



# WINNING STRATEGIES:

CANADA'S ELECTION TO THE UNITED  
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

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WINNING STRATEGIES



# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report offers two alternative proposals for campaigns that aim to get Canada elected to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It is organized into three parts: the first presents an analysis of the foreign policy context in which the campaign will be run, and the second and third each present one of the packaged campaigns.

The campaigns set forth in this report were designed to present considerably different visions of Canadian foreign policy, but there are a number of fundamental elements that any UNSC campaign has to address. The contextual portion of the report lays these common features out in detail, focusing firstly on explaining the workings of the United Nations (UN) and the UNSC, and secondly on analyzing the most salient features of Canada's foreign policy from its most basic values to the policies of the current day. At the core of these explanations—and central to the very purpose of this report—is the experience of Canada's failed bid for a seat on the UNSC in 2010. Both campaigns approach the lessons of this defeat in fundamentally different ways, but the first part of this report also offers an assessment of the 2010 campaign and the reasons put forward to explain Canada's loss. Both campaigns are targeted at achieving victory in the UNSC election to be held in 2024, and this introductory section lays out the reasons for which that date was chosen.

The bulk of the report lays out the campaigns in detail. The decision to present two alternate campaigns was based on the view that the most effective way to explore Canada's foreign policy would be to develop strategies that each encapsulated the divergent paths available to any policy maker: to either build an initiative that continues to move along the same general trajectory in which policy is currently heading, or to develop a programme that changes that trajectory entirely and puts forth a new vision. Based on that understanding, the first campaign proposes an electoral strategy developed on the basis of the policy orientation of the current government led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper, while the second campaign advocates a fundamental shift in the way in which Canada's foreign affairs are conducted.

Neither campaign is static: each offers its own vision and specific recommendations, although these proposals differ in both focus and scope. The first campaign's platform is based partly on a reorientation of the posture and framing of the current government's foreign policy, and partly on a series of modest and incremental policy changes organized according to the themes of "Partnership, Prosperity and Protection." The second campaign recommends that deeper changes be made to Canada's foreign policy in order to better respond to a changing global order. This platform ultimately seeks to transform Canada into a *smart power* that embraces the label of an *innovative internationalist*.

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# SECTION I:

## CONTEXTUALIZING THE CAMPAIGN

# 1.0 FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXT

## 1.1 CORE CANADIAN VALUES IN FOREIGN POLICY

Canadian foreign policy is a reflection and a manifestation of what Canada stands for in the world and what it wishes to achieve. It is the national expression of values, principles, and interests and the means by which to achieve and promote them. Overall however, Canadian foreign policy has remained relatively consistent in both style and substance. This consistency is best understood as the result of a “synthesized balance between principles and pragmatism or pragmatic idealism.”<sup>1</sup> At its core are the values and practices of democracy and democratization, economic security, protection of human rights, tolerance of diversity, respect for the environment, social equity and an engaged civil society.<sup>2</sup> Canadian policy makers have pragmatically shaped these values and harmonized them with Canadian national interests. Values and interests are not contradictory; they are complementary and give meaning to one another.

Canadian foreign policy rests on the simple strategic premise that global peace and order are indivisible and deemed necessary for security and economic prosperity. Since trade has always played an integral role in Canada’s development, the stability of the international system is a necessary ingredient to ensure economic prosperity.<sup>3</sup> Thus, Canadian policy makers have embraced a comprehensive agenda to secure the nation’s interests. This agenda primarily covered the following areas: peacekeeping and peacemaking, human rights, nuclear and non-nuclear arms control and disarmament, ecological protection, trade and commerce and international development assistance. A major goal of Canadian foreign policy has been, therefore, to satisfy Canada’s interests in the context of broader global interests. Canadian foreign policy is also driven by moral concerns. While Canadian policy-makers carefully gauged and calibrated a balance of power in a manner that sustains a workable equilibrium, they were also concerned about the problems of war and peace. An objective of Canadian foreign policy is thus a desire to create and contribute to a more peaceful and just world.

Multilateral engagement has traditionally represented the primary method by which Canadian foreign policy objectives were secured. The emphasis on multilateralism is more

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<sup>1</sup> Melakopides, Costas, *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1995*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), 3-6.

<sup>2</sup> Lee, Stephen, “Canadian Values in Canadian Foreign Policy,” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 10, no. 1 (2002): 1.

<sup>3</sup> Michaud, Nelson, “Values and Canadian Foreign Policy-making: Inspiration of Hindrance?” in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates & Old Ideas* ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 347.

than simply a global vision and a diplomatic style, but also a function of Canada's strategic position. Across time and over different issues, Canadian policy-makers have relied on multilateralism to secure a diverse set of foreign policy objectives, ranging from the preservation of international peace and order, to national security and economic prosperity. Moreover, multilateralism provided a means to collaborate with a range of states toward maintaining global stability. Deeply connected to this function is the concept of the middle power. Across time and over different issues, policy-makers have exploited the concept of the middle power to attain "disproportionate influence in international affairs and furnish Canada with a distinctive foreign policy brand."<sup>4</sup> Thus, Canadian internationalism and its associated multilateralism generated a unique image that distinguished the style and substance of Canadian foreign policy from both great powers and smaller states.

This particular concept of Canadian internationalism has often been described as "liberal internationalism." The doctrine is grounded in the application of political liberalism: democracy, social justice, transparent governance, the rule of law, equality, protection of individual rights and economic cooperation. However, the core values of Canadian internationalism are also reflective of the conservative underpinnings of a nation founded on the principles of "peace, order and good governance."<sup>5</sup> In this sense, Canadian internationalism, for many years considered the dominant foreign policy framework, has promoted Canadian identity at both the national and international level.<sup>6</sup> Since the liberal values of Canadian internationalism were somewhat idealistic, they provided space for Canada to distinguish itself from great powers that opted for a more realist approach. Moreover, the pragmatic application of these values distinguished Canada from smaller powers that lacked the relative capability to project their values through their foreign policy. However, as Canada's political environment and the world around it have shifted, this framework of "liberal internationalism" has increasingly been subject to change. What is clear is that Canadian foreign policy—whatever its political orientation—will continue to influence the way in which the nation and its citizens define themselves and their place in the world.

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<sup>4</sup> Welsh, Jennifer M., "Canada in the 21st Century: Beyond Dominion and Middle Power," *Behind the Headlines* 61, no. 4 (2004): 584.

<sup>5</sup> Chapnick, Adam, "Peace, Order, and Good Government: The Conservative Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal*, 60, no. 3 (2005): 637.

<sup>6</sup> Nossal, Kim, Stephane Roussel, and Stephane Paquin, *International Policy and Politics in Canada*, (Toronto: Pearson Canada, 2011), 136.



## 1.2 THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS PRIORITIES

The United Nations (UN) is one of the most significant multilateral institutions in today's world. It exists not only for maintaining international peace and security, but also for resolving international economic and social issues, encouraging respect for human rights and protecting the environment. It is the world's largest intergovernmental organization, with 193 member states.<sup>7</sup> The UN comprises six main organs: the General Assembly (GA), the Security Council (UNSC), the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Secretariat.<sup>8</sup> The GA is the central forum of the UN, where member states discuss and deliberate matters of peace and security, the expansion of UN membership and budgetary concerns.<sup>9</sup> However, it is the UNSC that holds authoritative jurisdiction over the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>10</sup>

The structure and functions of the United Nations have expanded over time to address new and evolving challenges in global affairs. It is in this context that the UN developed its peacekeeping mechanisms and established peacebuilding operations to assist fragile or collapsed states in post-conflict reconstruction.<sup>11</sup> The concept of security has expanded to encompass basic human needs such as food and water, development, global health, human rights and the environment. Thus, the focus of the United Nations has evolved since its inception to include a vast array of transnational issues.

In 2000, the GA adopted the Millennium Declaration to reaffirm member states' commitment to the UN in the twenty-first century. The Declaration outlined eight objectives for the new millennium: sustainable peace and security; sustainable development and poverty eradication, environmental protection, human rights, democracy and good governance, the protection of the vulnerable, meeting the special needs of Africa and strengthening the UN.<sup>12</sup> Based on this Declaration, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) established the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which committed member states to eight goals to be achieved by 2015. The eight MDGs are:

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<sup>7</sup> The United Nations, *Membership*, "Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present"

<sup>8</sup> The United Nations, Department of Public Information, *The United Nations Today* (New York, 2008), 5.

<sup>9</sup> The United Nations, *The United Nations Today*, 5.

<sup>10</sup> The United Nations, *The United Nations Today*, 6-7.

<sup>11</sup> The United Nations, *The United Nations Today*, 71-73.

<sup>12</sup> The United Nations, General Assembly, Eighth Plenary Session, 55/2, *United Nations Millennium Declaration*, September 8, 2000.



1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Develop a global partnership for development

The MDGs have remained prominent on the UN agenda. Since 2010, member states and various UN bodies have begun formulating the post-2015 development agenda. In 2012, the idea of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) emerged out of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in Rio de Janeiro, although specific goals were not developed. The following year, a 30-member Open Working Group was tasked with preparing a proposal for the SDGs in consultation with civil society groups, non-governmental organizations, scientific bodies and think tanks.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, inclusive social and economic development remains a priority for the UN as the global community strives to reach the MDGs as best as possible by 2015 and prepares for the transition to new SDGs.

In 2012, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon outlined a “Five Year Action Agenda” to address the “exponential” magnitude of change in the international system and resulting risks to security.<sup>14</sup> The agenda included five “Generational Opportunities:” sustainable development, prevention and pre-emptive action, building a safer and more secure world through innovation, supporting nations in transition and working with women and young people. To achieve these actions, the Secretary-General called for greater collaboration between the private sector, civil society, philanthropists and academics.

### 1.3 THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

According to Chapter V of the UN Charter, the UNSC assumes "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."<sup>15</sup> This responsibility carries with it the right to recommend measures to resolve "any threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression."<sup>16</sup> As a means of maintaining or restoring international security, the UNSC

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<sup>13</sup> The United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs, *United Nations Sustainable Development Platform.: Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals*.

<sup>14</sup> The United Nations, *The Secretary-General's Five-Year Action Agenda*, January 25, 2012, 1-2.

<sup>15</sup> The United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Chapter 5, Article 24.

<sup>16</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter 7, Article 39.

can use non-forceful measures such as the complete or partial interruption of economic relations or diplomatic relations or forceful measures such as "demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces."<sup>17</sup>

Unlike the GA, the UNSC has limited membership and an ability to make legally binding decisions.<sup>18</sup> Originally composed of eleven member states, the UNSC now has fifteen members.<sup>19</sup> The expansion increased the number of non-permanent members, keeping the same five permanent members (P-5), identified in 1945: the Republic of China (now the People's Republic of China), France, the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation), the United Kingdom and the United States of America. These five states each have the ability to veto draft resolutions that are put before the UNSC.<sup>20</sup> All other member states compete for ten non-permanent seats, elected in two-year terms by the GA.

### MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY

In 1945, the UN had a narrow understanding of security, focusing on inter-state conflict prevention, shifting in the 1990s toward intra-state conflict and humanitarian crisis prevention, first conceptualized in the report "An Agenda for Peace."<sup>21</sup> Approaching intra-state conflict from multiple levels, the UNSC attempts to prevent the emergence of conflicts, the escalation of conflicts and the occurrence of humanitarian abuses during conflicts.<sup>22</sup> According to Elizabeth M. Cousens, the UNSC can prevent conflict by four means: normative and symbolic tools, diplomatic and non-coercive tools, semi-coercive tools or coercive tools. Generally, this list also represents the order in which the Security Council approaches issues, with coercive means representing a last resort.<sup>23</sup>

Although this approach to conflict prevention has been developed over half a century, certain limitations remain. The UNSC does not have access to a rapid deployment force, hindering its ability to act promptly. Also, certain conflicts might not register on the Security Council's radar due to the political interests of the P-5. As Wallenstein and Johansson reveal, although there has been a decrease in vetoes and an increase in Chapter

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<sup>17</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter 7, Article 41-42.

<sup>18</sup> Michael C. Wood, "Security Council Working Methods and Procedure: Recent Developments," *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 45.1 (1996): 152.

<sup>19</sup> Wood, "Security Council Working Methods and Procedure," 152.

<sup>20</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter 5, Article 23.

<sup>21</sup> Elizabeth M. Cousens, "Conflict Prevention," in *The UN Security Council: from Cold War to the 21st Century*, ed. David Malone (Boulder, Colo: London, 2004): 101-103.

<sup>22</sup> Cousens, "Conflict Prevention," 105-107.

<sup>23</sup> Cousens, "Conflict Prevention," 108-111.

VII resolutions, "there is selectivity with respect to the conflicts that enter the agenda of the Council."<sup>24</sup> Notably, powerful member states are able to prevent the discussion of issues that they feel would impinge on their sovereignty.<sup>25</sup> The attentions of the UNSC are chiefly focused on Africa, Europe and the Middle East. The main factor contributing to this disproportion is the strong representation of European states on the UNSC, serving foremost European economic, post-colonial and geographical interests.<sup>26</sup>

### ENSURING EQUITABLE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

The UNSC does attempt to maintain proportional regional representation. Member states are divided into five regions within which they compete for an allotted number of non-permanent seats. Last amended in 1963, with Resolution 1991 (XVIII), the current regional breakdown of the 10 non-permanent seats is as follows:

- Five from Africa and Asia;
- One from Eastern Europe;
- Two from Latin America;
- Two from the Western European and "Others" category.<sup>27</sup>

Unofficially, the five seats allotted to the African and Asian states were divided in 1968, with the African group receiving two, the Asian group receiving two and an Arab state receiving the last seat.<sup>28</sup> Elected for two-year terms, each year five of the ten non-permanent members are elected. However, as Brian Lai explains, the allotment of seats does not currently represent regional state membership equally or proportionally. According to Table 2.3.1, the Western European and Others group (WEOG) is over-represented with one-third of the Security Council seats, while states from the Asia-Pacific region and Africa are significantly under-represented.<sup>29</sup> The Eastern European (EE) group receives the most proportionate representation within Security Council, followed by the

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<sup>24</sup> Peter Wallensteen and Patrik Johansson, "Security Council Decisions in Perspective," in *The UN Security Council: from Cold War to the 21st Century*, ed. David Malone, (Boulder, Colo: London, 2004) 19-22.

<sup>25</sup> Wallensteen and Patrik Johansson, "Security Council Decisions in Perspective," 23.

<sup>26</sup> Wallensteen and Patrik Johansson, "Security Council Decisions in Perspective," 25.

<sup>27</sup> The United Nations, General Assembly, Eighth Session, "Resolution 1991 (XVIII), Question of equitable representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council," 17 December 1963, 21-22.

<sup>28</sup> Axel Dreher, Matthew Gould, Matthew D. Rablen, and James Raymond Vreeland, "The Determinants of Election to the United Nation Security Council," *Public Choice* 158 (2014): 54.

<sup>29</sup> Brian Lai, "U.N. Security Council Nonpermanent Membership: Equitable Distribution for Equitable Representation," Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Conference, (Chicago, Illinois, 2-6 April 2009), 3.

Regional Grouping	UN Rep. (%)	SC Rep. (%)
WEOG	15.0	33.3
EE	11.9	13.3
Africa Group	27.9	20
Asia-Pacific Group	27.9	20
GRULAC	17.0	13.3

Latin American and Caribbean (GRULAC) group.<sup>30</sup> This unequal distribution of the seats has sparked complaints of a North-South divide within the UNSC.<sup>31</sup> As a result, UNSC reform is a reoccurring topic within the GA. This topic is contentious though, with member states disagreeing over proposals to expand permanent membership, especially suggestions to include Germany and

Japan, as well as proposals to reform or abolish the veto.<sup>32</sup> As no amendments have met the requirement of two-thirds ratification by the GA and the consent of all five permanent members, none have successfully passed.

### ELECTION PATTERNS AND TRENDS FOR REGIONAL GROUPS

Table 2.3.2 outlines the most elected member states according to region. The informal Africa group has the most evenly distributed election statistics representing a turn-taking style with only two states, Nigeria and Egypt winning more than three seats, leaving only 11 of its 54 members never having sat on the Council.<sup>33</sup> The informal Asia group is much less evenly distributed, with over half of its constituent states (30 of 53) never having sat on the UNSC. Statistically, the group has been dominated by Japan, which has the highest rate of election of all the regions at roughly 5.7 years. The EE group and the GRULAC group have similar election ratios, with roughly 40 percent of its members (9 of 22 and 13 of 33) never having won a seat on the Council. However, the EE group has significantly lower rates of election, possibly due to it receiving only one seat on the SC while the GRULAC group receives two. The WEOG bloc is considered one of the most

<sup>30</sup> The United Nations, *Countries Elected Members of the Security Council*.

<sup>31</sup> Gould, Matthew and Matthew Rablen, "Equitable Representation in the Councils of the United Nations: Theory and Application," *CESIFO Working Paper No. 4519*. (2013): 15.

<sup>32</sup> Fassbender, Bardo "Pressure for Security Council Reform," in *The UN Security Council: from Cold War to the 21st Century*, ed. David Malone, (Boulder, Colo: London, 2004), 341-342.

<sup>33</sup> Lai, "U.N. Security Council Nonpermanent Membership," 3.

competitive. Only 30 percent of its members (8 of 26) have never been elected, lower than all groups except the African bloc.

Table 2.3.2.

Region	Number of Member States Never Elected	Member States Most Often Elected	Year of UN Admission	Number of Won Campaigns	Rate of Election in Years
Africa Group	11/54 Members	Nigeria	1960	5	10.6
		Zambia	1964	3	16.3
		Zimbabwe	1980	2	16.5
Asia-Pacific Group	30/53 Non-Permanent Members	Japan	1956	10	5.7
		Pakistan	1947	7	9.4
		India	1945	7	9.7
Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC)	13/33 Members	Brazil	1945	10	6.8
		Argentina	1945	9	7.5
		Colombia	1945	7	9.7
Eastern European Group (EE)	9/22 Non-Permanent Members	Poland	1945	5	13.6
		Romania	1955	4	14.5
		Bulgaria	1955	3	19.3



Western European and Others Group (WEOG)	8/26 Non-Permanent Members	Germany	1973	5	8
		Italy	1955	6	9.6
		Canada	1945	6	11.3

Although attempts have been made to decipher which determinants explain successful elections, the ballots are secret and therefore all conclusions remain speculative. However, certain studies have been compiled that provide quantitative analysis of election determinants, dismissing the value placed on peacekeeping, foreign aid and territorial size. Furthermore, although Article 23 instructs the GA to consider a state's contributions to peace and security, states engaged in conflict have been elected to the UNSC.<sup>34</sup> Some positive determinants include: large populations in all regions except the EE group, states with a history of British colonialism except in Africa, and democratic states in the EE group, GRULAC group and the WEOG.<sup>35</sup> The largest connection among all groups is the use of the "turn-taking norm" whereby "the longer a country has been waiting to appear on the Council the higher the probability of receiving the endorsement of the regional caucus."<sup>36</sup>

For Canada, it is important to note the highly competitive nature of the WEOG. The WEOG is made up of multiple factions, including the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Iceland), the BENELUX countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg), CANZ (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), in addition to the European Union (EU) and non-EU affiliations, notably JUSCANZ. JUSCANZ is a group composed of industrialized states within and outside of the WEOG: Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This group is also associated with the Netherlands and several non-EU countries such as Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and San Marino.<sup>37</sup>

A divide between EU and non-EU states is increasingly visible. Since the creation of the UN, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are the most conspicuous "Others" in the WEOG. The CANZ states align their interests and act as an advisory group within the UN, making statements on issues ranging from peace-building, budgeting, the importance of the

<sup>34</sup> Dreher, Gould, Rablen, and Vreeland, "The Determinants of Election to the United Nation Security Council," 75.

