Contributions to Post-Conflict Peace Operations**

Canada’s extensive involvement in post-conflict peace operations (PCPO) began in the DRC in 1999 and subsequently expanded to Haiti, Kosovo, South Sudan, Afghanistan and Mali. In addition to being a generous financial contributor to PCPO,\textsuperscript{277} Canadian SSR activities have focused on demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration of former combatants and child soldiers, as well as training of national military forces and police officers. Canada maintains a roster of election observers through CANADEM that can be rapidly deployed to post-conflict zones. In addition, Canada has also funded and participated in election observation missions in Afghanistan and Mali and continues to maintain partnerships with international organizations such as the UN, the EU, and the African


\textsuperscript{272} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{274} Ibid., 23.

\textsuperscript{275} The UN report Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 from 2015 goes into depth on the correlation between female’s exclusion from peace processes and conflict; Ibid., 25.

\textsuperscript{276} Youth who are affected by conflict require explicit attention because the lack of educational opportunities and high youth unemployment after conflict can draw youth into anti-social and violent activities. Too often, however, youth are seen as threats or challenges to peace and neglected during peace operations, particularly in the post-conflict stage.

\textsuperscript{277} See Appendix E, Table 1
Pathway to Peace: Canada’s Re-engagement with UN Peace Operations

Union (AU). Canada’s commitment to human rights in post-conflict peace operations was especially noteworthy in Haiti through the successful recruiting of female military and police personnel. Since 2005, the creation of START has enhanced Canada’s participation in post-conflict peace operations.

The creation of START signaled Canada’s intent to assume a leadership role in assisting post-conflict regions regain stability and lasting peace. In a 2005 international policy statement, Canada recognized that “operations to restore order in failed and fragile states have become particularly challenging,” and announced the creation of START and the GPSF to provide extra financial resources. START has also developed partnerships with several Canadian NGOs, and governmental departments to facilitate a “whole-of-government” approach, which consists of deploying the Canadian military in partnership with the Department of National Defense and civilians in partnership with the Canadian Police Arrangement, CANADEM, and the Justice Rapid Response. To fulfill its intended purpose, START operations have focused on Security Sector Reform, election observation, peace agreement monitoring, and more recently, integrating C-NAP initiatives. C-NAP articulates Canada’s support for incorporating gender-focused initiatives and programs into post-conflict peace operations, specifically within SSR and early recovery peace and security initiatives. This declaration of intent, along with our expertise in the areas of SSR and the protection of human rights - areas identified by the UN as priorities in PCPO – makes Canada particularly poised to increase its contributions in the area of post-conflict peace operations.

279 Ibid.
Recommendations

Security Sector Reform

Canada can set an example by following UN recommendations to further commit to police training. The UN High Level Implementation Report notes that while “a credible national police service is important for sustaining peace,” UN police officers are insufficient in numbers, training, and equipment to deliver the police reforms needed as part of SSR. As a result, partnerships with police-contributing countries are needed to undertake the SSR initiatives the UN argues are important to ensuring peace after conflict. The UN also recommends that member states increase their contributions of civilians, including police, to rotations of twelve months to increase the effectiveness of training.

Given Canada’s record of successfully training police officers and correctional officers, we can take the lead by responding to this recommendation without delay. Canadian police officers are sent via the Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA) to fragile and conflict-affected countries to build the capacity of national and local police forces. Canada’s correctional officers have also trained local actors on managing correctional facilities and consistently provide training to local correction officers about adhering to international human rights standards. The Correctional Services of Canada is particularly well-suited to play a consistent and even greater role in SSR in current and future post-conflict peace operations. START has demonstrated its capability, in partnership with the CPA, to provide training in post-conflict affected states. Canada should build on its existing capacity by following the UN report’s recommendation of committing to police training missions of at least twelve months, but no more than twenty-four months to remain within the framework of PCPO.

