A Blueprint for Peace in Afghanistan

A Team A/Team B Proposal
Prepared by the 4th Year International Relations Class
At the University of Western Ontario
Introduction

Located in South-central Asia, Afghanistan is home to mountainous landscapes, desert plains, a culturally diverse population, and a rich historical narrative. Over the past 200 years, this history has been dominated by foreign occupation, civil war, and the growing threat of terrorism. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, troops from the international community entered the country with the goal of dismantling the Taliban regime. While this initial mission was deemed a success, Afghanistan remains vulnerable to security and developmental threats.

The Human Development Index (HDI), which measures the quality of life for 182 UN member states, ranked Afghanistan 181 out of 182 countries in 2009. Considering this statistic, the ongoing security threats in the region, and Canada’s continued foreign troop presence, it is evident that the international community is addressing a real world crisis in the realm of security, governance and development. While members of the international community have made some progress in areas such as healthcare, and education, Afghanistan remains one of the least developed countries in the world. For these reasons, it is appropriate for students of International Relations to analyze the current efforts of the international community. In so doing, pre-existing policy recommendations can be revised and innovative proposals can be considered.

For the 2009-2010 term, students of International Relations 4701 (IR 4701) analyzed the causes and evolution of 20th century ‘hot’ conflicts including global wars, inter-state conflicts, regional wars, civil conflicts, and genocide. The interdisciplinary nature of IR 4701 incorporated historical analysis and political science methodologies in order to achieve a thorough understanding of contemporary international relations. Through case-study seminars, the class was introduced to conflicts across Africa, Asia, South America and Europe, giving a more thorough understanding of the causes of warfare, the evolution of conflict, and the instruments for effective peace settlements.

A Blueprint for Peace in Afghanistan is a truly collaborative policy recommendation effort. It aims to apply the knowledge, research and analytical skills obtained by students this year, towards the current global concern in Afghanistan. With this assignment, International Relations students can utilize their specialized knowledge and transferable skills towards a goal that is both idealistic and pragmatic in nature. As a class, we chose a Team A/Team B framework in order to structure A Blueprint for Peace.

The purpose of using the Team A/Team B framework was to allow each group to begin from two divergent positions and see what policy recommendations would emerge. Team A began using the Afghan Compact as a base from which to develop policy options. The Afghan Compact is a highly detailed blueprint for Afghanistan created by the Government of Afghanistan along with numerous international organizations and participating countries. Team A came to focus on the Afghan Compact as the starting point for its analysis after exhaustive review of the long-
term and short-term goals of the Afghan situation indicated a remarkable plurality of agreement with the goals and priorities outlined by various international conferences on Afghanistan over the past 8 years, and formalized in the Afghan Compact. Team A’s goal was to utilize the Compact in order to develop a comprehensive and realistic solution, in line with the pre-existing consensus of the international community.

Team B began with no other instruction than to think outside the box. With no strict guidelines, Team B was able to look beyond the Afghan Compact and develop an innovative, experimental approach. While this method may seem unrealistic or overly idealistic, the challenge for Team B was to make the most implausible or far-fetched options workable.

Another purpose of Team B was to fight what is known as the ‘Zombie Concept.’ Coined by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck, the Zombie Concept refers to the circumstance in which long-standing ideas are no longer relevant, yet still shape policy understandings and norms. This concept can hinder the exploration of new ideas and possibilities. A foreign affairs example of the Zombie Concept was evident in the United States during the Vietnam War. Although the war was clearly failing to achieve the United States’ objectives, US leaders were unable to abandon their original strategy and sufficiently adapt to achieve their political goals through military means. Therefore, in foreign relations, the Zombie Concept can be observed when a policy has failed or is failing, yet continues to be utilized and blocks other — possibly superior — options.

In academia, there is a long history of Team A/Team B exercises. These exercises lead to a consideration of all the options, asking participants to delve deeper into more self-evident solutions while also challenging them to think beyond the status quo. With A Blueprint for Peace, dividing into two groups allowed for a more thorough investigation of the policy options for Afghanistan. It also inspired some healthy competition, with both teams aspiring to produce the best possible report. While our final recommendations differ, Team A and Team B both discovered that together we achieved far more than we could have individually.

Table of Contents

Team A’s Proposal – [in blue], pp. 4-61
Team B’s Proposal – [in green], pp. 61-103
Conclusion – 104-106
# Table of Contents

**Acronyms** ..................................................................................................................................... 7  
**Introduction** ................................................................................................................................. 9  
**Part 1:**  
**Security in Afghanistan** ................................................................................................................. 11  
**Security** ...................................................................................................................................... 12  
**Introduction** ............................................................................................................................... 12  
**Policy Recommendations** .............................................................................................................. 12  
**Obstacles** ........................................................................................................................................ 19  
**Part 2:**  
**Afghanistan’s Economy** ................................................................................................................ 21  
**Overview of the Afghan Economy** ................................................................................................. 22  
**Opium Production in Afghanistan** ................................................................................................ 22  
**Introduction** .................................................................................................................................... 22  
**Policy Recommendations** .............................................................................................................. 23  
**Obstacles** ........................................................................................................................................ 25  
**Agriculture** .................................................................................................................................... 25  
**Introduction** .................................................................................................................................... 25  
**Recommendations** ............................................................................................................................ 25  
**Obstacles** ........................................................................................................................................ 26  
**Mineral Extraction** .......................................................................................................................... 27  
**Introduction** .................................................................................................................................... 27  
**Policy Recommendations** .............................................................................................................. 27  
**Obstacles** ........................................................................................................................................ 28  
**Transportation** ............................................................................................................................... 28  
**Introduction** .................................................................................................................................... 28  
**Policy Recommendations** .............................................................................................................. 28  
**Obstacles** ........................................................................................................................................ 29  
**Part 3:**  
**Governance In Afghanistan** .......................................................................................................... 30  
**Governance** .................................................................................................................................... 31  
**Introduction** .................................................................................................................................... 31  
**Policy Recommendations** .............................................................................................................. 32  
  1. Anti-Corruption Measures and the Afghan Justice Sector .............................................................. 32  
  2. Central government and Electoral process ...................................................................................... 36  
  3. Sub national governance and Constitutional Review ...................................................................... 38  
**Obstacles** ........................................................................................................................................ 41
**Acronyms**

**ACT** – Accountability and Transparency Project
**ACBAR** – Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
**ADB** – Asian Development Bank
**AIHRC** – Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
**AMDG** – Afghan Millennium Development Goals
**ANA** – Afghan National Army
**ANDS** – Afghanistan National Development Strategy
**ANP** – Afghan National Police
**ANSF** – Afghan National Security Force
**ARTF** – Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
**BPHS** – Basic Package of Health Services
**CDC** – Community Development Councils
**CGSO** – Canadian Governance Support Office
**CIDA** – Canadian International Development Agency
**CSC** – Civil Service Commission
**DFAIT** – Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
**EEC** – Electoral Complaints Commission
**EITI** – Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
**ELECT** – Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow
**EOM** – Election Observation Missions
**EURFOR** – European Union Military Force
**FMRP** – Farm-Military Rotation Program
**GIAAC** – General Independent Administration for Anti-Corruption
**GoA** – Government of Afghanistan
**HAP** – Humanitarian Action Plan
**HOO** – High Office of Oversight
**IDLG** – Independent Directorate of Local Governance
**IDLO** – Independent Development of Legal Organization
**IEC** – Independent Electoral Commission
**IPDC** – Intergovernmental Program for the Development of Communication
**ISAF** – International Security Assistance Force
**JCMB** – Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
**KMCL** – Kahama Mining Corporation Limited
**KMTC** – Kabul Military Training Centre
**MDG** – Millennium Development Goals
**MISFA** – Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan
**MRRD** – Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
**NABDP** – National Area-Based Development Program
**NATO** – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
**NRAP** – National Rural Access Program
**NSP** – National Solidarity Program
**OMLT** – Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams
**PAG** – Policy Action Group
**PDPA** – People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
**PDT** – Provincial Development Teams
**PIU** – Project Implementation Units
**SCO** – Shanghai Cooperation Organization
**UNAMA** – United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
**UNDP** – United Nations Development Program
**UNESCO** – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
**UNODC** – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
**UNOHA** – United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID – United States Agency for International Development

VCA – Vulnerability to Corruption Assessment
Introduction

Recognizing the dire needs of the people of Afghanistan after nearly three decades of warfare and external control, a comprehensive approach to securing peace and stability in the region must be a top priority for the international actors involved. The Afghanistan Compact, signed at the London Conference on the 1st of February 2006, was meant to serve as a detailed blueprint for moving forward as it represents a broad consensus on the part of the Government of Afghanistan, along with 10 international organizations, and nearly 60 participating countries who all share a cooperative desire in finding workable solutions in Afghanistan. The Compact not only reaffirmed the international community’s commitment to finding peace in the country, but set detailed objectives, benchmarks, and timelines for delivery within the following 5-year period. Furthermore, it created the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) for the purpose of monitoring and evaluating the Compact’s implementation.

Two years after its inception, the JCMB produced a major review of the international community’s progress in implementing the goals of the Afghanistan Compact, and revealed that a number of these goals have turned out to be overly ambitious due to the rapidly changing nature of the conflict since 2006. While some areas have certainly seen significant levels of progress, such as the army, health, education, and the National Solidarity Program, others faced significant challenges such as the police, corruption, agriculture, private-sector development, and counter-narcotics. Although there are certainly many factors that determine a sector’s success, for example, government leadership, international will, institutional frameworks, or the security situation, the 2008 JCMB Review clearly pointed to four major challenge areas that had significantly inhibited the progress of the Compact. These four areas were, 1) the deterioration of the security situation, 2) the increasing dominance of the opium economy and the fragility of the licit economy, 3) governance and corruption, and 4) inadequate effectiveness and management of aid.

This report will use the JCMB 2008 Review as a starting point and focus its recommendations on these four areas that need the most sustained attention: security, economy, governance and corruption, and aid and development. While the report is divided into these key components, it is important to note that these issues do not exist in isolation. In fact, dealing with one facet of the Afghan situation without addressing many other components is impossible, and linkages and interconnectedness are a driving theme in this report. For example, the security situation cannot be improved until the capacity of the government is strengthened and corruption is tackled. Largely as a result of the interconnected nature of this conflict, many of the nuanced recommendations below require concurrent implementation and are premised upon the success of one another.

Furthermore, many of our proposals build upon existing structures and institutions already functioning in Afghanistan but which require increased funding, support, and expansion. For example, we suggest that the best way to improve aid coordination and grassroots effectiveness in Afghanistan is to work through the national government and its pre-
existing priority programs in order to sufficiently align international efforts with local and national priorities such as the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). Finally, the vast majority of recommendations included in this report assume increased Afghan ownership as their number one priority with the ultimate aim of enabling and empowering Afghans to create for themselves a secure and self-sustaining Afghan state.

Over the course of this report, Canadian involvement in Afghanistan will be considered in each section in order to provide a local context to the situation. Afghanistan is Canada’s largest foreign aid recipient and is therefore an important project for the Canadian government. The Canadian mission is dedicated to rebuilding Afghanistan in association with sixty other nations and international organizations as well as with the Afghan people themselves. Canada has taken an integrated peace-building or ‘3D’ (Diplomacy, Defence and Development) approach that focuses not only on policing and security but developing the foundations for lasting peace and stability. By 2011, the Canadian Government will have spent $11.3 billion towards the Afghanistan mission. While most of these funds have been used for National Defence ($9 billion,) there has also been significant spending for the internal development of Afghanistan through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT) amounting to $1.7 billion and $400 million respectively.

The Canadian project in Kandahar has, as its ultimate goal, to assist in achieving a stabilized Afghanistan that can be effectively run and administered by the Afghan people. To help achieve this, Canada has structured its aid around six priorities that are aligned with the Afghanistan Compact of 2006. Briefly stated these priorities are: (1) training and mentoring the Afghan National Security Forces, (2) basic services, (3) humanitarian assistance, (4) securing the Afghanistan-Pakistan border as well as the creation of dialogue, (5) solidify national democratic institutions and (6) promote national reconciliation. The first four priorities are aimed specifically for the region of Kandahar while the last two are at the national level. Canada has also committed itself to three “Signature Projects” within the Kandahar region, which include the construction of the Dahla Dam, the eradication of polio and increased education. Benchmarks, baselines and targets have been established for each priority as a way to track progress and orient development at a calculated pace.
A Blueprint for Peace in Afghanistan

Part 1: Security in Afghanistan
Security

Introduction
Security in Afghanistan remains a prerequisite for the stabilization and development of the country. Following the outbreak of hostilities in October 2001, the international community has reinforced its commitment to a multilayered approach to security. Understanding that military means cannot alone provide the soft-power stabilization and development required for genuine security, a policy of integrating defence with development and diplomacy – often referred to as the 3D approach - was adopted. Building on the successful and problematic aspects of the Afghan Compact, this report will offer suggestions for improving the international community’s current security strategy in Afghanistan. The subsequent recommendations will reinforce the structure that has been set by the international community, take into consideration the current situation in the country and the extent of international commitments, and provide an analytic framework that offers suggestions on how best to pursue security goals in Afghanistan.

The current security situation in Afghanistan is tenuous. Of particular concern is the strength of the growing insurgency. In August 2009, Stanley A. McChrystal the Commander of the US forces in Afghanistan argued that a new strategy in Afghanistan was needed. Since this assertion the Obama Administration has committed an additional 30,000 US troops to Afghanistan to allow for a smooth transfer of power to the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) within three years. The Obama Administration has also endorsed the idea of targeted negotiations and reconciliation with lower-level Taliban forces. These recent developments suggest a shift in international strategy in Afghanistan and will be addressed in this report.

Given the complexity of the mission in Afghanistan, the security sector policy recommendations will focus around the major goals for the existing strategy:

i) **Afghanization of Security**: transfer of responsibility for security in Afghanistan to Afghans.

ii) **Public Relations**: gain the support of the Afghan people for the ANSF, the Afghan Government and the ISAF.

iii) **Limit Insurgent Violence**: address the threat of insurgent action through military and diplomatic means.

iv) **Regional Security Initiatives**: integrate Afghanistan into a broader framework of regional partners to promote long-term stability within the country and in the region.

Policy Recommendations
The overall approach to security endorsed in this document includes the development and support of the ANSF so that it is prepared to take over security in Afghanistan from the ISAF by 2014. To achieve the above goals, the international community should pursue the following actions: 1. Institute a public relations program to increase the legitimacy of the ANSF; 2. Exploit
factions within the insurgent forces and begin targeted diplomacy to split the Taliban and encourage reconciliation, especially with lower-level, Afghan insurgent forces; 3. Development of the Afghan National Army; 4. Withdrawal of international forces and transfer of responsibility for security to Afghan forces; 5. The development of a regional approach to security. Each of these recommendations will be explored in detail.

1. Public Relations. Public support for security, as well as development and diplomatic initiatives in Afghanistan is vital for long-term peace and security within the country. Progress has recently been made in fostering Afghan public support for the current mission. A survey conducted by BBC News, ABC News, and Germany’s ARD in January 2010 shows that “most Afghans are optimistic about the state of their country”. Of more than 1,500 Afghans surveyed, 70% said they believed Afghanistan was going in the right direction. Sixty-nine percent also said they believed the Taliban posed the greatest threat to the country. Despite promising signs of public support for future operations in Afghanistan, the international community and the Afghan government must be committed to initiatives that enhance their relation with the local population.

The Afghan National Army and Police: The international community must continue to strengthen the relationship between the ANA, ANP and the Afghan public. Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) must continue to mentor ANA and ANP forces in communicating with the local population during the phased withdrawal of forces. The main purpose of OMLT’s is to establish an Afghan counterpart that establishes local points of contact for the ANA and the ANP. These most often include village elders who relay information, as well as grievances they are having. As noted by Captain Declan Lynn, head officer the Yorkshire Regiment OMLT in Helmand province, the Afghan liaison speaks with his military counterparts to figure out “how we can best alleviate those difficulties, thereby effectively, hopefully if it is done right, keeping the populous on the side of the Afghan Army." Such initiatives are essential to train Afghan forces on improving relations with local populations. See Case Study 1 for more detail.
The International Community: Prior to the full withdrawal of ISAF forces from Afghanistan, stronger commitments must be made to explain the purpose of field operations amongst local populations. Often times there are miscommunications between the intended operation, and the perceived threat experienced by the local population. At the centralized level of operations, international communications experts from UNESCO's Intergovernmental Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC) must work with Afghan government officials, as well with ANA and ANP Communications Officers to explain the objectives of security initiatives within the country. With 70% of Afghans living in rural areas, local initiatives will be essential for establishing community support for current and future security operations within Afghanistan.

2. Targeted Negotiations with Insurgent and Taliban Forces. Insurgent and Taliban forces are increasing in strength and numbers; however this group is far from homogeneous. Targeted negotiations, particularly aimed at Afghan citizens who are involved with insurgent groups for financial reasons, protection or convenience would serve to exploit the differences within the Taliban and other insurgents. The goal is to offer Afghanis who are not ideologically bound, or in high positions within the Taliban, other options within the Afghan community. This would limit violence through reconciliation and diminish the fighting capacity of the remaining core insurgent force, and by extension the length of the military commitment required by the international community.

3. Development of the Afghan National Army. The development of a strong, centralized Afghan National Army is crucial to the attainment of security in Afghanistan and to the transfer of responsibility for security to the Afghan government. To enhance the ANA, a three pronged approach which focuses on recruitment, coordination of compensation, and the improvement of training techniques, will be necessary.
A. Recruitment and Retention

The current ANA force strength is only 92,000; a figure which is far below the 2014 ISAF withdrawal benchmark of 122,000 forces or the estimated 200,000 that would be needed to secure long-term stability in Afghanistan. Figure One illustrates the historical growth of the ANA and its projected growth through 2014. To reach the short-term target of 122,000, or a more comprehensive long-term target, recruitment and retention issues must be addressed.

(Figure 1)

The Afghan government should strive to make the ANA an attractive employment option for Afghan citizens. Not only would this increase enlistment rates and thereby help to develop the ANA, but it would also provide options for Afghan citizens not ideologically committed to the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Many Afghans join insurgent fighting groups seasonally for financial or other practical reasons. An effort should be made to provide visible, attractive alternatives to this lifestyle. Recruitment programs in Afghanistan have not been as successful as hoped and retention of ANA forces has become a major obstacle. Some indicators show that as many as 16% of the total ANA forces are recorded as AWOL at any given time.

This is largely because the public image of the ANA and the structured lifestyle required by the ANA. Many recruits have been involved in fighting units in the past, but this involvement was largely informal. In addition, due to the state of disrepair of the Afghan education system, many who enlist in the ANA lack the structural experience of school. These factors make the structure of the ANA a novel and uncomfortable experience for many soldiers. Programs should be developed which would allow for more flexibility in soldiers’ lives. Currently the ANA operates on a rotation cycle between combat, administration and leave. See figure 2 for details on this
program. By modifying this cycle, the Afghan government could increase both enlistment and retention rates. See Box 2 for details on a program that could be applied in Afghanistan.

**Red-Yellow-Green Work Cycle for the ANA**

- **Training (2 months)**: Primarily administrative. Pay, leave, schooling and administrative requirements. Limited leader and individual staff training.
- **ANA re-arm/refit and leave (1 month)**: Builds on KMTC training, focused on company- and battalion-level collective training tasks.
- **Conduct of operations (6 months)**: Combat operational cycle. Reinforces company- and battalion-level collective tasks during and between operations.

**SOURCE:** ISAF, 2008e.

(Figure 2)

**BOX 1 – The Farm-Military Rotation Program**

The Farm-Military Rotation Program (FMRP) is designed to increase enlistment and retention rates in the ANA by making military service more flexible. The program would target Afghan men currently working in the agricultural sector. This program would allow soldiers to remain in their home communities for a longer period each year – during the growing and harvesting season – and would shorten the combat phase of their rotation.