<sup>35</sup> Dreher, Gould, Rablen, and Vreeland, "The Determinants of Election to the United Nation Security Council," 76-78.

<sup>36</sup> Dreher, Gould, Rablen, and Vreeland, "The Determinants of Election to the United Nation Security Council," 79.

<sup>37</sup> United States, United States Mission to the United Nations, "Statement by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on Israel's Membership in JUSCANZ in New York's Third Committee, February 11, 2014."

rule of law, sustainable development and counter-terrorism.<sup>38</sup> Since 1980 there has been an increasing awareness that CANZ members are elected less often. For example, Australia has lost two out of its past three bids against EU countries. Although the EU represents an increasingly institutionalized regional caucus, it is important to note the role of JUSCANZ in the reduction of CANZ's competitive edge. JUSCANZ "has developed as a (loose) forum of cooperation for non-EU 'Western' and like-minded countries in UN bodies."<sup>39</sup> Since 2000, and looking at candidacy declarations up until 2022, there has been only one contested campaign between JUSCANZ members—that between Australia and Iceland in 2008, although both lost to fellow competitors Austria and Turkey. Therefore, the recent failed bids of Australia and Canada can also be explained in terms of a political realignment, rather than the result of EU hegemony.

## 1.4 CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Canada has been an active and committed participant in the UN since 1945. Canadian policymakers have served vital roles within the UN, and many of the organization's accomplishments have had a Canadian dimension. For example, Canadian John Humphrey was the principal author of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights while Foreign Minister (later Prime Minister) Lester Pearson reaffirmed the concept of peacekeeping and Maurice Strong chaired both the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment and the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development. Canadians have occupied key positions within the UN System, including the Presidency of the GA (Lester Pearson) and the UN Deputy Secretary-General (Louise Fréchette).

Canada has been active in shaping formal provisions in the UN Charter, especially regarding the rights of non-member states. For instance, the first paragraph of Article 23 establishes guidelines that affect what the delegations take into account when they decide on how they will vote. The sentence reads: "The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution." The first of these two criteria is a byproduct of Canadian expertise, thus allowing for increased cooperation with the world's most powerful states.

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<sup>38</sup> New Zealand, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York, *New Zealand UN Statements: Legal*.

<sup>39</sup> Luif, Paul, "EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly," *European Union Institute for Security Studies* (Occasional Papers, 2003): 8.



Canada has not historically objected to the basic principle according to which the dominant states in global affairs also maintain the greatest authority and influence in the UN. Canada has instead sought to solidify its role as a middle power in global affairs. The fact that it remains the seventh-largest contributor to the UN reinforces such a position and demonstrates a lasting commitment to the organization. To take the most recently available figures, Canada's budget contribution in 2009 came to about \$72.5 million US (roughly the same as that of Spain, which contributed 72.3 million US). The budget contributions of only six countries exceeded that of Canada:

Country	Contribution \$ (million)
United States	598.2
Japan	405
Germany	209
United Kingdom	161.8
France	153.5
Italy	123.7

Over the past fifty years, Canada has made a significant, constructive and sustained contribution in many areas of UN activity: peace and security, development assistance, human rights and social, economic and environmental affairs. Currently, Canada is a member of multiple UN Specialized Agencies. Currently, it is participating in seven UN diplomatic missions in New York.

As the cornerstone of a rules-based international system, the UN has remained a vital forum for Canadian policy makers to influence world affairs, to promote economic interests and to project Canadian values. As Canada neighbours the USA, arguably the most powerful nation on earth, the UN has been of prime importance in counterbalancing the excesses of continentalism. But the UN's importance to Canada far surpasses this. The promotion of core Canadian values, such as the securing of human rights and justice, the alleviation of poverty and the advancement of human security are most effectively achieved through multilateral engagement.

## 1.5 THE 2010 CAMPAIGN

Canada began campaigning for a non-permanent seat on the UNSC nine years prior to the 2010 election.<sup>40</sup> Its intention to run, however, was not confirmed by the Harper government until 2009.<sup>41</sup> Prior to this point, Canada had served on the UNSC six times

<sup>40</sup> White, Marianne, "Canada going for UN Security Council Seat," *Canwest News Service*, December 17, 2008.

<sup>41</sup> White, "Canada going for UN Security Council Seat."

since the founding of the organization. With the exception of the first session of the GA in 1946, Canada had never lost an election. During its most recent campaign, Canadian policy makers stressed the country's long history of service to the organization, its commitment to multilateralism and its consistent participation in UN operations.<sup>42</sup> In contrast, Germany had rounded up considerable support for its campaign by 2008. However, it announced its candidature in 2006, a much later date than either Portugal or Canada.<sup>43</sup> Germany has served on the UNSC four times since its admission to the UN in 1973, winning all of its previous bids. During its recent campaign, Germany stressed its considerable contributions to peacekeeping missions over the last twenty years.

Portugal's delegates have served on the UNSC in both 1979 and 1997. Portugal announced its candidacy in early 2001.<sup>44</sup> According to the Portuguese Foreign Ministry, it ran an "inexpensive campaign," counting primarily on longstanding diplomatic ties.<sup>45</sup> Ahead of the voting, Portugal listed its priorities as addressing African security and issues related to climate change.<sup>46</sup> It largely stressed the need for greater UN representation of small and medium-sized countries, in addition to pledging support for increased developmental assistance.<sup>47</sup>

## SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE ELECTIONS RESULTS

The 2010 UNSC elections were held during the 65<sup>th</sup> session of the GA, on 12 October 2010. Before the first round of voting, Ion Botnaru, Director of the GA, reaffirmed the provision within the Rules of Procedure, stating that "due regard should be paid to candidates' contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security as well as equitable geographical distribution."<sup>48</sup> According to such rules, elections would take place by secret balloting, with a required two-thirds majority for a state to be elected. After member states had filled out their ballots, the GA would be suspended for approximately one hour while ballots were collected and counted. If the first round of balloting proved inconclusive, a second round of restricted balloting is held although limited to the two candidates that received the highest number of votes.

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<sup>42</sup> The United Nations, General Assembly, Sixty-Fifth Session, *Statement by the Right Honourable Stephen Harper Prime Minister of Canada*, New York, September 23, 2010.

<sup>43</sup> Security Council Report, "Special Research Report No. 3."

<sup>44</sup> Security Council Report, "Special Research Report No. 3."

<sup>45</sup> "Portugal elected to UN Security Council," *The Portugal News*, October 12, 2010.

<sup>46</sup> "Portugal elected to UN Security Council," *The Portugal News*.

<sup>47</sup> "Portugal elected to UN Security Council," *The Portugal News*.

<sup>48</sup> United Nations, "Press Conference on Rules of Procedure for Security Council Elections" (New York, October 11, 2010).

Immediately prior to the first round of voting, the Canadian delegation was optimistic. The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) estimated that Canada had secured the votes of 135 countries in the first round.<sup>49</sup> Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon stated that he was “confident” that Canada’s bid for a seat would be successful.<sup>50</sup> However, in the first round of voting Germany was the only country to receive 128 votes, securing the first non-permanent seat. During the second round, neither Canada nor Portugal obtained the 128 vote majority to be elected, although Portugal emerged as the leading candidate, surpassing Canada by 35 votes. The President of the GA, Joseph Deiss, announced that given the failure to obtain a majority vote by either state, the GA would proceed to the second restricted ballot.

Following the distribution of ballot papers, John McNee, then Canadian Ambassador to the UN, made a surprise announcement that Canada “wishes to withdraw its candidacy and to congratulate Portugal and Germany on their election to the Security Council.”<sup>51</sup> A third round of voting was nevertheless required to determine an absolute majority, resulting in 150 votes for Portugal. According to McNee, the Portuguese Foreign Minister publicly lauded the influential roles of Brazil, Spain and Turkey in Portugal’s success.<sup>52</sup> The Portuguese State Secretary attributed the country’s victory to its strategy of diplomacy and dialogue.<sup>53</sup> The results of the election were clearly met by surprise for Canada’s UN representatives, indicating that the loss was largely unforeseen and unexpected.

An examination of the 2010 UNSC election points to several factors that contributed to Canada’s failed bid. There were some factors that affected the election result that fell outside of Canada’s control. In particular, Canada was operating from a disadvantage due to the EU’s backing of Portugal and Germany. Both countries enjoyed the support of 24 European states that had negotiated the nominations well before the election campaign.<sup>54</sup> Whereas the African, Asian and Latin American blocs each nominated one candidate, thereby eliminating the need for a GA vote, the WEOG nominated three candidates for two seats. It seems clear that bloc voting by the EU continues to seriously disadvantage the ‘Others’ category, consisting of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Israel.

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<sup>49</sup> Adam Chapnick, “Canada’s Failed Campaign for the UN Security Council: 10 Unanswered Questions,” *Policy Options* 32, no. 2 (2011): 59.

<sup>50</sup> Chapnick, “Canada’s Failed Campaign for the UN Security Council,” 59.

<sup>51</sup> Canada withdraws from race for UN council seat,” *The Toronto Star*, October 12, 2010.

<sup>52</sup> “Portugal elected to UN Security Council,” *The Portugal News*.

<sup>53</sup> “Portugal elected to UN Security Council,” *The Portugal News*.

<sup>54</sup> David Frum, “Don’t Blame Harper for Canada’s UN Rejection,” *National Post*, October 13, 2010.

Bloc voting also went hand-in-hand with another factor that was difficult to control: vote-trading. While vote-trading does garner support, there is no mechanism that binds UN ambassadors to their promises.<sup>55</sup> In practice, Australian diplomat Richard Woolcott contends that nominees should always discount approximately 12% of all written pledges of support.<sup>56</sup> Using this benchmark, the Harper government needed at least 143 votes to win outright; more than the alleged 135 pledges Canada had secured. Furthermore, Canada received 122 votes in the first round and, more surprisingly, only 78 votes in the second round. This massive drop-off suggests that Canada did not have a second round balloting strategy. One possible explanation is that diplomats feared second round campaigning could be interpreted as a lack of confidence. Such a strategy was necessary however for confirming the support of wavering states.<sup>57</sup>

## 1.6 FOREIGN POLICY OF THE HARPER GOVERNMENT

Analysts connected elements of the current government's foreign policy initiatives with the 2010 defeat. Since its election in 2006, Prime Minister Harper's government has attracted commentary—both laudatory and critical—for its perceived alterations to a variety of aspects of Canadian foreign policy. For many commentators, some of the government's policies appear in stark contrast with an internationalist legacy of Canadian foreign policy, most closely associated in recent years with Foreign Ministers Bill Graham and Lloyd Axworthy.<sup>58</sup> However, while some commentators assert that there is a clear ideological framework behind the policies of the current government, others argue that Prime Minister Harper's approach is less cohesive and at times even contradictory.<sup>59</sup> In general, these changes can be characterized as having increased the government's focus on instruments of "hard" policy, particularly trade and national defence, at the expense of "softer" initiatives, including development, environmental policy and active participation at multilateral organizations. After the Canadian government's failure to secure a seat on the United Nations Security Council in September 2010, the current government's foreign policy came under increasing scrutiny from foreign policy analysts.

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<sup>55</sup> David Malone, "Eyes on the Prize: The Quest For Non-Permanent Seats on the UN Security Council," *Global Governance* 6, no. 1 (2000): 15-16.

<sup>56</sup> Woolcott, Richard, *Reflections of Diplomacy from Stalin's Death to the Bali Bombings* (Scarborough: Harper's Colin Publishers, 2003), 192.

<sup>57</sup> International Peace Institute, "Taking Stock, Moving Forward: Report to the Foreign Ministry of Finland on the 2012 Elections to the United Nations Security Council," April 2013.

<sup>58</sup> Adam Chapnick, "A Diplomatic Counter-Revolution: Conservative Foreign Policy, 2006-11," *International Journal* 67.1 (Winter 2011/2012): 142.

<sup>59</sup> John Ibbitson, "How Harper transformed Canada's foreign policy," *The Globe and Mail*, 31 January 2014.

Of particular significance for UNSC campaigns—both past and future—is the suggestion that the current government is indifferent or even hostile to the UN. Numerous commentators have accused the Harper government of showing little interest in the organization.<sup>60</sup> In the three years that led up to the 2010 UNSC election, Prime Minister Harper only spoke twice at the GA. In comparison, German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke seven times between 2006 and 2009.<sup>61</sup> Similarly, Portuguese President Anibal Silva actively participated in UN initiatives to provide technical assistance to Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa.<sup>62</sup> These actions were instrumental in creating the impression that both countries were committed to the UN beyond their interest in the UNSC. During the same period, Canada had a considerable shortage of human resources operating abroad, and allocated fewer responsibilities to the DFTAD. This institutional ‘rust-out’ resulted in the DFATD having its budget cut in half, weakening Canada’s diplomatic outreach.<sup>63</sup> The Harper government has also been accused of having reduced more tangible commitments to the UN, particularly to peacekeeping. However this assertion is less attributable to the actions of the current government, as the governments of Prime Ministers Chrétien and Martin undertook more significant reductions in Canada’s participation in peacekeeping than that of Prime Minister Harper.<sup>64</sup>

The current government’s approach to development policy has also shifted from that of past governments, and it has been identified as one aspect of current foreign policy that may be alienating other states. Under Prime Minister Harper’s leadership the former Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) reorganized its’ system of distributing aid, channeling its funds into a smaller group of focus countries, which the government argued would improve aid effectiveness. In 2010, these changes may have jeopardized the votes of fifty-two African states at the UN in exchange for regional support Canada likely already had.<sup>65</sup> Additionally, as Ted Hewitt explains, the countries of Latin America have a tendency of voting based on hemispheric interests, both in terms of military defence and

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<sup>60</sup> Denis Stairs, “Being Rejected in the United Nations: The Causes and Implications of Canada’s Failure to Win a Seat in the UN Security Council,” *Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute* (2010).

<sup>61</sup> Nick Amies, “Germany Waits on Result of Its Quest For a Security Council Seat,” *DW German News*, October 13, 2010.

<sup>62</sup> Kesha Fikes, *Managing the African Portugal: The Citizen Migrant Distinction* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009): 154-155.

<sup>63</sup> Parmar Parminder, “2010 Crystallized Canada’s Changing Foreign Policy,” *CTV News Online*, January 2, 2011.

<sup>64</sup> The United Nations, “Troop and police contributions archive (1990-2012),” United Nations Peacekeeping.

<sup>65</sup> David Black, “Between Indifference and Idiosyncrasy: The Conservatives and Canadian Aid to Africa,” in *Struggling for Effectiveness: CIDA and Foreign Aid*, ed. Stephen Brown (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012): 255-257.



trade.<sup>66</sup> Canada's geographical proximity, coupled with its longstanding trade policies, was likely to garner more Latin American votes than either Portugal or Germany. More recently, the decision to fold CIDA into the newly-rechristened DFATD in mid-2013 may have exacerbated the negative effects that previous changes in development policy have had on Canada's standing among UN member states. Nonetheless, in other respects the changes to development policy are more superficial than sometimes assumed. Actual funding for development initiatives increased under Prime Minister Harper, and while past governments had tended to make more prominent statements of their development commitments, they also fell short on meeting them.<sup>67</sup>

The current government has also been criticized for its attitude toward international climate change commitments. In advance of the UNSC election in 2010, Canada's retreat from environmental standards established in the Kyoto Protocol and abandonment of its targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions was widely condemned by small island states.<sup>68</sup> Disapproval was evident during the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference, as accusations of environmental negligence were leveled against Canada.<sup>69</sup> Past governments also made little progress in reaching Canadian emission reduction targets, but the current government has been the target of particular criticism for environmental shortcomings.<sup>70</sup> This heightened criticism fits in with a new pattern observable with other problematic policy areas, wherein the current government has exacerbated the effect of unpopular policies by its reduced activism through diplomatic and multilateral channels.

One of the Harper government's most frequently discussed—and criticized—policies is its' attitude toward Israel. Prime Minister Harper and other officials in the government have taken a highly supportive stance toward the Israeli government since 2006. The government expressed support in instances where Israeli policy has been condemned by other nations for being excessively belligerent, including Israel's 2006 conflict with Hezbollah.<sup>71</sup> At the UN, Canada has also changed its votes on a certain

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<sup>66</sup> Ted Hewitt, "The Ties that Bind: A 20-Year Retrospective of Canada's Municipal Linkages in the Americas," *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 36, no. 71 (2011): 19-21.

<sup>67</sup> Jennifer Paul and Marcus Pistor, *Official Development Assistance Spending*, Publication PRB 07-10E (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, Parliamentary Information and Research Service, 2009).

<sup>68</sup> Sandra Contenta, "Canada: a Climate Change Loser," *Global Post*, December 16, 2009.

<sup>69</sup> Contenta, "Canada: a Climate Change Loser."

<sup>70</sup> Robert Fowler, "Why Canada was not elected to the Security Council two years ago, and why we will never be elected unless and until there is a fundamental change in our foreign policy," in *The United Nations and Canada: What Canada has done and should be doing at the United Nations*, ed. John E. Trent.

<sup>71</sup> Jon Elmer, "Israel's new 'best friend'?" *Al-Jazeera*, May 29, 2010.

number of resolutions critical of Israel, joining a small group of nations that vote against the resolutions.<sup>72</sup> This is widely seen as a reorientation of Canadian policy away from an approach that supported Israel but also spoke out against Israeli policies that were seen to contravene principles of international law.<sup>73</sup> However, it must be noted that official policy documents remain consistent with the less openly supportive policy of past governments.<sup>74</sup> In general, this divergence seems to be another expression of the Harper government's tendency toward making changes to the rhetorical posture of Canadian policy without altering the concrete fundamentals of past policy. Nevertheless, as in the other cases described here, these superficial alterations have had the same effect as more tangible changes.

In the context of the 2010 election, Canadian policy toward Israel—whether perceived or real—likely alienated members of the Arab League. The government's vocal, pro-Israel stance also distinguished Canada from its competitors. A firm, 'honest-broker' approach was exactly what the Arab League was looking for in a WEOG candidate. Had the Harper government adopted a more balanced approach, it might have, in Ian Williams' view, "gained legitimacy in the eyes of the Arab world."<sup>75</sup>

## AREAS OF PROGRESS

While criticisms of governmental foreign policy are nearly always more prominent than praise, there are certain facets of the Harper government's foreign policy that are less contentious and can be considered positive changes.

The expansion of trade and the promotion of Canada's commercial interests is one of the most prominent areas of focus for the current government. Prime Minister Harper has championed a wide variety of bilateral agreements with various countries. This has even been the case for countries of which the Harper government had initially been critical. The current government's policy toward China is the most notable instance of this shift in stance. After having criticized the Chinese government for committing human rights abuses upon coming into office in 2006, Prime Minister Harper then chose to visit the country in 2009 and has since presided over the signing of a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) with China.<sup>76</sup> Other free trade agreements have been

<sup>72</sup> The United Nations, General Assembly, "UN Voting Records."

<sup>73</sup> Paul Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Playbook for Canada* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2010), 201-204.

<sup>74</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."

<sup>75</sup> Ian Williams, "Canada Loses Bid for the Security Council Seat Due to Recent Unqualified Support for Israel," *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* no 9 (2010), 31.