Canada’s large Francophone population provides another opportunity to respond to UN recommendations relating to PCPO. In a recent meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon recently reaffirmed the necessity of Francophone and bilingual UN peacekeepers and civilians. Post-conflict peace operations are affected by current peace operation personnel’s inability to communicate with locals due to language

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284 Ibid., 55; UNSC Resolution 2151 emphasizes SSR activities at the end of a conflict and their importance for facilitating sustainable peace.
287 Danielle Murdoch, “Criminal Justice Reform in Post-Conflict Environments: A Case Study of Corrections Reform in Kosovo,” (PhD diss., Simon Fraser University, 2013), 113; see Table 2 for more information.
differences. Training of locals, for example, is impeded when the trainer does not speak the same language. In Africa, where over 80% of UN peacekeepers are deployed, one of the main languages is French; however, many of the contributing countries are not French-speaking and do not have French-speaking personnel.290

As a bilingual nation, Canada is particularly suited for filling the UN’s need to have more French-speaking personnel in post-conflict missions. Canada currently has the capability to deploy French-speaking officers; CANADEM states that it has approximately 10,569 bilingual personnel on their rosters, while 17.1 percent of RCMP officers are French-speaking.291 Canada should aim to increase its capabilities by actively encouraging more fluent French-speaking Canadian police and military personnel to join the CPA and CANADEM for post-conflict peace operations.292 Our current expertise in training police and correction officers, coupled with our status as bilingual nation provide Canada an opportunity to contribute to the improvement of security sector reform.

Protecting Human Rights

Canada’s commitment to PCPO cannot focus solely on security sector reform. The UN stresses that Human Rights is an essential element of PCPO and single-minded focus on SSR can sometimes overshadow Human Rights. For instance, during MINUSTAH, excessive focus on SSR and on the Haitian National Police made security conditions in the nation worse by leading to higher arbitrary arrest rates, over-extended prisons, and by virtue of these two factors, the neglect of human rights.293 As Canada devises a strategy for engagement with PCPO, Human Rights must remain a priority to avoid such a scenario in the future.

A crucial element of human rights, and a current priority of the UN, is gender mainstreaming. Canada shows skill in incorporating a gender focus in its more recent post-conflict peace operation engagements, as evidenced by its inclusion of females in missions and gender-sensitivity training.294 In addition to 2010's C-NAP, Canada adopted the Declaration on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict in 2013, thereby committing itself to preventing the occurrence of sexual violence

during and after conflict. That same year, Canada contributed five million dollars to help prevent conflict related violence and respond to the needs of victims. In early 2016, the CAF adopted the “CDS Directive for Integrating UNSC Resolution 1325 and Related Resolutions into CAF Planning and Operations.” Canada should build on these successes by ensuring that START, the RCMP, and the DND follow the CAF’s lead and develop a strategy to fully implement the recommendations contained in the C-NAP. In addition, all four institutions must collaborate to create shared definitions and goals, and to forge a common understanding of Women, Peace and Security issues.

Canada should also maximize the Human Rights and gender mainstreaming potential of START. START is one of the few Canadian foreign policy apparatuses that refer to gender in post-conflict peace operations under the Women, Peace and Security thematic priority. Despite this, only 42 percent of civilians deployed through START to post-conflict environments received training on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls. Given START’s stated prioritization of gender and women, it is reasonable to expect that one hundred percent of all START members and partners receive gender-based training prior to beginning their work in post-conflict operations.

Gender mainstreaming is also essential to combat sexual violence in post-conflict settings. The issue of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse has emerged over the last year as an acute challenge facing UNPOs. The UN adopted a special measure on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in 2003 condemning this behaviour for “violat[ing] universally recognized international legal norms and standards and [being] [...] unacceptable behaviour and prohibited conduct for [UN] staff.” The UN Secretary-General commissioned a report in February 2016 and the UNSC adopted a Resolution in March of 2016 reiterating the UN’s unequivocal condemnation of sexual abuse and exploitation after learning that UN personnel were still engaging in this behaviour.

Canada has responded to the UN’s call to address and eliminate instances of sexual exploitation and abuse by establishing the Deschamps Commission to investigate sexual misconduct in the CAF. In order to be effective against combating sexual violence in a post-

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296 Global Affairs Canada, “Standing Up for Victims of Sexual Violence in Conflict Areas.”