A six month ‘off’ period at home, with a 5 month combat period and a 1 month training period each year would allow for the development of an effective Afghan fighting force and would be tailored to the Afghan lifestyle. This program also has the potential to enhance other aspects of Afghan reconstruction in the following ways:

i) **Agriculture**: by adjusting military service to the growing seasons, this program would lend itself to the development of the agricultural sector in Afghanistan.

ii) **Illicit Substances**: to be eligible for the FMRP program recruits must prove that they are involved with the production of legitimate crops.

iii) **Education**: the FMRP program would help introduce soldiers to a structured lifestyle, would provide basic education, incentives for literacy, and would allow soldiers to pursue educational opportunities in their home communities during the farming cycle.

iv) **Seasonal Conflict Cycle**: The seasonal increase in ANA forces would help to address the seasonal increase in insurgent activities after the annual harvest. Many Afghan
men leave their homes and communities and join insurgent groups during the non-growing season due to poverty or lack of other employment opportunities. Not only would the FMRP address the heightened tensions in the non-growing season, it could also attract some of these seasonally-displaced farmers, reducing the number of insurgents.

**B. Standardization of Pay Scales**
To further the goal of enhanced enlistment rates it is necessary to introduce standardized compensation for soldiers in the ANA. Currently, the pay for a first time Afghan soldier varies from US$15 to US$170 per month. It is suggested that each new soldier who enlists begin at a rate of US$110 per month, and that pay increases be done in a standard incremental fashion according to seniority.

Because of infrastructural problems in Afghanistan, the transfer of payments to soldiers has been problematic, and like many other aspects of the reconstruction, rife with corruption. The ANA must develop an effective, reliable system for coordinating payments to soldiers and soldiers should be offered various payment options depending on the resources available in their region.

**C. Afghan National Army Training**
The ANA has increased from 1,750 forces in 2003 to a current total of 92,000. With this dramatic increase in forces and with the projected increases before 2014 training the ANA has presented significant challenges. See Box 2 for details on training for the ANA. It is recommended that the ANA training period be increased to its original 15 weeks. The Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) does not have the capacity to fully train all new recruits properly; therefore additional training centers should be opened to accommodate new ANA recruits.

**BOX 2 – TRAINING THE ANA**

A thorough training program for new ANA should consist of the following:

1. 7 weeks of Basic Combat Training
2. 6 weeks of Advanced Combat Training
3. 2 weeks of Platoon Training

This training program format was initially used at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC); however, due to inadequate resources and insufficient time the training program was reduced to 10 weeks.

4. **Withdrawal of International Forces.** The withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan and the transfer of responsibility for security to the Afghan government is the most important long-term security goal in Afghanistan. ISAF forces must withdraw
carefully in order to ensure the ANA is able to control the security situation. The most prudent course of action would be to use ANA forces to hold stable regions, and use concentrated and increased levels of ISAF forces to target intense-conflict areas and insurgent strongholds. Image 3 shows the current location of ANA forces. By concentrating ANA forces that are currently dispersed in the unstable south and east to the north, ISAF forces could be concentrated in the intense-conflict zones. See Box 3 for a Timeline of Withdrawal and Transfer of forces.

**Figure 3**

*Afghan National Army Current Deployment by Province and Area*

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**BOX 3 – STAGES OF WITHDRAWAL AND TRANSFER OF POWER**

- **Immediate**: Increase of ISAF forces in the South and West of Afghanistan to target intense conflict zones
- **December 2010**: Transfer of power in stable regions of North and East Afghanistan to the ANA and withdrawal of roughly 5,000 ISAF forces from these regions (leaving 2,000)
- **Concentration of remaining ISAF forces in conflict zones and transfer of power in stable regions to ANA**
### December 2012:
Begin withdrawal of ISAF forces from stabilized regions and transfer of power in these regions to ANA

### December 2014:
Target date for stabilization and full ISAF withdrawal and transfer of responsibility of ANA

ANA forces will become responsible in December 2010 for holding stable regions in Afghanistan. To prepare for this, and for the transfer of responsibility for the security of all of Afghanistan, ANA soldiers will complete one five-month combat rotation in a hostile region after the standard 15-week training alongside ISAF forces.

5. **Regional Security:** Afghanistan must work with its neighbours to ensure commitment to regional security initiatives. Sustainable security within the country is dependent on cooperation within the greater region of Central Asia. Unlike regional security organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union, or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Central Asia lacks an organized system of security. More than pursuing a regionally-based security pact, however, Afghanistan should seek initiatives that integrate the security concerns of the “near abroad”. It is recommended that Afghanistan enhance its role within regional supranational organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It should attempt to move beyond its current role as Guest Attendant through the SCO- Afghanistan Contact Group to a fulltime member of the SCO. Given the SCO’s mandate of addressing regionally-based security threats, particularly as related to terrorism and extremism, this provides Afghanistan the opportunity to facilitate regional security initiatives which are beyond its current pursuance of bilateral projects.

### Obstacles
The attainment of security in Afghanistan faces a number of obstacles that must be overcome. Some of these obstacles will be discussed:

- **The Legitimacy of the ANA and APF.** The perception that the ANA and APF are legitimate will be crucial to the successful hand-over of security to Afghani forces. Steps must be taken to ensure that the ANA and APF are seen as valid career paths and those individuals who enlist in these forces are not ostracized from their communities.

- **Commitment of Forces and Funds by the International Community.** After almost a decade of involvement in Afghanistan, the international community is growing weary of the military and financial costs of the operation. Training, equipping and increasing the numbers of ANA and APF forces will require substantial financial commitments by the international community. Eliminating the insurgent forces and stabilizing the most tumultuous regions of the south and east of Afghanistan will require increased ISAF forces. Convincing the international community of these necessary measures poses a significant obstacle.
iii) **Obtaining Security Without Development.** Without achieving a certain level of social, political and economic development it will be difficult to construct a functioning Afghan security structure. Training soldiers who lack basic education, transporting troops without adequate transportation infrastructure, and developing a police force without a functioning legal system are all substantial impediments. Unfortunately, many development programs are prevented from being successful by the security situation in Afghanistan.

iv) **Cultural Barriers.** There are significant barriers to security that are presented by cultural differences. Negative perceptions by many Afghani citizens of Westerners make achieving security a formidable task. In addition, ISAF forces have also been accused of cultural insensitivity in a number of cases. Particularly, night searches of Afghani villages fail to address cultural and gender issues as male soldiers conduct searches of females.

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**Canadian Involvement**

Canada is one of forty-one countries participating in the UN authorized NATO-ISAF forces and has been leading operations in the Kandahar province since 2005. Canada spends the majority of its aid budget for Afghanistan on National Defence, which will amount to a total of $9 billion for the 2002-2011 period. Security is of utmost importance in the province of Kandahar because it is a stronghold of Taliban power. The area is therefore highly susceptible to insurgent attacks. In addition to carrying out combat operations, the Canadian government is working towards consolidating the strength and perceived legitimacy of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. Canada has been training and equipping these bodies and hopes to gradually shift security responsibilities away from foreign forces as the national forces, through training and mentorship programs, become increasingly able to carry out missions on their own and in a manner that adheres to important codes of conduct. In addition the Canadian government is working towards improving detention facilities.
Part 2:
Afghanistan’s Economy
Overview of the Afghan Economy

Afghanistan’s economy has improved rapidly since the fall of the Taliban from power in 2001. This growth is primarily the result of large investments in foreign aid. Despite the growth and international assistance Afghanistan still ranks in the bottom of almost every economic indicator. There is much work to be done to create a sustainable and legal Afghan economy. The United Nations Development Programme’s Human Poverty Index ranks Afghanistan at the very bottom of 135 countries in terms of human deprivation, due to short lifespan, lack of basic education and lack of access to both private and public resources. Afghanistan has a low GDP per capita, roughly USD $800; low literacy rates at 34.3% for the total population and is characterized by gendered inequality. The composition of sectors providing the nationwide GDP of USD $13.32 billion are 31% agriculture, 26% industry, and 43% services, excluding opium. This contrasts sharply with the fact that agriculture employs roughly 80% of the populace, showing an inequality within the GDP distribution. Afghanistan does have economic potential; it is endowed with vast amounts of mineral resources and a prime geographic location to become a regional transport hub. Several issues are most pressing regarding the development of Afghanistan’s economy. These include the illicit opium economy, agricultural and infrastructural deficiencies, as well as the extraction of Afghanistan’s mineral resources.

Opium Production in Afghanistan

Introduction

Most of the international community considers opium to be the greatest threat to the long-term stability of Afghanistan. The industry grew significantly after the fall of the Taliban’s regime, and cultivation of poppy in the country reached an all-time high in 2007 – only one year after the release of the Afghanistan Compact. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) Afghanistan Opium Survey, Afghanistan grew 93 percent of the world’s opium poppy as of 2007. These numbers are staggering in light of the industry’s crippling effect on Afghanistan’s economy and its people. The country’s narcotics industry is “increasingly linked to insecurity and terrorist activities,” notes the JCMB, since the trade fuels corruption, spawns drug use and dependency, and undermines the country’s rule of law. Most of Afghanistan’s opium is refined into heroin, an unsettling fact due to the drug’s negative impact on Afghanistan’s population and the country’s significant role within the global drug trade. For these reasons, the UNODC has stated that while controlling drugs in Afghanistan will not solve all of the country’s problems, “the country’s problems can not be solved without controlling drugs.”

Yet there is good news on the horizon. In the past two years, it appears a combination of efforts ranging from eradication in targeted areas, to widespread counter-narcotics measures, to economic support for legal crops have begun to make an impact. Afghanistan’s opium market is shrinking, as the following specific figures from last year’s UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey reveal:

1. Opium cultivation in Afghanistan decreased by 22% in 2009, from 157,000 hectares (ha) in 2008 to 123,000 ha. This is attributed to various strategies, namely, a combination of
an “aggressive counter-narcotics offensive; terms of trade more favourable to legal crops; and the (related) successful introduction of food zones to promote licit farming”.

2. The number of poppy-free provinces in the country (out of 34) has increased from 18 to 20. Several more have dropped to marginal production numbers.

3. Opium prices have fallen, due to both over-supply at the source and lower market penetration in Europe. Wholesale prices have fallen in the country by a third in the past year; in fact, opium values (in nominal terms) have not been this low since the Taliban’s regime in the 1990s.

4. This combination of reduced cultivation and falling prices has caused a 40% drop in the total “farm-gate” value of opium production in Afghanistan, for a total of US $438 million. This equals just 4% of the country’s licit GDP – down from 12% two years prior, and the all-time high of 27% in 2002.

5. 800,000 fewer Afghans are involved in opium production compared to 2008.

Source: UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009 Summary Findings

Policy Recommendations

Evidently, there is a positive momentum due to the counter-narcotics efforts within Afghanistan. But despite this progress, the drug trade within the country still threatens to hinder both development and security. As such, like the Afghanistan Compact prescribed, counter-narcotics must remain a crosscutting priority and should be achieved through a variety of simultaneous means. The following recommendations seek to continue the momentum witnessed in recent years and provide alternatives to the production of opium:

- **Phase out eradication of poppy crops.** Two years ago, the goal for 2008 by the Policy Action Group (PAG) was to eradicate 50,000 ha of the opium cultivation – an example of the prior trend towards more extensive eradication. Yet over the past two years, there has been a shift towards reducing eradication efforts; only 10,000 ha (less than 4% of the amount planted) were eradicated in 2008 and 2009 collectively. This is a positive trend. Moving towards the elimination of eradication measures means that millions of impoverished Afghan farmers, dependent on their opium crops to make a living, will not be the first to suffer due to counter-narcotics measures. Total eradication of Afghanistan’s opium crops is, in fact, socially and technically unfeasible. Money previously used on eradication efforts should be reallocated to the promotion of alternative crops, as per our agriculture recommendations to follow.

- **Focus on interdiction, rather than eradication.** Criminal activity, not farming, is the primary root of Afghanistan’s involvement in the drug trade. As such, we endorse the UNODC’s recommendation that major traffickers should be identified and brought to justice. The Afghanistan government, working alongside NATO, has begun dismantling high value assets – a trend which must be encouraged by the global community. In addition, Afghanistan’s justice system must be strengthened in order to prosecute major traffickers, along with the strengthening of border police.

- **Seek and promote alternative crops.** Poppies are by far the most financially rewarding crop grown in Afghanistan. Yet other lucrative crops have the potential to be grown in the country – including saffron, alfalfa, and cotton, among others. More must be done
to encourage a shift among Afghanistan’s farmers and advance a new rural development strategy. Microcredit initiatives and financial incentives are one way to free Afghan farmers from the clutches of the drug trade (for information on Aid & Development strategies, see Part 4). Foreign aid must also be redirected from military operations to development. Perhaps most importantly, improvements in the country’s infrastructure, storage facilities and greater access to markets can help farmers market new crops.

- **Implement strategies to curb drug use among Afghan citizens.** Afghans’ opium and heroin use is on the rise, with a United Nations report from 2009 showing that at least 1 in 12 people abuse drugs in the country. This is caused primarily by the simple abundance and affordability of these drugs. As such, only through the reduction of opium crops can drug use be curbed significantly.

- **License opium for medicinal production.** The previous recommendations should be the primary course of action. However, a more innovative and controversial direction may be necessary, similar to one that proved successful in Turkey. Unregulated crop growing in Turkey was shifted to legal poppy cultivation in the 1970s when the country deemed total eradication impossible. Opium could then be sold for use in various medicines, such as morphine and codeine. Together with the American government, Turkey implemented a “strict licensing system supported by the United Nations and a preferential trade agreement with the US” (see Turkey, Box 1). A similar strategy could prove successful in Afghanistan, with a shift to a licensing system coupled with an increase in factories within the country to produce legal opiate derivatives.

**BOX 1 — Turkey’s Triumph Over the Opium Trade**

By the mid-1960s, over half of the world’s opium came from the poppy fields of Turkey. The country faced pressure from the American government to eradicate their crops, which the Turkish government deemed impossible — the poppies would simply return illegally. Yet, under the weight of American demands, Turkey banned all poppy cultivation in 1972. While the country was quickly rewarded with US $35 million in aid from the US, the ban proved difficult to maintain, as predicted. It was overturned in 1974 and, clearly, something different had to be done. The Turkish prime minister that year chose to licence the growth of opium for medical purposes. The United Nations helped Turkey construct a processing factory and providing US $8 million (over the following 15 years) to set up tight regulations and monitoring controls.

To date, the United States still purchases a significant amount of poppy derivatives from Turkey. In addition, over half a million Turks currently work in the heavily regulated poppy industry which provides jobs and stimulates the country’s economy.
Obstacles
The challenges faced to date when implementing counter-narcotics strategies in Afghanistan are a testament to the immense obstacles faced by the country and the international community. For many farmers, the financial rewards of opium production may simply prove too lucrative to give up. In addition, Afghanistan may lack the legitimacy in its government, infrastructure and justice system necessary to successfully implement the aforementioned strategies. Without the requisite law enforcement capabilities, opium production and drug abuse will remain difficult to curb. Similarly, a licensing system could prove impossible to monitor, particularly with the prevalence of drug lords and major traffickers. Only by encouraging increased security and legitimate governance can Afghanistan hope to develop a functioning legal economy.

Agriculture
Introduction
Agriculture is highly important to the Afghan economy and, when excluding opium, it contributes an estimated 31% to GDP as well as occupies 78.6% of the labour force as of 2008. Afghanistan’s agriculture sector produces many different crops including wheat, nuts, oil seeds, fruits and vegetables. As of May 2009, the sector was self-sufficient in terms of wheat production for the first time in thirty years. Growth in this sector is the result of increasing international attention, most importantly the rehabilitation of cultivatable land, concentrated primarily in North. Organizations such as the Islamic Development Bank have helped to improve access to credit, irrigation systems are being rehabilitated, and rural roads are being reconstructed.

Despite improving results in the agriculture sector there are still major issues with the small amount of arable land, roughly 12% of the total land area of Afghanistan, water availability, rural access, education and the availability of basic agricultural needs such as seeds and fertilizers.

Recommendations
There have been great improvements regarding the agricultural sector in recent years. Many programs are in place that are functioning effectively and improving the quality of life for the average Afghan farmer. The following recommendations seek to improve the quality of land, increase access to both regional and international markets, as well as increase farmer’s opportunities and options. These directly relate to a reduction of opium consumption.

- **Irrigation Improvements.** Water access for farmers is one of the central problems to Afghanistan’s agricultural sector. The years of conflict have caused a breakdown in physical infrastructure as well as governmental and societal support systems. Through rehabilitation as well as development of new infrastructure, particularly water storage, it is estimated 3.54 million hectares of irrigated land could be attained. Both physical development, as well as operational and maintenance organizations are needed. To
achieve this, construction funds and resources are needed, as well as locals educated in basic irrigation techniques and strategies.

- **Continued Rural Access Road Improvements.** One of the most important factors in the successful development of Afghanistan’s agricultural sector thus far has been through the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development’s (MRRD) National Rural Access Program (NRAP). The programs focus is on sustainable development and thus far has constructed or rehabilitated 9,000 kms of roads country wide, connecting 3000 villages. The improvement of roads connects villages to local, regional, and international markets for their products. As well, it makes receiving aid, credit and services easier. Temporary work from the construction and rehabilitation of roads provides extra income for local consumption. Funding for this program must be maintained, and if possible increased, to spur agricultural development.

- **Focus on Microcredit Programs for Farmers.** Increasing the availability of credit to farmers through culturally sensitive micro credit resources such as the Islamic Development Bank (see micro credit section) helps farmers access some of the tools they need most, while encouraging independence. Credit gives them access to seeds, fertilizers, and agricultural tools helping them improve productivity and efficiency. Established micro-credit resources can eventually be transformed into banks and other permanent financial institutions by maintaining Afghan participation and eventually transferring control.

- **Agricultural Export Products.** Independence in regards to domestic food demand allows for the profitable expansion of the agricultural sector into other areas. Various agricultural products in Afghanistan could be marketed for export have high levels of profitability. Giving Afghan farmers both access to products as well as the expertise to produce them would help shift production from opium. Examples of developments to be followed include 7 virtues (CASE Study – Canadian Content), and the high value of almonds exported to India. This sector would be dependent on increasing Afghan farmers access to global markets through infrastructural improvement.

## Obstacles

Implementing these recommendations requires overcoming many obstacles. Security concerns hinder construction of rural roads as well as irrigation projects. A lack of education amongst Afghan farmers, hinders their ability to implement new more efficient techniques to maximize their productivity. A complicated system of land use rights makes it more difficult for westerners to understand how best to improve agricultural efficiency while being culturally sensitive. With regards to the exportation of agricultural products, lack of efficient transportation connections to local, regional and international markets is a major concern. As well, while India is a major export market, where Afghan agricultural products are known and trusted, trade between India and Afghanistan is hindered by Pakistan and India’s difficult relationship. To make the positive effects of these recommendations apparent, these issues need to be considered.
Mineral Extraction

Introduction

Afghanistan has a wealth of undeveloped or underdeveloped mineral resources that if properly utilized could create a highly profitable sector of the Afghan economy. These resources include some of the world’s largest reserves of copper, as well as large reserves of iron, tin and many other valuable minerals. Their potential to generate wealth for the state is unmatched. Integrity Watch Afghanistan suggests that the Aynak copper deposit alone, when in full operation, could generate revenues 1.6 times the 2006 Afghan state budget. Extensive exploration of the mineral resources by the Soviet Union in the 1970’s make extracting the resources of Afghanistan cheaper than they otherwise would be due to companies now interested in the resource wealth knowing its location and how much of it exists. Furthermore many of large mineral deposits such as Hajigak Iron and Aynak copper deposits are located near large coal reserves providing a possible cheap source of energy.

In contrast to these natural advantages of Afghan’s mineral resources there are several major drawbacks to the development of the sector. Firstly, there is the lack of efficient infrastructure throughout the country hindering both access to international markets, as well as energy and water. Secondly, there is the lack of government capacity to develop its mineral resources in a way that would be beneficial to the Afghan people.

Policy Recommendations

The recommendations for Afghan’s mineral sector primarily deal with enforcement of regulations on possible private enterprises as well as their need for effective transport:

- **Join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.** The extractive industries transparency initiative (EITI) is a comprehensive guide to providing beneficial relationships between the mineral extractors and the people of the candidate countries. Currently Afghanistan is a candidate, with only Liberia and Azerbaijan having achieved compliant status. Through auditing and other measures it is important to ensure that companies, including state owned enterprise, actively facilitate sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction. The rough cost of Afghanistan joining EITI is expected to cost US $700,000 and the funding is already in place. Joining EITI will greatly benefit the people of Afghanistan through the transparency of wealth generated by the mineral extraction industries. These efforts must be coordinated with efforts to improve governance and combat corruption, as discussed below.