<sup>76</sup> Paul Evans, "Canada, Meet Global China," *International Journal* 61:2 (2006), 293-294.

concluded with several countries, including Korea and the members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). Negotiations are also ongoing on another major free trade agreement with the EU.<sup>77</sup>

The current government has also shown strong signs of continuing its' commitment to Canada's multilateral security commitments. Prime Minister Harper and his government have shown strong support for Canada's participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, and continued to provide substantial developmental and restructuring funding to the country.<sup>78</sup> Canada actively participated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in Libya, and Canadian Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard directed the enforcement of NATO's no-fly zone.<sup>79</sup> Finally, the current government has also shown a strong interest in expanding Canada's presence in the Arctic, and has participated in a variety of international discussions on matters of Arctic sovereignty, including those of the Arctic Council.<sup>80</sup>

Although it has been accused of disengaging from the UN, Prime Minister Harper's government has shown an active interest in playing a significant role in certain multilateral organizations, particularly groupings of larger developed nations. Although not a change from past policy, Canada continues to play an active role within the G8 and G20, and hosted summits for the members of both organizations in 2010.<sup>81</sup>

## 1.7 VALUE OF A SEAT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The value of a non-permanent seat on the UNSC is a topic that has generated a great deal of discussion amongst political scientists. Some analysts contend that a successful election campaign can be seen as a measure of international prestige, ultimately reflecting a country's diplomatic achievements. Other scholars maintain that the value of a non-permanent seat lies in the aftermath of a successful nomination, particularly in shaping the actions of the UNSC and, in the case of reform, its' very structure. It has also been noted that countries elected as non-permanent members either enjoy the benefits of increased

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<sup>77</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Canada's Free Trade Agreements."

<sup>78</sup> The Canadian Press, "Canadian military involvement in Afghanistan formally ends," *CBC News*, March 12, 2014.

<sup>79</sup> Paul Koring, "Canadian general to lead enforcement of Libya's no-fly zone," *The Globe and Mail*, March 25, 2011.

<sup>80</sup> John Higginbotham, "What's in store for the Arctic?" Centre for International Governance Innovation, January 10, 2014.

<sup>81</sup> Prime Minister's Office, "PM Announces Canada to Host G0 Leaders in 2010," September 25, 2009.



economic aid or, for the more prosperous nations, the establishment of long-term political connections.<sup>82</sup>

Each of these interpretations, however, needs to be evaluated and placed in the context of current developments and a country's traditional diplomatic practices. For a middle power such as Canada, the imperative to engage in the international agenda is acute. While not powerful enough to impose its will onto other states, Canada can use UNSC elections as a method for supporting broad foreign policy goals.<sup>83</sup>

The UNSC plays an indispensable and preeminent role in international crisis management and global mediation, exercising its unique power of enforcement in situations that threaten international peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It exercises near full discretion in measures it employs to enforce its' decisions, and may call upon other members of the UN to apply such measures.<sup>84</sup> The UNSC is an extremely powerful body. Non-permanent membership provides an opportunity to share in this decision-making power and shape negotiated outcomes, while also allowing for meaningful interaction with significant powers and an elevated international profile. Access to a vast network of states and organizations, and powerful mechanisms to check and guide the decisions of larger powers are all features of UNSC membership. This is critical, particularly for a power such as Canada that lacks the hard power resources or the political clout to act unilaterally or independently from the UNSC. Canada has a vested interest in pursuing stability in regions where it is threatened. In the present state of international affairs, this may only be pursued collectively, through the institution of the UNSC.

A non-permanent seat on the UNSC also provides a gateway for Canada to promote well-defined policy objectives. In the 1998 election, Canada made it abundantly clear that its campaign was designed to promote human security as an extension of the Axworthy agenda. By building on its earlier diplomatic achievements—such as its contributions to the creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC)—the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) was able to bolster the legitimacy of its foreign policy and drive the production of comprehensive UN reports that fit these objectives.<sup>85</sup> Such opportunities to capitalize upon non-permanent membership to advance clear policy foreign objectives may certainly arise in the future, representing a further impetus to run for a seat.

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<sup>82</sup> Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council," *Global Governance* 8, no. 1 (2002): 47.

<sup>83</sup> Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott and Kim Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004): 19-21.

<sup>84</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter VII, Article 39.

<sup>85</sup> Malone, "Eyes on the Prize," 8-9.

Given the evolving nature of the UN and the UNSC and the increasingly vocal calls for their reform, there is a significant opportunity for Canada to become involved in the shaping of these two powerful institutions. Many scholars see the next decade as having potential and opportunity for Canadian diplomacy given this prospect. In the words of Paul Heinbecker, Canada has two choices in how it approaches the UN: “[we] can get involved and try and make it better, or [we] can sit on the sidelines and criticize.”<sup>86</sup> The next decade is likely see an increase in opportunities for collective international action, notably on issues related to nuclear weapons proliferation, energy security and climate change. Within this context, serving on the UNSC would arguably give Canada an edge in terms of the visibility of its policies and preferences, while also giving it a voice on ongoing security issues. In short, while running for a non-permanent seat remains a choice for Canadian policymakers, it is a choice that presents vast opportunity for action, influence and the advancement of Canadian values and objectives.

## 2.0 RUNNING THE CAMPAIGNS

### 2.1 DECISION TO RUN: REASONS TO CAMPAIGN FOR ELECTION IN 2024

After considering the possibility of campaigning for election in 2020, 2022 and 2024, it was decided that 2024 presents the best opportunity for Canada to be elected to the UNSC. There are multiple factors that contributed to this decision.

Upon initial discussions, running for 2020 seemed to be the best target year; however, numerous factors made this idea less than advantageous. First, multiple informal non-compete agreements, specifically CANZ and JUSCANZ prevent Canada from running against Australia and New Zealand for the WEOG seats. Additionally, since the EU was formed, it has been normatively established that Canada does not run against other non-EU members. With Norway already having declared its intention to run in 2020—along with EU member Ireland—running in this election would contradict Canada’s record. Analysis of the option to run in 2022 yielded similar results, as Switzerland is the only country yet to proclaim its intention to run for the WEOG seats in this election year. Launching a campaign for 2020 was also ruled out for pragmatic reasons. Both campaigns in this report incorporate various shifts in policy that require more time than would be permitted with a campaign aimed at the 2020 election.

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<sup>86</sup> “Paul Heinbecker Speaks to CIGI Junior Fellows of the Ballsillie School of International Affairs,” Youtube video, posted by “CIGI,” February 8, 2011.

There are other reasons for directing the campaigns toward the election in 2024. Allowing such a gap in between election years gives Canada an opportunity to engage in tactical vote-trading agreements, enabling the government to secure a number of votes, both from the WEOG and others, long before the election. A “tit-for-tat” exchange policy, or a vote for a vote, offers Canada the advantage of being able to strategically calculate the number of votes that will be accounted for heading into an election. Additionally, this period will give the government time to deepen engagements with countries that it may not, at the present time, have strong relationships with, potentially resulting in the possibility to trade votes.

Launching a campaign targeted at 2024 avoids the above mentioned issues, while simultaneously providing policy makers with enough time to make any necessary shifts in policy. Finally, given that Greece is the only country that has declared its intention to run for a WEOG seat in 2024, there is no conflict in terms of running against another member of CANZ or JUSCANZ.

## 2.2 ASSESSMENT OF COMPETITION IN 2024

Currently, Greece is the only other country that has declared its intention to run for the 2024 election from the WEOG. On the whole, while Greece has the advantage of being a member of the EU, it is a relatively weak member state. However, it should not be underestimated solely on this basis, because in terms of population size, economic stability and geography Greece is comparable to Portugal, which defeated Canada in the 2010 election. The following chart illustrates the similarities according to 2009-2013 statistics.

Country	GDP (USD)	Population
Greece	\$249,098,684,277	11,280,167
Portugal	\$212,273,977,886	10,526,703

While Greece and Portugal are similar in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and population, there are fundamental differences between the two countries that must be noted.

Greece has been actively involved in UNSC elections, running for six times (1951, 2004, 1976, 1986, 1988, 1998), and winning on two occasions (1951, 2004).<sup>87</sup> In three of

<sup>87</sup> Security Council Report, “Special Research Report: Security Council Elections 2013,” September 24, 2013.

these elections (1976, 1988, 1998) Canada ran against Greece, winning the election in all three cases.<sup>88</sup> The following chart illustrates these victories.<sup>89</sup>

Year of Election	Vote Tally: Canada	Vote Tally: Second Victor	Vote Tally: Greece	Vote Tally: Other Competitors	Rounds of Voting
1976	126	Federal Republic of Germany – 119	1	Finland – 2, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia – 1 each	1
1988	127	Finland – 100 (round 1), 110 (round 2)	77 (round 1), 47 (round 2)	N/A	2
1998	131	Netherlands – 122	87	N/A	1

Portugal, on the other hand, has a stronger electoral record. While Portugal has only served one more term on the UNSC than Greece, it must be noted that Portugal has run four times and served three terms, while Greece has run six times and served only twice.

It must also be noted that there are specific, polarizing issues that affect Greece’s UNSC candidacy. The ongoing conflict in Cyprus is the most significant of these issues and has likely already been a factor in undermining past Greek campaigns. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is the longest standing UN peacekeeping mission, originally established in 1964 to prevent increased fighting between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.<sup>90</sup> The mission just recently celebrated its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary.<sup>91</sup> This security issue damages Greece’s international reputation, making election to the UNSC increasingly difficult. In the 1998 UNSC election it was believed that Canada and the Netherlands were better candidates than Greece precisely because of the conflict in

<sup>88</sup> Security Council Report, “Special Research Report.”

<sup>89</sup> Security Council Report, “Special Research Report.”

<sup>90</sup> The United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.”

<sup>91</sup> The United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.”

Cyprus.<sup>92</sup> As of January 2014, the Monthly Forecast for Cyprus put out by the UNSC noted that insufficient progress has been made toward reaching a sustainable settlement in Cyprus.<sup>93</sup> On 30 January 2014, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2135, extending the mandate of UNFICYP until 31 July 2014.<sup>94</sup> Given this likely extension of the mission's mandate, it is logical to predict that UNFICYP will still be active in 2024, when Greece has declared its intention to run, leaving Cyprus a continually relevant issue.

While it is too early to examine the precise platform on which Greece will campaign in 2024, it is possible to speculate the likely focus of their campaign based on their current priorities. It is likely that Greece's foreign and domestic policies will continue to be dominated by regional issues.<sup>95</sup> Greece's continuing economic crisis and its ongoing negotiations with EU member states and actors, such as the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), are unlikely to leave it with sufficient freedom of action to engage with high-profile global issues that do not directly concern Greek interests. This is very likely to limit the scope of a Greek campaign for the UNSC. Canadian policy makers can thus remain confident that a Canadian campaign will likely be able to establish more tangible links between Canada's foreign policy and issues of international importance, than that of its Greek counterpart.

### 2.3 DECISION TO PLAN TWO CAMPAIGNS

Born out of a process of trial and error, the following campaigns began with an examination of the history of Canadian foreign policy and an analysis of Canada's failed bid for a UN Security Council seat in 2010. Agreeing that the 2010 bid failed due to an ineffective campaign, a greater focus needs to be placed on the formation and execution of the campaign. Divided into multiple groups, one group analyzed the UNSC election process: researching election regulations and future candidates, and examining election statistics and successful and unsuccessful past campaigns. Another group was tasked with comparing Canada's current foreign policy and the global priorities of the United Nations and its member states to draw conclusions on the international perception of Canada. This approach revealed the areas of foreign policy for which Canada has been criticized.

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<sup>92</sup> "Elections of Members to the Security Council, 1998: Cruises, Concerts, Even the Circus," *The Associated Press*. July 22, 1998.

<sup>93</sup> Security Council Report, "January 2014 Monthly Forecast: Europe – Cyprus", December 20, 2013.

<sup>94</sup> The United Nations, "Security Council Adopts Resolution 2135 (2014), Extending Mandate of United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Until 31 July."

<sup>95</sup> "Greece Eager to Enhance Image as EU President," *Deutsche Welle*, December 28, 2013.

Subsequently, effort was dedicated to contextualizing the campaign, outlining the do's and do not's of campaigning. Firstly, the audience of the campaign was discussed, choosing to dually address high elites in Ottawa and diplomats in New York. Secondly, a degree of sincerity and integrity is necessary in the campaign, emphasizing the need to legitimize the campaign by matching rhetoric and praxis. Finally, the campaign must highlight how the seat can benefit Canada and also Canada's intentions with the seat.

Finally, a brainstorming session occurred where bold, aspirational and critical campaign approaches were suggested. Ultimately, seven campaigns were chosen for further development; approached, conceptualized and designed according to: Canada's traditional values, Canada's foreign policy under Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Canada winning it regionally within the WEOG, Canada as a leader in technology and innovation, Canada as a leader in security, Canada advocating for UN reform and Canada as a partner in development. Realizing the overlap within these campaigns, they were narrowed down to two primary approaches Canada could adopt to win a non-permanent seat on the UNSC. Differing in their approach to Canada's foreign policy, the first campaign focuses on the reimagining and branding of Canada's current foreign policy, while the second creates new aims for Canada's foreign policy.



# SECTION II:

## CAMPAIGN OPTION NO. 1



# 1.0 RATIONALE

## 1.1 PERSPECTIVE AND BRAND

### RATIONALE AND GOALS OF THE CAMPAIGN

The proposed approach to obtaining a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) celebrates and capitalizes upon Canada's exceptional international performance in three key areas: promotion of national and global prosperity through numerous multilateral trade agreements and foreign investment, international development and humanitarian initiatives; engagement in extensive partnerships within a dense, multilateral network of states; and protection of freedom, human rights, security and democratic values worldwide.

Choosing to frame a campaign around the current realities of Canadian foreign policy is pragmatic, effective and implementable. The proposed campaign draws upon both enduring foreign policy traditions continued under the present government, as well as innovations in Canada's international role. This approach recognizes that Canada's global contributions are in fact substantial and noteworthy when viewed in their totality. Revising Canadian foreign policy is both unnecessary to success and unfitting to the character of UNSC elections. The elections are, and have always represented, an opportunity to celebrate a country's unique capacity to enhance the workings of the UNSC. Objective assessments of Canada's performance in key areas reveal that it is, in fact, in such a position. Moreover, this approach is realistic in its prospects for implementation. It makes use of innovative and progressive policies pursued by Prime Minister Stephen Harper's government to produce a campaign that is attractive and credible at a low cost.

The purpose of the proposed campaign is not only to remind United Nations (UN) member states of Canada's continued high standing in terms of international investments and commitments, but also to reinvigorate Canada's role at the UN. Canada's contributions to multilateralism, development and human rights are worthy of recognition and should be harnessed to further its international influence. From a purely pragmatic standpoint, the imperative to engage in the international agenda is acute for a country of Canada's rank and stature. In this context, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) remains a powerful tool for the promotion of Canada's foreign policy goals, given its extensive membership and handling of critical international issues and disputes. Given that the proposed campaign entails a focus on United Nations reform, it promises not only to appeal to a broad range of nations that support the concept, but also to give Canada a decisive role in shaping the character of the Security Council in the next few decades. With high investments in the UN and other international initiatives in recent years, Canada is in an excellent position to



campaign successfully for a UNSC seat and exert its influence to shape the body and further Canadian foreign policy goals.

### **CAMPAIGN APPROACH: REVISION OF POLICY OR MESSAGE?**

Essentially, the proposed campaign approach involves framing Canadian foreign policy in a way that is true to recent accomplishments and current priorities, while introducing incremental, realistic and effective additions and revisions to policy throughout the duration of the campaign and as part of Canada's prospective UNSC agenda. Much of the campaign simply involves bringing to the forefront overlooked projects and areas of progress and innovation, and presenting them in a manner by which overarching themes in Canada's international commitments become apparent (namely, Canada's performance in multilateral partnerships, development and trade initiatives and the promotion of human rights and security). In showcasing Canadian foreign policy, the focus will be on initiatives (or continuities in meaningful areas) taken under the Harper government specifically, to endow the campaign with a more updated flavour. However, to bolster credibility and add substance to the campaign, certain focused alterations and additions to policy and diplomatic conduct are suggested. These recommendations are designed to minimize costs while ensuring effectiveness, an increased chance at election and synergy with current foreign policy values and priorities. In this way, the proposed campaign strives to strike a balance between ambition and realism. While it is understood that large deviations and changes to foreign policy are unlikely to be undertaken for the purpose of a UNSC seat, Canada must also ensure that a lost campaign does not reoccur, and that the proposed platform promises to gain the support of the GA's majority. Thus, taking shrewd steps to project an image of continuous progress on the part of the current government is a prudent choice which is reflected in the proposed campaign.

### **DEPARTURES FROM THE 2010 UNSC CAMPAIGN**

This campaign acknowledges the real possibility that Canada's loss in 2010 may have been an anomaly. Most major UN contributors have experienced odd losses in UNSC elections, and one loss is neither indicative of a critical decline in a country's international standing nor warrants a full-scale rethinking of foreign policy. However, this campaign also recognizes that the 2010 bid did not draw upon the full range and significance of foreign policy commitments undertaken by the Conservative government. The previous campaign saw Canada focus too narrowly on its past history of service to the UN and its role as a founding member.<sup>96</sup> Where it did discuss recent developments, the focus was on the traditional realm of peacekeeping, obscuring advancements in other areas as well as the full picture of Canada's exceptional international position. An international "contest" of the

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<sup>96</sup> The United Nations, General Assembly, Sixty-Fifth Session, Statement by the Right Honourable Stephen Harper Prime Minister of Canada.

character that UNSC elections represent requires a degree of convincing packaging to secure the support of the General Assembly. The presentation of a characteristic, broadly appealing and easily digestible agenda is critical to success. The previous campaign was seen by some as having a “tentative,” almost unsure, attitude, which detracted from the impression of a cohesive and clear campaign platform. Fortunately, an analysis of Canadian performance in key areas of foreign policy reveals that Canada is in an excellent position to formulate an attractive campaign that is true to its record while also incorporating innovations that are in line with the values and policies of the current government.

Within the themes of Prosperity, Partnership and Protection are particular niche projects and developments that will be highlighted to showcase Canada’s focused and effective international activities. At the same time, the proposed campaign suggests a few, focused and incremental, changes in policy and conduct, while introducing the element of innovative and tangible UN reform. In regards to the latter, this campaign proposes that Canada participate in the debate on Security Council working methods reform by joining the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) group, which aims to promote working methods reform within the UN. In this way, the proposed campaign bestows upon the Canadian government a credible plan for action that places Canada in a position to shape the UNSC favourably in the coming decades. It thus departs from the previous campaign in two key ways: (1) by stressing recent policies over Canada’s historic role within the UN, and (2) by entailing a few focused changes in policy and a clear agenda for action once on the UNSC. The pragmatism of the campaign is reflected in the decision to run in 2024. 2024 allows the campaign to capitalize on the ACT platform by not running against a founding member of ACT, as would be the case in 2020 (Ireland and Norway) and 2022 (Switzerland). Additionally, a ten-year timeline allows sufficient time to introduce policy changes and multilateral initiatives that are necessary in order to uphold the legitimacy of the proposed campaign.

## 1.2 PROMOTING CANADIAN INTERESTS

### IMPORTANCE OF A UNSC SEAT TO CANADA

Winning a non-permanent seat on the Security Council is intrinsically valuable for Canada. Often considered the world’s preeminent crisis management forum, the UNSC plays an increasingly visible role in global mediation. Securing a seat allows elected states to have a voice in shaping the direction of such responses, all the while negotiating with significant powers and raising international profile. For middle power states like Canada that neither have the political clout to operate independently from the Security Council nor a historical tradition of acting unilaterally, a non-permanent seat is widely regarded as a

prize to be pursued with vigour. Canada's interest in stabilizing regions such as Syria and Iran—to name a few current examples—is highly dependent on a functioning Security Council. Having a non-permanent seat would ensure that Canada's concerns in these particular regions are, at the very least, discussed within the Council.

Generally speaking, a UNSC seat is a sign of prestige that grants Canada access to insider information. Being privately informed on the most pressing global security issues is something that all countries desire. Moreover, the present Security Council consists of two BRIC countries, seven nuclear powers, eight G20 members, prominent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leaders and two of the most powerful states in Africa. Being able to conduct daily meetings with powerful nations via a UNSC seat is an added perk that Canadian policymakers cannot dismiss. Such connections only serve to enhance Canada's global reach and provide a convenient avenue for cultivating long-term diplomatic relationships.