298 Ibid., 32.

299 Ibid.


conflict setting, the Canadian government must ensure Canadian military forces are upholding gender equality within their own ranks. According to the Deschamps report, there is a sexualized culture within the Canadian armed forces that must be addressed. Degrading expressions, innuendos and sexual jokes about women are commonplace and even encouraged among new recruits.\textsuperscript{302} A major issue also lies in the fact that training on sexual conduct in the CAF is not taken seriously, and more often than not, individuals who have been complicit in prohibited behaviour conduct the training.\textsuperscript{303} A first step in reforming this culture must be to adopt Deschamps’ recommendation to create an independent and external center to report incidents which would help facilitate accountability for sexual assault, harassment and violence within the military.\textsuperscript{304} The establishment of a legitimate reporting mechanism, wherein women are able to disclose any issues they face, will help the CAF actively participate in facilitating the UN and Canada’s own desire to uphold principles of gender equality.

### Transparency and Accountability

Greater transparency and accountability will increase the utility of Canada’s financial contributions to PCPOs, as well as our training of police and correctional officers.\textsuperscript{305} Without progress reports to evaluate the effectiveness of Canada’s contributions to post conflict peace operations, post-conflict states continue to face challenges of corruption, a weak civil service, and a lack of transparency that stalls the country’s ability to move beyond conflict.\textsuperscript{306} Canada currently cannot properly evaluate or assess progress in recipient countries because of vague reporting on the use of financial contributions.\textsuperscript{307} For example, C-NAP’s progress report on the Government of Canada’s funding of the integration of women and girls states that “the engagement of women/girls in all phases of peace operations consumed the highest allocation of GPSF programming when compared to other areas of focus.”\textsuperscript{308} The report does not include the method of evaluation, or an explanation of what constitutes these other ‘areas of focus.’ Without more detailed reports, it is difficult to accurately gauge Canada’s success in post-conflict initiatives.\textsuperscript{309}

To effectively and accurately assess the effectiveness of Canada’s financial contributions, certain types of missions require additional START representatives. While START currently

\begin{flushright}
303 Ibid., 84.
304 Ibid., 36.
305 See Appendix E, Table 2 for a list of Canada’s financial contributions.
308 Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada, 61.
\end{flushright}
sends representatives to post-conflict countries to find suitable partners and gather information on local needs. This does not happen in missions where Canada solely finances contributions.

For example, Canada provided significant funding to the UNDP through the GPSF to facilitate the DDR of combatants and children in South Sudan; however, even with these funds, the project fell behind schedule due to a lack of coordination with international organizations and other donor countries to ensure that START programs are not duplicating efforts.

Canada also lacks data on the long-term performance of Canadian-led and trained police, corrections, and military personnel. START personnel who are on the ground must conduct quarterly audits on all Canadian-led and trained local police and military personnel. They are responsible for maintaining contact with the host country’s military and police force to monitor their progress and provide further support. Enhancing transparency and accountability will better identify the strengths and weaknesses of Canada’s current strategies, thereby allowing us to participate more effectively in post-conflict peace operations.

Enhancing transparency and accountability will better identify the strengths and weaknesses of Canada’s current strategies, thereby allowing us to participate more effectively in post-conflict peace operations.

Sending more START representatives can support this UN goal by facilitating coordination and communication with START’s home base in Canada and the experts in the recipient country. The success and engagement in corruption, neglect the rule of law, and disregard human rights. The purpose of these audits is to ensure that they can competently carry out all areas of their military and police duties, adhere to international human rights standards, and operate in an accountable and transparent manner. The purpose of these audits is to identify and deter anyone who is likely to engage in corruption, neglect the rule of law, and disregard human rights. After leaving a post-conflict country, one member at START should be responsible for maintaining contact with the host country and the UN, and training local police and military personnel. Enhancing transparency and accountability will better identify the strengths and weaknesses of Canada’s current strategies, thereby allowing us to participate more effectively in post-conflict peace operations.
Conclusion

During the recent announcement that Canada would be seeking a seat on the UN Security Council in 2020, Prime Minister Trudeau stated that Canada is “determined to revitalize Canada’s historic role as a key contributor to United Nations peacekeeping, in addition to helping advance current reform efforts.” 316 This report echoes this sentiment by recommending that Canada adopt a more robust international policy, one that acknowledges the enduring significance of the UN in maintaining global peace and security. Just as Canada spearheaded the creation of the first UN peacekeeping mission in 1956, Canada should take the lead in the evolution of peace operations in the 21st century.