- **Award Contracts to Companies With Proven Records of Social and Environmental Responsibility.** Mining companies operating in the developing world have repeatedly been accused of providing little social and economic benefits to local populations, while tolerating multiple human rights violations. There have also been many environmental concerns, significantly undermining rural livelihoods of populations around mining areas. The social impacts of mining have led to significant conflict in many developing countries. These
impacts can also have severe negative economic consequences. Therefore it is of the utmost importance that any entity given development rights adheres to the strongest interaction guidelines for social development and the environment. If the companies develop projects like the KMCL Bulyanhulu mine in Tanzania, the local benefits can be quite extensive. China Metallurgical Construction Corporation, the company awarded the contract to develop the Aynak copper deposit, located in Logar province, 35 kms south of Kabul, has not had a positive track record. No positive economic spillover has occurred at one of their ore extraction operations in Pakistan.

- **Develop an Internal Rail Network With External Connections.** The development of an extensive rail network would lower transportation costs of ore, making mineral extraction in Afghanistan more competitive as well as linking Afghanistan to the world market. See Transportation in Afghanistan for detailed assessments.

### Obstacles

The major problems to sustainable and secure mineral development in Afghanistan are the lack of transparency in the bidding process, a lack of strong governmental oversight, governmental corruption, possible security risks, start up costs of the mining developments, and a lack of efficient transportation networks. The potential for corporate and developmental abuse, as well as the possibility of large profits from the development of Afghan’s mineral resources, requires that the government strictly control and regulate the exploitation of its resources.

### Transportation

#### Introduction

Afghanistan has great potential to become a regional transportation hub due to its geographic location. Currently, the ring road through Afghanistan is the primary means of transport. This is problematic: the road system is difficult to maintain, especially in the winter, creates transport bottlenecks and raises costs through informal tolls and the comparative inefficiency of transporting bulk goods by truck. To develop trade routes within Afghanistan, and connections with the surrounding countries for the trade of legal goods, a functioning transportation network is necessary.

### Policy Recommendations

- **Develop an Internal Rail Network With External Connections.** A feasibility report by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) highlighted the possibility of Afghanistan becoming a transportation hub through the development of its rail network. In addition to benefits for Afghan mineral development, Afghanistan’s geographic location between Central Asia, the Middle East and South Asia create potential for an estimated 20-30 million tones of cargo passing through per annum. Rail offers an affordable means of transport both for people and goods, which is superior to roads
in many ways. Importantly it would link Afghanistan’s agricultural and mineral products with world markets through connections with its neighbours trade centers and seaports. Most importantly for investors, the costs of rail are far easier to recoup due to the ability to charge for transport when compared to roads, which are difficult to legitimately toll. The Asian Development bank has proposed 2067km of rail in three corridors.

Obstacles
The primary obstacles to rail development are high initial costs and security concerns because rail networks are highly vulnerable. Currently the Asian Development bank is financing the construction of a 75km line from Hairatan to Mazar-e-Shaif, which is expected to reduce transportation bottlenecks from the border. The costs are expected to be US $170 million and have a rate of return of 15%.

Canadian Involvement
Canada plans to invest $210 million over three years in order to achieve their second priority of strengthening the Government of Afghanistan’s ability to deliver important basic services to its citizens. Kandaharis have identified education, vocational training, the creation of roads, employment opportunities as well as repairing infrastructure for irrigation and potable water as basic services that they wish addressed. These priorities address the importance of building a stable economic system. Canada has made important developments in education with the early successful achievement of their 2011 literacy target. Canada has also been an important contributor to the Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) and in doing so has also reached and exceeded its 2011 target. Canada’s signature project, the reparation of the Dahla Dam, is intended to not only deliver important drinkable water resources but also facilitate the creation of jobs in agriculture through the development of irrigation systems. This project is off to a slow start with little to report after the last quarter and with 2011 targets far from realized. However, its completion will have significant and far reaching benefits for the 80 percent of Kandaharis that live along the water system’s contours.
Part 3: Governance In Afghanistan
Governance

Introduction
To date, Afghanistan has experienced a myriad of different forms of governance, including: monarchical, oligarchic, republic, communist, socialist, theocratic, interim and today’s democratic governments. However, none of these political models have achieved stability or “political legitimacy” with Afghans for long enough to be termed successful. Rather, Afghanistan’s national history has viciously dictated the failure of each of these nine different forms of government. Afghans have responded to these various governmental models with widespread rebellions, pursued through factional mujahadeens and eventually the Taliban. The central lessons of these periods are twofold.

First, political culture in Afghanistan has dictated tendencies towards both centralized and decentralized models of governance. These mixed tendencies are rooted in the synthesis between political and charismatic legitimation. Afghan rulers from the monarchical dynasties of the distant past to the socialist and democratic governments erected in the past twenty years (i.e. The Khan monarchies, General Muhammed Daoud Kahn, and today Hamid Karzai), have strictly appealed to a synthesis between the traditional and charismatic modes of political legitimation. These mixed forms of legitimation demonstrate the complex and multi-dimensional nature of Afghan political culture.

Second, despite the range of governments implemented in Afghanistan’s political past Afghanistan has lacked the self-determination to elect any single form of government. While the idea of authentic self-governance has been touched upon by past governments, the Afghani people have lacked the ability to determine the political shape and future of their government. Today, this has resulted in the construction of a “democratic illusion” as opposed to a functional democracy. Afghanistan’s current government appears democratic, but lacks democratic substance and practice because of its weak political institutions and dysfunctional modes of democratic governance. Regardless of the democratic appearance of the central government, the political institutions present in today’s Afghanistan severely lack actual “democratic substance” and “practice”. Strengthening the institutions that are in place is essential to giving Afghanistan’s democracy more substance.

Afghanistan’s current government under Karzai has failed to decide on a centralized or decentralized governance model. This report recommends that both national and sub national governance can best be strengthened through the amalgamation of two variants of governance: deconcentrated and devolved forms of decentralized government. The deconcentrated form of decentralized government dictates that political responsibility and resources should be moved to local levels while retaining accountability relationships with the central government in Kabul, whereas devolution involves the transfer of authority to sub-national units with some autonomy (e.g. in federal systems). A balanced synthesis between the two is a necessary response to the traditional-charismatic crossbreed of political legitimation.
looked to in Afghanistan’s past governments, as well as the ambiguity presented by the current administration’s democratic illusion.

For the democratic government of Karzai to escape the category of a democratic illusion and be the first democratic government to gain the trust of the Afghan people, changes must be made in three main areas:

I) Anti-corruption measures and the Afghan Justice Sector
II) Central Government and Electoral procedure
III) Sub-national Governance and Constitutional Review.

As corruption has been identified by the JCMB report as one of the four major obstacles to the Afghanistan Compact, the anti-corruption goals are highest priority at the current time, although all the goals will be important to eventually establishing sustainable and legitimate democracy in Afghanistan.

Policy Recommendations

I. Anti-Corruption Measures and the Afghan Justice Sector

Corruption is a major political obstacle in Afghanistan today with a variety of consequences, one of the most important being that the Afghan people do not place their trust in the government. The previous body for monitoring anti-corruption, the General Independent Administration for Anti-Corruption (GIAAC) was disbanded due to its own internal corruption levels. Afghanistan currently has an Anti-Corruption Strategy which is to be implemented by the High Office of Oversight (HOO).

The following three goals are crucial to the future of the Afghan anti-corruption effort:

i.) The establishment of trust between the Afghan people and their government. Anti-corruption measures are indeed in the interest of the population, as opposed to being the strict concern of political bureaucrats and civil servants in Kabul.

ii.) Reform to the central and most relevant actor in anti-corruption today in Afghanistan, the HOO.

iii.) Increased commitment of the Afghan Ministry of Justice and its international base of support to the construction of a viable system of courts, with a foundation of legitimate legal education, and strengthening of the Vulnerability to Corruption Assessments (VCAs).

These goals can be accomplished in 7 stages with a binding timeline of 2 years:

1) The establishment of trust between the Afghan people and its government that anti-corruption measures are indeed in the interest of the population, as opposed to being the strict concern of political bureaucrats and civil servants in Kabul. This report recommends increased commitment to the reforms and human rights standards set by the AIHRC,
including the recognition of human rights offenses committed against the Afghani people in the near past.

A mandatory oath of “ethics and service” must be taken in the civil service, as recommended by the AIHRC in 2005. In addition, there must be implementation of a government-wide oath to abide by Article 72 of the Afghanistan Constitution which “prevents the appointment of a person as a Minister in the Government if he or she has been convicted of a crime against humanity, any criminal acts, or a deprivation of civil rights by a court”. President Hamid Karzai and his government must articulate a “political commitment to justice”. At the most basic level the president has not acknowledged the morally abhorrent human rights abuses inflicted upon Afghans “in the course of war”. A report found that nearly 70% of respondents had personally suffered loss or injury due to crimes inflicted on them in the course of the war. An immediate step in establishing good governance would be for Karzai to at least acknowledge “the suffering experienced on the road to building a new Afghanistan”.

2) Reform to the central actor in the National-Anti-Corruption Strategy in Afghanistan, the High Office of Oversight is needed. We recommend improving International Coordination Efforts of Assistance to HOO through UNAMA Working Group.

Afghanistan already has or is developing the strategies and institutions necessary to combat corruption. Upon the creation and commencement of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy in 2008, the Ministry of Justice, in concert with international support, has established a High Office of Oversight (HOO) to identity and “vet out” corruption. HOO stands for the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, or has also been called the High Office of Oversight of the Implementation of the Anti-Corruption Strategy. The HOO is responsible for coordinating all anti corruption agencies and anti-corruption efforts. It is a new organization, established in 2008, and needs assistance to fulfill its extensive anti-corruption mandate.

The re-establishment of the HOO Working Group previously hosted by UNAMA is a key priority for strengthening anti-corruption in Afghanistan. The Working Group had success in coordinating the efforts of international donors to the HOO, but their meetings were suspended after the departure of a UNAMA employee in September 2009. Re-establishment of the committee will be crucial to HOO’s ability to function successfully.

3) This report recommends improving the staffing, resources, and credibility of the HOO.

The HOO is currently only 20% staffed, with some departments having only 1 or 2 staff members when dozens more are necessary. Acquiring additional qualified staff is therefore necessary for the HOO. A major obstacle is that most Afghans do not have any anti-corruption expertise, creating the need to increase staff education efforts which offer training and on-site coaching to potential workers. In addition, increasing appointments are needed of high-level advisors such as judges or anti-corruption specialists until Afghanistan can develop corruption specialists of its own. Following up on the work completed thus far by the HOO and the Afghan
Civil Service Commission (ACSC) on the implementation of a merit-based pay system could result in higher salaries, which would also be of immense value for attracting staff.

In addition, while the HOO is supposed to conduct completely independent oversight of the government, it has strong links to the Office of the President. Currently, the Director General and Deputy Director General hold presidential advisory positions, creating a conflict of interest. HOO independence can be improved by encouraging the Director General and the Deputy Director General of the HOO to either resign from their presidential positions or resign from their HOO positions. In addition, HOO currently rents office space from the President. Construction of additional facilities by the ACT (Accountability and Transparency Project) can allow the HOO to have its own offices. HOO needs to be able to determine its own budget, because it is currently delegated a budget from the Ministry of Finance, and has no role in the determination of its financial needs.

4) This report recommends improving the legislative framework, budget, and authority of the HOO.

Currently, the US Department of State, the UNODC, UNDP and United Kingdom’s Embassy have all expressed their interest in drafting improvements to the HOO legislation. The clear support for such a reform demonstrates its necessity in the immediate future. This new legislation must give the HOO greater authority, making it obligatory for government agencies to report corruption to the HOO, and providing penalties for refusing to provide documents or information requested by HOO. In addition, HOO can improve its operations in three ways. First, it needs to turn the existing HOO strategy paper into a concrete action plan with measurable goals and performance benchmarks. Second HOO needs to develop strategies for tracking corruption cases after they have been reported, and the development of strategies to verify assets after asset declaration has taken place. Third, the HOO must more effectively use current program commitments: US $1.5 million offered by USAID (to fund the initial salaries for five program office directors and up to 12 more key positions), the UNDP’s US $7.3 million from the ACT project, and the Asia Foundation. Extension of the HOO’s budget through USAID could be accomplished on the condition of the development of a sustainability plan, in which employee salaries would eventually be transferred back to the government.

5) Afghanistan must build upon the Afghan Ministry of Justice’s increased commitment to the construction of a viable system of courts, based on the consistent function of Vulnerability to Corruption Assessments (VCAs) and a foundational legal education system. We recommend that Afghanistan work toward establishing a “foundational legal education system” of moderate quality in order to make legal reform in Afghanistan sustainable.

Universities in Afghanistan need to be able to produce a reliable flow of “qualified graduates” for the proper function and sustainability of the Afghani Justice Sector, and the construction of an independent bar. The Independent Legal Training Center Law Library (ILTCLL) is an initiative undertaken in the aftermath of the Rome Conference on the rule of law in Afghanistan. Since
opening its doors on August 27, 2008, the Independent National Legal Training Center Law Library (INLTC) membership has grown to over 200 members. Kabul University should be further developed as a flagship institution for this endeavour, as recommended by the Ministry of Justice’s 2005 “Justice for All” report. Instructors must be properly paid and infrastructure developed. Canada has begun this effort with the “Project of Canadian Governance Support Office (CGSO‐CANADEM)”, and these efforts must continue. Another way to promote Afghan legalism is the creation of legislative committees, which are comprised of experienced lawyers and civil servants, to train Afghan lawyers about how to draft and scrutinize legislation within a democratic system of government.

Despite the extended efforts at improving legal education through the Judicial Reform Commission, IDLO (Independent Development of Legal Organization) and LOTFA (Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan), there exist today no Afghan institutions capable of assessing the training needs of the legal professionals and implementing the required educational programs. In addition, the Justice Sector requires increased resources and staff. The Justice Sector needs adequate facilities in every province and every district, including the provision of basic resources such as communication, equipment, transportation, and computers. As suggested by the Afghan Evaluation and Research Unit, “without transportation, prison officials cannot transport prisoners to courts or hospitals, Attorney General investigators cannot travel to crime scenes, and Huqquq officers cannot visit districts to mediate land disputes”. There therefore needs an increased commitment to the improvement of Justice infrastructure in Afghanistan and efforts to make the courts credible institutions that the public is able to trust and seek out.

6) This report recommends the creation of multi‐purpose justice centers for court, prosecution, defence and other services, the construction of viable detention centers, and the increased construction of “mobile courts”.

There are currently inadequate levels of basic resources to fulfill the court’s role and function. In many Afghani provinces and districts (i.e. 12 out of Kabul’s 17 districts) there exists a severe lack of basic resources. This necessitates the rapid construction of mobile courts and transitional institutions of justice in Afghanistan. The idea of “mobile courts” is deeply rooted in the history of Western countries (i.e. the system of assizes in common law countries) and is also a good practice for other countries with remote populations (i.e. remote aboriginal communities in Canada.) For the Afghani government to effectively utilize this recommendation, it needs to adopt the goals of the “three year pilot program” proposed by the Afghani Ministry of Justice in 2005. This program looks to facilitate the periodic visits of judges, lawyers and additional legal professionals to villages which are too remote to contain permanent staffing, and also calls for the continued construction of at least one “traveling court” in every province or locality. Detention and rehabilitation facilities, with appropriate facilities for women and children, all complying with international human rights standards, are necessary.
7) This report recommends that Vulnerability to Corruption Assessment (VCA) goals must be strengthened and ratified through increased support of VCA activities.

VCA goals have been conducted in the Revenue Department of the Ministry of Finance, the Budget Department of the Ministry of Finance, the Merit-Based Appointments in the Civil Service, the Road Sector, and the Energy Sector. However, increased follow-up on VCA results is needed. Each assessment currently contains action plans and priorities for reducing corruption in each sector. The next step is the creation of follow-up teams for each sector, using the original actors involved in conducting the VCAs. The ministries that were reviewed by the VCAs should follow-up with “corruption risk-management plans”, outlining their progress since the VCA was conducted.

VCA methods work better in core government areas than in the areas of public service; VCA methods must therefore be adjusted in the areas of public service to focus on the beneficiaries rather than the distributors, and the coordination of the multiple ministries involved in this area.

The next set of VCAs should be administered as planned, and the possibility of future VCAs in Police, Central Government, and the Ministry of Public Health sectors must be more seriously considered by the current government.

Publicizing and making the results of completed VCAs readily accessible to the public, through the Public Relations & Media department of the HOO, would improve the transparency of anti-corruption initiatives and the Afghan public’s trust of anti-corruption strategies in place today.

II. Central government and Electoral process

“Rather than once again running the polls merely as distinct events, the enormous resources and attention focused on the elections should be channelled into strengthening political and electoral institutions as a key part of the state-building efforts required to produce a stable country” - June 2009 Report from the International Crisis Group

The words of the ICG point to one of the most fundamental obstacles to stable governance in Afghanistan – its electoral processes. Despite costing over US $40 million, elections in Afghanistan in June 2009 were undemocratic and corrupt, lacked accountability and transparency, and were poorly facilitated by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Despite the negative elements of the 2009 elections, the implementation of the electoral cycle in Afghanistan has begun to provide the Afghani political system with a major source of stability and normalcy. However, this report demonstrates that elections will remain a largely “useless and costly” exercise if they are not supported by three fundamental elements: a census, a strengthened electoral commission, and enhanced electoral complaint bodies.
1) This report recommends the completion of a thorough political census by the end of 2010, through the IEC and active PDTs (provincial development teams).

Essential to good governance is being able to ascertain both the precise number of people and ethnic groups existing under its rule. Although a population census was supposed to be conducted by the end of 2008, no thorough political census has been completed since 1979. This census was completed over a three week period in June 1979 after the establishment of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). It estimated the population to be 13.9 million, including 800,000 nomads. However, this census has little legitimacy because only 56% of the population was enumerated due to mounting resistance in the countryside. Grossly inflated figures were added for the remainder. Before the 1979 census, another was undertaken in 1972-74 by the State University of New York (SUNY) for the United States Agency for International Development (AID), in cooperation with the Afghan government. Provincial Development Teams (PDTs) have proven to be the most successful development initiatives in Afghanistan. This report believes that PDTs are the closest the international community can get to a direct link to the nomadic populations. In order to complete an accurate political census, there must be increased contact with the northern as well as tribal areas of Afghanistan in order to discern, at the very least, some estimate of the nomadic populations in Afghanistan. The provincial elections in 2011 are an opportunity to estimate the population of Afghanistan. Completing this goal by the end of 2010 would then allow for the establishment of a voter registry, an element which has never been present in Afghanistan.

2) This report recommends strengthening the Independent Election Commission (IEC).

The IEC must take substantive measures to improve its own accountability to the Afghan people. These measures should comprise more than token dismissals of basic “contract workers”, instead looking towards incidences of fraud taking place at the hands of permanent IEC staff. The extended auditing of results from random polling booths can be used in areas of atypical voter demographics, such as high female turnout; this would serve as a check on fraud. Along with self-auditing, the IEC can ensure its successful function for the 2011 Parliamentary Elections by issuing the frequent and random inspection of campaign finance reports within the offices of all presidential candidates, as well as prominent district and provincial council candidates. With regards to improving the 2011 elections, the IEC must also establish clearer guidelines for campaigning and voting decorum among the population and government ministries. It is common practice within certain districts (i.e. Herat and Bamiyan) for political blocs to form and encourage corrupt election practices (i.e. taking down of opposing candidates’ posters of outside district governors). In order to eliminate the emergence of these voting blocs, which are mainly based on ties of lineage, local support, and reputation, the Afghan district governors must be given clearer guidelines about how to legally run in provincial and national elections. This being said, while the rules and systematic checks must be built up to ensure that such rules are adhered to, there also must be an increase in the role, responsibility, and accountability of district governors.
3) This report recommends strengthening the ECC and ELECT programs.