### **WHAT A SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN WILL OFFER TO THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT**

The potential reputational gains from a successful UNSC campaign are vast for the current government. Whether or not the 2010 campaign failure was an anomaly, it was seized upon by several members of the domestic opposition as alleged proof of a flawed Conservative foreign policy. In light of the upcoming federal election, taking steps to address some of the grounds on which current foreign policy has been criticized could prove politically beneficial. Incremental “fixes” through public relations activities and innovations in certain key departments and areas—which a UNSC campaign would entail—could go a long way in characterizing the Conservative government as flexible and adaptive with minimal costs. A campaign that is ultimately successful would also win back any prestige or reputational losses resulting from the failed bid in 2010. As the Conservative government enters a new phase of planning and development, it is important to diversify and innovate policy. Campaigning for a UNSC seat offers a methodology for this while promoting and showcasing investments and commitments that have been obscured by the 2010 loss.

## **1.3 DEMANDS ON LEADERSHIP**

In order to ensure that the Canadian campaign reflects a high degree of enthusiasm and commitment from the government, certain prominent members of the government must take a more conspicuous role in promoting the campaign than was noted in 2010. The visible engagement of the political leadership is an integral part of running an effective campaign, made more significant in the context of this campaign because it is sought here

to overcome a perceived lack of engagement with the UN and other multilateral institutions. As noted elsewhere in this report, this impression has been fed by certain occasions on which the Prime Minister and other prominent political figures have been absent from UN functions or have chosen to attend other nearby functions instead.<sup>97</sup>

The clearest means to remedy this perceived distancing from the UN would be to associate the Prime Minister and other senior members of the political leadership with the opening moments of the Canadian campaign. These would serve as demonstrations of enthusiasm and a clear statement of the value of the UN to the present government. Prior to the beginning of the campaign it would be advisable for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister or other senior foreign policy makers to take the first available opportunity to reframe their approach to the UN. It is the position of this campaign that the UN—and membership on its most powerful organ—is advantageous to Canada and that although the organization is in need of reform, Canada is prepared to work within existing structure of the organization to achieve these changes. This position would necessitate a change in the tone often adopted in reference to the UN by the current government. However, as reform is a central part of this platform it would not be necessary to drop criticism of the organization, but rather to adopt a more constructive approach in its critiques. Once this position is clearly established, it would be advisable to have the Prime Minister begin the campaign in person by officially announcing it at the United Nation’s General Assembly (UNGA).

As this campaign seeks to build off of the foundation of present foreign policy, and considering that Prime Minister Harper seems to have indicated a desire to reduce his personal visits to the UN, it would not likely be necessary for the Prime Minister to make many other direct engagements with the campaign. However, in order to avoid lending credence to the notion of disengagement, the leadership will have to be careful to make appearances at the UN at those junctures when they have commitments nearby. The failure to do so in the past has led to accusations of “snubbing” the UN, which can only be detrimental to the campaign. Above all, the campaign will depend upon the ability of the Canadian government to maintain the impression of active engagement. To this end, it should endeavour to seize every possible opportunity to participate constructively in multilateral institutions. If the Prime Minister chooses to take a less active role in promoting the Canadian campaign, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other senior foreign policy making officials should take the leading position in doing so. This includes addressing the Canadian campaign when in discussion with Canada’s global partners and taking available opportunities to speak at the United Nations—though not every occasion should be used to discuss the campaign. More generally, the Canadian Permanent

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<sup>97</sup> The Canadian Press, “Re-engage with United Nations, Harper urged,” CBC News.

Representative in New York should take care to ensure that they and their staff remain active on committees and other forums in which Canada participates at the United Nations.

## 1.4 ADDRESSING THE CREDITABILITY GAP

The following section addresses cases in which the Canadian government may be challenged during its campaign for a UNSC seat. Although Canada's capacity to improve its weaker policy performances may not be fully addressed during the 10-year campaign period, it would benefit Canada to identify these criticisms publicly. Thus, diplomats and representatives ought to be ready to address such challenges in ways that maintain Canada's credibility and its image of progress through highlighting the steps that have been or will be taken to mitigate certain issues or by altering diplomatic style.

### SHIFTS IN MULTILATERAL & UN ENGAGEMENT

Canada has been domestically and internationally depicted as a middle power whose commitment to the UN has been declining since the start of the new millennium. Those who believe Canada is disengaged at the multilateral level argue Canada will only invest funding when it is in their national interest, which weakens their international cooperation. It is also argued that Canada is more inclined to invest in bilateral agreements than multilateral agencies, which erode the effectiveness of multilateral organizations such as the UN.<sup>98</sup>

The possible criticism that Canada has withdrawn as a whole, multilaterally is relatively easy to address, for the simple reason that in concrete terms, this simply has not been the case to the degree in which it is often portrayed. Perhaps the most significant fact pointing to Canada's ongoing commitment to multilateralism and the UN is the fact that Canada has remained the fourth-largest contributor to the organization.<sup>99</sup> Without Canadian contributions, the UN as a whole would be performing much less effectively.

Canada is the seventh largest contributor of humanitarian assistance worldwide.<sup>100</sup> It remains an active member of the UN, providing significant financial support and offering credible ideas and solutions. Canada's contributions to UN institutions and banks reflect its dedication to cost-effective and efficient international assistance. Canada contributed \$126.7 million USD to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), making it the

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
<sup>98</sup> Stephen Brown and Michael Olender, "Canada's Fraying Commitment to Multilateral Development Cooperation," *Multilateral Development Cooperation in a Changing Global Order*.

<sup>99</sup> Yves Fortier, "Canada and the United Nations: A Half Century Partnership," Government of Canada.

<sup>100</sup> The United Nations, "How Much Does Peacekeeping Cost?"

fourth largest donor in 2013.<sup>101</sup> Canada has concentrated its contributions to particular agencies such as the World Bank and World Food Program (WFP) to ensure a more operational use of resources. In 2013, for instance, Canada was the third largest

Fig. 1.4.1: Top ten donor countries as well as EU Institutions that total 92.2% of global humanitarian assistance.<sup>102</sup>



contributor to the WFP with \$333.6 million USD.<sup>103</sup> In addition to financial contributions, Canada is willing to adopt measures to maximize its resources in multilateral aid. Following the move to untie all food aid in 2008, Canada successfully untied all goods and services through aid programs in 2013, most of which is focused in the world’s least developed countries.<sup>104</sup> Canada takes on a leadership role in seeking inclusivity, accountability and cost-effective reliability in development assistance through platforms such as the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.<sup>105</sup> Indeed, it is dedicated to boosting the effectiveness of multilateral institutions. Canada is in an excellent position to undertake

<sup>101</sup> United Nations Development Programme, “Top Contributing Donors.”

<sup>102</sup> Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013, “Where Does Humanitarian Assistance Come From?”

<sup>103</sup> World Food Programme, “Contributions to WFP 2013.”

<sup>104</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, “Maximizing Value.”

<sup>105</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, “The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation,” June 26, 2012.



additional responsibility within the UN to further improve to the effectiveness and efficiency of the international system, because it is a natural extension of Canada’s current approach to multilateralism—which itself remains a prized and ardently observed principle in Canadian foreign policy.

#### Summary of Recommendations: Sample Policy Statements

“Canada is a critical actor within the UN, as its fourth largest donor worldwide. The Canadian government believes that the UN is an indispensable organization that is worthy of continued engagement and investment, and thus we pledge to remain a top contributor while working actively to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of UN operations. To this end, we are proposing a collection of working methods reforms within the UN Security Council...”

“The Canadian government has contributed to and led a diverse multitude of UN projects. In the vast yet interconnected areas of peacekeeping, peace building, refugees, health and development aid, the statistics speak for themselves—Canada remains a global leader and intends to maintain this position responsibly and boldly on the UN Security Council. In all of these initiatives, we work across dense networks of organizations, including NGO’s, government agencies and local action groups. We believe in the fundamental value of multilateralism in resolving the problems that global civil society currently faces.”

### PEACEKEEPING

While the number of Canada’s peacekeeping troops has indeed dropped, Canada’s contribution through the Canadian Forces remains comparable to Security Council members such as Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.<sup>106</sup> Canada’s current contributions to UN peace operations reflect an intersectional approach, which involves integrating and administering support, recovery and development for countries prone to recurring cycles of violence. Most significantly however, monetary contributions to peacekeeping have increased—substantially—under the Harper government. Contributions have increased by \$121 billion in the years 2006-12 as compared to the seven year span prior to Harper’s election.<sup>107</sup> Thus, Canada’s commitment to the cause of peacekeeping has clearly not waned.

Canada’s involvement has further increased since 2005 and the creation of the Peace Building Commission (PBC). It has been granted a position on the Organizational

<sup>106</sup> The United Nations, “Monthly Summary of Contributions.”

<sup>107</sup> The United Nations, “Monthly Summary of Contributions.”

Committee because of the significant contributions it makes to UN budgets and its voluntary contributions to funds, programs and UN agencies.<sup>108</sup> Canada has helped to develop the Peacebuilding Support Office to provide policy guidance to the PBC and helped to form the UN Peace-building Fund (PBF) to provide financial assistance for post-conflict operations.<sup>109</sup> Since the inception of PBF in 2006, Canada has contributed \$33.9 million USD, making it the sixth largest contributor.<sup>110</sup>

Canada's shift away from providing peacekeeping personnel to a concentration on administrative roles in peace-building operations demonstrates its continued commitment to effective and sustainable progress. These developments and areas of contribution should be emphasized throughout the UNSC campaign, to affirm to UN members that Canada remains a valuable actor in the realm of peacekeeping and peace building.

#### Summary of Recommendations: Sample Policy Statements

“Through its presence in UN peace operations, Canada aims to move beyond the idea that peace is achieved where there is a ceasefire. To ensure peace, there must be adequate institutions that can direct conflict in the future. Thus, Canada has embraced an integral role in UN peace-building as part of a collective effort to build and sustain lasting peace. Through our leadership within the UN Peace building Commission, we have demonstrated our recognition that peace and stability require flexible and creative approaches. Yet we remain committed to the integral concept of peacekeeping, which is why we have steadily increased our contributions to this critical area and are committed to doing so in the future.”

### ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Canada's position on environmental regulation is possibly the largest source of criticism emanating from the international community today. Currently, Canada's climate change record is characterized by some as not only as being ineffective, but also as being an impediment to global emissions reductions.<sup>111</sup> Having withdrawn from both the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention to Combat Desertification, Canada's environmental reputation at the United Nations is sometimes viewed as fading.<sup>112</sup> Additionally, Canada receives consistent criticism by the members of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and major environmental NGOs such as the Climate Action Network and

<sup>108</sup> United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, “Organizational Committee Members.”

<sup>109</sup> United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, “What is Peacebuilding?”

<sup>110</sup> United Nations Development Group, Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, “The Peacebuilding Fund.”

<sup>111</sup> Mark Kennedy, “Canada Pulling Out of Kyoto Accord,” *The National Post*, Dec. 12, 2011.

<sup>112</sup> Mike Blanchfield, “Canada First Country to Pull Out of UN Drought Convention”, *The Globe and Mail*, March 27, 2013.



the Sierra Club for its development of the Alberta tar-sands, among other controversial issues.<sup>113</sup> Domestically, the Conservative government has been the victim of frequent political attacks by opposition parties including the Liberals, the New Democrats and the Green Party for its' post-2006 environmental policies.<sup>114</sup> These attacks have been bolstered with accusations of “muzzling” government scientists as a result of recent changes to both the structure and finances of Environment Canada, which saw close to 40% of its' funding cut.<sup>115</sup>

Should the Government of Canada encounter opposition to its Security Council election on the grounds of its environmental record, it should pursue a course of action which seeks to highlight the successful aspects of its environmental policy (air quality control, renewable energy and sustainable transit) while emphasizing other features of the campaign. The language surrounding responses must be clear and concise in order to avoid further media coverage and potential political attacks from UN members. Canada should frame its action by stressing that it is not interested in funding bureaucracy or ineffective legislation; there is no value in circular discussions. Rather, Canada should promote effectiveness and equality in environmental regulation. Canada should stress that all states must abide by the same rules. In order to be effective, international environmental legislation must apply equally to all states.

In spite of its weaknesses, the Government of Canada may choose to highlight its action on air quality control post-2006. Signed in 2007, the Conservative-led Clean Air Act was developed to improve the health of Canadians and their environment through an integrated, nationally consistent approach to reducing industrial air emissions.<sup>116</sup> Canada remains committed to improving air quality within its borders by supporting the Regulatory Framework for Air Emissions (Clean Air Regulatory Agenda) as well as respecting the principles established within the Canadian Environmental Protection Act.<sup>117</sup>

Despite the global recession that has occurred post-2007, the current government has made major investments in alternative energy sources with the aim of reducing oil dependence. In 2011, Canada invested \$1.7 billion into energy development, a figure up 30% from 2009, when the recession began.<sup>118</sup> Within the energy sector, nuclear fission has been the main focus of research, funding for which has increased by 377% over that

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<sup>113</sup> “Canada wins ‘Lifetime Unachievement’ Fossil Award at Warsaw Climate Talks,” Climate Action Network Canada, November 22, 2013.

<sup>114</sup> “Opposition Demands Government Response to Environment Audit,” CTV News, February 5, 2013.

<sup>115</sup> “Muzzling of Federal Scientists Targeted by Campaign,” CBC News, February 18, 2012.

<sup>116</sup> Environment Canada, “Improving the Health of Canadians and their Environment through an Integrated, Nationally Consistent Approach to Reducing Industrial Air Emissions,” July 10, 2013.

<sup>117</sup> Environment Canada, “Air Quality Monitoring Networks and Data,” July 19, 2013.

<sup>118</sup> Statistics Canada, “Industrial energy research and development expenditure and extramural payments outside Canada by area of technology annual,” 2013.

period.<sup>119</sup> Additionally, research into energy efficiency increased by 25%, in fossil fuels by 28% and in renewable energy by 16%.<sup>120</sup> Energy policy in Canada represents a combination of increasing investment into technology and a continuing tradition of consumer focus to ensure renewable energy sources can become feasible options for global energy demands.

Canada has committed to achieving “positive environmental results” through public infrastructure and transportation innovation in the Canadian Gas Tax Fund.<sup>121</sup> As of 2011, the Gas Tax Fund became a permanent fund of \$2 billion CAD per year and starting in 2014-15 will be further indexing at 2% per year for the next ten years, totaling \$21.8 billion CAD in long-term municipal investment.<sup>122</sup> Moreover, in 2013 it introduced the Building Canada Fund to provide \$14 billion CAD over the next 10 years to improve infrastructure, highlighting public transit as a key area of “national significance.”<sup>123</sup> Additional projects designed to reduce environmental impact as well as productivity receive federal support, including the Confederation Light Rail Transit Line in Ottawa, which received \$600 million CAD in federal contributions. Canada also invests heavily in outreach programs to educate the public on the need and ways to reduce their environmental impact.<sup>124</sup> Organizations that work to improve long-term methods of sustainability have also been encouraged to team up with Transport Canada through Moving on Sustainable Transportation, with the goal being too soon make sustainable transportation a reality throughout Canada.<sup>125</sup>

#### Summary of Recommendations: Sample Policy Statements

“The fact of the matter is that Canada is continuously striving to reduce emissions growth. Given our close economic alignment with major emitting nations, including the United States and China, this is significant as climate policy is an area where Canada faces several natural economic barriers. However, we hope that serving on the UN Security Council will enable us to engage in further dialogue on this issue, particularly with those nations which Canada’s economic and trade policies depend upon so heavily.”

<sup>119</sup> Statistics Canada, “Industrial energy research and development expenditure and extramural payments outside Canada by area of technology annual.”

<sup>120</sup> Statistics Canada, “Industrial energy research and development expenditure and extramural payments outside Canada by area of technology annual.”

<sup>121</sup> Government of Canada, “Investing in Infrastructure and Transportation,” February 11, 2014.

<sup>122</sup> Government of Canada, “Investing in Infrastructure and Transportation.”

<sup>123</sup> Building Canada Fund, “Canada’s Economic Action Plan.”

<sup>124</sup> Environment Canada, “Programs encouraging transportation programs,” July 18, 2013.

<sup>125</sup> Environment Canada, “Programs encouraging transportation programs.”

“Despite stagnation in the formulation of a widely embraced broader climate change agreement, Canada has undertaken several initiatives that demonstrate our continuing concern for this issue. Domestically, we have a demonstrated commitment to air quality control, investment in alternative energy sources and technology and public awareness programs. We are moving forwards, not backwards. We make a difference where we can—for instance, by being a critical contributor to UN refugee programming. We recognize that ultimately, all of us benefit from taking action to combat climate change, whether independently or collectively.”

### CANADA'S POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL

The Canadian government's current stance on Israel has isolated Canada from many members of the international community. As both the self-proclaimed and internationally recognized leaders on pro-Israeli policy, the perception of Canada as a global actor has become rather polarized.<sup>126</sup> Prime Minister Harper himself has noted the “bruises” Canada's international reputation, specifically within the UN, has received as a result of this policy, noting that, “there are a lot more votes in being enemies of Israel than in taking a stand.”<sup>127</sup> Canada will remain supportive of Israel as a strong democratic nation in the Middle East; the question is how to do this without becoming alienated from the international community. As Michael Ignatieff has stated, losing the seat on the UN Security Council in 2010 denied Canada a major avenue to defend Israel on the international stage, claiming that “if Canada wishes to defend Israel against Iran, as it should, it would have been nice to be on the UN Security Council.”<sup>128</sup> The government must recognize the value in slightly shifting its rhetoric in order to accomplish its ultimate end, with regards to its defense of Israel. The following are ways in which this end could be approached.

It must be acknowledged that officially the Canadian government's stance towards Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not changed. Canada recognizes the Palestinian right to self-determination and supports the creation of an independent, viable, democratic and territorially contiguous Palestinian state.<sup>129</sup> Additionally, Canada respects UN Resolutions 242 and 338 for the establishment of the separate Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders.<sup>130</sup> Canada also recognizes the illegality of the construction of Israeli

<sup>126</sup> Murtaza Hussain, “Harper: More Pro-Israel than Israel Itself,” *The Globe and Mail*, January 15, 2014.

<sup>127</sup> “Harper: ‘I’ve Got Bruises’ for Pro-Israel Stance. *CBC News*. November 8, 2010.

<sup>128</sup> “Harper: ‘I’ve Got Bruises’ for Pro-Israel Stance. *CBC News*.

<sup>129</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, “Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” January 13, 2014.

<sup>130</sup> DFATD, “Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.”

settlements in these territories.<sup>131</sup> Regarding multilateral negotiations, Canada maintains support for a number of agreements, including the Quartet's Road Map launched by the Annapolis Conference and the Arab Peace Initiative.<sup>132</sup> Canada also recognizes the Palestinian Authority as the governmental entity in the West Bank and Gaza, and continues to work with President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Rani Hamdallah.<sup>133</sup> The commitment to aid, specifically to the West Bank, has also been apparent, as the 2009 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) Strategy Report on the West Bank and Gaza notes.<sup>134</sup> Aid to Gaza had been restricted as the DFATD's policy was understandably, to only fund aid to partners who have been defined as trusted partners, which Hamas was not considered to be.<sup>135</sup> However, on January 20, 2014 Prime Minister Harper extended a new aid package of \$66 million to both Gaza and the West Bank during his visit to Israel and the West Bank.<sup>136</sup> This aid package should be emphasized as emblematic of the government's attempt to renew relations with the Palestinian people and encourage stability in the region.

Canadian support for Israel must also be valued as part of Canada's larger foreign policy objectives. A cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy is support for democratic countries and regional democratizing efforts.<sup>137</sup> The 2007 report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development clearly outlines this, making support for Israel, as the sole established democracy in the Middle East, a logical component of Canadian foreign policy. It must be noted that the Arab Spring occurred after the 2007 report. Canada has rightfully been criticized for not assisting Bahrain and Egypt in their democratizing efforts, as improved relations with these two countries would serve to further legitimate Canada's Israel policy.<sup>138</sup> A critical analysis of Canada's recent voting record at the UN regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict sheds light on the government's position. From 2006 to 2010 Canada voted on nine resolutions that were critical of Israel.<sup>139</sup> Canada voted "no" on only four of these resolutions, on the status of East Jerusalem, condemning the Israeli military operations in Lebanon, and alleged Israeli

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<sup>131</sup> DFATD, "Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."