Through various reports and resolutions, the UN articulated a series of gaps in peace operations. Canada is in a unique position to address these gaps because it does not currently have a clear foreign policy for engaging in peace operations. Moreover, Prime Minister Trudeau, as previously mentioned, has articulated a clear desire to increase Canada’s cooperation with the United Nations. Prime Minister Trudeau has also stated his desire to re-commit to peace operations in a meaningful way, utilizing Canada’s specific capabilities. This report proposes a series of recommendations to inform the Prime Minister’s foreign policy on different types of peace operations; specifically, preventive action and mediation, peace enforcement, and post-conflict peace operations. The recommendations we proposed, while extensive and ambitious, are based on extensive research of Canada’s past and present contributions to peace operations. Our recommendations also emphasize the importance of gender mainstreaming in the UN and in the Canadian government. We firmly believe that Prime Minister Trudeau and his Cabinet are more than capable of addressing these shortcomings by implementing our recommendations. This would make Canada’s case for acquiring a seat on the Security Council significantly stronger and more compelling.

SUMMARY of RECOMMENDATIONS
SECTION ONE
Conflict Prevention

Canadian Participation in Conflict Prevention and Mediation
United Nations Peacemaker
- Canadian involvement in Peacemaker initiatives such as the Mediation Support Network and the Group of Friends.
- Involvement of Canadian NGOs in the international mediation process through facilitating their connection with the Mediation Support Network.
- Apply for membership with the Group of Friends of Mediation.
- The Government of Canada should invest in a public database of all available public and private mediation organizations.

Gender Inclusion in Prevention and Mediation
- The new Canadian Action Plan for 2016 should advance gender mainstreaming in Canada’s proposed partnerships with Group of Friends of Mediation and the Mediation Support Network.

Canada’s Role in UN Rapid Response Operations
Joining the PCRS
- Canada should join the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System, a contemporary alternative to UNSAS.

Gender Inclusion in Rapid Response
- Canada’s partnership with the PCRS should recruit of women across all aspects of the peace process.

Canadian Humanitarian Assistance Team (CHAT)
- Canada should consider creating the Canadian Humanitarian Assistance Team (CHAT).
SECTION TWO
Peace Enforcement

Gender Inclusion in Canadian Peace Enforcement
  · Acknowledge that women remain the main victims of violence during conflict, as a result of the oversight of female needs and vulnerability to rape.
  · Create government rosters of female-only personnel to ensure qualified candidates receive qualified positions.

Gender Mainstreaming in Canadian Peace Enforcement Training
  · Creation of GENAD.
  · Training must educate peace operators on the different ways conflict impacts males and females by moving beyond classroom teaching, reading materials, and online quizzes to interactive and mission specific gender training.
  · The CAF and RCMP should develop time-bound strategies to increase the number of women that can be appointed to high-level leadership positions as part of international security deployments, and for retaining women at these ranks.
  · The RCMP should consider forming and deploying an all-female or majority female police unit as part of a United Nations peace support mission. The Government of Canada should also provide financial assistance to enable other countries with international civilian police capacity to deploy such units.

Pre-Deployment Training
  · Draw on lessons learned in Afghanistan in order to train peacekeepers on how to protect themselves when threatened by insurgencies.
  · Provide pre-deployment training that prepares UN troops for the security situations they will be experience during mission.
  · Provide training that includes an emphasis on gender mainstreaming.
  · Utilize existing MTCP model and training partnerships to focus training the troops of countries that contribute the most to peace operations.

In-Mission Training
  · Deploy small contingents of qualified troops to perform embedded, in-mission training with foreign battalions involved in UN peace operations.
  · Draw on experience utilizing OMLT mentorship practices in Afghanistan.
  · Embedded training can immediately “augment” the ability of troops to further develop and best utilize their pre-deployment training.
SECTION THREE
Post-Conflict Peace Operations

Security Sector Reform
- Canada should follow the UN’s recommendation to commit to police training by undertaking the Security Sector Reform initiatives the UN argues are important for ensuring peace after conflict.
- Canada should encourage more fluent French-speaking Canadian police and military personnel to join the CPA and CANADEM to increase its roster of French-speaking personnel who can deploy to PCPOs.