Strengthening the capacity and resources of the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) which issued decisions on 181 of the 467 lodged complaints during the 2009 elections, is crucial. These decisions encompassed responses to complaints regarding campaign material disputes, the abuse of public resources, and the interference of government officials in electoral affairs. Despite the commission’s success in vetting out specific sources of corruption in the last election (i.e. throwing out of one-third of the votes cast for Mr. Karzai because they were fraudulent) it must receive more staff and its staff cannot be appointed by the president, as a recent decree has stipulated. (In February 2010, President Karzai issued a decree that gave himself full authority to appoint members of the group, saying he wanted to "Afghanize" the body). The continued function of this commission requires the appointment of impartial international actors to oversee both the function, as well as gauge the usefulness of the ECC in ensuring free, fair and sufficiently inclusive elections. The increased deployment of the Election Observation Mission steams (EOM) to further oversee parliamentary elections in 2011 would be a positive step towards evaluating the usefulness of the IEC, while supporting elections. The European Union and its Member States are currently spending close to €1 billion a year on various civilian, political, and social development activities. However, the EOM initiative must now receive increased attention, because it is able to play a prominent role in the nearing 2011 parliamentary elections.

In strengthening the role of the ECC, there are other similar initiatives such as ELECT (Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow), which can also ensure impartial international participation in the 2010 elections. Given the fact that ELECT is the central mechanism for the coordination of international assistance towards the election process, there needs to be more preparation for national and provincial elections through its initiatives. The creation of a working review commission within ELECT may be of immense benefit in better ensuring that the coordination of international support for the elections process takes a more meaningful shape in the 2011 parliamentary elections. ELECT’s role in ensuring successful elections is extremely valuable because stable and democratic elections not only depend on the coordination of select government ministries (i.e. The Ministries of Defence and Internal Affairs) but also on the coordination of a larger set of government bodies (i.e. Ministry of Education, Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs.)

III. Sub national governance and Constitutional Review

1) The AERU and ANDS reports recommend the strengthening of district governance as the chief priority of the current approach to governance reform.

Many reports have stated that governors are seldom found in their districts, so are rarely held accountable for their decision-making and campaigning practices at the local and national levels. Disillusionment with the government is growing as a result of a lack of institutions of
justice and democracy. For example, 4/17 districts in Kabul are nominally functional politically and legally, with forty police officers to uphold the rule of law, local security, and the fairness of political processes. These current resources can hardly be considered an adequate legal and social foundation for the establishment of the rule of law, and therefore need to be changed. This change must first come to the districts of South and East Afghanistan, which exhibit a major lack of resources and funding as well as a stark difference from some of the Northern provinces.

2) We recommend the integration of the tribal justice system into the formal justice system at the sub-national level.
The traditional justice system within Afghanistan is a mix between civil law and Islamic Sharia-based legal system. These traditional tribunals focus on apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation, also known as the principle of “restorative justice.” These customary legal systems operate in most non-urban areas, and thus should be increasingly incorporated into any successful sub-national governance strategy. The principle of restorative justice must be recognized by the current sub-national governance strategy as an important aspect of Afghan history and culture, and be an inclusive part of District councils and local arms of government. Since these tribunals are currently flourishing in the rural areas, there must be formal integration of these “restorative justice circles” into the official political and legal systems of District governments. Recommendations include the integration of Pashtunwali code into local enforcement of Rule of Law, and that local justice should co-exist with tribal and provincial elders rather than compete with them. In this way the government can work with and maximize a cultural practice that is already established in Afghanistan’s past and a pronounced part of everyday life in the rural areas of Afghanistan.

3) This report recommends that increasing mandate of the IDLG and the introduction of laws regarding the District Councils, Municipal Councils, and Village Councils
Any successful reform of sub-national governance in Afghanistan must look to strengthen the goals and mandates of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and its plan of action. While the IDLG provides a crucial mechanism to coordinate reform of local models of governance, even its most basic goals have not been met, such as the establishment of a web site in Pashto, Dari and English for communication of its policies and programs to Afghan citizens and the international community. A secondary example is the IDLG’s inability to complete a review of its processes, as well as facilities available in all the Councils, sub national government offices and municipalities by the end of 2008. An important recommendation is increased commitment to the fulfillment of the IDLG’s goal to establish basic facilities and equipment for all of the District councils, and the adequate means of mobility for governors and officials to make more direct connections with the communities they are serving. In providing more resources there must also be a redefinition of overall strategy; implementing an overall legislative framework to establish the powers and boundaries of the provincial governing bodies would respond to Afghan confusion over national and sub-national governance structures. The roles and responsibilities of structures at the sub-national level must be thus more clearly defined and empowered, by the creation of a distinct civil code for sub-national branches of government.
4) This report recommends streamlining and correctly appointing the organizations which have been created at the sub-national governance level.
Community Development Councils, District Development Assemblies, and Traditional “shuras” function within overlapping guidelines and mandates. The institutional purposes and mandates of these arms of government need to be clarified and streamlined to properly appointed civil servants so that there is increased accountability at the sub national sector. This recommendation specifically includes the need to strengthen the mandate and resources of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) by giving it the ability to dismiss pointless or mischievous complaints. Where the CSC proceeds with an investigation it should supply the official in question with a written copy of the allegations and the impugned official should have the right to reply in writing.

5) This report concludes that the constitutional review and construction process must be strengthened.

Two approaches will help achieve this goal. First, the Constitutional Review Commission and Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) need more resources, training and time. The CRC and CLJ are the two main legislative bodies appointed to oversee the construction, review, and drafting of the 2001 constitution. The review commission is mandated to conduct public consultation on the preliminary draft of the constitution in all 34 provinces of the country. However, given the CRC’s poor resources (i.e. 35 members) as well as extremely limited time (i.e. three months to complete the process with only a month of education) to review the drafting of a constitution, it was unable to complete all parts of this process and construct a sufficiently strong constitution. This fact is made immediately clear by the drafting of later legislation, such as the National Stability and Reconciliation Law, passed in March 2007, as well as the lack of checks on the presidential power of Hamid Karzai.

The CRC thus needs increased staffing, more educational training, enhanced legal-rational experience, and a more functional, and pronounced role in the review and amendment processes concerning laws passed today. Furthermore, the CRC must independently take steps towards ensuring that human rights standards, as clarified by the AIHRC, are adhered to within the 2001 constitution. Second, immediate amendments are needed to National Stability and Reconciliation Law, passed in March 2007. This law prohibits the prosecution of individuals responsible for large-scale human rights abuses in the preceding decades, and there have been strong protests against this law. This constitutional provision is in direct conflict with Article 72 of the Afghanistan Constitution, which “prevents the appointment of a person as a Minister in the Government if he or she has been convicted of a crime against humanity, any criminal acts, or a deprivation of civil rights by a court”. This report suggests the need to immediately dismantle this law by giving it a clearer purpose and an established enforcement system.
Obstacles

While the HOO is to work with government offices and ministries, a major obstacle is the tradition of a lack of support and cooperation among the government offices. As well, strong political will is needed; firm and committed action is necessary to crack down on corruption. Another obstacle is the amount of time that training qualified Afghans will take. Development of the HOO will be a long-term project. The HOO currently does not exist at a sub-national level, and this concern will need to be addressed. In addition, this report acknowledges the difficulties and imperfections of the VCA process. Balancing flexibility and staying within the mandates has been a continual challenge throughout the VCA process. There has also been considerable difficulty organizing donors and sponsors. In addition, the VCAs have a limited capacity to deal with large-scale corruption. They focus mostly on small-scale and immediate corruption in specific areas, and therefore VCAs must be seen as only a part of the larger anti-corruption strategy.

The construction of a functional and sufficiently accessible legal education system is essential for the sustainability of sub-national governance reform in Afghanistan. It has been estimated by the Afghan Ministry of Justice that a modest legal aid system for Afghanistan could cost US $30 million over 12 years - roughly US $1.20 per person. This might be compared with a cost of US $9 billion for legal aid, roughly US $700 per person, over the same period in a developed setting like Ontario, Canada, where most of the capital and training costs have long since been absorbed.

Canadian Involvement

Over a three year period, Canada intends to invest $355 million towards establishing democratic and effective institutions within Afghanistan. Canada has been supporting the International Elections Commission through financial aid, training, equipment, and program assistance including working towards the creation of a national voter registry in order to promote free and fair elections in Afghanistan. In adhering to their priority objective of targeting both national and regional development, the Canadian government, to name one of several projects, has also contributed to the Government of Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program. This program aims to strengthen community level governance and reconstruction through local elected bodies. Local judiciary systems have also been assisted through the support programs set up for the ANA and ANP. In addition, the Canadian aid assistance is in the process of strengthening Afghan institutions in order that they are better able to deliver basic services to their citizens as well as attempting to fortify the legitimacy of these institutions as they are perceived by the public by enhancing their abilities as well as through reconciliation processes.
A Blueprint for Peace in Afghanistan

Part 4:

Aid & Development In Afghanistan
Aid & Development

Introduction

The majority of Afghanistan’s population remains vulnerable after over three decades of war, frequent natural hazards such as earthquakes, landslides and harsh weather, and a continuing national conflict. Despite millions of dollars committed in aid annually and an increasing level of social development, the situation in Afghanistan has continued to deteriorate for many Afghans.

Whilst principles of cooperation and mechanisms for coordination and monitoring of international aid efforts were emphasized in the signing of the 2006 Afghanistan Compact, effective aid management remains one of four primary challenge areas according to the JCMB and its 2008 review of the implementation of the Compact. According to the Humanitarian Action Plan published by the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOHA) for 2010, the incident level rose to 35% in 2009 from 30% in the previous year. This placed increased risk on the lives of Afghans as well as those of international humanitarian workers. Despite the international community agreeing upon concrete goals and specific deadlines, international donors and aid organizations have largely failed to align their efforts with the Government of Afghanistan and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). Much of the international community now considers the goals of the 2006 Compact to have been overly ambitious, and inadequate effectiveness and management of aid has since emerged as one of Afghanistan’s foremost challenges.

Furthermore, the Government of Afghanistan has emphasized the necessity of creating mechanisms and strengthening pre-existing frameworks in order to better coordinate and facilitate aid effectiveness. The Government of Afghanistan has called for an incremental increase in aid funding being channeled through the national government through programs such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and the Afghanistan Law and Order Trust Fund. In addition, increased resources and a heightened mandate for the coordinating and monitoring functions of both the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the JCMB has also been made a priority.

**BOX 1: Fund Co-ordination and Oversight Organizations for Afghanistan**

*The following mechanisms oversee the commitment to the Millennium Development Goals and the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy.*

- The Join Coordination and Monitoring Board
- The Afghanistan Development Fund
- Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR)

*The following instruments are responsible for channelling funds within Afghanistan*  
- The Afghan Budget
- The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
- The World Bank under the United Nations
Given the geographical, social, cultural and economic diversity in Afghanistan, each region must be considered on a case-by-case basis in order to successfully implement local programs. Recognizing that there has been and continues to be extensive field research conducted with regards to the needs of the Afghan people as published in the annual Humanitarian Action Plan (specifying annual objectives, logical frameworks and strategic objectives based on bi-annual research and monitoring,) it is necessary to focus on the effectiveness of aid to ensure that these needs are met. The Human Development Index, a tool to measure human development conceptually, has shown that although economic development is necessary for social development it is not sufficient. There needs to be focus on human development priorities (education, healthcare, political freedom,) in order to reduce poverty and hardship.

**BOX 2: The Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) 2010**

This annually conducted Action Plan provides a national and regional summary and recommendations of immediate action required in Afghanistan. It has calculated a budget of US $870,561,261 for 2010.

It focuses on the following areas, identifying strategic objectives for each:

- Education
- Telecommunication
- Food Security and Agriculture
- Health
- Nutrition
- Protection
- Water Sanitation and Hygiene
- Multisector (including immigration, returning Afghans and refugees)

An indication of the wide reach of the HAP program is the fact that only 24% of all funding in Afghanistan works with projects outside of those covered in the HAP, whilst 77% work towards their goals and findings.

United Nations’ agencies working through UNAMA are the “Lead Agencies” in all of the areas. For further information of the UN involvement in Afghanistan refer to Appendix 1.

The final section of this report will address this challenge area of effective aid management by first, making recommendations for the international community to better coordinate and harmonize its approaches to Afghan development, and secondly, by presenting a number of case-studies of successful Afghan initiatives that can be utilized as a means to effectively coordinate the efforts of bilateral donors, NGOs, and international organizations such as the UN while aligning all of these efforts with the primary goals of the Afghan government and the ANDS. These recommendations are in keeping with the United Nations agreement that efforts need to be increasingly localized, and goals, such as the global Millennium Development Goals and their achievement, must become an increasingly Afghan initiative.
The UN Millennium Development Goals in Afghanistan

The United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals have become a global benchmark for development. However, while their universal utility is recognized, they have been “Afghanised” in order to suit them to the realities of the Afghan situation. To this effect, the timeline for the Afghan MDG’s (AMDG’s) has been extended from 2015 to 2020 by a decision of the Afghan government upon endorsing the Millennium Development Goals in 2004 and an additional goal has been added to the universal list. The United Nations recognizes the importance of creating “people’s goals” and that in order to meet these successfully the support of the Government, civil society and local communities is required. This is in contrast with top-level aid management, which deals largely with the sanctioning and management of funds. When considering the results that are seen in Afghanistan it is important to consider both levels of aid effectiveness:

i) **Top-level Aid Management** refers to the administration and coordination of aid funding and project implementation. While certainly important, the international community has largely focused disproportionately on top-level aid management and neglected the question of its long-term effectiveness for the Afghan people. For example, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness has been criticised for its extensive focus on the management of aid without adequately considering its grassroots impact.

ii) **Grassroots-level Aid Effectiveness** refers to the implementation and impact of aid on the ground. This type of local understanding of aid effectiveness would be that “aid should effectively meet the needs of the people by having a positive impact during and following project implementation”. This level is certainly important when considering the assigning of funds, the utility of a program and cultural feasibility. Thus, the AMDG’s have been closely aligned with Afghan priorities through extensive consultation with the ANDS, and the Afghan Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper which looks to relieve international debt and encourage pro-poor growth policies.
**Figure 1: Overview of Millennium Development Goals**

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger</td>
<td>- Decrease the number of people earning &lt;US $1.00/day by 3% per annum until the year 2020.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Decrease the number of people suffering from hunger by 5% per annum until the year 2020.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promote gender equality and empower women</td>
<td>- Eliminate gender disparity in education at all levels by 2020.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Reduce gender disparity in economic areas by 2020</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Reduce gender disparity in access to justice by 50% by 2015, and 100% by 2020</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Increase female participation in all levels of governance to 30% by 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce infant and child mortality</td>
<td>- Reduce by 50% between 2003 and 2015, the under 5 mortality rate, and further reduce it to 1/3 of the 2003 level by 2020.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improve maternal health</td>
<td>- Reduce by 50% by 2015 the maternal mortality ratio, and a further 25% of the 2002 level by 2020.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases</td>
<td>- Have halted by 2020 and reversed the spread or incidence of diseases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure environmental sustainability</td>
<td>- Reverse the loss of environmental resources through integrating principles of sustainable development in to policies and programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a global partnership for security</td>
<td>- Structure the provision of foreign aid appropriately in order to enable Afghanistan to develop in a long-term sustainable manner.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Develop an open, rules based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system that includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Provide access to and affordable essential drugs in cooperation with pharmaceutical companies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>- Enhance Security through:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Reform and professionalize the ANA and ANP by 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- All emplaced antipersonnel mines destroyed by 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- All other explosives destroyed by 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- All stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed by 2007 and all abandoned/ unwanted explosive stock destroyed by 2020.</td>
</tr>
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Information from *The State of Human Development and the Afghan Millennium Development Goals*

In recognizing that increased Afghan ownership is the most efficient and effective way to better coordinate and align development efforts in Afghanistan as well as improve their effectiveness
on the ground, this report proposes the following three areas as being in need of immediate attention to ensure effective aid: funding, implementation, and monitoring. These three areas are explored below in more detail, along with key policy recommendations.

1. Funding

Introduction

The international donor communities, including national funding agencies, international organizations and NGOs, have contributed in many ways to the difficulties of reconstruction and development. In many ways, funding has been inconsistent and unreliable, whereas the proper planning and prioritization of projects and programs requires confirmed, long-term, multi-year funding. Moreover, a growing gap has been noted between amounts pledged and amounts dispersed, as well as delays between disbursement and implementation. Furthermore, over two-thirds of all international aid monies bypass the Afghan government all together, thereby inhibiting its ability to control its own national budget and threatening its overall legitimacy. In recognizing that increased Afghan ownership is the most efficient and effective way to better coordinate and align development efforts in Afghanistan, this report proposes that international funding be more directly and efficiently channeled through the Afghan national government through the following procedures.

Policy Recommendations

1. **Increase the amount of aid channelled through the Afghan government.**

In order for the Afghan government to effectively take ownership of the development process, it must be given greater control over international aid monies entering its country. A large proportion of assistance is currently not in alignment with national and provincial plans, and under half is disbursed in agreement with the Afghan government. Roughly two thirds of all aid monies bypass the Afghan government all
together. The amount of aid monies being channelled through the central government and the Afghanistan Reconstruction Fund (ARTF) should be increased by 50% within the next two years. Based on the success of this initiative, future timelines will be determined, ultimately working towards complete Afghan ownership.

2. **Distribute full amounts pledged and reduce the delay between disbursement and implementation.**

There is currently a US$ 10 billion deficit between amounts pledged (US $25 billion since 2001) and those disbursed (US $15 billion since 2001) by the international community. According to Afghan government figures, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and India have disbursed only a third of their commitments for 2002-2008. The US has to date disbursed only half of its US $10.4 billion commitment for this period; and the World Bank just over half its US $1.6 billion commitment. The EC and Germany have disbursed less than two-thirds of their respective commitments of US $1.7 billion and US $1.2 billion. International donors must work towards effective and efficient disbursement of 100% of pledged aid monies.

3. **Decrease the amount of tied-aid.**

Unfortunately, large amounts of the international aid flowing through Afghanistan do not stay. An estimated 40% of aid goes back to donor countries in corporate profits and consultant salaries – some US $6 billion since 2001. Profit margins on reconstruction contracts for international companies can also range from 20-50%, while most full-time expatriate consultants, working in private consulting companies, cost US $250,000-US $500,000 a year. This amount of tied aid (over 50% of all aid) should be significantly decreased, and efforts made to encourage domestic procurement of goods and services.

4. **Reroute security funding towards development funding.**

Despite the international community’s emphasis on Afghan reconstruction and sustainability, development funding remains only a fraction of military spending to this day. While the US military spends close to US $100 million a day in Afghanistan the average volume of development aid spent by all donors since

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Figure 3: Completed, ongoing and funded PRT spending per capita, per province. Source: ISAF, May 2007

According to ISAF, reported data omits an estimated 40% of all reconstruction and development. Tasks do not include counter narcotics and public order for AKA (unclassified graphic).
2001 is just US $7 million a day. Efforts must be made to quickly transition from a security-intensive approach towards a more development-intensive approach in Afghanistan. The proportion of aid monies directed towards development initiatives versus security measures should be revalued for 2010; there should be enough capital to adequately fund the development of the ANA, as outlined in the Security section, while re-routing proportionate but significant amounts of money towards development. More specifically, donor funds directed towards Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) should be transitioned towards more local and national government initiatives, such as the National Solidarity Program (NSP) with the ultimate aim of achieving full domestic ownership of Afghan development.

5. **Increase donor transparency and accountability.** In addition to insufficient donor coordination, there remains little donor transparency and few mechanisms to hold donors accountable or monitor and evaluate donor budgets. The Afghanistan compact has 77 measurable benchmarks for budgeting of the Afghan government, but none for donors. In fact, the Afghan government does not know how one-third of all aid since 2001 – some US $5 billion – has been spent. Donors need to make use of pre-existing resources such as the ARTF and the Donor Assistance Database in order to increase transparency, practice full disclosure, and increase accountability for all aid budgets - including salaries, contractors, and use of Afghan resources.