<sup>132</sup> DFATD, "Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."

<sup>133</sup> DFATD, "Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."

<sup>134</sup> Government of Canada, CIDA (DFATD), "West Bank and Gaza Strategy (Effective as of 2009)."

<sup>135</sup> CIDA (DFATD), "West Bank and Gaza Strategy (Effective as of 2009)."

<sup>136</sup> Lee-Anne Goodman, "Stephen Harper Offers \$66 Million in New Aid to Palestinians But Refuses to Criticize Israel During West Bank Visit," *The National Post*, January 20, 2014.

<sup>137</sup> Kevin Sorenson (Chair), "Advancing Canada's Role in International Support for Democratic Development: Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development," House of Commons Canada. 39<sup>th</sup> Parliament: 1<sup>st</sup> Session. July 2007.

<sup>138</sup> Roland Paris, "Baird's Silence on Abuses in Bahrain Exposes Canada's Inconsistency," *Globe and Mail*, April 5, 2013.

<sup>139</sup> "Canada's UN Votes on Israel-Palestine: A Selected History," Canadian International Council, September 22, 2011.

human rights abuses in Palestinian territories.<sup>140</sup> Canada abstained from two others, regarding the right of Palestinian self-determination, and voted “yes” on two resolutions regarding the illegality of Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan and the need to maintain the applicability of the Geneva Convention to the situation in the Occupied Territories.<sup>141</sup> This is the voting record Canada should be following—voting “no” when it seems absolutely imperative, and simply abstaining where possible.

As part of the larger goal of peace, stability and prosperity in the Middle East and globally, Canada should continue to support Israel as a bastion of democracy in the troubled region. However, the government must also be careful not to do so in an inflammatory way. It is essential to recognize that Canadian isolation from the international community will not benefit Canada or Israel. In order to improve Canada’s global position, and to truly be a strong ally and advocate of human rights and democracy, it is imperative that foreign policy no longer be used as a domestic political tool. That being said, Canada does not need to renounce all support for Israel, nor should it. This would be construed as hypocritical and would cost the government a valuable ally; however, the tone of the rhetoric and the image put out to the international community does require some re-tooling should Canada hope to win a Security Council seat.

#### Summary of Recommendations: Sample Policy Statements

“Let us reaffirm that we ardently and unequivocally support a two-state solution and an independent, viable and democratic Palestine. We respect UN resolutions on this matter, and concretely support the plight of Palestinians through ongoing and substantial aid to the West Bank. We hope that our close relationship with Israel will allow us to serve a role as a trusted mediator on this conflict in the future.”

## ABORIGINAL RIGHTS

The government’s current position on aboriginal rights remains a strong source of contention within the international community. As evidenced by the 2009 UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review, many states have highlighted the increased poverty, domestic violence, unequal access to education and healthcare, income disparity, land claim disputes and poor governance affecting aboriginal communities throughout Canada.<sup>142</sup> Utilizing this outlet, many states—including WEOG (Western Europe and Others Group) members such as Switzerland and Norway—have called for a national investigation

<sup>140</sup> “Canada’s UN Votes on Israel-Palestine: A Selected History,” Canadian International Council.

<sup>141</sup> “Canada’s UN Votes on Israel-Palestine: A Selected History,” Canadian International Council.

<sup>142</sup> Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Universal Periodic Review – Canada,” February 3, 2009.



into the disappearances and sexual abuse of aboriginal women as well as the possible recognition of Canada's "historic genocide" towards its indigenous populations.<sup>143</sup> These issues have likewise been highlighted by human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International in its 2013 Human Rights Agenda for Canada.<sup>144</sup>

Should Canada encounter criticisms relating to its aboriginal relationships, it will not suffice for it to frame these problems as a "domestic issue" irrelevant to the interests of the UN. Rather, Canada should frame the "aboriginal question" within the context of its strong, national human rights record. Specifically, Canada should emphasize its various reforms to good governance, economic prosperity, gender equality and Arctic integrity within aboriginal communities. In keeping with theme of governance-reform highlighted throughout the "Partnership, Prosperity, Protection" campaign, Canada should reaffirm its support for First Nations communities in their implementation of strong, effective and sustainable governments.<sup>145</sup> Among others, Canada's most significant contribution to good governance among aboriginal communities is found in its recent First Nations Elections Act signed in October of 2013.<sup>146</sup> The First Nations Elections Act supports the political stability necessary for First Nations governments to make sound business investments, carry out long-term planning and build external relationships.<sup>147</sup> Likewise, the government's enhanced Band Support Funding (a component of the First Nation Indian Government Support Funding Programs) aims to provide a reasonable contribution to the costs of governance—with a specific focus on the costs associated with the administration of departmentally funded programs and services within Band Councils.<sup>148</sup> These contributions, among many others, reflect Canada's values and historic commitment to democracy, good governance and the rule of law.

As outlined in its Federal Framework for Aboriginal Economic Development, the Government of Canada remains committed to ensuring that all aboriginal communities have the capacity to reach their economic potential. This framework builds off of an existing investment of \$200 million through Canada's Economic Action Plan for aboriginal skills and training to improve labour market outcomes. Specifically, the framework in question places an acute emphasis on strengthening aboriginal entrepreneurship, developing aboriginal human capital, enhancing the value of aboriginal assets and forging

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<sup>143</sup> "Canada Nixes UN Review of Violence on Aboriginal Women," CBC News, September 19, 2013.

<sup>144</sup> Amnesty International, "Human Rights Agenda for Canada," December 2013.

<sup>145</sup> Government of Canada, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, "Governance," March 12, 2013.

<sup>146</sup> Government of Canada, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, "First Nations Elections Act," December 23, 2013.

<sup>147</sup> Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, "First Nations Elections Act."

<sup>148</sup> Government of Canada, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, "Band Support Funding," September 15, 2010.

effective partnerships.<sup>149</sup><sup>150</sup> No longer should decisions regarding the economic prosperity of aboriginal communities be determined solely by the federal government and as such, this framework seeks to provide a high level of economic autonomy to the aboriginal peoples of Canada.

In order to build gender equity throughout aboriginal communities, Canada is proud to continue its historic tradition of standing up for the equal rights of all women. It should be noted that when addressing the specific issue of missing aboriginal women, the Government of Canada must adapt its policy slightly in order to quell public opinion from both sides of the political spectrum. While Canada should no doubt highlight its enduring support of both the Special Committee on Violence against Indigenous Women (IWFA), as well as the House of Commons Standing Committee on the Status of Women (FEWO), it must do more. These additional measures will include enhanced police powers or further community programming, but ultimately the language surrounding the issue must be clear, strong and action-based. Finally, the Government of Canada may also seek to highlight the signing of the Gender Equity in Indian Registration Act which ensures that eligible grandchildren of women who lost status as a result of marrying non-Indian men will become entitled to registration (Indian status).<sup>151</sup>

As the current Head of the Arctic Council, the Canadian government should emphasize the promotion of Canada's Northern Strategy with a focus on its Arctic partners: the Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), the Gwich'in Council International (GCI) and the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC).<sup>152</sup> Canada is equally committed to ensuring the health and wellbeing of Northern aboriginal communities through its Northern Contaminated Sites Program in which the clean-up and remediation of a number of contaminated sites in the North is possible.<sup>153</sup> When discussing Arctic sovereignty, Canada should likewise mention the preservation of aboriginal (specifically Inuit) communities and heritage within the North as key priority within its policy agenda.

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<sup>149</sup> Government of Canada, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, "Federal Framework for Aboriginal Economic Development," September 15, 2010.

<sup>150</sup> Government of Canada, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, "Economic Development," June 28, 2013.

<sup>151</sup> Government of Canada, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, "Gender Equity in Indian Registration Act," February 11, 2013.

<sup>152</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Canada's Arctic Partners," March 10, 2014.

<sup>153</sup> Government of Canada, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, "Contaminants in the North," November 8, 2012.



### Summary of Recommendations: Sample Policy Statements

“The Canadian government understands that it must set an example for global civil society through correct and just treatment of its aboriginal populations. To this end, Canada has taken several initiatives in recent years to address the pressing issue of aboriginal rights. We have engaged in a multitude of reforms on good governance, economic prosperity, gender equality and Arctic integrity. Most importantly, we have pursued these initiatives in close collaboration with aboriginal communities, whose right to self-determination and autonomy we cherish and recognize.”

## 2.0 POLICY CHANGES AND THE CAMPAIGN

### 2.1 PARTNERSHIP

Canada is one of the world’s most widely connected countries, with multilateral engagements that span a variety of forums and initiatives. Its participation in international organizations and programs makes it a valuable partner for UN member states and an effective advocate in the resolution of issues of global importance. The intention of this facet of the campaign will be to remind member states of Canada’s continuing engagement and standing in the world and offer concrete evidence of past and future plans to further multilateral involvement. In part this will involve a reiteration of Canada’s various engagements and its contributions to the UN and other international and regional organizations. However, the Partnership platform also introduces a significant new initiative whose adoption will be recommended to the current government. Security Council reform remains a dominant issue for the UN, and this campaign proposes that Canada actively participate in the debate on Council working method reform by joining ACT. This offers a constructive way for the current government to demonstrate its’ continued commitment to the UN and would entail a concrete program for it’s’ plan of action should it win a seat.

### UN ENGAGEMENT AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY, COHERENCE AND TRANSPARENCY GROUP

Canada’s historical role in cultivating long-term partnerships is best demonstrated through its commitment to the UN. Since formally joining the organization in 1945, Canada has made significant global contributions, including but not limited to: drafting the UN Charter; deploying major peacekeeping forces in Egypt and the Congo; and spearheading

the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC).<sup>154</sup> Such engagement is part of a longstanding obligation to protect the organization's capacity to implement timely and effective decisions. Canada is the seventh largest financial donor to the UN, and continues to support several permanent diplomatic missions around the world.<sup>155</sup> It is currently leading seven UN permanent missions ranging from the organization of food and agriculture to the maintenance of international civil aviation.<sup>156</sup> Each of these missions represents a firm commitment to upholding the most important elements of an indispensable organization.

At the core of Canada's commitment to the UN is a deeper affinity with the organization's mandate on peace and security. According to the UN Charter, security encompasses a broad range of issues that extend beyond the protection of state sovereignty. In policy terms, this includes comprehensive security from fear, conflict, poverty, hunger and social deprivation.<sup>157</sup> Resting upon positive and negative freedoms, the UN Charter recognizes that the UNSC is not capable of addressing all of these issues unilaterally. Support is needed from other state actors that are, in some instances, better equipped to deal with various security developments.<sup>158</sup> For Canadian policymakers, this luxury of choosing specialized agencies has been an effective method of overcoming the political paralysis of the UNSC. Rather than make small UN contributions over a wide-range of issues, policymakers have historically adopted a piecemeal approach that emphasizes a few of Canada's most noticeable specialties.<sup>159</sup> In the case of security, such niches have included a mediatory role in post-conflict resolutions and providing the bulk of ground forces in peacekeeping operations. In short, by framing its security agenda in broad terms, the UN's mandate aligns with Canada's practice of choosing specific situations to exert its influence.<sup>160</sup>

While some of Canada's longstanding UN priorities have changed under the current government, the framework of focusing on key specialties has remained consistent. In terms of its multilateral engagement, the current government has adopted a thematic approach of choosing to operate in areas in which it excels. Its' active involvement in improving the technical aspects of peacekeeping policies—culminating in 2010 with its

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<sup>154</sup> Nancy Gordon and Bernard Wood, "Canada and the Reshaping of the United Nations," *International Journal* 25, no. 3 (1992): 488-490.

<sup>155</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Canada and the United Nations," Second National Report Under the Universal Periodic Review, May 2013.

<sup>156</sup> DFATD, "Canada and the United Nations."

<sup>157</sup> Adam Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005): 113.

<sup>158</sup> Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project*, 146-148.

<sup>159</sup> David Black and Greg Donaghy, "Manifestations of Canadian Multilateralism," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 12, no. 2 (2010): 6-7.

<sup>160</sup> Paul Gecelovsky, "Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 4, no. 1 (2009): 84-85.

decision to chair the working group at the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations—illustrates this trend. Since administrating the organization, Canada has established numerous workshops on how to effectively respond to the challenges of civilian protection. Despite the fact that its numerical contribution has declined, Canada still provides the logistical tools for efficient peacekeeping.<sup>161</sup> Such engagement has extended into other mediation initiatives, including Canada's lead role in the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict (GFCAC). This UN-sponsored multilateral institution has promoted the implementation of specific UNSC Resolutions through sharing information and advocacy. So far, the Harper government has contributed approximately \$12 million annually in strengthening GFCAC's capacity for sustaining peace-building operations.<sup>162</sup> That number is expected to increase by 2% over the next three years.<sup>163</sup>

These efforts, while extensive, only represent one aspect of the current government's dedication to partnership. Beyond the UN, Canada has been highly committed to the initiatives of regional organizations—such as NATO's state building project in Afghanistan—that have reinforced Canada's willingness to play a lead role in global affairs. In the case of Afghanistan, its efforts in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) ranks higher than any other member state.<sup>164</sup> This not only includes the deployment of 2,800 Canadian soldiers, but also a \$21 million contribution to support the Afghani Law and Order Trust Fund.<sup>165</sup> Key to this involvement is Canada's ability to shape NATO mandates and extend its expertise on police training. In other words, the current government has used NATO participation as a way of redefining Canada's niche in international security. This, in turn, has lent credence to Canada's push for increased sponsorship of regional roundtable seminars in order to enhance cooperative peacekeeping practices.<sup>166</sup>

Such a desire to improve the methods for more efficient multilateral engagement also allows for a gradual diversification of Canada's partnerships. In fact, its historically strong position in the UN provides an excellent opportunity to join, and perhaps lead, organizations that stride for enhancing the efficiency of the UNSC. In particular, ACT is a prominent organization aiming to strengthen the working methods of the UNSC. Its credibility stems from promoting gradual UN reform that does not hinder the composition

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<sup>161</sup> Cristina G. Badescu, "Canada's Continued Engagement With United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 16, no. 2 (2011): 49-50.

<sup>162</sup> Badescu, "Canada's Continued Engagement With United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," 54.

<sup>163</sup> Badescu, "Canada's Continued Engagement With United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," 55-56.

<sup>164</sup> Kenneth Holland and Christopher Kirkley, "An Evaluation of Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan," *International Journal* 68, no. 2 (2013): 269.

<sup>165</sup> Dan Fitzsimmons, "Canada and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," *International Journal* 94, no. 4 (2013): 305.

<sup>166</sup> Fitzsimmons, "Canada and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," 305.

or power of the P-5.<sup>167</sup> As an informal group consisting of twenty-three states, ACT has implemented a similar thematic approach of allowing members to strategically select which working methods they are best suited to improve. For example, the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) of Uruguay and Australia have pressed for better interaction between the UNSC, the Secretariat and the states providing ground forces.<sup>168</sup> In contrast, members that have a proven track record in economic sanctions—such as Switzerland—have focused on improving the UNSC’s methods for codifying measures on delisted targets.<sup>169</sup> Each working method is divided into specific categories based on regional advantages, which, subsequently, coincides with Canada’s sectoral approach.

### PLAN OF ACTION

Before Canada considers the prospect of joining ACT, it first needs to build its reformist credentials. The purpose is to not only legitimize a potential UNSC campaign that advocates working methods reform, but also to establish credibility as a successful reformer within the international community.

The current government has already taken a stance in favour of the reform of the UN and has made this position clear in public forums. Canada is a member of the Group of Friends of UN Reform and the Carlsson Group, associations of countries that are committed to the reform of aspects of the UN system. Canada is also one of the members of the Utstein Group of donor countries seeking to improve the system for distributing UN aid. As the seventh-largest contributor to the UN budget, Canada is also a member of the Geneva Group, composed of the 14 largest contributing nations.<sup>170</sup> This association of like-minded nations holds consultations and runs sessions for mission personnel and policy experts aimed at improving oversight of the UN system to ensure its efficient management and operation.<sup>171</sup>

In addition, Canada has offered its support to nations seeking working methods reform within the UNSC, which it can use to build its position as an active contributor to working method reform in the future. During the 60<sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly the S-5 (Small Five) group of countries presented a draft resolution on the floor of the assembly proposing a suite of reforms to the operation of the UNSC. Canada expressed its general support for the draft and supported the work of the S-5 in seeking these reforms.<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>167</sup> Security Council Report, “Security Council Working Methods,” Monthly Forecast, October 13, 2013.

<sup>168</sup> Security Council Report, “Security Council Working Methods.”

<sup>169</sup> Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Switzerland’s Working Methods Reform on the Security Council,” ACT Special Report no. 1, January 2014.

<sup>170</sup> Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, “United Nations Reform,” August 2012.

<sup>171</sup> The Geneva Group, “About the Geneva Group,” August 2013.

<sup>172</sup> Center for UN Reform Education, “S5 presents draft resolution on Improving Working Methods of the Security Council,” July 2013.

This not only indicates the Canadian interest in achieving constructive reform of the UNSC, but it is also an indication of Canada's goal of seeking modest and achievable reform rather than aiming for deeper structural change on the UNSC.

Beyond the actions already taken by the present government, there are also two modest and achievable courses of action that could be taken to promote Canada as committed to the reform of multilateral institutions. The first falls outside the UN and involves modifying NATO's bureaucratic structure in peacekeeping operations. As a heavily taxed member, Canada remains a leading proponent of initiating gradual NATO reforms that allow non-member states to collaboratively address pressing security issues.<sup>173</sup> The second is increasing the transparency of the annual UN High Commissioner's Report on Human Rights. As a major contributor to the monitoring of human right abuse, such an initiative has garnered interest from the Harper government.

The purpose of these reforms is to ultimately create awareness and garner the support of ACT. While ACT remains an informal working group, its' membership is granted on the basis of invitation. It is, therefore, necessary to push workable objectives that can be achieved in a short timeframe for the sake of winning over ACT members. Command reform within NATO is a particularly appealing option given that several ACT members are either NATO countries or support NATO security projects.

More importantly, the prospect of initiating gradual reforms is an independent policy objective. Successfully achieving the aforementioned goals and bolstering Canada's reformist credentials is, by extension, an added bonus. Thus, the impetus behind reforming NATO's command structure and introducing new methods of oversight to UN treaty bodies is not bound to a successful UNSC campaign. It is quite possible the Harper government will pursue such goals regardless of UNSC implications. Yet, in terms of vying for a nonpermanent seat, pushing distinct reforms that align with Canadian interests only enhances the Partnership platform.

In the case of NATO reform, the goal is to follow the current government's desire for gradual change. Similar to ACT's mandate, Canada has avoided the contentious issue of NATO enlargement in order to improve the organization's interoperability. One gradual change that has been advocated is to reduce NATO's Command Structure from seven regional entities to six regional entities. Although the command structure has decreased since 2011—from the previous thirteen operational entities—the current government has maintained that NATO's Command needs to be further streamlined.<sup>174</sup> A major problem

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<sup>173</sup> Government of Canada, Department of National Defence "Canada and NATO," BG12.065, October 2013.

<sup>174</sup> Alexander Moens, "NATO and the EU: Canada's Security Interests in Europe and Beyond," in Canada's National Security in the Post-9/11 World, ed. David McDonough (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012): 217-218.



that has plagued NATO operations is the lack of coordination between multiple decision-making bodies prior to deployment. As is often the case, defence ministerial meetings tend to operate on an ad-hoc basis, thus creating a divide between the Command Structure and lower-level agencies.<sup>175</sup> In addition, the cost of funding numerous governmental bodies within NATO is financially burdensome. It is estimated that Canada is taxed 13% of the costs of maintaining NATO's Command personnel.<sup>176</sup> Fortunately, the prospect of further reducing NATO's Command Structure is a popular proposal among the twenty-eight member states.