Protection of Human Rights
- Canada must ensure that START, the RCMP, and the DND collaborate to create common shared definitions, and to forge a common understanding of Women, Peace and Security issues.
- Canada should ensure that 100 percent of all START members and partners receive gender-based training prior to starting their work in post-conflict operations.
- Canadian armed forces must adopt Deschamps’ recommendation to create an independent and external centre to report incidents to help facilitate accountability for sexual assault, harassment and violence within the military.

Transparency and Accountability
- Canada must send START personnel to evaluate and coordinate the use of Canadian funds in missions where it is solely a financial contributor.
- After leaving a post-conflict country, one member at START should be responsible for maintaining contact with the host countries’ military and police force to monitor their progress and provide further support.
Appendix A

Organizational Structure of START – as of February 2011 (underwent reorganization)\textsuperscript{317} - shows areas START and the GPSF is deployed.

### Appendix B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operations Training</th>
<th>Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (India)</th>
<th>Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre (Ghana)</th>
<th>Birendra Peace Operations Training Centre (Nepal)</th>
<th>Centre for International Peace and Stability (Pakistan)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mission-Specific Pre-Deployment Training</td>
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<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
<td>Military Contingent Officer Course</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
<td>UN Staff Officer Course</td>
<td>Senior Leadership Course</td>
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<td>Military Observer Course</td>
<td>Human Rights for Peace Support Operations</td>
<td>UN Logistics Officer Course</td>
<td>Contingent Commander Course</td>
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<td>International Criminal Justice</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations Instructor's Course</td>
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<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>Train the Trainers Course</td>
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Note on Mission-Specific Pre-Deployment Training

Mission-Specific training takes a variety of forms across these different training centres. It ranges from short mission briefing programs in Bangladesh to intensive courses that include fitness testing and basic military skills in Nepal. However, all of them seemed to lack a specific focus on force protection issues.

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Appendix D

What is a Post-Conflict Peace Operation (PCPO)?

This report uses the term post-conflict peace operations to refer to short-term peacebuilding operations. Unlike post-conflict peacebuilding, which is more extensive, long-term, and operates both within and outside of the realm of peace operations, we use the term post-conflict peace operations to refer to short-term peacebuilding missions that are shorter, less extensive and occur exclusively within the framework of UN-sanctioned or UN-led peace missions. Our definition of “Post-Conflict Peace Operations” is as follows:

“Post-Conflict Peace Operations” occur within 24 months \(^{324}\) of the end of a conflict, when the intensity level is relatively low, and last up to 2 years. The purpose of these operations is to reduce the risk of a country relapsing into conflict through further stabilization initiatives that develop or improve existing national capacities as well as lay the foundation for sustainable peace."\(^{325}\) For the purpose of this policy brief, the discussion of Post-Conflict Peace Operations will be limited to government-sanctioned initiatives.

The following is a simple infographic outlining where “post-conflict peace operations” fit into a peace operations model.\(^{326}\)

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\(^{324}\) In the Summary of the Report of the Secretary General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of the Conflict from 2012 and 2014, the Secretary general states that the two years after the main conflict has ended is a critical period because threats to peace are often greatest during this phase, but so are the opportunities to establish the foundations of peace.

\(^{325}\) This definition was created by synthesizing findings from academic literature, such as Alex Bélamy and Charles T. Hunt’s “Twenty-first century UN peace operations: protection, force and the changing security environment”; The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, edited by Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk; “The Canadian Contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping” created by United Nations Association in Canada; the UN Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, the UN Peacebuilding: an Orientation, and the Report of the Secretary General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of the Conflict.

\(^{326}\) Dorn and Libben, 9; The following infographic is from the Rideau Report; however, minor changes have been made to the image to reflect the definition used in this report.
### Appendix E: Tables 1 and 2