6. **More equal proportionate distribution.** In 2007-2008, the most insecure provinces of Nimroz, Helmand, Zabul, Kandahar and Uruzgan have been allocated more than US $200 per person, whereas many other provinces are due to receive less than half this amount, and some, such as Sari Pul or Takhar, are allocated less than one third this amount. This disparity is causing increases in incidences within these provinces, largely as a means to appear insecure and therefore receive more funding. Efforts should also be made to decrease disparities in the geographical distribution of aid and ensure that all provinces receive a proportionate amount of aid funding. This can be done through an increased emphasis on provincial and regional development initiatives such as those outlined in the following section on Implementation.

**Obstacles**

Despite the international community’s formal recognition of the importance of domestic ownership over the development process in Afghanistan, international donors have been largely hesitant to channel their funds through the Government of Afghanistan and the ARTF due to widespread accusations of fraud and corruption. In order to justify a greater degree of governmental control of resources, the Afghan government must continue its efforts to improve budget execution capabilities, strengthen financial management, expedite public administration reform, tackle corruption, and promote sub-national ownership.
2. Implementation

Introduction

Arguably the best way to coordinate aid in Afghanistan is to align the work of international donors and aid organizations with national and local development priorities such as the ANDS and the provincial and district development plans. Unfortunately, the international community has failed to adequately support Afghan-led initiatives such as the seven priority programs of the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development (MRRD). These government-mandated programs have not only provided an important framework within which to coordinate the efforts of bilateral donors as well as NGOs, but have also provided new and innovative approaches to the creation of local governance structures and local ownership over development initiatives. Furthermore, as they are largely executed with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), they have also succeeded in incorporating the Afghan Millennium Development Goals (AMDGs) into the development agenda. This partnership with the UNDP means that the goals are framed in a manner consistent with international protocol and presented in a cohesive and consistent manner to any country, organization, or individual donor.

The strategy behind these programs has been to take each of the eight pillars of the ANDS (Security; Good Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights; Infrastructure and Natural Resources; Education, Culture, Media and Sport; Health and Nutrition; Agriculture and Rural Development; Social Protection; Economic Governance and Private Sector Development) and break them down into highly specific and specialized goals for each province and district. Their approach is not only comprehensive and coordinated, but also demand-driven, pro-poor, and pro-growth. As these provincial and district development plans are specific to Afghan needs, perceptions, and priorities, it is counterintuitive for donors and NGOs to ignore their requests and create independent and over-lapping initiatives that impose international objectives upon Afghans and are not truly based in local realities. By further supporting and strengthening these local development initiatives the international community is best able to improve coordination and aid effectiveness.

Policy Recommendations

The Government of Afghanistan has outlined four areas of focus with corresponding projects that currently offer the best option for effective implementation of both short-term aid and long-term sustainable stability.

1. **Community Empowerment.** This area specifically focuses on incorporating gender awareness and gender-sensitivity into its proposals, as well as providing Afghan citizens with basic needs.
   - **Ex:** The Ministry of Health has been working with NGOs and donors to implement the **Health Sector Emergency Reconstruction and Development Project**. It has focused on distributing Basic Package of Health Services (BPHSs) throughout the country. In addition to providing primary health care, this includes training volunteers, opening health centres and improving the quality of care. Also, the project supported the
Community Midwifery Education programme to address the shortage of female health workers in remote areas. As a result, national coverage rates from 9% in 2003 to 85% in 2008.

2. **Institutional Development** aims to strengthen the institutional and technical capabilities of the Afghan state on both a national and sub-national level.
   - Ex: The National Solidarity Programmes (N.S.Ps) promote good local governance, and empower rural communities to take control over their lives and livelihoods. This is achieved through the training of citizens in participatory governance roles and the creation of Community Development Councils (C.D.Cs), which monitor the different initiatives undertaken in their region. (See Appendix 2 for a more detailed example of these projects.)

3. **Economic Regeneration outside of poverty reduction.** This would focus on the regeneration of policies and strategies according to regional rather than national needs. Although many of the resources are focused on rural development, urban areas, such as Kabul, are also included in its planning because development is a nation-wide goal.
   - Ex: The National Rural Access Program (NRAP) – works with the World Bank, the ILO, and the Government of Afghanistan to increase access to rural infrastructure for local communities and to provide employment opportunities for rural labourers.
   - Ex: The Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) – works with NGOs, commercial banks, cooperatives, and insurance companies to provide flexible, handy, and reasonable financial services for poor people throughout Afghanistan.

4. **Implementation Support** is perhaps the most pertinent to this section of our report. This area of focus challenges both the MRRD and the Government of Afghanistan to increase its implementation capacity in order to effectively mobilize both its own resources and those of others who have given aid.
   - Ex: The National Area-Based Development Program (NABDP) promotes the establishment of PDPs and DDPs as an integrated planning and implementation framework for regional and district level development. They have formed highly specific goals that are derivatives of the broad national goals outlined by the ANDS and that are specific to each region.

**Obstacles**

With the multitude of bilateral donors and aid organizations functioning within Afghanistan, differing motives and objectives prove a major challenge when aligning aid programmes. International donors are often subject to domestic pressures and perceptions about what is required for Afghan reconstruction and various organizations have their own independent priorities. As with budgeting, questions regarding misconduct and manipulation on the part of Afghan officials remains an additional challenge. Furthermore, adequate research into the long-term impact and success of aid projects remains difficult to find in such a country where even a national census does not exist. However, by aligning all aid efforts with national
and local priorities and by utilizing pre-existing frameworks for effective implementation, the international community will best ensure that they are meeting the needs of the Afghan people and leaving a positive impact both during and after project implementation.

3. Monitoring

Introduction

The international community and the government of Afghanistan have been very clear about setting specific goals and deadlines with regards to reconstruction and development in Afghanistan through agreements such as the Compact and the ANDS. However, monitoring and evaluation methods to go along with these benchmarks are few and far between. As was previously stated, the Afghanistan Compact has 77 measurable indicators for Afghan budgeting and implementation, but none for bilateral donors and aid agencies. Largely for this reason, only two-thirds of pledged aid monies have been effectively distributed and the long-term impact of aid projects remains largely unknown. If Afghan ownership and long-term aid effectiveness remain the ultimate goals of the international community’s involvement there, measurable benchmarks and far-reaching evaluation mechanisms must be sufficiently expanded and utilized.

Policy Recommendations

1. **Aid Effectiveness Indicators.** The 2005 Paris Declaration outlined the following five priority areas for monitoring effective aid coordination: ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability. Although useful, these five indicators focus primarily on top-level management and do not adequately address the grassroots level of aid effectiveness. Therefore, donors and the Afghan government should, where possible, collectively agree on measurable indicators that consider both levels of aid effectiveness and that have correlative targets capable of measuring the impact, efficiency, relevance, sustainability, accountability, and Afghan ownership of aid, as well as the use of Afghan human and material resources.

2. **Top-level monitoring and evaluation.** Despite the emphasis on aid coordination and harmonization, less than 40% of technical assistance is coordinated with the Afghan government and only one-third of donor analytical or assessment work is conducted jointly. Originally set up in 2006 to monitor the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact, the mandate of the JCMB could be expanded and its resources improved in order to be used as a national, independent commission for aid effectiveness. It should monitor aid practices, identify deficiencies and make recommendations to the Afghan government as international donors in conjunction with the ANDS and subsequently, the Afghan government.

3. **Grassroots monitoring and evaluation.** With hundreds of domestic and international NGOs functioning within 34 different provinces within Afghanistan, grassroots communication and coordination is often scattered and insufficient. However, organizations exist, such as the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR),
that can be further expanded and used a means to coordinate and evaluate NGO efforts in Afghanistan and align them with the ANDS and the Afghan Millennium Development Goals. ACBAR already has a number of useful resources such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers that should be used by all aid actors during both the implementation and evaluation stages of aid projects in throughout the country.

4. **Supply of information.** Donors should publicly provide full information on aid flows both before and after implementation through resources such as the ARTF and the Afghanistan Donor Assistance Database. These agencies should be overhauled, updated and allow full public access to aid information.

**Obstacles**

In a country where an official population statistic and a nation-wide census are still unattainable, full monitoring and evaluation of aid projects certainly seems a daunting task. In order to measure long-term grassroots impact, extended commitments from aid agencies and national coordination bodies will be necessary as there are certainly no quick-fixes in the case of Afghanistan. However, by prioritizing both levels of aid effectiveness and utilizing pre-existing monitoring systems, proper aid evaluation can be achieved and will certainly assist in overall aid effectiveness both in Afghanistan as well as in other fragile states abroad. Again, building on pre-existing mechanisms in order to strengthen Afghan ownership over the development process remains the best and most efficient way to coordinate and align international aid efforts both at home and abroad.

---

**Canadian Involvement**

Due to the regional diversity of the provinces, it is important to tailor development programs to their particular necessities and ensure that each region is developing an important sense of community empowerment. However, a strong central body is also required in order to create a stable Afghanistan. The Canadian government is an example of a concerned donor of development aid, as their strategies have been adapted to fit the needs of their region (Kandahar) while simultaneously addressing the need of a central capacity building through the division of their six priorities into national and regional initiatives. Kandahar remains highly vulnerable to insurgent activity and recruitment and therefore Canadian aid has been geared towards gaining the trust of communities through smaller projects such as ‘Operation Kalay’. This particular project involves the creation of small ‘model villages’ where quick impact projects can be created, boosting the trust towards Canadian and Afghan aid and security agents. This practice has been taken up by NATO in other regions of Afghanistan, thus indicating the success of smaller scale projects that contribute to both regional and national stabilization.
Appendix 1: Summary of the United Nation’s Current Involvement in Afghanistan

The following chart, a compilation of UNAMA’s involvement in Afghanistan, furthers the channelling of aid through UNAMA in accordance with the JCMB, ANDS and ARTF to minimize the duplication of efforts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Areas of Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan’s New Beginning Program (ANDB)</td>
<td>Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Labour Organization (ILO)</td>
<td>Restructuring the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs; Increasing employment services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organization for Migration (IOM)</td>
<td>Afghan Civilian Assistance Program; construction of Health and Education facilities, border and passport control; reintegration of Afghans returning from Iran and Pakistan; the return and integration of qualified Afghans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan (MAACA)</td>
<td>The safe and timely removal of land mines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)</td>
<td>Primary education; training teachers; vocational training; immunization; prevent child trafficking; mine risk education programs; providing school supplies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Office Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
<td>Production of the annual Humanitarian Action Plan: collating and reporting on all humanitarian activity within Afghanistan to monitor and continually assess regional needs and priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Development Program (UNDP)</td>
<td><em>DiAG</em> – Disbandment of illegal armed groups. (Collection and registration of arms &amp; disbanding illegal groups with arms) Since 2009, working with Government’s National Peace and Reintegration Program; Developing and reshaping Afghanistan’s Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)</td>
<td>Development of the natural, social and human sciences, cultural restitution, communication and information sharing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</td>
<td>Implementation of the ANDS 5 year development goals ensuring the safe return of refugees to Afghanistan. Main goals include: Favourable protection environment, Fair protection processes, Basic needs and services, Durable solutions, External relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Human Settlement Programs (UN Habitat)</td>
<td>City development program. Looking to build infrastructure in 6 major cities across the country; land management system and land market; municipal support: water supply, sanitation, solid waste management; shelter construction; waste management; neighbourhood construction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)</td>
<td>Working towards a legal, narcotic free economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN World Food Programme (WFP)</td>
<td>Relief food assistance, post-conflict rehabilitation, provision of common air services to UN and private NGO’s in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN World Health Organization (WHO)</td>
<td>Works in conjunction with the Compact, ARTF and ANDS: NSP; NERAP; MicroFinance Ventures; Governmental Communication; Education; Power rehabilitation; Irrigation Rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: Major Needs

This Appendix outlines major needs as identified by the ANDS, AMDGs, and DDPs as developed by the MRRD. Its purpose is to prove that there is a well developed framework that exists in Afghanistan to effectively channel aid in order to produce results that have the maximum impact, priority, and ultimately ownership. It synthesizes the primary, secondary, and tertiary pillar-goals as identified by the ANDS, and then applies the AMDGs as applicable. Finally, this appendix shows which of the DDPs for each region are applicable to the above goals. Kandahar was chosen as the focus province for this appendix to highlight Canada’s involvement in the region, as their work is an example of how countries can align themselves with the goals and projects that have been identified by the Afghan people as priorities.

**ANDS Priority 1: Security & AMDG: Security**

**Region: Arghandab**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Rank</th>
<th>Project Idea</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Estimated Budget</th>
<th>Lead Agency</th>
<th>Type of Community Contribution</th>
<th>Selected by Men/ Women/ All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Provision of modern equipment, communication radios and vehicles for the local security forces</td>
<td>Police, District people</td>
<td>$600,000</td>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Establishment of 6 security check posts</td>
<td>Army force, District people</td>
<td>$150,000</td>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Construction of a local Police Department complex</td>
<td>Police, District people</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Construction of a district detention centre</td>
<td>Prisoners, District people</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Increment of salary scale for the local security personnel</td>
<td>Police, District people</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
<td>MoI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Region: Afghanistan
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Rank</th>
<th>Projects Idea</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Estimated Budget</th>
<th>Lead Agency</th>
<th>Type of Community contribution</th>
<th>Selected by Men/ Women/ All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Recruitment of security personnel on the basis of qualification and merit</td>
<td>Police Inhabitants of district</td>
<td>350,000 $</td>
<td>Mol</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Establishment of a local tribal militias to assist in maintaining security and imposing law and order</td>
<td>100 Inhabitants of district</td>
<td>70,000 $</td>
<td>Mol</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Establishment of a Police Academy</td>
<td>50 people Inhabitants of district</td>
<td>50,000 $</td>
<td>Mol</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Implementation of district de-mining programmes</td>
<td>200 people Inhabitants of district</td>
<td>100,000 $</td>
<td>Mol</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Construction of check posts throughout the district</td>
<td>80 people Inhabitants of district</td>
<td>100,000 $</td>
<td>Mol</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ANDS Priority 2: Infrastructure & Irrigation & AMDG: Environmental sustainability**

**Region: Arghandab**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Rank</th>
<th>Project Idea</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Estimated Budget</th>
<th>Lead Agency</th>
<th>Type of Community Contribution</th>
<th>Selected by Men/ Women/ All</th>
<th>Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Restoration of the Dalai Dam and construction of a hydropower station</td>
<td>Workers District people</td>
<td>1,000,000 $</td>
<td>MoWaP</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Construction of 7.9 Kms road From Nagahan to Ahmad Khil is ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Construction of new primary &amp; secondary roads</td>
<td>Workers District people</td>
<td>140,000 $</td>
<td>MoPW MRRD</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Construction of new roads</td>
<td>Workers District people</td>
<td>400,000 $</td>
<td>MRRD</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Restoration of irrigation canals and streams for 50 villages</td>
<td>Workers District people</td>
<td>200,000 $</td>
<td>MRRD</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Region: Afghanistan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Rank</th>
<th>Projects Idea</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Estimated Budget</th>
<th>Lead Agency</th>
<th>Type of Community contribution</th>
<th>Selected by Men/ Women/ All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Construction of new roads and culverts</td>
<td>300 people Inhabitants of district</td>
<td>20,000,000 $</td>
<td>MoPW</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Construction of new roads and culverts</td>
<td>150 people Inhabitants of district</td>
<td>20,000,000 $</td>
<td>MoPW</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Construction of new roads and culverts</td>
<td>80 people 15000 people</td>
<td>214,000,000 $</td>
<td>MoPW</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Rank</td>
<td>Project Idea</td>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Estimated Budget</td>
<td>Lead Agency</td>
<td>Type of Community Contribution</td>
<td>Selected by Men/ Women/ All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Restoration of the Dalai Dam</td>
<td>Workers, District</td>
<td>150000000 $</td>
<td>MRRD</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Construction of flood protection walls</td>
<td>Workers, District</td>
<td>20000000 $</td>
<td>MRRD</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Construction of an equipped veterinary clinic</td>
<td>Workers, District</td>
<td>300000 $</td>
<td>MoA</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Establishment of agricultural research farms</td>
<td>Workers, District</td>
<td>400000 $</td>
<td>MoA</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Establishment of livestock farms</td>
<td>Workers, District</td>
<td>200000 $</td>
<td>MoA</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANDS Priority 3: Agriculture & AMDG: Environmental Sustainability
Region: Arghandab

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Rank</th>
<th>Projects Idea</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Estimated Budget</th>
<th>Lead Agency</th>
<th>Type of Community contribution</th>
<th>Selected by Men/ Women/ All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Restoration of irrigation karizes</td>
<td>Labours, Farmers</td>
<td>292000 $</td>
<td>MRRD</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Establishment of wells for safe drinking water</td>
<td>Labours, Inhabitants of district</td>
<td>450000 $</td>
<td>MRRD</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Distribution of tractors for farmers</td>
<td>Farmers, Inhabitants of district</td>
<td>360000 $</td>
<td>MoA</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Provision of capacity building programmes for farmers</td>
<td>Participants, Inhabitants of district</td>
<td>600000 $</td>
<td>MoA</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Establishment of veterinary clinics</td>
<td>Staff, All Husbandman</td>
<td>180000 $</td>
<td>MoA</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


Coburn, Noah and Larson, Anne(November 2009) "Voting Together : Why Afghanistan’s 2009 Elections were (and were not) a Disaster" Afghanistan Research and Evaluation UnitBriefing Paper Series pp.3.


Team B:
A Blueprint for Peace in Afghanistan

Michael Carfagnini, Peter Davey, Jessica Dubinsky, Deema Elshourfa, Kathryn Gullason, Bayly Guslits, Sakthi Kalaichandran, Lenny Loewith, Nicolas Pollack, Katrin Seidel, Zachariah Seville, Brian Waltman, Steven Weisman
Table of Contents

Introduction..................................................................................................................63
1.1 Goal
1.2 Current Situation
1.3 Our Recommendation
1.4 Justification
2. Background History..................................................................................................69
Security.........................................................................................................................71
3.1 Worst Case Scenario
3.2 Implications of Troop Withdrawal
3.3 Policy Recommendations
Governance..................................................................................................................76
4.1 Worst Case Scenario
4.2 Implications of Troop Withdrawal
4.3 Preventing a Taliban Resurgence
4.4 Policy Recommendations
Development................................................................................................................79
5.1 Worst Case Scenario
5.2 Economy
5.3 Health
5.4 Education
5.5 Women’s Rights
5.6 UNAMA Coordination
5.7 Development Budget
Appendix..........................................................................................................................92
Bibliography..................................................................................................................96
Introduction

1.1 Goal

On October 7, 2001, a U.S. led coalition force invaded Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The goal was to topple the country’s repressive Taliban regime, and dismantle al-Qaeda, an international terrorist organization which claimed responsibility for the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. By December 2001, the Taliban had retreated. The international community then turned to the development of an independent, secure and stable Afghanistan, while continuing to repel insurgent attacks.

1.2 Current Situation

1.2.1 Security

There is little to no stable security in most areas of Afghanistan. 2009 was the most tumultuous year since the fall of the Taliban. Intensification of military operations, which penetrated into former Taliban safe havens, led to 960 security incidents per month, compared with 741 in 2008. Security threats impede efforts to address governance and development issues. Insurgents are now targeting development projects, attacking convoys and aid facilities, and intimidating, abducting and killing aid workers. Security threats led to the closing of 800 polling stations during the 2009 presidential elections, and prevented one-third of Afghans from voting. Four hundred schools were closed, primarily in the south, due to safety concerns, and the violence has displaced 296,000 Afghans. 2009 was also the worst year for civilian casualties since 2001. Mines and explosive remnants block access to agricultural land, water, health, and education, and kill or injure 42 people every month. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are increasingly involved in campaigns alongside ISAF. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is leading 73 percent of operations, and participating in 90 percent of all ISAF operations. The Afghan National Police (ANP) remains a largely untrained force with high levels of corruption and absenteeism. However, the United Nations Development Programme found that 82 percent of respondents believed that police in their areas were doing a very good or fairly good job. The Afghan National Army is seen in a favourable light, due to its more effective training, higher degree of discipline and better equipment, though cooperation with foreign forces prevents many from supporting the ANA. Borders with Pakistan and Iran are weak, with both nations providing military assistance and safe havens for insurgents.
1.2.2 Governance

On 2 November 2009, Hamid Karzai was announced as Afghanistan’s 12th president, following the withdrawal of his main rival in the race, Abdullah Abdullah. In his inauguration speech, Karzai set out a reformist, state-building agenda. Elections to the lower house of parliament, the Wolesi Jirga, are set for 18 September 2010. The 2009 presidential elections were characterized by ballot stuffing, intimidation of voters, low voter turnout, and a lack of security. Corruption is also prominent, and obstructs the development of effective governance institutions. In a report issued by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in January 2010, Afghans ranked corruption as a higher concern than security. Combating corruption is challenged by high levels of poverty, the strength of the narcotics trade, weak governance structures and administrative capacity. The formal justice system is out of reach for most everyday Afghans. The judicial system faces the corruption of judges, inefficiency, and high costs. Consequently, many citizens resort to traditional dispute resolution techniques.