In light of this preexisting desire for reform, the Partnership platform will entail advocating the reduction of NATO's Command Structure to six entities by the end of 2016. While previous targets to reduce operational command have been achieved, there are still several discussions regarding the removal of Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) along the Mediterranean. After all, this obsolete regional body has been superseded by sub-organizations that provide rapid reaction corps to emergency situations.<sup>177</sup> Moreover, despite NATO's recent structural changes resulting in a five percent decrease in expenses, it is estimated that the removal of ACLANT would produce an additional fifteen percent reduction.<sup>178</sup> In fact, the reform is supported by the United States and is consistently brought up in NATO's Council meetings. As such, this campaign will aim to create a small group of "knowledgeable statesmen"—namely from Canada, the US and other Western European supporters, for the purpose of convincing reluctant members to form a unanimous consensus. Typically, structural reform within NATO takes approximately three years to fully implement.<sup>179</sup> However, with American support, the changes could be accomplished by an earlier date. More importantly, in terms of bolstering Canada's credentials, this proposal constitutes gradual reform that relies on consensus building.

The current government has also shown interest in altering treaty bodies within the UN. In particular, the development of the High Commissioner's Report on Human Rights is a process that, according to the Harper government, lacks visibility.<sup>180</sup> Few non-governmental stakeholders are involved in the formation of the High Commissioner's Report, and most non-member states are unable to access the document until after its annual publication in July. This, in turn, has delayed the process of monitoring human rights abuse.<sup>181</sup> In order to rectify the transparency gap, this campaign proposes to follow

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<sup>175</sup> Moens, "NATO and the EU," 182.

<sup>176</sup> Moens, "NATO and the EU," 184-186.

<sup>177</sup> Bruce Weinrod, "The Future of NATO," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (2012): 8-10.

<sup>178</sup> Andrew Vallance, "A Radically New Command Structure For NATO," *NATO Review*, May 2013.

<sup>179</sup> Weinrod, "The Future of NATO," 12-13.

<sup>180</sup> Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Canada's Submission," Policy Report, December 30, 2013.

<sup>181</sup> International Society For Human Rights, "Update on Treaty Body Reform," *Human Rights Monitor Quarterly*, July 2012.

up on the High Commissioner's suggestion to increase the accessibility of treaty bodies through webcasting and videoconferencing. The idea has generated support from numerous states, and the only countries that have expressed concern are those from the "cross regional group."<sup>182</sup>

With this in mind, the Partnership component will look to revive previous discussions and advocate for the implementation of videoconferencing by the end of 2016. However, a few modifications will be made. To ensure this working method reform is accepted by the 'cross regional group,' Canada will push for the webcasting of all meetings with non-state stakeholders. Such a proposal for greater transparency between treaty bodies and NGOs is well supported by both the "cross regional group" and the WEOG countries.<sup>183</sup> Unlike the idea of creating a comprehensive reporting calendar for treaty bodies, which is unsustainable and costly, introducing webcasting and videoconferencing is a simple measure that already has widespread support.<sup>184</sup>

Once these reform initiatives are launched, Canada will then publicly demonstrate its interest in joining ACT. The best way to approach this undertaking is by courting ACT members prior to admission. This will involve inviting representatives from all twenty-three states to an informal two-day gathering. Ideally, the representatives will be invited to a private location by early 2017—shortly after Canada has completed its reform objectives. The purpose of such an informal gathering is twofold. First, it informs the Canadian public that the current government has expressed interest in joining an evolving reform group. This will mitigate criticism vis-à-vis a lack of engagement with UN organizations. Second, it demonstrates to ACT members that Canada is, indeed, invested in the organization's push for improving the efficiency of the UNSC. Of course, the timing of this meeting will be essential, as Canada would have already begun (and likely completed) its independent reform campaigns. Still, the gathering is a token gesture that reinforces Canada's suitability for membership in ACT.

As far as joining ACT, while there is always the risk of not being offered an invitation, the odds of admission are in Canada's favour. For starters, Canada's reformist credentials will already be developed by the time a formal application is submitted. Moreover, as a relatively new organization, building a support base is one of ACT's primary objectives. Not only is ACT seeking to expand its membership, but it is also searching for regional powers with little interest in reforming the structure of the Council—such as

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<sup>182</sup> Canada, Costa Rica, Ireland, El Salvador, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Thailand, Switzerland, USA, Liechtenstein, Colombia, the African Group and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) each support the proposal. The 'cross regional group' consisting of Belarus, Russia, Bolivia, China, Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Syria and Venezuela do not support webcasting unless the state concerned expresses its consent.

<sup>183</sup> International Society For Human Rights, "Pretoria Statement on Strengthening the Reform of the UN Human Rights Treaty Body System," ISHR Special Report no.1, July 2011.

<sup>184</sup> International Society For Human Rights, "Pretoria Statement."



Canada—in order to facilitate discussions between the P-5 and the General Assembly.<sup>185</sup> Thus, the likelihood of being offered admission is quite high.

### POTENTIAL RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES

The prospect of joining ACT and advocating working methods reform does present some possible risks. In particular, the organization is relatively new and many of its reform proposals are still a work-in-progress. Currently, of its sixteen issue-based reform proposals, only Lichtenstein's effort to establish informal meetings between the UNSC and the ICC has achieved desirable results.<sup>186</sup> ACT fully acknowledges that its mandate is not comprehensive, and that the working group is still trying to find a distinct identity from organizations that advocate membership reform. These groups include the L-69, the G-4, the United for Consensus Group and the Ezulwini Consensus.<sup>187</sup> Consequently, the goal of launching working methods reforms while serving on the UNSC may not provide enough time to solidify concrete changes. Voting states may question the plausibility of successfully achieving reform during a two-year rotation.

These risks, however, are mitigated by the fact that this campaign seeks to promote Canada's unique relationship with the UNSC. Again, this ties back to regional partnerships and a longstanding commitment to improving international peace and security. As a non-member state, Canada currently plays a significant role in helping the Council devise operational plans for various peacekeeping missions. Normally, this takes place through informal meetings between the P-5 and certain non-member states. In the case of peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, for example, Canada provides \$1 million in annual in-kind contributions to the UNSC via legal expertise and training.<sup>188</sup> In addition, the recent amending of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), which has allowed for faster convictions of human right abusers, is a byproduct of Canadian expertise.<sup>189</sup> These efforts in Sierra Leone are, of course, just a few examples of Canada's close working relationship with the UNSC. The key to this relationship, and something ACT is looking for in potential member states, is that Canada has historically strong ties to most of the P-5. Specifically, France, the US and the UK each have a mutual partnership with Canada that extends beyond UN initiatives. Thus, winning over the majority of the P-5—a task that poses a challenge to ACT—is more achievable coming from a well-connected power like Canada.

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<sup>185</sup> International Society For Human Rights, "Pretoria Statement."

<sup>186</sup> Volker Lehmann, "Reforming the Working Methods of the UN Security Council: The Next ACT," Perspective New York Files, August 2013.

<sup>187</sup> Lehmann, "Reforming the Working Methods of the UN Security Council."

<sup>188</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Canada-Sierra Leone Relations," Report on Canadian Bilateral Relations, May 2013.

<sup>189</sup> Joseph Charley and Freida M'Cormack, "Force for Good? Police Reform in Post Conflict Sierra Leone," IDS Bulletin 43, no. 4 (2012): 53-55.

Even if Canada is not invited to join ACT, its ability to launch gradual reforms and work in partnership with the Security Council makes it a strong candidate for a UNSC seat. The purpose of ACT is to simply provide another level of legitimacy within the campaign. Outside of ACT, Canada's extensive multilateral engagement and expertise in specific peacekeeping operations offers a sense of dependability for non-member states. Based on partnerships alone, Canada is more than qualified to make significant contributions to the UNSC.

### **ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL**

Canada's Partnership platform is aimed directly at its goals for substantive work on the Security Council. In particular, Canada will stress its commitment to achieving working methods reform that will improve the transparency of UNSC operations and strengthen its communicative and consultative mechanisms with UN member states and other regional organizations. Canada can take particular advantage of this when it holds the rotating Presidency of the UNSC. During this time Canada will take the lead to continue expanding the number of Arria Formula meetings—to which non-Council members can be invited—and will engage with UNSC members to discuss ways of formalizing the means by which invitees participate and contribute to decision-making. These reforms apply not only to general meetings, but to particular UN operations as well. The TCCs involved in peacekeeping operations have indicated their desire for further cooperation and integration into Council operations, and Canada should take a leading role in promoting their involvement. These countries have indicated their satisfaction with moves made by other Council members, including the United States, to hold debates and meetings to discuss the relationship between TCCs and the UNSC.<sup>190</sup>

The aim of the formalization of these procedures will be to ensure that concrete decisions can be taken in the presence and with the input of non-members, rather than using private meetings to bypass increased openness. As a leading middle power with particularly strong connections to certain members of the P-5, Canada is very well positioned to engage in meaningful discussions with the most powerful members of the UNSC to ensure that real progress can be made in achieving working methods reform. The formalization of these procedures can contribute to the improvement of communication between the UNSC and other UN bodies as well as with other multilateral organizations.

There are numerous others areas for working methods reform that Canada can target in its campaign, including problems which have not yet been identified but which are likely to be raised in the ongoing discussions of reform. In order to demonstrate its continued commitment to the achievement of these reforms Canadian policy-makers will

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<sup>190</sup> Center for UN Reform Education, "Working Methods Reform," July 2013.

need to remain attuned to these debates and be prepared to alter or add to Canada's proposals for reform at all points during the campaign.

#### Summary of Recommendations: Partnership

- Existing Policies to be Highlighted and Promoted;
- Canada's commitment to various working methods reform organizations such as the Carlsson Group, the Group of Friends and the Utstein Group;
- Financial Contributions and leadership provided to the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations, as well the Group of Friends of Children of Armed Conflicts;
- NATO contributions in Afghanistan;
- Involvement in maintaining the Special Court for Sierra Leone;
- Proposed Changes and/or Additions to Policy;
- Deploying the necessary diplomatic personnel for the purpose of creating a group of "knowledgeable statesmen" to push NATO command reform;
- Resuming discussions regarding the implementation of videoconferencing and webcasting through UN treaty bodies.

## 2.2 PROSPERITY

Canada remains committed to building prosperity while enhancing democracy through both trade and economic assistance. The government has engaged in vigorous and continual trade promotion and has invested considerably in development initiatives. Trade agreements have expanded substantially under the Harper government, putting Canada in a unique position to interact with developing markets and further global prosperity. Canada's international development program capitalizes on its expertise and position, and concentrates on building economic foundations to integrate governments into regional and global markets.<sup>191</sup>

### TRADE AGREEMENTS

Canada has implemented a Global Commerce Strategy, negotiating trade agreements with key markets, as well as high growth economies.<sup>192</sup> This not only benefits Canadian firms, but also international markets because the integration of markets benefits the world

<sup>191</sup> Government of Canada, Canada Action Plan, "Stimulating Sustainable Economic Growth."

<sup>192</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Our Priorities," June 25, 2013.

economy. Pursuing free-trade agreements with the European Union, as well as signing a free trade agreement between Canada and the European Free Trade Association, provides access to new markets. Recently, Canada has signed a Free-Trade agreement with South Korea that will increase economic exchange by 32%.<sup>193</sup> Furthermore, Canada's commitment to the Trans Pacific Partnership covers a market of over 650 million people with GDP of \$20.5 trillion.<sup>194</sup> This movement to develop economic relationships with key markets also includes Canada's continued commitment to human rights and democracy. Improving transparency and accountability among new trade partners allows for ease of business, as well as a means to promote Canadian values. Finally, Canada continues to reinforce their relationship with the United States, promoting such strategies as the Canada-US Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness.<sup>195</sup> The chart below illustrates the extent to which Canada depends on the US.<sup>196</sup>

This extends to other parts of Central and South America. Recently Canada has signed free trade agreements with Honduras (2013), and has free trade agreements already in force with Panama (2013), Colombia (2011) and Peru (2009).<sup>197</sup> These agreements showcase Canada's leadership within her own hemisphere and promote greater economic integration among nations of the Organization of American States (OAS).

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<sup>193</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Canada-Korea Free Trade Agreement (CKFTA)," March 14, 2014.


<sup>194</sup> DFATD, "Our Priorities."

<sup>195</sup> DFATD, "Our Priorities."

<sup>196</sup> Paul Haggart, "Canada and the United States: Trade, Investment, Integration and the Future," Economics Division, April 2, 2012.

<sup>197</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Canada's Free Trade Agreements," March 11, 2014.

Foreign Direct Investment in Canada



The general trend among developed states is for greater economic cohesion, and Canada is one of the leading members of this new trend. Greater connectivity among nation states regarding their economies benefits the world system and has been proven to promote unity and friendship. Canada's intention to craft free trade agreements with some of the world's largest economies, such as Japan and India, promote Canada as a globalizing actor and a committed nation looking for greater economic integration.<sup>198</sup>

### DEVELOPMENT AID

Canada is also a significant contributor of development aid. In the 2011, Canada delivered \$5.5 billion in aid to developing nations.<sup>199</sup> Of this aid, nearly 40% is given to underdeveloped regions of Africa, an increase of over 15% since the 2000-2001 fiscal year.<sup>200</sup> Much of this developmental aid has been set-aside for the Millennium Development Goals, established by the United Nations in 2000. One example is the \$1.1 billion given by Canada for maternal health, as well as the \$2.85 billion planned for 2010-2015 to reduce

<sup>198</sup> DFATD, "Canada's Free Trade Agreements."

<sup>199</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Statistical Report on International Assistance 2011-2012," March 28, 2013.

<sup>200</sup> DFATD, "Statistical Report on International Assistance 2011-2012."

infant mortality.<sup>201</sup> Furthermore, Canada has contributed \$150 million for child education initiatives, a declared goal of the Millennium Development Goals.<sup>202</sup> With the deadline for the Millennium development Goals approaching, Canada recently provided over \$1 million in funding to a 27 member panel that has begun to re-evaluate the MDG and expand on them after 2015.<sup>203</sup> Canada remains the 6<sup>th</sup> largest donor of developmental aid in the world and has reinvigorated its commitment to goals set out by the UN to eradicate basic poverty, hunger and suffering in the world. Furthermore, Canada has agreed to lift the debt burden on numerous developing nations. Debt is one of the most challenging aspects of development for many poor countries. An example of this is Canada's role in eliminating all of Haiti's \$8 million debt to the International Development Association. Canada also continues to actively develop Haiti's economy.<sup>204</sup>

Canada remains one of the most committed international actors to the well being and development of the global community. Under the Harper government aggressive policies promoting free-trade agreements have led to new economic opportunities for Canadian businesses, and have assisted in strengthening the world financial system. These negotiations are ongoing with many important nation-states. Furthermore, the relocation of CIDA to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development has consolidated Canada's developmental aid program, while still remaining committed to its initial mandate. Today, Canada stands apart from the rest of the world in its outstanding commitment to the continued prosperity of its fellow UN members.

#### Summary of Recommendations: Prosperity

- Existing Policies to be Highlighted and Promoted;
- Free-trade dialogue with targeted states, specifically India and Japan;
- Continued Canadian leadership in Western Hemisphere, particularly within organizations such as the OAS and economic organizations;
- Development Aid program focused on specific countries with priority given to the Millennium Development Goals set out by the UN;
- Commitment to debt forgiveness;
- Proposed Changes and/or Additions to Policy:
- Increased participation with UN organizations to promote the well-being and development of emerging nations.

<sup>201</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Millennium Development Goals," September 30, 2013.

<sup>202</sup> DFATD, "Millennium Development Goals."

<sup>203</sup> DFATD, "Millennium Development Goals."

<sup>204</sup> Government of Canada, Department of Finance, "Canada Helps Haiti Eliminate All Debt Owed to World Bank," March 31, 2010.



## 2.3 PROTECTION

Of the broader values and ideals which Canada seeks to protect internationally, three have been enduring for the past decade: democracy, human rights and security. The initiatives that Canada has taken in these areas will be highlighted throughout the campaign, to illustrate Canada as a nation that consistently works to share its model for ensuring the well-being of citizens. While the types of initiatives and particular areas of focus may have shifted within these broad policy principles, the overall record is one of innovation and progress. Canada is involved in a vast array of projects, which tend to be highly focused in nature and therefore perhaps easy to overlook when assessing Canadian policy from afar. However, the niche-like nature of many Canadian undertakings does not detract from their value; rather, it ensures that they are effective and efficient. Many of the niche areas where Canada leads exceptionally are in fact synergistic with the broader goals of the UN community and global civil society. The proposed campaign aims to bring to the fore the multitude of Canadian initiatives meant to further human rights and security as well as democratic development. In a few focused areas, the campaign proposes some significant but manageable adjustments to current institutional frameworks.

### HUMAN RIGHTS

Under the human rights category, three areas of exceptional Canadian leadership will be promoted: the prioritization of health initiatives, the government's concern for gender equality and the focused attention given to religious freedom as enshrined in the recently established Office of Religious Freedom. Health promotion is undoubtedly an area where Canada has excelled in creating innovative and effective policies, particularly through the Muskoka Initiative for the improvement of maternal, newborn and child health, launched in November of 2010. The investments made in this area have been substantial, and promise to remain a priority theme in international development throughout the duration of the campaign. Under the Harper government, Canada has allotted total of \$2.85 billion to maternal and child health programming between 2010 and 2015.<sup>205</sup> The most recent Speech from the Throne emphasized the continuation of this policy, which especially concerns African states, post 2015.<sup>206</sup> The initiative is also representative of Canada's unique talent for streamlining its projects through coordination with other agencies, because it draws upon extensive networks of organizations also dealing with maternal, newborn and child health in areas with high mortality rates. As it stands currently, the initiative focuses its efforts on ten countries—all but three

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<sup>205</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Maternal, Newborn and Child Health."

<sup>206</sup> Government of Canada, "Speech from the Throne," October 16, 2013.



(Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Haiti) are African nations. As the Initiative enters its fourth year, Canada will expand the number of nations targeted by the Initiative by adding two to three to the priority list, continuing the existing focus on Africa. Nations to consider adding include Sierra Leone, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Somalia and Rwanda, all of which remain in the top 15 among United Nations indexes of infant and maternal mortality.<sup>207</sup> At this point in time, the Initiative has effectively undergone a trial period, during which it has acquired know-how and experience in coordinating and mobilizing resources. Thus, expanding the number of areas of focus is a feasible option which will allow Canada to demonstrate that its involvement and interest in Africa has not waned. This is an important priority given that many experts pointed to African states as a likely cohort where Canada lost votes during the 2010 campaign because of its apparent shift in aid allotment to Latin American nations.<sup>208</sup> Expanding the number of nations targeted by the Initiative need not be an expensive endeavour, and could simply entail shifts in resource allotment or greater coordination with other agencies—namely, the Canadian Coalition for Global Health Research. However, a small budget increase in health aid to African nations could prove beneficial, not only to a successful campaign, but to Canada's relations with this increasingly important region. As the site of the world's fastest-growing middle-class, economic growth rates approaching those of Asia, and vast natural resource endowment, African nations may constitute critical partners and major investment destinations for Canada in the near future.<sup>209</sup> While overall aid policy has moved away from a primary focus on Africa, focused initiatives such as the Muskoka Initiative need not. They represent a crucial means by which relations with this region can continue to be cultivated, while providing Canada with a focused leadership role in the area of international health promotion. Thus, the campaign recommends allotting a portion of its budget to expanding this Initiative, while also promoting the progress it has achieved in the area of maternal and child health thus far.