#### Table 1: Fund for post-conflict peace initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-Conflict Country</th>
<th>Canadian Initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Sudan</strong>&lt;br&gt;(2006-Present)</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform (SSR)&lt;br&gt;- GPSF donated approximately 70% of the UNDP budget to DDR in South Sudan.327&lt;br&gt;- GPSF also provided funds to train ex-combatants to run the Southern Sudan Prison Service.328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Haiti</strong>&lt;br&gt;(2004-Present)</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform (SSR)&lt;br&gt;- CIDA and START donated $17 million to restore Haiti National Police Force (HNP) training facilities to improve the ability of the HNP units to repair 14 police stations and protect their communities within Port-au-Prince.329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</strong>&lt;br&gt;(1999-Present)</td>
<td>Human Rights&lt;br&gt;- The Canadian government sends funds to the DRC to finance healthcare services for survivors of sexual violence.330 These health services have helped reduce the effects of sexual violence, such as mitigating the spread of HIV/AIDS331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghanistan</strong>&lt;br&gt;(2002-2014)</td>
<td>The Canadian government established the Kandahar Local Initiatives Program (KLIP) with a budget of $30 million to identify long-term development needs.332&lt;br&gt;Security Sector Reform&lt;br&gt;- Canada committed to providing $330 million between 2015-2018 to help sustain the ANSF, including the ANA and the ANP&lt;br&gt;Electoral Assistance&lt;br&gt;- Ottawa committed $5 million to support the 2004 Afghan presidential election and $1.8 million in 2013 for two projects intended to support the 2014 elections.333&lt;br&gt;- CIDA also funded the Elections and Registration in Afghanistan Project to support the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in preparing for the national election in 2004.334</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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328 Ibid.
330 Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada, 43.
331 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-Conflict Country</th>
<th>Canadian Initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Mali (2013-2014)      | **Security Sector Reform**  
- In May 2013, Canada provided funds to support the stabilization initiatives of MINUSMA, the AU mission, and the EU training mission.  
**Electoral Assistance**  
- In July 2013, Canada provided funding to support an election observation mission in Mali. |

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336 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-Conflict Country</th>
<th>Canadian Personnel Involvement</th>
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</table>
| South Sudan (2006-Present) | Security Sector Reform  
- In 2009, 20 Canadians from the Ontario Provincial Police, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Halifax and Ottawa police forces deployed to Sudan to train and mentor the Southern Sudan police.  
|                            | Canada’s Whole-of-Government Team to Haiti is made up of several government agencies, including the START, Canada Border Service Agency, RCMP, Correctional Service Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and DND.  
|                            | Security Sector Reform  
- Canada focuses heavily on reforming three aspects of the security sector in Haiti: police, prison, and border checkpoints.  
|                            | - As of July 2015, Canada has 5 military and 85 police personnel focusing on security sector and criminal justice reforms.  
|                            | Human Rights  
- Canadian police and military forces developed a HNP reform plan that vetted police personnel accused of human rights violations and other serious crimes.  
|                            | - This reform also resulted in increasing the number of women recruited, creation of separate women’s affairs unit and gender-sensitivity training for recruited participants.  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1999-Present)</td>
<td>Canada’s primary contribution to the UN’s mission to DRC was the provision of a military force named Operation CROCODILE. Security Sector Reform - Currently the Canadian task force in DRC consists of nine CAF personnel with expertise in operations, liaison, and training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (2002-2014)</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform - Although ISAF was a NATO-led security mission that largely focused on counterinsurgency, Canadian forces provided support to the Afghan government by mentoring, training, and providing operational support to the ANA and the ANP. - Canada assumed responsibility for the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar City in 2005 with 335 Canadian personnel comprised of diplomats, correction experts, development specialists, Canadian police, and the Canadian Forces. - The PRT Kandahar assisted the training of ANA and disbandment of illegal armed groups to maintain a secure environment.</td>
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</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-Conflict Country</th>
<th>Canadian Personnel Involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Mali**  
(2013-2014) | **Electoral Assistance**  
- Canada funded an election observer mission which consisted of both Canadian and international experts to oversee the Presidential elections, and monitored the legislative elections in November and December 2013. 349 |
| **Kosovo**  
(1999-2006) | **Security Sector Reform**  
- The Correctional Services of Canada recruited and trained more than 850 local correctional officers in 2001-2002. 350  
- Canada assisted with the implementation of policies that reflected best practices for prison setting. 351  
**Human Rights**  
- Canada mentored Kosovo Correctional service workers on upholding international human rights standards in prison and correctional facilities as part of their training. 352 |

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349 Embassy of Canada to Mali, “Canada - Mali Relations.”  
351 Ibid., 187.  
352 Ibid.
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