1.2.3 Economic and Social Development

In 2009, the Human Development Index (HDI) ranked Afghanistan 181 out of 182 countries. GDP in 2009 was US$ 13.32 billion. Real GDP expanded by 15 percent in 2009 due to agricultural recovery, increased aid, and improved economic policies. Inflation dropped in 2009 and the currency was stable. The rate of foreign direct investment peaked in 2008/09 at $300 million. Opium cultivation declined by 36 percent from 2008, with 121,300 fewer Afghan households involved in illicit opium poppy cultivation in 2009 compared to 2008. Despite reductions in cultivation, Afghanistan still accounts for 90 percent of the world’s opium supply, and is a major source of income for many Afghans. In 2008, the total export value of the country’s opium crop nearly reached US$ 3.5 billion.

The delivery of international assistance to the Afghan population is inefficient and uncoordinated. Thus far, very little aid has reached Afghans at the local level, and the lives of ordinary Afghans have not significantly improved since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. President Karzai has requested that aid be channelled through local institutions, which would increase Afghan ownership of development projects.

In the health sector, health care facilities increased from 498 in 2002, to 1,443 in 2008. 85% of Afghans now have access to basic health services. Maternal, infant, and under-five mortality rates remain high, and diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria are prevalent.

Women’s constitutional rights are strong on paper. However, they have been difficult to enforce in practice, particularly in rural areas. In terms of education, more than 3,500 schools have been built since 2001, but literacy and school enrolment remain low. Insurgent attacks targeting schools, staff, and students have made it difficult for students to travel to school.
1.3 Our Recommendation: Withdraw Troops Now & Focus on Development

While pulling out troops from Afghanistan is a withdrawal, it is not a defeat. It proves the ability of the international community to respond to popular sentiment and recognize that when one tactic fails, they must turn to another. International engagement within Afghanistan will continue in order to support the Afghan effort to create a stable and secure Afghanistan.

Both the ANA and ANP have reached levels beyond which is stated in the Afghan Compact. However, this increase in manpower has been offset by a decreased perception of legitimacy by Afghans. Partly due to the notion that they rely too heavily on Western powers for support, the ANA exhibits unprofessional behaviour, such as their dress and mannerisms. According to Ambassador Eikenberry, increasing reliance upon Western military personnel, whether perceived or actual is detrimental to both the Afghan government and the respect and legitimacy of the ANA and ANP. If Afghan security forces maintain or increase their capability, with help from continuing international advisors, trainers and aid, yet conduct operations autonomously, their legitimacy should improve.

The goal of the current ISAF force in Afghanistan is to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces, and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development. However, the logic of this strategy is flawed. The presence of international military personnel actually undermines any attempts at governance and socio-economic development. Everyday Afghans do not want foreign troops on their soil, and view the international military presence in Afghanistan as illegitimate. Therefore, institutions or development work which are built by that military presence will be viewed as illegitimate and will not be sustainable. By removing the military force from Afghanistan, development efforts will be able to continue without being discredited due to association with foreign troops. The current mission in Afghanistan is also extremely costly for the international community. Bringing an end to the Afghan mission will free up some of those funds to be invested in development projects. In terms of the current goals for Afghanistan, the means will not achieve the end that the international community desires. Therefore, we must implement a new strategy, by withdrawing military forces and giving development and nation-building efforts a chance to be owned by Afghans and gain some legitimacy.

The full withdrawal of troops and increased emphasis on internal development goals will facilitate the establishment of a viable Afghan society. While we recommend full military cutbacks, we will not abandon the development and enhancement of its civil society. UNAMA will play a coordinating role, legitimizing the strategy for human development as an international endeavour.
1.4 Justification

The implementation of the following proposal may lead to an immediate violent reaction by some Afghans. In the long run, however, these recommendations are appropriate in establishing the foundation for our goal of a stable country deemed legitimate by its citizens. The current presence of largely Western troops is not working towards this goal for the following reasons: government corruption, national, regional, and international resentment for continued foreign occupation, the detrimental effects of war on the economy, Afghan security officials lacking resources for autonomous command, an increase in violence since the 2001 intervention, and the perceived illegitimacy of the central government and development projects due to heavy Western influence. Outside forces must give Afghans ownership while continuing to support development with funds and equipment. Further, the general foreign presence consistently prioritizes defensive military missions over the development sector, and detracts attention and funding from development projects.

The Afghan security forces, including the ANA and ANP, are fundamental to the country’s security. However, their dependence on foreign troops and the presence of ISAF undermines their legitimacy. Public opinion polls reveal that many nations disapprove of the NATO and US presence. Figure 1 is a snapshot of international public opinion in regards to the withdrawal of US and NATO troops.

Figure 1: Should US and NATO Keep Troops in Afghanistan or Remove Them?
Percent Responding: Remove their Troops (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian ter.</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For most Afghans outside Kabul, NATO has not developed a positive image. Many civilian groups are calling for military withdrawal due to the detrimental effects of war on education, women’s security, health care and overall civil society. While Karzai’s government supports their continued presence, most everyday Afghans favour foreign troop withdrawal. The principal complaints against international forces are focused on tactics such as the forced entry into houses and the arrest of Afghans by international forces. Further, civilian casualties increased by 40 percent between 2007 and 2008, which is a major cause of grievance. These statistics have led to increased anti-American sentiment – hostility towards US military presence and cultural influence. The majority of Afghans reject the Taliban and they continue to rate the ANA positively compared to US and NATO/ISAF forces.
ISAF is prolonging the war, which hinders the conditions for development activities and aggravates pre-existing ethnic conflicts within Afghanistan. Anti-American inspired rebel attacks continue to occur in the southeast regions of the country, which raises the possibility for ex-Taliban groups to establish a political position in the areas. With security threats, basic health care services are lacking in these vulnerable regions. Further, Western influence in the education sector is often perceived as incompatible with traditional Islamic teachings, and with a violent foreign presence, this perception will increase.

An implicit problem within the current international mission is the lack of cultural knowledge and understanding towards the local population. For example, with the presence of male, mostly Western forces, incidents such as night raids and security checks add to the perceived illegitimacy towards ISAF and NATO forces by Afghan women and their families. Therefore, after foreign military withdrawal, the incidents of cultural misunderstandings will decrease due to the presence of ANA and ANP forces in the security sector. An understanding of the country’s history is also crucial, because it demonstrates that foreign intervention in Afghanistan has never succeeded, the seeds for a stable society are already implicit in Afghan society, and there has been a general mistrust and resentment of foreign presence over the past 200 years.

A 2009 BBC/ABC opinion poll taken from men and women in the country’s 34 provinces indicates the growing dissatisfaction with the current peace process. Figure 2 is a snapshot of the poll results. Another 2009 survey conducted by the International Republican Institute found that Afghans believe their state is less stable than a year ago.

Figure 2: BBC/ABC National Public Opinion Poll Results “Where Is Country Heading?”

(http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/2009/02/afghan-people-losing-confidence.html)
Figure 3: Is Afghanistan More Stable than it Was One Year Ago? (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More Stable</th>
<th>Less Stable</th>
<th>The Same</th>
<th>DK/REF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/IRI_Afghanpublicopinionsurvey.pdf)

In terms of development, however, the majority of Afghans are satisfied with current international development projects being implemented by the international community, and appear to want more rehabilitation projects in the immediate future.

Figure 4: Are you satisfied with the rehabilitation/development projects that are being implemented by the international community? (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>DK/REF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/IRI_Afghanpublicopinionsurvey.pdf)

The current troop presence is not working towards the goal of establishing a sustainable peace in Afghanistan. The policy recommendations detailed within this proposal will address possible alternatives to the present situation in Afghanistan.

1.4.1 Our Internationalist Philosophy

Military withdrawal from Afghanistan is based on experience, observations, principle, and pragmatism, and promises positive results. The UN mandate to rebuild will not be undermined by military withdrawal, since the troops that are being withdrawn from Afghanistan belong to NATO. Nor will such an action demonstrate a lack of international commitment. Public opinion in ISAF countries largely points towards an imminent troop reduction, much as the Netherlands recently enacted. Drawing from historical lessons, an immediate troop withdrawal will not bring total security, but there will be a window of opportunity during which the Afghan forces and international development agencies can effectively gain legitimacy in the Afghan public eye. The role of the international community in Afghanistan must be to facilitate rapid development along Afghan mores without further alienating the Afghan public. While a Taliban resurgence is the ultimate fear, the ANA and ANP can handle the brunt of the security challenges having surpassed the totals allocated in the Afghan Compact. As the Taliban is no longer an international threat, it is both justified and prudent for international forces to withdraw and allow for a complete focus of development efforts and state-building. The current situation is a failure for international troops that threatens to persist. International forces must change their direction and mitigate the harms associated with their presence.
5. Background History

Military incursions in Afghanistan have historically encountered heavy resistance and endured far longer than planned. Britain’s military interventions before its independence in 1919 met with successive defeats at the hands of Afghan guerrilla forces. These defeats are generally ascribed to four main mistakes: the use of foreign, non-Muslim troops in occupying the country; the installation of an unpopular ‘puppet’ Emir over the previous indigenous monarch; the brutal treatment by British-supported Afghans of their rivals; and reduction in payments to tribal chiefs in exchange for their acquiescence. This brief will outline how these mistakes have been repeated by ISAF forces in Afghanistan, as well as guidelines for redressing these errors.

In 1947 the partition of British India and the accession of Pashtun lands to Pakistan angered the Pashtun tribes of South and East Afghanistan, by far the largest and most dominant ethnic group in the country, sowing the seeds of the ‘Pashtunistan’ issue. Today the fiercely independent, rural Pashtun tribes still straddle the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Taliban is primarily a Pashtun movement to this day. Throughout the 1950’s tensions grew between urban-based, progressive government and conservative, rurally-based tribal and religious leaders. Tensions with Pakistan were exacerbated as then P.M. Mohammed Daoud attempted to rally support by championing the creation of Pashtunistan.

The constitution drafted in 1964 established a constitutional monarchy under which the royal family’s authority was severely curtailed and secular reforms such as rights of property, religion and assembly, secret elections and women’s suffrage were introduced. This freedom allowed for the political radicalisation of the left-wing, urban-based People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (or PDPA, a local proxy for the Communist Party), and the fundamentalist conservative forces based in rural areas who opposed the progressive reforms and sought an Islamic state (supported by the United States). In 1973 former P.M. Daoud seized power with the support of the PDPA, abolishing the monarchy and suppressing religious leaders. However, once domestic opposition was weakened Daoud began to distance himself from the PDPA. The communists subsequently overthrew Daoud in a coup in 1978 under Muhammad Taraki, who himself was overthrown a year later by co-conspirator Hafizullah Amin.

When Soviet troops invaded in 1979 to maintain the increasingly unstable PDPA government, they immediately replaced Hafizullah with Barbak Karmal, repeating the first two mistakes of the British a century before: installing a puppet regime under a foreign military occupation. The United States immediately began supplying and training Afghan resistance groups based in Pakistan to fight the Soviets, funnelling money and weapons through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI). American officials publicly lauded the insurgents, but were privately aware that the mujahidin were mostly ‘brutal, fierce, bloodthirsty... fundamentalist’. The battered Soviets pulled out by spring 1989, however the Kabul government held out for another three years.

With the Soviet withdrawal, America lost all interest in Afghanistan’s development and reconstruction. After the final fall of the PDPA government in Kabul to the Mujahidin in 1992,
the country descended into sectarian violence and power struggles among the victorious warlords until the rise of the Taliban, the latest faction to benefit from training and funding by the ISI. Initial Western optimism for good relations with the new government was dashed as the Taliban brutally conquered and oppressed what had become a failed state. The teeming refugee camps and madrassas along the Afghan-Pakistan border provided an inroad for radical Wahhabist Islam from Saudi Arabia through donors like Osama Bin Laden, who saw combat experience during the Soviet occupation when the ISI favoured the most fundamentalist and dedicated insurgents.

In 1996, the same year the Taliban captured Kabul, Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan. Radicalized by the presence of thousands of American troops in Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network subsequently claimed responsibility for the killing of U.S. troops in Somalia in 1993, the attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and finally the attacks on New York and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001. The United States then led an international force to topple the Taliban and drive Al Qaeda from Afghanistan. Top Al Qaeda leaders have continued to evade capture but the group has little active presence left in Afghanistan. Thus the initial imperative for intervening in Afghanistan has in fact been met.

The Taliban, however, continues to violently resist the Western occupation, operating out of the same Pashtun areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border from where they initially began their sweep of the country in the 1990’s, as did the Mujahidin before them. Having repeated the British and Soviet mistakes of installing a regime of limited autonomy through a foreign occupation, Western authorities are now repeating the third by inviting former insurgents into the government in hopes of national ‘conciliation’. This inclusion may be necessary for short-term stabilization, however it contributes to the perception of government illegitimacy by putting the same warlords back on American payroll after three decades of freelance violence. Drawing on the lessons of previous foreign occupations in Afghanistan, three main guidelines for future policy are here proposed:

1. The legitimacy of any future Afghan government will require indigenous leadership selection and the perception of self-sufficient rule independent of Western military support.
2. Stability in Afghanistan will require a balance between accommodating local chiefs without compromising the perception of authority and capacity of the central government.
3. Post-withdrawal, the extension of development and military aid to Afghanistan is necessary to prevent:
   a. The poverty & refugee situation which allows the recruitment of a large-scale insurgency.
   b. Government inability to resist armed insurgency, as witnessed from 1989-92.

Furthermore, the political development in Afghanistan between 1919 and 1973 was only destabilized by the patronage of radicals by foreign powers. The seeds of a stable political
society are already present in Afghanistan, and can be nurtured by responsible development aid and support for moderate political voices by the international community.

Security

The military objectives have already been achieved and continued troop presence is now detrimental and counter productive. Currently, the United States continues its military surge in Afghanistan with the aim of “disrupting, dismantling and defeating the terrorist organization that attacked [America] on September 11.” This objective has been achieved. As of now, there are 400 Al Qaeda operatives in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region of which only 100 are in Afghanistan.

ISAF forces have aligned their security goals with the focus on Afghan stability rather than counter-terrorism. ISAF’s security goals are to establish a secure and stable environment and to develop Afghan security forces. Operation Enduring Freedom’s long term goals have evolved to managing relations with the international coalition, the Arab and Muslim world, and reconstructing Afghanistan.

The presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan is an issue of contention between insurgent groups and Kabul, thereby hampering negotiations and perpetuating conflict. Continued involvement of foreign troops will likely enhance Taliban recruitment efforts.

3.1 Worst Case Scenario

With the removal of foreign troops, the Taliban will view themselves as the victors against a Western power, and may use the opportunity in an attempt to seize power. This would be most likely in the southern provinces, where the Taliban (although in reduced numbers) are in greater concentrations. (See Map 2) In addition should advisors be targeted by insurgents and the ANA unable to provide protection, it is likely that residual forces would be withdrawn. Should international commitments fail to materialize, the capability and material strength of Afghan forces (already strained) would depreciate. Without aid of foreign troops at the border, the military might lose further control, thus allowing insurgents to enter Afghanistan. Should the situation in Pakistan deteriorate, the risk to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will be heightened, resulting in nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist and extremist organizations. If personnel and funding for security along the Afghan-Iranian border decreases with the withdrawal of security forces, weapons smuggling will increase giving the Taliban capabilities to seize power in Afghanistan.
3.2 Implications of Withdrawal

3.2.1 International: Terrorism

With the withdrawal of foreign troops, the threat of Al Qaeda will continue to diminish. Within the past five years, autonomous groups that are inspired by Al Qaeda but receive no formal direction from a central terrorist organization account for 78% of global terrorist schemes directed towards the West. ‘Moral outrage’ at Western interventions in Muslim territories has motivated young Muslims to attack the West. Therefore, military involvement in Afghanistan is insignificant and counterproductive in defeating the transnational nature of Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism or its leadership hiding in Pakistan.

Many fear that withdrawal of troops could result in a resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda would once again be granted a safe haven to plot terrorist attacks. However, the return of the Taliban to Afghanistan does not automatically signify a revival of a Taliban-Al Qaeda partnership. The Taliban is a parochial group with local objectives as opposed to Al Qaeda’s international outlook. Foreign military involvement spurs Taliban anti-Western resentment and attacks against Western troops in Afghanistan, but they are not a threat to Westerners abroad. Furthermore, there is a history of Taliban distrust of Al Qaeda. In the 1990s, there is evidence that the Taliban reluctantly hosted Al Qaeda on the basis that they refrain from issuing provocative statements to the international community, which Al Qaeda subsequently violated. Furthermore, the Taliban resent Al Qaeda after September 11 for implicating them in an attack that they did not perpetrate, resulting in the collapse the Taliban regime. Therefore, it is highly unlikely if the Taliban were to re-emerge after withdrawal that they would cooperate with Al Qaeda. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that Al Qaeda would want to return to Afghanistan. Currently, Pakistan is providing a safer environment for hiding. In addition, Al Qaeda will never be able to resuscitate their large training camp facilities in Afghanistan that the West once neglected, and they would remain in hiding in a similar manner to their current situation in Pakistan, debilitating their ability to consolidate operations. Therefore, Afghanistan might not be the optimal operational location for their base. Even if Al Qaeda returned to Afghanistan, there are many ways to manage them without troop intervention (see policy options). These terrorists will always find a safe haven somewhere in the Islamic world. We cannot eliminate this variable safe haven, but we can ensure that there is a sustainable effort to contest their hideout locations. The current military effort is not a sustainable solution in weakening Al Qaeda’s organizational capacity.

3.2.2 Internal: Afghan Security Assistance

With the withdrawal of foreign troops, an international residual force of trainers and advisors left in Afghanistan would see their information and supply network uprooted. Protection of this advisory force would be required, as it would remain a visible aspect of international militaries.
in Afghanistan. Similar to ensuring the continuation of funding, pledges have been made to deploy trainers, but have yet to be committed. The majority of Afghan soldiers are engaged with international forces and therefore lack the resources, leadership and infrastructure which autonomous command requires.

Residual forces and training programs for the Afghan National Army and Police should involve Muslim nations, helping bridge the cultural divide. Currently Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey are involved in the training program. In addition the Afghan government should expand its own bilateral security cooperation agreements which now stand at 12 partners. Regional and non-Western trainers and bilateral Afghan training programs will reduce the perception that Afghan security forces cannot work without the West; negatively affecting the legitimacy of Afghan security forces.

Both the ANA and ANP have reached levels beyond which is stated in the Afghan Compact. However, this increase in manpower has been matched with a decreased perception of legitimacy by Afghans. Partly due to the notion that they rely too heavily on Western powers for support, the ANA exhibits unprofessional behaviour, such as their dress and mannerisms. According to Ambassador Eikenberry, increasing reliance upon Western military resources, whether perceived or in reality, is detrimental to both the Afghan government and the respect and legitimacy of the ANA and ANP. If Afghan security forces maintain or increase their capability, with continued help from international advisors, trainers, and aid, yet conduct operations autonomously, their legitimacy should improve.