Gender equality is another human rights principle that is has been embedded in international development initiatives, and one which has been consistently pursued through multilateral means. Current foreign policy priorities include the elimination of violence against women, the full and equal participation of women in decision-making and the mainstreaming of a gender perspective. Many actions have been taken by the government in this direction in recent years, including contributing the greatest investment by any world donor to EQUIP, a World Bank institution promoting education for girls, as well as bestowing on DFATD a new gender equality theme.<sup>210</sup> In line with these

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<sup>207</sup> United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Population Estimates and Projections Section, "World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision."

<sup>208</sup> "Policy cost Canada UN seat: ex-ambassador," CBC News, October 13, 2010.

<sup>209</sup> Hannes van Rensburg, "Africa is Rising Fast," Forbes, November 9, 2012.

<sup>210</sup> The McLeod Group, "Gender Equality," October 2013.

actions, Canada announced in 2010 its “Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security” (C-NAP), designed to guide the development of Canadian policy and interventions abroad so as to promote women’s rights and advance equal access to humanitarian and development assistance.<sup>211</sup> It is one of twenty countries worldwide to advance such a national plan in response to the UNSC Resolution 1325, which requested that UN member states address several key themes related to women’s rights and equality.<sup>212</sup> The action plan is highly comprehensive, touching on the prevention of violence against women, representation and political participation of women in local bodies and the participation of women in peacemaking and post-conflict recovery. Actions stipulated under the plan include the implementation of modules of gender awareness for all Canadian training for personnel being deployed operationally; engagement in policy dialogue with other multilateral actors (including the UN and its various bodies); the improvement of accountability mechanisms on the part of the UN; direct Canadian diplomatic missions; and advocacy for Women, Peace, and Security issues to be included in the mandates of all UN missions for peace operations and throughout the work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.<sup>213</sup> Canada’s action plan operates within a highly multilateral context, and a considerable number of its stipulated actions involve multilateral cooperation—namely within the UN—to achieve its’ objectives. The Action Plan currently covers the period up to March 31, 2016, and is likely to be continued given recent progress reports. According to the most recent 2013 report, Canada furthered women’s inclusion in peace operations, remained a key partner in international networks promoting women, and advocated within UN Open Debates for women’s issues and for greater gender integration in UN processes.<sup>214</sup> At the 2012 Sommet de la Francophonie in Kinshasha, Canada pledged \$18.5 million to fight against sexual violence and impunity in the DRC, in addition to funding initiatives to implement global standards for the protection of girls and boys in humanitarian action.<sup>215</sup> Given that the action plan is current, continuing, effective and in accordance with Canadian capabilities and priorities, the campaign includes highlighting the plan throughout its duration, in addition to working it into Canada’s agenda once on the UNSC. As part of the campaign, Canada will pledge to improve accountability mechanisms and reporting to member states on progress made to implement Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security as a UNSC member and to work

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<sup>211</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, “Canada’s Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security.”

<sup>212</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, “Minister Cannon Launches Canada’s Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security,” October 5, 2010.

<sup>213</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, “Canada’s Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women.”

<sup>214</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, “2012-2013 Progress Report Canada’s Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security.”

<sup>215</sup> DFATD, “2012-2013 Progress Report Canada’s Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security.”

toward involving women in peace agreements and mediation processes undertaken by the UNSC. Canada's work in the area of gender equality undoubtedly demonstrates not only commitment to globally shared UN goals, but also an enduring involvement in multilateral engagements, which deserves to be showcased as part of a UNSC campaign.

A final area of exceptional leadership by Canada in the area of human rights is religious freedom. The recent establishment of the Office of Religious Freedom is an unprecedented demonstration of leadership in an area where Canada sets an example internationally. Violations of religious freedom are an acute problem across the globe. Religious hostilities in almost every world region have been on the rise, and more than 76% of the world's population live in countries with a high level of restriction on religion, according to a rigorous study.<sup>216</sup> Given Canada's high degree of religious pluralism and tolerance, the newly established Office cements our reputation as an international leader in religious rights. The Office's mandate includes the protection of religious minorities under threat, opposition to religious hatred and intolerance and the promotion of Canadian values of pluralism and tolerance abroad.<sup>217</sup> This area is a clear example of Canada's continuing initiative in the multilateral arena. In fact, the Office aims to promote freedom of religion as a Canadian foreign policy priority, creating synergies with broader Canadian values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law.<sup>218</sup> The government has invested the Office with \$4.25 million per year in funding to finance projects outside of Canada in order to assist threatened religious communities.<sup>219</sup> In doing so, it works with a variety of multilateral organizations and research bodies, while supporting Canadian diplomats in religiously charged situations. Campaigning for the UNSC presents an opportunity to extend the influence of the Office to the UN, and showcase the credibility of Canada's commitment to human rights. The proposed campaign would involve Canada incorporating the protection of religious freedom into its Security Council agenda. Canada will pledge to integrate principles of religious freedom into peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, strengthen bodies of the UN which concern religious freedom (such as the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief) and improve coordination among the network of NGO's working to promote religious rights. In doing so, Canada can leverage the comparative advantages it has in this area and work to internationalize the deeply Canadian value of religious tolerance. A UNSC campaign thus represents an opportunity to further Canadian foreign policy goals as they pertain to human rights, while capitalizing upon the remarkable progress Canada has achieved in critical focus areas.

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<sup>216</sup> Pew Research Religion and Public Life Project, "Religious Hostilities Reach Six-Year High," January 14, 2014.

<sup>217</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Canada's Office of Religious Freedom."

<sup>218</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Mandate of the Office of Religious Freedom."

<sup>219</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Background Information on the Office of Religious Freedom."

## DEMOCRACY

In the area of democracy assistance, the Canadian government has affirmed its dedication to promoting this value around the world.<sup>220</sup> In 2007 and 2009, the government announced plans to significantly expand Canada's role in international democracy support.<sup>221</sup> Supporting the advance of democracy has been viewed as in the Canadian interest in the same manner as the spread of international human rights norms and the rule of law. Prime Minister Harper and his foreign ministers still regularly invoke democratic values as part of their conception of a values based foreign policy. For example, in an April 2012 interview, Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird responded to a question about disturbing developments in Russia by asserting that "promoting democratic development is a key priority, promoting freedom is a big priority around the world, in Russia and everywhere."<sup>222</sup> Given this continuing emphasis on the importance of democracy promotion, good governance has been identified as a crosscutting theme in Canada's development cooperation program. The DFATD in particular has been involved in democratization efforts worldwide, employing a focused approach that works with those developing countries best placed to achieve change.<sup>223</sup> The DFATD's goals have included furthering the international consensus on democracy and governance issues, working with international financial institutions to integrate the objectives of this policy into their work and developing programming that works with local organizations to achieve progress.<sup>224</sup> Canada has also worked closely with the European Union (EU) to promote democratic values within the UN and through development cooperation projects. It is a contributor to the EU's election observer missions, participating in 19 such missions, most recently in Senegal in 2012 and Nicaragua, Tunisia, the DRC, Niger and Sudan in 2011.<sup>225</sup> In addition, support for democracy is a central pillar of the Harper government's policy of re-engagement with the Americas. The government has sought to create a "hub of democracy" in the region, placing civil servants responsible for developing democracy assistance programs on the ground and providing funding to intergovernmental organizations like International IDEA.<sup>226</sup> Promoting democracy remains a fundamental concept within Canadian foreign policy, and this should be stressed throughout the duration of the proposed campaign.

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<sup>220</sup> Government of Canada, "Speech from the Throne," October 16, 2013.

<sup>221</sup> Gerald J. Schmitz, "Canada and International Democracy Assistance: What Direction for the Harper Government's Foreign Policy," (Kingston, ON: Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's University, 2013): 2.

<sup>222</sup> Schmitz, "Canada and International Democracy Assistance," 2.

<sup>223</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Governance."

<sup>224</sup> Government of Canada, CIDA (DFATD), "Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and Good Governance."

<sup>225</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Democracy and Human Rights."

<sup>226</sup> Maxwell A. Cameron, "Democracy promotion," Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, The University of British Columbia, April 13, 2011.

In stressing this, the campaign recommends that the current government follow a highly consistent approach in its' stance toward antidemocratic conduct worldwide. As Prime Minister Harper has stated himself in response to the 2014 democratic crisis in Ukraine, anti-democratic transgressions should not be subordinated to economic interests.<sup>227</sup> Indeed, given the disruptions to trade and investment caused by democratic crises, democracy promotion serves Canada's economic interests in the long-term. It ensures stability and security, while advancing a value that is fundamental to Canadian identity and to Canada's vision for an ideal and prosperous world order. Thus, in light of the proposed campaign, the government should commit to a firmer and more consistent approach toward any democratic transgressions that may arise in the coming years. This need not entail sacrificing flexibility in diplomatic approach. The complexity of democratic crises naturally demands tailoring responses around the specifics of a given situation. However, at a minimum, the Canadian government should clearly articulate its opposition to antidemocratic actions and exert diplomatic pressure where crises occur, as it has in the case of Russia's military actions against Ukraine. This recent policy stance represents a positive model which the government should maintain to improve the credibility of its' official democracy agenda. In the meantime, the government should strive to internationalize democratic rhetoric by resuming biennial conferences on democratic development, and expanding their scope by inviting representatives from other nations. These steps would demonstrate Canada's ongoing commitment in this area, while continuing to promote democratic and free market values worldwide.

## SECURITY

The final area of Protection to be emphasized is security in the form of disaster relief and conflict resolution. Canada actively participates in disaster response initiatives on the international stage. In terms of emergency assistance, Canada contributes to international efforts that address disaster relief including the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). CERF was created to ensure that the victims of natural disasters and armed disputes receive faster and more dependable humanitarian aid.<sup>228</sup> Canada is the fifth largest donor country for this fund, providing \$26,719,985 in 2014 alone.<sup>229</sup> Another of Canada's assets in this field is the highly praised Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), a military group that quickly mobilizes and provides a range of services to aid in the immediate aftermath of disasters, including natural disasters and humanitarian crises.<sup>230</sup> This is a critical initiative, which allows for immediate needs of local populations to be addressed until international organizations and national government assets are

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<sup>227</sup> Steven Chase, "Harper warns of 'risks' in doing business with Russia," *The Globe and Mail*, March 24, 2014.

<sup>228</sup> United Nations Emergency Response Fund, "Who We Are What is the Central Emergency Response Fund?"

<sup>229</sup> United Nations Emergency Response Fund, "CERF Pledges and Contributions 2006-2014."

<sup>230</sup> Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, "The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)."



mobilized. In recent years, DART has played an important part in disaster relief efforts, including Haiti in 2010 and the Philippines in 2013.<sup>231</sup> Prime Minister Harper effectively deployed DART to the Philippines before any requests for help were made to Canada by the government of the Philippines. This illustrates how the DART force continues to be seen as relevant and capable of meaningfully impacting recovery efforts. Canada's contributions to peace operations and disaster relief have not waned, and deserve to be emphasized in its pursuit of a UNSC seat.

#### Summary of Recommendations: Protection

- Existing Policies to be Highlighted and Promoted;
- The Muskoka Initiative's record of progress thus far;
- Canada's 2010 Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions Women, Peace and Security (C-NAP);
- The mandate of the Office of Religious Freedom;
- Canadian involvement in the UN Peacebuilding Commission;
- Support for the Disaster Assistance Response Team;
- Proposed Changes and/or Additions to Policy;
- Addition of 2-3 African nations to the Muskoka Initiative's priority list of targeted nations;
- Employment of more consistent diplomatic approach to antidemocratic transgressions worldwide;
- Resuming of biennial conferences on democratic development, with inclusion of representatives from other nations.

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<sup>231</sup> Kim Mackrael and Steven Chase, "Canadian disaster-relief team moving 'incredibly fast,' Baird says," The Globe and Mail, November 11, 2013.

## 3.0 CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN

### 3.1 TIMELINE

Proposed Objective	Proposed Date
Announce Canada's bid for a 2024 UNSC seat within the WEOG bloc. The aim is to follow the widely practiced and often successful tradition of announcing a country's candidacy ten years prior to an election.	End of 2014
A speech from either Prime Minister Harper or another senior foreign policymaker that reframes Canada's approach to the UN. Ideally, this will occur at the beginning of the campaign in order to provide a clear sense of direction.	Early 2015
Establish a group of supporting statesmen—particularly from the US and ACT members that happen to be NATO states—for the sole purpose of solidifying a consensus in order to streamline NATO's command structure.	End of 2015
Establish a support base and mutual agreement with the Cross Regional Group in relation to the webcasting of all non-stakeholder meetings.	End of 2015
Hold a biennial conference on democratic development.	End of 2015
Aim to remove ACLANT from NATO's command structure.	End of 2016
Aim to introduce videoconferencing and webcasting to the formation of the UN High Commissioner's Report.	End of 2016
Invite ACT members to a two-day informal gathering in Canada.	Early 2017



Submit an application to ACT. While the process of admission is based on invitation, submitting an application shortly after the informal gathering would clearly emphasize Canada's interest in the organization.	Early-mid 2017
Hold a biennial conference on democratic development.	End of 2017
Announce a re-allocation of the federal budget to expand the Muskoka Initiative.	Early 2018
Add 2-3 African states to the priority list of the Muskoka Initiative.	End of 2018
Hold a biennial conference on democratic development.	End of 2019
Hold a biennial conference on democratic development.	End of 2021
Hold a biennial conference on democratic development.	End of 2023

### 3.2 BUDGET

The 2012 Security Council election saw the WEOG member states allocating diverse, and often quite high, budgets to their campaigns. However, as many of the recommendations in this campaign pertain to changes in diplomatic conduct and promotion of existing commitments, costs will be reasonable and moderate. Moreover, the proposed campaign does not entail increases in humanitarian assistance or security infrastructure, which demands considerable expense. Nevertheless, it is important that Canada's advocacy of working methods reform, human rights and democracy is qualified through meaningful policy change sustained through adequate financing. In addition, any campaign budget must account for routine expenses such as hospitality for representatives, conferences and promotional materials. This campaign predicts that the majority of any established budget would be allocated towards the following:

- Promotional expenses, such as a website profile, promotional events, general advertising and public relations expenses and corporate hospitality and gifts;

- Travel and accommodation expenses for representatives, accounting for additional diplomatic personnel deployed to advocate NATO command reform;
- Event hosting expenses, including those related to the hosting of biennial conferences on democratic development;
- Any expenses related to the expansion of nations targeted under the Muskoka Initiative, though expenses may be minimized by re-allocating existing resources;
- Any additional research expenses related to reform.

The costs of these initiatives are not expected to be dramatically higher than previous Canadian UNSC campaigns. However, those related to the financing of representatives are expected to rise in line with these recommendations to increase the scope of personal diplomacy by Canadian officials throughout the course of the campaign. Costs may also be minimized through appeal to private donors.

### 3.3 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The “Partnership, Prosperity, Protection” Campaign offers an achievable and attractive Security Council campaign built on a series of realistic policy goals that have been developed to harmonize with the foreign policy of the present government. It provides a concrete strategy and a positive message for the government to promote during the years leading up to the Security Council elections of 2024. However, the campaign also takes into consideration the broader foreign policy context within which Canada operates, and to that end also provides a series of responses for the government to consider employing should it face criticism over other aspects of its policy agenda.

This campaign faces some potential challenges. The proposal recognizes the possibility that certain aspects of the present government’s foreign policy are unpopular with some UN members, and this campaign’s close association with those policies could undercut some of the effectiveness of the campaign message. Perhaps a more significant challenge for this campaign is the possibility of resistance from the current government. While the policy changes proposed here are incremental and designed to fit with present policy, this campaign does propose a certain alteration to the government’s broader diplomatic posture. This is reflected in the ways in which the campaign proposes to frame current policy and also in its’ suggested minor policy changes. If the government is not willing to fully embrace all of these changes, then the campaign’s message will not be as effective.

Nonetheless, this campaign without a doubt represents the best means for the government to successfully vie for a seat on the UN Security Council in 2024. Furthermore,

it aims to do so in a cost-effective manner that is consistent with this government's foreign and domestic policy goals. This campaign offers a concrete, carefully laid out program that also takes into consideration Canada's role on the Security Council should it win the election. More broadly, this campaign offers a cohesive and consistent vision according to which the government can lay out its foreign policy platform, which will prove valuable to foreign policy makers even beyond the scope of the campaign itself.



# SECTION III:

## CAMPAIGN OPTION NO. 2

# 1.0 RATIONALE

## 1.1 PERSPECTIVE AND BRAND

The decision to launch this campaign is based on two interconnected factors. First, globalization has been the defining process of the past few decades, shaping, if not determining, the economic, social and political context of international security. Its' simultaneously creative and destructive force has brought forth greater integration between nations as technology and trade connect peoples across the globe, redefining relationships and creating new identities and ideas. New major powers—China, Brazil and India—are rising, while older powers—the United States, the European Union and Russia—are evolving in new and unpredictable ways. These transitions have made the international security environment much more complex. Traditional approaches to security, which attempt to control the consequences of insecurity, appear inadequate and clear delineations of what constitutes a threat have become blurred. State, human, energy and environmental are all necessary forms of security to ensure overall sustainable security as the world is beset with daunting challenges and seemingly intractable problems, ranging from civil conflict and religious extremism to climate change, environmental degradation and resource conflict. In the face of global problems, nations often resort to the United Nations as it provides a legitimate, and perhaps a best, hope at resolving them. However, although the United Nations Security Council is the arbiter of international peace and security, it has not yet adjusted its' approach to deal with the scope and diversity of the security problems of the twenty-first century. There remains a gap between the common challenges all nations face and the mechanisms and institutions used to resolve them.

The second factor is the profound effect of post-Cold War changes to the international state system on Canadian foreign policy. Canada's historical middle power role is no longer aligned with the workings of the international system. Lacking the hard power capabilities to make a substantial impact, Canadian policymakers have packaged their specific skills into a soft power approach to international security. While policy makers sparked a lively discourse about Canadian soft power, little was done in terms of substantial contributions to the global community. Limited commitment to implementing substantial policy may not have tarnished Canada's international standing in the short-term, but it has proved to be costly in the long-term. The more the Canadian government spoke about what ought to be done without supporting its' claims, the greater the credibility gap became in relation to its foreign policy. The Harper government has attempted to close this gap by taking a much more pragmatic and narrow approach to foreign policy relative to its' predecessors. The primacy of national interests and domestic priorities, however, has led to an unbalanced approach to foreign policy as other matters of

public interest, such as climate change and global poverty are sidelined. Moreover, the rhetorical assertion of a principled approach to foreign policy has generated a perception of inconsistency and hypocrisy as the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law appear to be considered on a case-by-case basis. This can also help to explain the government's detachment from multilateral institutions, particularly the United Nations, because the assumption is that these forums encase Canada within an a priori set of principles that limits the country's foreign policy. Altogether, this foreign policy approach has created a credibility gap between what the government claims are Canadian values and what it is actually doing to promote those values. Canadian foreign policy, characterized by inconsistency and lacking credibility, has sidelined the nation in world affairs. In order to ensure that Canada remains a relevant actor in matters of international security, the Canadian government must adjust its approach to foreign policy to reflect the changes in the international system.

Given the current dynamic of the international system, Canada has an opportunity to reinvent itself, which requires thinking about the kind of power it wields, where it can best wield it and for what purposes. This campaign suggests that Canada embrace a new role: that of a smart power. A smart power combines hard and soft power resources in cost-effective strategies. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of having a strong military, but also places an emphasis on alliances, coalitions and institutions at all levels to expand one's influence and secure one's foreign policy objectives. As part of the smart power mantra, the United Nations remains an essential tool to thinking strategically about multilateralism in the twenty-first century because it continues to provide a legitimate means of convening nations to address conflict, transnational threats and humanitarian crises. Taking on this new role requires Canada to set specific and reasonable priorities, particularly in the context of trying to promote stability and well-being in the international community at large. A smart power approach to foreign policy will thus help to close the credibility gap. Furthermore, it resonates with the essence of Canadian Internationalism: (1) a responsibility to play a constructive role in the management of conflict; (2) an emphasis on multilateralism for defusing conflict; (3) involvement and support for international institutions; (4) a willingness to enter into formal commitments (directly linked to the principle of functionalism); and (5) a reinforcement and respect for international law.<sup>232</sup> Canada's *smart power* approach will thus project a new and evolved national brand: the *innovative internationalist*.