3.2.3 Internal: Human Security

The removal of foreign troops will likely result in a decrease in security incidents. 1,630, or 67 per cent of the deaths in 2009, were considered anti-Government attacks, which the insurgents view as puppets of the foreign troops. Although foreign troops have successfully taken measures to reduce civilian deaths, it is their presence that incites attacks. Only 5 suicide bombings were recorded in December 2009, far less than numbers in 2007. The Afghan National Security Forces should be prepared to inherit the violent condition of Afghanistan. Autonomous efforts by the Afghan National Army are viewed more positively than those undertaken in concert with ISAF. The ANA is in the process of meeting growth targets of 134,000 in October 2010, and 171,600 in October 2011. The ANP is under-performing compared to the ANA as a result of high corruption rates. Nevertheless, public opinion of the ANP is positive: 82% of respondents believe that the police are performing successfully. It will be the responsibility of the ANSF to maintain domestic security following the withdrawal of foreign troops.
3.2.4 Regional: Border Security

With the withdrawal of foreign troops, the Afghan and Pakistan armies will be required to assume dual responsibility of border security. A permeable border has allowed Taliban influence to freely enter and exist Afghanistan (See Map 1). The assistance of foreign troops has established a comprehensive system for the future of the Afghan-Pakistan border that will be transferred to the ANA.

3.2.5 Regional: Weapons Proliferation

With the withdrawal of foreign troops, the Iranian-Afghani border will require a more effective border patrol. Weapons include mines, mortars, and plastic explosives. In addition, large numbers of munitions and weapons caches and many other relics from the Soviet invasion, are scattered across Afghanistan. As well, 17% of small arms supplied to Afghan security forces remain unaccounted for, and possibly in the insurgents’ possession. ISAF efforts have proven incapable of ceasing weapons smuggling across the border and accounting for weapons caches.

Taliban Areas

3.3 Policy Recommendations

3.3.1 Regional: Human Security

- Continue build-up of security forces, along the targets set for October 2010 and October 2011.
- Maintain funding for training and equipment for ANA and ANP, with a focus on the latter.
- Assign a special force of the ANA to handle local security incidents in the immediate aftermath of the withdrawal of foreign troops to ease the transition.

3.3.2 Regional: Border Security

- Allocation of funding and training for the Afghan and Pakistan armies monitoring the border.
- Continue the use of the Tripartite Commission, to facilitate discussion and coordination.

3.3.3 Regional: Afghan Security Assistance

- International security assistance commitments must be carried out, as the strained Afghan economy is unable to independently support its security forces (For international contributions, see appendix).
- Efforts must made to initiate and expand bilateral training programs with Muslim countries, building on those in place with Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Jordan.

3.3.4 Weapons Proliferation

- Better coordination efforts between Iranian and Afghani militaries and officials, with a system similar to that of the Afghan-Pakistani border.
- An increase in training for border police will ensure a better transition of responsibility, NATO's current projects managing ammunition and physical security should be increased, but the Western co-lead nations should limit their assistance from providing security, to providing resources and training.
- Efforts should be made to strengthen Afghan security forces control over their weapons supplies.
3.3.5 Terrorism

- Enhanced intelligence cooperation among international agencies, greater intelligence databases and spatial surveillance to ensure sustainable counter-terrorism efforts.

Governance

4.1 Worst Case Scenario

A full withdrawal of foreign troops involves a possibility of turning into a disaster for the current Afghan administration. The Taliban could rearm themselves and become emboldened by the lack of a foreign presence in the country and use the opportunity to strike against the Karzai government. Although a total overthrow of the government seems unlikely, destabilization in rural areas and perhaps even some cities besides the major centres of Kandahar and Kabul could bring the country into another civil war or at the very least a return to warlordism.

A more plausible scenario, though equally unattractive, would be the floundering of democracy in Afghanistan. The current democratic situation in Afghanistan is fragile as there is corruption and favouritism in the Karzai administration. Elections have been far from perfect and often had their results contested. It is possible that the government may revert to an authoritarian state especially if threatened by Taliban resurgence or destabilization. If this occurs it is not necessarily a failure for the current mission so long as stability is maintained and the regional security is not threatened by a militant Afghanistan. Authoritarianism, though not ideal, may at least prevent a return to Taliban-rule in the area.

4.2 Implications of Troop Withdrawal

4.2.1 Increased Legitimacy

With the withdrawal of foreign troops in Afghanistan the government will surely see a rise in their legitimacy throughout the nation. Eventually as the people become more aware of an Afghan presence, both from the police and the military, in Afghanistan rather than a Western or American presence they will become more inclined to believe in and support their government. Once the quelling of insurgency is left in the hands of the Afghan government and people, there will likely be a decrease in overall violence as the insurgents realize that the enemy – the western infidels – is gone and the unity that the opposition groups now have will likely end. Hopefully the fragile democratic process that has started and been maintained over the past
nine years will take over and continue well into the future. Regardless of fraud allegations there is a current realization in Afghanistan that the government is here to stay (given Abdullah Abdullah’s acceptance of 2009 election results without a run-off) and this sentiment should remain once the government is left to its own devices after the proposed withdrawal. Strengthening of the military, police, and of course overall infrastructure throughout the country should then be focused upon in order to further increase and spread legitimacy across Afghanistan.

4.2.2 Resource Management

Once foreign troops have left Afghanistan, all of the ISAF nations will have a considerable amount of money that was once allocated to military efforts freed up. With such funds, former ISAF members could increase their donations, giving money to both the Afghan government and the various NGOs already at work in the country. This should help in overall development in Afghanistan especially in critical areas such as health, education, agriculture and rural development. It will then be up to the Afghan government to distribute said funds to the appropriate sectors and continue the many development projects in the country.

4.3 Preventing a Taliban Resurgence

4.3.1 Reconciliation

In order to prevent a resurgence of the Taliban upon withdrawal, it is necessary to attempt reconciliation talks between Karzai and the leftover Taliban forces to negotiate a modus vivendi. The process should involve negotiations with all interested parties with a resultant binding agreement for the parties to not interfere militarily in the other’s interests. This is the most effective way of bringing the Taliban into the fold and preventing a military resurgence of their interests to instead shift to competing within the democratic framework.

4.3.2 Afghan National Army

If reconciliation talks fail, there should be no hesitation to use the well-trained and well-equipped ANA for the purpose of suppressing the Taliban forces. As with any other armed engagement against an enemy attempting to usurp your government, the ANA should be used to defend the country from foreign invaders. Further, the bordering regions have a vested interest in preventing the Taliban from retaking control of Afghanistan and so will likely offer their assistance in the event of an imminent takeover from these forces. Such interested actors include Pakistan, China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, all of which have the capability to assist in
the event of a disaster that would undermine both Afghan and the surrounding region’s security.

4.3.3 Corruption

The 2009 presidential election was marred with corruption, as ballots were stuffed by the same electoral staff appointed to monitor corruption. Moreover, substantial intimidation of voters prevented a significant turnout to support the electoral process which undermined the legitimacy of the election altogether. Of the candidates fielded, 70 had direct links to illegal armed groups despite claims by the Independent Electoral Commission that these candidates would be barred from running. Further, Karzai’s chosen vice-presidential candidate had ties to drug trafficking. These issues must be addressed and are paramount in the establishment of a legitimate state.

4.4 Policy Recommendations

4.4.1 Hold Legitimate Elections

On September 18, 2010 there will be a parliamentary election in Afghanistan. It is important to ensure that these elections are held legitimately with international observers present and that it does not succumb to the same problems that undermined the 2009 presidential elections. It is necessary for there to be independent observers with no ties to the Afghani government to portray legitimacy to the Afghans in both the rural and urban areas. The United States, Canada and other NATO actors have an obligation to assist in gathering relevant actors to ensure that the elections go off without a hitch. They need to address the issues in the 2009 elections, ensure that there is security, due process, and accountability for the results of this election. The capacity of the state must be built up through infrastructure, anti-corruption campaigns, and a true belief in the rule of law in order to gain the support of the population. It is unacceptable that they use the military to enforce their rule but should rather act with a sense of humility in the face of a country in ruins, which requires Kabul to act as a democratic government, not an authoritarian one.

Registered Voters Nationally:

As of 2008, voter registration was only carried out in three provinces in Afghanistan. As of 2005, 12.6 million voters were registered with only 1.26 million turning out to vote in the 2009 presidential election. Increased turnout, thereby legitimizing the electoral process, ensures full enfranchisement for the Afghan people. Though 100% is too high a number to expect, more than 10% turnout is necessary for the perception of legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghans and the Western liberal democracies which support it.
Establishment of Independent Electoral Complaints Commission:

As the 2009 presidential election was fraught with corruption and no accountability, it is necessary to develop an IECC for the purpose of increasing accountability in the area of elections. The government must be separated from this and it should be run by individuals who have no direct party affiliation and are not susceptible to the same corruption that was seen in 2009.

4.4.2 Reform the Judiciary

Currently, the judicial system is composed of a Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal, and Primary Courts. These all operate on concurrent principles to the justice system in the West. The fundamental problem with courts in Afghanistan is that there is a lack of access to these courts for the majority of the population, especially in rural areas where travelling to Kabul for a court-date is impractical. In order to resolve this problem, it is necessary to accept the arbitration of rural Elders as binding, which is already perceived as such by rural Afghans. It is important to bring these civil arbitration proceedings into the justice system rather than pushing them out of it. There is already precedent in the Canadian justice system where we accept aboriginal healing circles at a binding level for those who opt into it. The same system must be put in place in Afghanistan to increase the ability for normal Afghans to seek redress in a way which is suitable for them.

Development

Development in Afghanistan is contingent on the continued advancement of four specific areas: the economy, health care, education, and an improved situation for Afghan women. Progress is being made in these areas to date, but the heavy involvement of the ISAF forces is damaging the legitimacy of many projects and efforts. With the withdrawal of military troops, our focus is shifting towards the development of social necessities. The increased contribution to these areas will foster a stable civil society, with a bottom up approach to state building. The withdrawal of troops, and the eventual full control of humanitarian efforts under the umbrella of UNAMA will allow all development initiatives to gain legitimacy, and eventually, succeed in the creation of a proper and sustainable Afghanistan.
5.1 Worst Case Scenario

The greatest concern for foreign troop withdrawal is the resurgence of the Taliban. Current efforts by ISAF have led to increases in opium production and smuggling. The worst case scenario of early withdrawal is even more rapid growth in these areas. More distressing would be the increased risk/lawlessness of the country with ISAF withdrawal. Many have entered this sector of the economy because they have few other options. Thus, an already weakened sector of the population would become further endangered. However, the argument could be made that the worst case scenario for development is being played out right now with current occupation.

The worst case scenario would be a weak ANA and ANP, which is unable to provide security and would create the opportunity for the Taliban to return to power. In terms of the economy, this would result in the complete decline of all economic activity to the black market as a strong Afghan security forces are necessary to monitor the proper use of the poppy crops. A weak government, which is unable to provide basic services to people, such as unemployment opportunities, will also contribute to the economic collapse. Due to the grave current economic situation, it is unlikely that the situation can get much worse in Afghanistan. In terms of health, if there is no security basic health care services will be greatly hindered. Vulnerable populations in the region will not have access to immunization for preventable diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria; as well there will be a lack of nutritional education available. With regard to education, a lack of security will leave education facilities, staff, and student vulnerable to insurgent attacks. If the Taliban return there could be a ban on female education and schools may be forced to close resulting in limited educational opportunities. Women will be particularly vulnerable with the return of the Taliban and will face the challenges of oppression, violence, and poverty. Aid agencies and international actors which provide humanitarian assistance will be unable to function due to a deteriorating security situation. Aid workers’ personal security will be jeopardized which will make it difficult for them to travel through the country and reach vulnerable populations. Overall the security void and rise of the Taliban would be detrimental to the socio-economic situation in Afghanistan.

5.2 Economy

The GDP in Afghanistan was US $13.32 billion in 2009, 114th in the world. While it is far behind, the economy experienced a real growth rate of 3.4% despite a global recession. Per capita GDP sits at US $800, and has not changed in the past decade. By sector, the current workforce is 78.6% agricultural, 5.7% industrial, and 15.7% services.

The top export destinations are India, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and the Netherlands, and items include opium, fruit and nuts, carpets, wool, cotton, hides and pelts, as well as precious and semi-precious gems.
5.2.1 Recommendations

Opium growth and smuggling must be curbed.

Other legitimate livelihoods must be acknowledged and supported. Increased legitimacy of Afghan initiatives through the removal of ISAF will encourage legal economic pursuits with the promotion of development initiatives. Afghanistan is rich in natural resources and given the right opportunity would be ideal for many exportable commodities, and these industries could provide jobs for current opium farmers.

Opium eradication is not working. The anti-poppy campaign has angered many Afghans through its indiscriminate crop spraying, fostering support for insurgents. More importantly is the fact that it does not address the real issues of Afghanistan’s opium dependency. A United Nations report made it clear that many farmers don’t want to grow opium, they have to pay high taxes to drug-lords and it is dangerous to engage in an illegal activity. Eradication policy was adopted mainly on the success of similar policies towards Mexican opium in the late 1970s. However, it is evident that the two situations are very different. Recent reports have suggested alternative approaches; “Afghanistan: Economic Incentives and Development Initiatives to Reduce Opium Production” released by the World Bank suggests that an intensive campaign be taken to subsidize and expand the production of other activities, such as cotton production and livestock farming.

Turkey faced an opium production crisis in the 1970s. The government responded with an aggressive UN and US supported campaign that sought to license poppy cultivation for the purpose of producing morphine, codeine, and other legal opiates. The country built legal factories for these drugs; the US is required to purchase 80% of the ‘narcotic raw materials’. While this did not eradicate Turkey’s illegal production, it seriously reduced it, much more effectively than the anti-poppy campaign is having in Afghanistan. These two strategies should be combined.

As for smuggling, this can be combated by engineering Afghan policy to attract foreign business and local economic ventures. Many have discussed the use of micro-credit to fund local, legitimate small businesses. The problem with current micro-credit ventures taking place in Afghanistan right now is that they are not properly administered and much comes with narrowly set conditions. If the Afghan government were more closely involved with appropriate micro-credit campaigns in concert with NGOs already working in the area, they might have more success. However, the best way to combat the smuggling in Afghanistan is to increase state stability which will come about by withdrawing troops.
Foreign investment in industry

In terms of larger industrial resources, Afghanistan has many mineral deposits which present promising opportunities and livelihoods for many Afghans, including a potential source of coltan. The Aynak copper mine has become Afghanistan’s largest-ever infrastructure project, and a multi-billion dollar Chinese investment. It contains the second largest untapped copper deposit in the world and the investment is designed to provide jobs and training to Afghans. Encouraging Trans-National Corporations to pursue development in Afghanistan is integral in deterring growth in the opium and smuggling industries. Especially in the case of the Aynak copper mine where China Metallurgical Group Corp. and Jiangxi Copper Corp. have obliged themselves to provide jobs for Afghans. The approach should be two-pronged with incentive provided to small business as well as TNCs.

A culturally viable micro-credit strategy must be established

Micro-credit strategies have been and are being attempted throughout Afghanistan by NGOs and ISAF partners. However, their success has been limited due to cultural limits. The lending and borrowing of money is strictly controlled by Shar’ia law of the predominantly Muslim Afghanistan. It is evident, however, that the Afghani people have a long history of sustenance livelihoods, even during times of war and famine. The entrepreneurial nature of the people suggests that small business could survive with the proper financial supports. Taking a more informal approach to forego any set payment schedule and interest could avoid religious laws on lending. For example, a few rural towns have started an informal communal fund which all residents pay into and can borrow from as needed, with the unwritten expectation that they will pay the sum back and donate a little extra money to support the fund, also known as interest. This system has been accepted by religious officials, and has been largely successful where implemented. Microcredit, despite its limited successes is something which must be pursued in Afghanistan following withdrawal. Like with large businesses, policy should make Afghanistan more appealing to small business.

Active government management of the economy

The government will need to take an active role in the economy, controlling industries of vital interest, as well as the delivery of necessary services and goods that the free-market approach will not solve. With the flow of international aid and involvement of both the World Bank and IMF, an effective government strategy can be developed for a proven economically savvy people. The people must see economic benefits in order to support the new government. Whether it comes in the form of an increase in the dollars in their pockets and a growth in the services they receive and have available to them, tangible benefits must be seen soon.
5.3 Health

5.3.1 History of Health Sector

In the mid 1980s, NGOs emerged in Afghanistan as health care providers for Afghan refugees. Through the establishment of health facilities in rural areas under the more centralized control of the Mujahidin, these NGOs were able to increase the accessibility of health services. With the outbreak of civil war, a more fragmented health care system was the result, and this continued under Taliban rule. At the time the Taliban fell in 2001, NGOs provided 80% of health care services in Afghanistan.

5.3.2 Health Goals

The World Health Organization (WHO) is working in collaboration with the Government of Afghanistan through their Ministry of Public Health to improve the country’s health care situation. The Government’s goal is to provide professional prenatal care to 25% of pregnant women by 2015 and 50% by 2020. Another concern in Afghanistan’s health sector is the high infant mortality rate (IMR), which as of 2007 was 135 per 1000 live births. The goals for WHO and the central government are to reduce IMR to 70 per 1000 live births by 2015, and 46 per 1000 by 2020. Health policy goals include the implementation of health services using the basic package of health services (BPHS), the formation of prevention programmes, formulating the essential package of hospital services (EPHA), strengthening human resources especially the increase of female staff, and developing effective monitoring and evaluation criteria at all health care levels.

5.3.3 Healthcare Issues in Afghanistan

- The life expectancy for women and men in Afghanistan is 45 and 47 years respectively. Life expectancy of men exceeds that of women, a phenomenon that is solely observed in Afghanistan and may be rooted in Afghanistan’s high maternal mortality rate. Afghanistan has the second highest maternal mortality rate in the world (after Sierra Leone).
- Among services available, delivery care and emergency obstetric care are especially poor – this is an issue related to women’s rights, children’s rights, and human rights in general. This is a key issue that we need to focus on for short term and long term goals.
- Lack of qualified female health practitioners, which is tied to the need of expanding health services to remote areas, and education of women and men on reproductive health, including reproductive health rights.
• High incidence of malnutrition throughout the population with limited access to food due to bad roads, lack of transportation, and low food production. Further, most families outside the cities are unable to purchase food due to large family size and low income. Malnutrition is also linked to low purchasing power and low levels of nutrition-based education.

-> between 40% and 60% of Afghan children are either chronically malnourished or stunted

• Lack of access to water – outside the cities, only 30% of households have access to safe drinking water. In provinces such as Bahglan and Bamyam, the figures are less than 10%.

• High incidence of communicable diseases, especially tuberculosis and malaria. Tuberculosis affects young adults, especially young women. Afghanistan is one of 22 high tuberculosis countries in the world, with an annual incidence of 70,000 cases, and 23,000 deaths from tuberculosis annually.

• Despite an increased access to basic health services between 2002 and 2008, there remains an inequitable distribution of quality health care services, especially outside major cities.

### Afghanistan – Accessibility to Drinking Water, Rural/Urban Divide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value (year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population with sustainable access to improved drinking water sources (%) rural</td>
<td>17 (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population with sustainable access to improved drinking water sources (%) urban</td>
<td>37 (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population with sustainable access to improved sanitation (%) rural</td>
<td>25 (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population with sustainable access to improved sanitation (%) urban</td>
<td>45 (2006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 5.3.4 Implications of Withdrawal

More than 40 health and reconstruction were killed in Afghanistan in 2004, and five health care officials from the NGO Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF – Doctors Without Borders) were murdered. The latter incident led to MSF withdrawing their agency from Afghanistan. Rebel attacks continue to occur in the Southeast regions of the country, which raises the possibility for ex-Taliban groups establishing a political position in these areas. Due to these security concerns, the implantation of basic health care series are compromised in these regions and further political instability may lead to the withdrawal of funding from donors. Providing physical security for health care workers is beyond the current capacity for the Ministry of Public Health, which greatly hinders the possibility for improving health care in Afghanistan. Peace and stability are the preliminary conditions for the implementation of a successful health program. Without a stable security force, the implementation of basic health services is in great danger.
5.3.5 Policy Recommendations

- Security to protect health care workers, NGOs, and hospitals will have to replace ISAF. Therefore strengthening the capacity of the ANA and the ANP is crucial.
- Hospital services are currently underutilized; only 14% of births were attended by skilled health personnel (compared to 43% in India and 96% in Sri Lanka) in 2003. This is attributed to low literacy among mothers, lack of access to safe drinking water, food, and access to hospitals. Therefore improve accessibility to health care services through transportation from rural areas, and increase literacy rates for both men and women.
- The distribution of hospitals and hospital beds is skewed. Twenty-one hospitals, 9.96 beds per 10,000 people in Kabul, 1 hospital and 0.77 beds per 10,000 in Ghor Province, 1 hospital and 0.9 beds per 10,000 in Nuristan Province. Construct more hospitals, especially in the south and southeast regions. However, this must be in collaboration with increasing literacy rates, and encouraging the use of hospitals when giving birth. The use of hospitals is not a necessary recommendation, however as hospitals have a heightened amount of resources, it may be beneficial for births to occur in hospitals in the event of severe maternal complications.
- It is estimated that some of the reasons Afghanistan has the second highest maternal mortality rate is due to the lack of female health care workers. Therefore, incentives should be provided for female doctors, nurses and midwives to practice in the South and Southeast regions of Afghanistan.
- With western troops gone, violence will likely decrease, however, the presence of ANP or ANA troops around hospitals can serve as an added security protective measure.
- Improve the conditions of drinking water – USAID and UNICEF have indicated that the use of products such as water disinfection solutions and the delivery of water purification and testing equipment will effectively contribute to this cause.
- Immunize population for tuberculosis and malaria. Between 2002 and 2004, as a result of measles immunizations, the number of reported cases of measles decreased from 8762 in 2001, to 466 in 2004. Similar results have occurred with maternal and neonatal tetanus elimination and polio eradication. This can be achieved through supplementary immunization activities such as national immunization days (NIDs), as advised by WHO and the Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health. Ensure immunization programs reach the rural communities of the south and south-east regions.
5.4 Education

5.4.1 Main Issues

According to UNICEF, only 49% of men and 18% of women are literate in Afghanistan. Between 2003 and 2008, 74% of boys were enrolled in primary education while only 46% of girls were enrolled. When this is compared to school attendance, however, the numbers are lower; with 66% male attendance and 40% female attendance (See table below). Afghanistan has set the goal of achieving universal primary education by 2020. This is in accordance with the United Nations Millennium Development Goals Target 2 to “ensure that by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.” Afghanistan chose to define its target to be 2020 due to their development obstacles caused by past conflicts.

Low primary education enrolment and attendance rates have led to low rates for secondary education as well. Based on UNICEF 2003 to 2008 attendance rates, male attendance was 18% while female attendance was 6%. These low rates indicate that few Afghans are qualified to attend post-secondary education. According to Afghanistan’s Ministry of Education’s 2007 statistics, there were 19 higher education institutions functioning within Afghanistan. Enrolment, however, was low with 34,066 students attending, of which 26,398 were male and 7,668 female students. Although it is crucial to establish universal primary education, higher education must also be developed and funded in order for students to continue their education and gain technical skills and experience needed to find employment. The education goal in Afghanistan must be to develop a sustainable education system which meets the educational needs of the people and is culturally acceptable.

The greatest impediment to achieving education goals in Afghanistan is the lack of security. Parents do not want their children to attend school as it is unsafe for them to travel to and from school due to insurgent attacks. Schools within the more secure cities are generally safer, but schools are often attacked by bombs and missiles and teaching staff frequently receive death threats which have led to school closures. According to UNESCO, as of July 2009, over 400 schools primarily in the southern regions of Afghanistan were forced to shut down. Madrassas are deemed by the west to be breeding grounds for terrorism and as a result have received little funding. Madrassas, however, are an important cultural element in Afghanistan and the religious teaching of Islam should not be overlooked in the Afghan education system.

Although foreign troops have attempted to create security within Afghanistan, as the security situations is worsening they have become an impediment to development. In 2008 there were 670 attacks on schools which were more than the attacks of 2006 and 2007 together. As foreign troops have been unable to fully secure areas, they are vulnerable to insurgent attacks particularly in the south. Education facilities which have been established and supported by the west are seen as symbols of western influence and because of this are targeted. Western
influence in education is perceived as incompatible with traditional Islamic educational teachings and is unwelcome in Afghanistan. As quickly as education facilities are built, they are destroyed which has led to wasted foreign aid. Education facilities have the greatest chance of success if western troops withdraw.

The past three decades of conflict in Afghanistan have been detrimental to educational development. In 1978 during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the literacy rate was 18% for males and 5% for females and only 1.2 million students were enrolled in the education system. During this time 80% of schools were either destroyed or damaged which created a deficit in educational facilities. When the Taliban took power in the 1990s, female education was banned, making an already bad situation for female education worse. NGOs during this period were able to provide education to many children. In 1995, 34% of girls were educated by NGOs, however, by 1999 after the Taliban had shutdown many of these NGO activities only 6% of girls were receiving education.

### Afghanistan Education Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>In the Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth (15-24 years) literacy rate, 2002-2007, male</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth (15-24 years) literacy rate, 2002-2007, female</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number per 100 population, 2007, phones</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number per 100 population, 2007, Internet users</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school enrolment ratio 2003-2008, gross, male</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school enrolment ratio 2003-2008, gross, female</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school enrolment ratio 2003-2008, net, male</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school enrolment ratio 2003-2008, net, female</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school attendance ratio 2003-2008, net, male</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school attendance ratio 2003-2008, net, female</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survival rate to last primary grade (%) 2003-2008, admin, data</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survival rate to last primary grade (%) 2003-2008, survey data</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school enrolment ratio 2003-2008, gross, male</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school enrolment ratio 2003-2008, gross, female</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school enrolment ratio 2003-2008, net, male</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school enrolment ratio 2003-2008, net, female</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school attendance ratio 2003-2008, net, male</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school attendance ratio 2003-2008, net, female</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.4.2 Policy Recommendations

- Ensure all schools are secure through the use of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan Police Force.
- In coordination with the Afghan Ministry of Education and the Afghan Madrassas establish a standardized curriculum for all primary schools which focuses on basic skills in reading, writing and math.
- Increase teaching and education staff with an emphasis on educating female teachers.
- Allocate funds to build more schools to replace those that have been destroyed by insurgents as well as for the purchase of school supplies.
- Establish a transportation system which will ensure the safety of children to and from school.
- Establish programs and schools which will encourage female education and meet their specific educational needs.
- Establish accelerated learning programs in order to improve adult literacy and skills necessary for employment.
- Fund higher education, particularly in terms of technical skills and training programs.

5.5 Women’s Rights

5.5.1 Main Issues and Implications of Withdrawal on Women’s Rights

“The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) strongly believes that there should be no expectation of either the US or any other country to present us with democracy, peace and prosperity. Our freedom is only achievable at the hands of our people.” According to the international NGO Women for Afghan Women (WAW), “withdrawing troops means abandoning 15 million women and children to madmen who will sacrifice them to their lust for power.” Without proper security and economic measures, this may well be the case and the situation for women throughout the country could deteriorate into poverty, violence and oppression. Therefore, social, political, and economic development are intrinsically tied to the development of women’s rights in Afghanistan. The issue of women’s rights is largely a human security problem. In the event of withdrawal of foreign troops, the ANP and ANA must take over the role of providing a secure environment for women, men, and children to go about their daily lives. Legally both men and women Afghan citizens have land ownership rights. Afghan women, especially in rural areas, are currently challenged by the lack of health care facilities, reproductive rights, personal security, education, employment opportunities, and a voice in governance. The few women who have a role in the Afghan government are frequently silenced and threatened. These issues will need to be addressed to ensure a stable Afghanistan based on legitimate institutions in the post-withdrawal era. Without the foreign presence, Afghan women will also be able to live without the imposition of western ideals and develop a base for Afghan civil society through grassroots community building initiatives. Although this
will surely take time, Afghan women are resilient and capable of forming organizations that transcend ethnicity to maintain their common goals of survival and protecting their ways of life.

5.5.2 Policy Recommendations

**International Actors**

- Increase cooperation with Afghan run women’s NGOs, like WAW and RAWA
- Support capacity building initiatives for grassroots women’s organizations ie. health and water care projects, etc.
- Monitor role of women in national government and ensure the safety and free speech of women representatives in Afghan government

**Afghan Government (with international aid)**

- Increase number of female police officers and military personnel throughout country, not just in major cities
- Increase accessibility to medical and crisis facilities for women, particularly in rural areas and the south.
- Invest in education, literacy and job-training programs for women
- Include female participation in local governance
- Provide assistance programs for mothers, especially widows
- Ratify and enforce the WAW’s 2003 Afghan Women’s Bill of Rights

**Afghan Women’s Bill of Rights**

On September 5, 2003, in the historic city of Kandahar, we, the Afghan Muslim participants in the conference, "Women and the Constitution: Kandahar 2003", from Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, Herat, Wardak, Jousjan, Badakhshan, Samangan, Farah, Logar, Gardez, Kapisa, Uruzgan, Paktia, Helmand, Baghlan, Sar-e-Pul, having considered the issues of the constitution that affect the futures of ourselves, our children, and our society, make the following demands on behalf of the women of Afghanistan. Moreover, as representatives of all of Afghan women, we demand that these rights are not only secured in the constitution but implemented.

1. Mandatory education for women through secondary school and opportunities for all women for higher education.
2. Provision of up-to-date health services for women with special attention to reproductive rights.
3. Protection and security for women: the prevention and criminalization of sexual harassment against women publicly and in the home, of sexual abuse of women and children, of domestic violence, and of "bad blood-price" (the use of women as compensation for crimes by one family against another).
4. Reduction of the time before women can remarry after their husbands have disappeared, and mandatory government support of women during that time.
5. Freedom of speech.
6. Freedom to vote and run for election to office.
7. Rights to marry and divorce according to Islam.
8. Equal pay for equal work.
9. Right to financial independence and ownership of property.
10. Right to participate fully and to the highest levels in the economic and commercial life of the country.
11. Mandatory provision of economic opportunities for women.
13. Full inclusion of women in the judiciary system.
14. Minimum marriageable age set at 18 years.
15. Guarantee of all constitutional rights to widows, disabled women, and orphans.
16. Full rights of inheritance.

Additional demands affecting the lives of women:

1. Disarmament and national security.
2. Trials of war criminals in international criminal courts and the disempowerment of warlords.
3. A strong central government.
4. A commitment to end government corruption.
5. Decisive action against foreign invasion and protection of the sovereignty of Afghanistan

5.6 UNAMA Coordination

The primary goal of the international community in Afghanistan is to support local development and state-building efforts. Following the withdrawal of all NATO, EU, and independent military operations, they will be better equipped to do so. Coordination of actors and donors will increase the effectiveness of these efforts.

5.6.1 Policy Recommendations

- Following the withdrawal of all NATO, EU, and independent military operations from Afghanistan, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) should assume primary responsibility for development efforts within the country
- In partnership with the Government of Afghanistan and local Afghan organizations, UNAMA supports development efforts with the goal of achieving a secure, stable, and independent Afghanistan.
- UNAMA is in an advantageous position as it:
  - played a facilitating role during the Bonn process
has developed in-country expertise and institutional memory over its decade-long engagement in Afghanistan
-already has many structures in place to address development issues such as UNFEM, UNICEF, UNDP, etc.
-has a pre-existing relationship with the Government of Afghanistan as well as local Afghan development groups
-is an impartial actor with no ulterior motive or agenda
-is viewed as legitimate by the international community

- In order to take over responsibility from NATO, UNAMA will have to increase its budget and staff
- In order to create a cohesive effort, NGOs and other actors within Afghanistan should coordinate their efforts through UNAMA

5.7 Development Budget

- Economy: The government currently takes in about $1 billion a year in limited tax revenues. Current government economic expenditures are $3.3 billion, and will rise dramatically with the increase in government involvement in the economy. Afghanistan currently receives $2.6 billion from the International Development Fund, but this number will have to double, largely through domestic taxes.
- Health: For the fiscal year 2006 a total of US $281.7 million was identified as the expected requirement. Since the current funding allocation is US$ 115.61 million, the funding gap is US$ 166.09 million.
- Education: The Asian Development Bank predicted in 2002 that the predicted monetary need for Afghanistan’s education system would be US$ 125 million per year. The Asian Development Bank recommended that 3% of Afghanistan’s GDP should be allocated to education.
- Women’s Rights: Sources of funding for programs supporting women are NGOs and the UN, such as UNOPS $8.1 million plan to refurbish the female dormitories at Kabul University. Putting a price tag on women’s rights, health, education and security is impossible. Afghan women must be made a priority in every budgetary consideration made by governmental and non-governmental organizations.
- UNAMA: The budget has been steadily increasing, from US$75 million in 2008, to US$240 million in 2010. Presumably UNAMA’s budget will have to be drastically increased in order to take on a greater role in Afghanistan following military withdrawal. Funds previously allocated for the military mission in Afghanistan will be reinvested in UNAMA.
Appendix-Graphics
Graph 1: Public Opinion Poll

Support for War in Afghanistan
Should the U.S. and NATO keep troops in Afghanistan or remove them?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percent Responding Remove their troops (2009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian ter.</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken From: http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=9
Appendix—Maps

Map 1: ISAF Regional Commands, Major Units, Provincial Reconstruction Teams—March 2010

Regional Commands and Troop Strength
Regional Command North: 5,950
Regional Command East: 23,340
Regional Command West: 5,000
Regional Command South: 47,300
Regional Command Capital: 4,900
HQ ISAF in Kabul: 2,900

Table 1

Table 3. Budget Authority for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror (GWOT) Operations: FY2001-FY2010

(Internal estimates in billions of budget authority)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation and Source of Funding</th>
<th>FY01 and FY02</th>
<th>FY03</th>
<th>FY04</th>
<th>FY05</th>
<th>FY06</th>
<th>FY07</th>
<th>FY08</th>
<th>FY09 Pending Request</th>
<th>Cumulative Enacted: FY01-FY09</th>
<th>Cumulative Total: FY01-FY10 Including Request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRAQ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>126.8</td>
<td>138.3</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>643.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Ops</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA Medical</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Iraq</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>101.7</td>
<td>130.8</td>
<td>141.1</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>682.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| AFGHANISTAN                     |               |      |      |      |      |      |      |                     |                               |                                             |
| Department of Defense           | 20.0          | 14.0 | 12.4 | 17.2 | 17.9 | 37.1 | 40.6 | 51.1                | 68.1                          | 210.2                         | 278.3                              |
| Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Ops  | 0.8           | 0.7  | 2.2  | 2.8  | 1.1  | 1.9  | 2.6  | 3.7                 | 4.0                           | 15.8                          | 19.7                               |
| VA Medical                      | 0             | 0    | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.1  | 0.2  | 0.4  | 0.9                 | 0.7                           | 0.7                            | 1.6                                |
| Total OEF                       | 20.8          | 14.7 | 14.5 | 20.0 | 19.0 | 39.1 | 43.4 | 55.2                | 72.9                          | 226.7                         | 299.6                              |

Table 2: Budget for Operation Enduring Freedom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Account</th>
<th>FY04</th>
<th>FY05</th>
<th>FY06</th>
<th>FY07</th>
<th>FY08a</th>
<th>FY09 Bridgea</th>
<th>Total Enacteda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Table 3: Countries with Substantial ISAF Assistance Commitments

Taken from: http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/troop-contributing-nations/index.php

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Current Troop Contribution</th>
<th>ANA Trust Fund and NATO equipment fund</th>
<th>Post operation emergency fund</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1550</td>
<td>€150,000,000 pledged</td>
<td>€315,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>€60,000 50 mortars, ~21 million rounds of small arms ammunition, 500 binoculars</td>
<td>€160,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2830</td>
<td>2,500 small arms and 6 million rounds of ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3750</td>
<td>Personal equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4335</td>
<td>€50,000,000 pledged Clothing and equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3160</td>
<td>€100,000 contributed, €2,000,000 pledged</td>
<td>€300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>50,590</td>
<td>€99,964</td>
<td>€1,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2140</td>
<td>Uniforms, 4 million rounds</td>
<td>€50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1835</td>
<td>€1,500,000 Artillery, munitions, academy supplies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>9500</td>
<td>€4,540,006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1075</td>
<td>€4,000,000 pledged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>€22,600,000</td>
<td>€300,000</td>
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A Blueprint for Peace in Afghanistan

Conclusion:

Considering Afghanistan’s turbulent past as well as the complexity of the current conflict, proposing a plan to bring a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan is certainly a daunting task. Now, assign this task to a group of 23, fourth-year international relations students at the University of Western Ontario and allow them a mere six weeks in which to research, write and present a practical, yet innovative collection of policy recommendations for the current intervention, and the task looms even larger. However, as the shared satisfaction with this 100-page report clearly testifies, and as an enlightened General George S. Patton once instructed us, we must “accept the challenges that [we] may feel the exhilaration of victory”. And, as an equally enlightened John F. Kennedy said, in a quote that aptly describes both our year-end project as well as the international project in Afghanistan:

...we choose to go... not because [it] is easy, but because [it] is hard, because that goal will serve to measure and organize the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win.

After three weeks of what might be considered ‘an intellectual stalemate’ the IR 4701 class decided to take a TeamA/Team B approach to the conflict in Afghanistan. We did not know quite what to expect. With two very different starting points and opposing methodologies - Team A taking the Afghanistan Compact as its jumping-off point and Team B wanting merely to think outside-of-the box - we were not sure how compatible our final products would be. Having now combined the two reports, it is both interesting and beneficial to reflect on their differences, their similarities, and ultimately, their complementary nature.

Most students agree that where the two reports differ the most is in their underlying assumptions and their plan of attack. While Team A sought to focus on particular areas of the conflict and propose changes within the current strategy, Team B felt the current strategy to be fundamentally flawed, arguing instead that something different was needed. These differing assumptions allowed Team A to give very specific recommendations about how to improve coordination and implementation of development projects in Afghanistan, while Team B looked more broadly at a contentious issue and presented a philosophical argument in support of immediate withdrawal. Furthermore, while Team A argued for a simultaneous and interdependent developmental approach for its recommendations, both before and after the withdrawal of ISAF forces, Team B focused on the immediate withdrawal of ISAF forces as a
means to improve development and sustainability - a focus which, at times, caused them to lose track of a long-term perspective for Afghan development. Yet despite these differences, both reports have much in common.

In fact, Team A and Team B are closely aligned in their specific recommendations. Interestingly, both teams ended up calling for a prompt withdrawal of international troops and an immediate shift away from defence and towards development-centered initiatives. Both teams also recognized the need for the international community to remain involved in Afghanistan, particularly with the training and equipping Afghan bodies such as the NAP and the central government. Economically, both teams emphasized the potential of mining and resource wealth in Afghanistan, as well as the licit use of opium production and poverty alleviation techniques such as micro-finance. With regard to development, both teams appreciate the need for better aid coordination and harmonization within Afghanistan and suggest UNAMA as a means to accomplish this. Furthermore, concepts like legitimacy, domestic ownership, and empowering the Afghan people have informed all the recommendations in each report. Each group supports a self-sustaining Afghanistan; independence remains the ultimate goal.

Certainly, the Team A/Team B approach has proved a constructive tool in our analysis of the conflict in Afghanistan. Not only did the light-hearted competition help us to overcome an intellectual stalemate, but also the contrasting frameworks helped spur our creativity, provoke a more in-depth analysis, and create more innovative and compelling policy recommendations. When presented together, our two reports not only enlighten the reader to different aspects of the conflict, but also complement and strengthen one another throughout. Finally, it is our sincere hope that these reports have succeeded in accurately portraying the research, thought, and hard work that went into them, and that upon examining these reports our readers feel not only better versed in the conflict in Afghanistan, but also more hopeful for a bright and prosperous future for the Afghan people.

“The assignment was very different from typical essay assignments in Social Science, and the ‘real life’ aspect, and necessity for complete practicality within the report made it a stimulating and challenging task.” - RaginiKashyap

“I feel like developing these two reports was supposed to promote constructive arguments and consequently a more creative outcome in each group. Instead I see more similarities between the two, which I now realize could be a good thing and actually gives me hope about the future of Afghanistan.” - KatrinSeidl
“The fact that both teams arrived at similar conclusions, although with different priorities and methodologies, underlines the idea that there are concrete goals and steps that will lead to the achievement of stabilization in Afghanistan.” – Rachel Rawana

“I think you accomplished more as a collective than you would have as individuals.”
– Professor McKenzie