The smart power approach to the United Nations requires looking to areas where member states, including the Permanent Five, can make realistic progress on international challenges. Over the past two decades, there has been growing consensus among member

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<sup>232</sup> Kim Nossal, Stephane Roussel, and Stephane Paquin. *International Policy and Politics in Canada* (Toronto: Pearson Canada, 2011), 119.



states that a holistic and multidimensional approach to development and security is necessary for international stability. The intention is to consolidate this understanding of international security through the Sustainable Security Agenda with the hope that it will maintain the credibility of the United Nations Security Council in the twenty-first century.

The Sustainable Security Agenda is based on the concept of sustainable security.<sup>233</sup> It is a concept rooted in sustainable development and the human security discourse that seeks to promote positive change by combining conventional and non-conventional paradigms of security and capitalizing on human innovation, diplomatic opportunities and environmental change.

This campaign encourages Canada to take a holistic approach to security that seeks to address the long-term drivers of insecurity, with an emphasis on prevention and anticipatory action as opposed to only reactive strategies and crisis intervention. Climate change, resource conflict, socio-economic marginalization and increased global militarization are four interrelated drivers of global insecurity. Canada, and the rest of the international community, can no longer treat these issues in isolation. They must aim to resolve the root causes of conflict and global instability, rather than simply treating the symptoms. The current approach to international security focuses on containment and maintaining the status quo. In an era of change, however, the status quo is unsustainable; borders alone cannot control for all the consequences of insecurity. Achieving security is a dynamic process of adapting, learning and acting. This is the idea that the Sustainable Security Agenda advances. This understanding of security has gained prominence in the international agenda, most notably in the recent report “Realizing the Future We Want for All by the United Nations System Task Team.”<sup>234</sup> There is growing consensus among UN member states that peace and security, environmental sustainability, inclusive economic development and inclusive social development are rooted in the principles of human rights, equality and sustainability and form an integrated framework for realizing the future that is best for all.<sup>235</sup> With this Sustainable Security approach Canada will bring this idea to the forefront and consolidate the understanding of international security within a multidimensional context, affirming the linkage between the conventional and non-conventional aspects of security. This affirmation speaks to the role that Canada has and can perform within international security—the role of connecting ideas and nations. Sustainable security should be a shared vision for all nations; a security issue in one nation has regional and global implications. Only when members of the global community cooperate with one another will long-lasting security be achieved.

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<sup>233</sup> Oxford Research Group, "Sustainable Security." January 2014.

<sup>234</sup> United Nations System Task Team, *Realizing the Future We Want for All: Report to the Secretary-General* (New York: United Nations, 2012).

<sup>235</sup> United Nations System Task Team, *Realizing the Future We Want for All: Report to the Secretary-General* (New York: United Nations, 2012), 21-32.

This campaign projects Canada into the role of a liaison between large and small nations and between developed and less developed countries, in the hopes of better coordinating the interests of the UN member states. Membership in a wide variety of multilateral organizations allows Canada to understand and balance the multiple interests of the global community. Canada will seek to ensure that the interests of all UN members are expressed, understood and addressed. Furthermore, it speaks of Canada's commitment to long-term global security and the conviction that a safe world is a prosperous one.

## 1.2 LESSONS LEARNED

Canada finds itself in a new, uncertain and multi-polar world in which the drivers of globalization have created both problems and opportunities. The threats to international security have become more diverse, encompassing the non-traditional dimensions of security. Physical borders cannot halt the spread infectious disease, protect the planet and its' population from the impact of climate change, or secure Canada completely from extremism. At the same time, methods of development cannot deter acts of aggression, resolve crises when they arise, or protect individuals from oppression.

### WHAT LESSONS CAN WE LEARN FROM THE 2010 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ELECTION?

In the run up to the 2010 election, Canadian officials were confident of victory. Sources close to foreign affairs minister Lawrence Cannon noted that Canada had received written guarantees from 135 Member States, eight more than required for Canada to be elected on the first ballot. The loss in the first ballot and the collapse in the second vote indicated that Canada did not have a second ballot strategy. The campaign stressed Canada's role as a founding member of the United Nations and its long-standing commitment to the organization. It also underscored previous contributions to the United Nations Security Council, its commitment to peacekeeping and its commitment to multilateralism. The rhetoric, however, was not supported by Canadian policies abroad, nor was it backed by a strong domestic front. Moreover, the campaign message did not align with recent changes in foreign policy. This refers to the noticeable shift in its position on climate change, a staunch pro-Israel policy in the Middle East and an explicit shift in development policy. The campaign exposed serious credibility gaps in Canada's foreign policy, including its policy toward the UN. Such gaps undermined Canada's traditional reputation as a state committed to multilateralism and diplomacy, and revealed the campaign's lack of substance and vision.

The 2010 campaign suffered from ineffective leadership and organization. The announcement of its candidature in 2006 was relative to the declaration of the candidatures of other competing states. However, in the four years preceding the vote, the Harper government dithered on the campaign. The campaign was not a priority, made evident by the fact that only in the final year did the government voice it as one of Canada's top priorities. This was accentuated by the Harper government's failure to adequately promote the campaign to the Canadian public. Prime Minister Stephen Harper, by openly denigrating the UN and choosing to miss important UN sessions for other media events, gave off the impression that he was not committed to obtaining a seat for Canada on the UNSC. Despite hosting the G8 and G20 summits, as well as the Winter Olympic Games in the year of the election, campaign outreach programs to garner support for Canada's bid were insufficient and the government did not adequately draw upon the extensive international experience of Canadian diplomats in making a case for its bid to the Security Council. In fact, under the Harper government, there have been increased budget cuts to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) that have weakened Canada's diplomatic capacity. Altogether, Canada appeared to be running a campaign based on the presumption that it was simply entitled to a seat, rather than an actual desire to enact change.

The loss of the election can be interpreted as a sign of Canada's reduced international profile. While it appears that the loss was strictly a result of the Harper government's foreign policy and a poor campaign focus, these alone do not entirely explain it. The Canadian governments' engagement in the world began to waver in the 1990s when faced with federal budget and deficit reduction issues and with national unity crises. Cuts to Canada's diplomatic and foreign policy institutions resulted in the deployment of fewer peacekeepers, a reduction of foreign aid and a scaling down of diplomatic resources. These changes came about in part due to changes in the structure of power in the international state system. In relative terms, Canada became a less significant player in international security matters. The result of the vote was thus a cumulative effect of changes in the international system, a creeping decline in Canadian internationalism and changes in Canadian foreign policy.

The loss of the 2010 campaign should be taken as a learning experience. Nearly every country that has previously served on the Security Council has lost a bid for the seat at least once. While the results may be a symbolic representation of Canada's reduced international standing, they do not determine the future. If Canada is to be successful in the future there are a number of things that it needs to consider.

## THE WAY FORWARD

- The campaign must be a part of a long-term vision of Canadian foreign policy. A campaign for the sake of obtaining a seat lacks integrity.
- The campaign should not only appeal to global priorities, but should also be representative of Canadian interests and values. Canada cannot and should not be obligated to involve itself in every international issue; only those that challenge or engage its values, pertain to its interests and those where it has the capability to act.
- The campaign strategy should have a specific policy platform (the Sustainable Security Agenda, which delineates Canada's interests, values and the objectives it will pursue on the Security Council).
- The campaign must be organized, focused and have strong leadership. It should take into consideration factors including: the announcement of candidature, time to consolidate public support and flexibility to adjust to new issues. In addition, there should be support from the Prime Minister. If there is no clear and definite support from the Prime Minister, it is advised that he/she not be openly against the campaign as this may cause it to lose legitimacy.
- There must be effective outreach programs, at home, in New York and abroad. Campaign representatives, including Canadian diplomats, ambassadors and special envoys should organize formal and informal meetings, conferences and seminars to promote Canada's message.
- Canadian diplomats should actively engage in vote trading in multilateral forums because many, approximately one-third, of United Nations' delegates do not have or follow explicit instructions from their government regarding voting. Some are simply instructed to vote for country X in the first ballot, but are free to act as they wish in subsequent rounds of voting. Vote trading should not be the only strategy however.
- Canadian officials should harness the tools of public and digital diplomacy in order to promote the campaign and consolidate support.

This campaign is part of a longer-term process in the development of Canada's foreign policy. The campaign, and the prospected UNSC Seat, will serve as a bridge to close Canada's credibility gap by aligning its foreign policy with global priorities and national interests. It will present Canada as an active, innovative and collaborative member of the international community.

## 1.3 DEMANDS ON LEADERSHIP

### CANADA'S PRIME MINISTER AND CANADIAN OFFICIALS

The Prime Minister, whoever may hold that position at the time the campaign is declared, should emphasize Canada's interest in the United Nations and the Security Council. By emphasizing the importance of multilateralism for security purposes, the Prime Minister can also dispel claims of Canada's shift towards bilateralism. The Prime Minister's message should highlight the Sustainable Security Approach outlined in the previous section. This message must coincide with an increased presence of the Prime Minister at the UN, particularly within its target audience, the General Assembly (GA). For the past two years, Prime Minister Harper has attended the opening ceremonies of the GA without "joining other heads of government in speaking to the representatives of the world."<sup>236</sup> The Prime Minister is encouraged to make multiple speeches regarding Canada's bid for a UNSC seat.

#### *A Message from the Prime Minister*

*Canada is again campaigning for one of the two Western European and Other Group's non-permanent seats for the Security Council in 2025—2026 . If elected, Canada is prepared to use its respected status as a multilateral power to enhance the United Nation's security structure by bridging the existing gap between small and large powers.*

*Canada aspires to bring its understanding of, and commitment to, sustainable security to the council. This approach to security is proactive, rather than reactive, focusing on the causes of insecurity rather than the consequences of insecurity.*

*Canada turns, in particular, to the private sector as a means of securing the well-being and dignity of humankind, equally valuing knowledge diplomacy, the transfer of technology, science, and information, and peace keeping and peace building missions.*

*We thank you for your support!*

*Nous vous remercions pour votre soutien!*

Prime Minister [Stephen Harper]

#### *Consolidating Diplomatic Relationships*

Canadian diplomats should seek to garner support through traditional diplomatic activity. A cordial relation with another state is important in securing its support. Canada's

<sup>236</sup> Paul Dewar, "Why Stephen Harper should speak at the UN," *The Globe and Mail*, September 24, 2013.

permanent representative to the United Nations should remain active within the inner corridors of the United Nations Headquarters in New York and arrange to speak at organized press conferences and other media events for the purposes of publicity. The Canadian Ambassador should constantly lobby and consistently promote Canada's platform through formal and informal meetings, including networking sessions, focus groups and soirées, in a personal and approachable manner that enables he/she to forge cordial bilateral relationships with a wide range of member states.

#### *Canada's Participation in Multilateral Forums*

It is recommended that Canadian delegates actively engage in various international and regional organizations, including the United Nations, G8/G20, NATO, OECD, the Arctic Council, the Commonwealth and La Francophonie. They should seize opportunities to introduce the elements of the Sustainable Security Agenda into formal and informal discussions. Sharing the message in multilateral forums will place Canada at the centre of the dialogue on matters concerning peace and security. For example, including sustainable security on the agenda of the Arctic Council would be fitting not only because it includes the two largest nuclear superpowers (the United States and Russia), as well as indigenous peoples who serve as Permanent Participants, but also because it aligns with the government's current policy of continental security.

Furthermore, Canadian diplomats should participate in formal and informal discussion with members of different voting blocs. In addition to vote trading within these blocs, Canadian diplomats should inform their counterparts on the Sustainable Security Agenda and how it relates to their concerns and interests.<sup>237</sup> Given Canada's positive perception among large Western states, diplomats should focus their efforts with smaller-medium states in the non-Western world for two reasons. First, these states and voting blocs comprise the bulk of member states to the UN and second, it underlines a key plank of Canada's campaign: Canada as a bridge between small-medium and large states.<sup>238</sup> These discussions can also be useful later on, if Canada secures a seat on the Security Council, in building coalitions and partnerships to promote common concerns.

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<sup>237</sup> See Appendix A-G for a general outline of priorities issues in different regions and how they align with Canadian foreign policy and the campaign.

<sup>238</sup> BBC World Service Poll, "2012 Country Rating Poll."



## 2.0 POLICY FOCUS AREAS OF THE CAMPAIGN

### 2.1 PEACEKEEPING

Canada plays an important role in the conceptualization of UN peacekeeping operations. In 2000, Canadian policy-makers were key architects of the Brahimi Report, which addressed the challenges of UN peacekeeping in the twenty-first century and offered realistic recommendations for change. The document called for a renewed commitment on the part of member states and significant institutional changes, including the development of a rapid deployment force and increased financial support. The Brahimi Report motivated member states to continue with major reforms, including the United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines, the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peace Operation 2010 Reform Strategy and the New Horizon Process.

Moreover, Canada plays an active and leading role in shaping emerging peacekeeping policy and practice. This represents a large part of Canada's current agenda at the UN. Since the creation of the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations in 1965, Canada has annually served as a vice-chair. Collaborating with the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Canada works to shape and improve the doctrines that guide peace operations. Canada is also involved in peacebuilding initiatives, such as the Peacebuilding Commission which is an intergovernmental body that supports peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict. Canada is one of the most involved nations on the Commission and provides policy guidance to the Committee and the UN Peacebuilding Fund. In 2014, Canada was the fifth largest donor to the Fund, contributing \$33 million dollars, behind only Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Norway.<sup>239</sup>

Canada currently has 115 active peacekeepers, which ranks Canada 61st in the world in the amount of human resources dedicated to peacekeeping.<sup>240</sup> Although this ranking elicits self-criticism and nostalgia for a lost role as peacekeeper par excellence, the reality is that Canada's contribution cannot be assessed in terms of the old standard of boots on the ground. More countries contribute to peacekeeping and this is a welcome development even though it means Canada's ranking has dropped. As of 2013, Canada was the ninth largest donor to UN peacekeeping missions, contributing 2.98% of the total budget, behind only the US (28.38%), Japan (10.83%) and France (7.22%).<sup>241</sup> Most recently, Canada has expanded its contributions under the Military Training and Cooperation Programme, which is designed to provide training assistance and capacity building to students from approximately sixty non-NATO/Commonwealth countries.

<sup>239</sup> United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, "Contributors" July 2014.

<sup>240</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, "Troop and Police Contributors," July 2014.

<sup>241</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, "Financing Peacekeeping," July 2013.

Eligible countries must meet Canadian defense and foreign policy strategic interests and have historic bilateral relations with Canada. They must be non-oppressive and in line with human rights standards, they must not threaten regional stability and they must demonstrate the ability to absorb and accept Canadian assistance. Finally, they must meet Canadian Armed Forces' (CAF) operational goals and interests, be active participants in peace operations and have a maximum GDP per capita of USD \$15,000 a year.<sup>242</sup>

Canada was also active in the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). With an allotted budget of \$21 million for the period 2011-2014, the government cooperated with multilateral institutions, donor governments and other states to support the training of Afghan National Forces. This program also promoted regional diplomacy and strengthened the judicial system.<sup>243</sup> While Canada only contributed one peacekeeper for UNAMA operations, Canada committed 950 military trainers and 45 Canadian civilian police to support and train the Afghan National Forces.<sup>244</sup>

Since the end of operations in Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan have become the primary focus of Canadian peacekeeping missions. Haiti is the largest recipient of Canadian aid development assistance and Canada is one of Haiti's principal donors, having committing \$520 million for reconstruction and development between 2006 and 2011.<sup>245</sup> In addition, Canada supports the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti through the contribution of 150 police, 25 penal corrections experts and ten military officers.<sup>246</sup> Canada has also actively assisted the Haitian government in strengthening its judicial system, as well as training local military and police forces.

The second region of focus for Canadian peacekeeping operations is Sudan and South Sudan. Canada provides roughly 50 Canadian troops and 25 police personnel to UN peace operations in Sudan and South Sudan.<sup>247</sup> Canada supports all three UN missions in the region and, since 2006, has provided \$255 million in voluntary support for peacekeeping operations.<sup>248</sup> In addition to unilateral provisions of diplomatic, financial and logistical support, Canada co-chairs the "Friends of UNAMID" group with the United States.<sup>249</sup>

<sup>242</sup> Government of Canada, Canadian Forces "The Directorate - Military Training & Cooperation (DMTC)."

<sup>243</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Canada's Role 2011-2014: Building a Better Future of Afghans."

<sup>244</sup> DFATD, "Canada's Role 2011-2014: Building a Better Future of Afghans."

<sup>245</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "START in Haiti."

<sup>246</sup> DFATD, "START in Haiti."

<sup>247</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Canada Supporting Peacekeeping in Darfur: Past, Present, Future."

<sup>248</sup> DFATD, "Canada Supporting Peacekeeping in Darfur: Past, Present, Future."

<sup>249</sup> The United Nations Secretary General, "Secretary-General Welcomes Move To Establish 'Friends of UNAMID' Group," SG/SM/11454 (6 March 2008).

Regions where Canada continues to promote its peacekeeping role include Central Asia, Asia-Pacific and Latin America. Canada can draw upon its technical and logistical expertise and recent experience in Afghanistan to mentor and support countries that contribute to UN peace operations in these regions, in terms of human resource capability, technological support and strategic mission planning.

As the nature of conflict has evolved, so too have peace operations: they are no longer limited to one type of activity, but can include peacemaking, peacebuilding and peace enforcement. While UN missions are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of a cease-fire or peace agreement, they often are required to play an active peacemaking role and initiate early peacebuilding efforts. To meet the challenges of contemporary peacekeeping operations, UN peacekeepers may use force at the tactical level with the permission of the UNSC to defend themselves or their mandate, particularly in situations when the state is unwilling or unable to maintain order. This robust peacekeeping is different from peace enforcement because it requires consent of the host nation or main parties to the conflict. Peace enforcement may involve the use of force, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorized by a UNSC Chapter VII resolution. Canada's commitment to Afghanistan reaffirmed that the Canadian Force were able and willing to engage in heavy combat at the tactical level, in addition to serving as peacekeepers. Canada's experience in counter-insurgency and civilian protection in Afghanistan can thus be a valuable asset to these new types of peace operations.

In light of the changing nature of peacekeeping operations, it is recommended that Canada increase its standing number of UN peacekeepers and enhance the capabilities of the CAF to contribute to UN peace operations:

- By 2019, Canada should increase its contribution of UN peacekeepers by 250-900 peacekeepers. This will place Canada among the top 50 in the world, making Canada more visible in matters of international peace and security.
- By 2022, Canada should operate two new auxiliary ships, the Queenston-class, at a cost of \$2.6 billion; and
- Canada should operate fifteen advanced, multi-purpose, helicopters, which constitute medium to heavy lift capabilities at a cost of \$5 billion.<sup>250</sup> This investment will ensure Canada can provide formal commitments to UN operations in addition to logistics and technological provisions.

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<sup>250</sup> Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, "Fact Sheet – Medium-to-Heavy Lift Helicopter Project: Status," July 2013.

The UN remains the central body for international peace and security and is thereby important for Canadian security. A greater commitment to UN peace operations has a number of benefits for Canada. These benefits include:

- Making Canada more visible in matters of international peace and security;
- Allowing Canada to develop a leadership role by specializing in technological and logistics support, capacity building and training and offering skilled personnel to take leadership roles on the ground;
- Building more constructive political and economic channels for Canada;
- Supporting Canada's advocacy for the development of a UN Emergency Peace Service as a part of the Sustainable Security Agenda.

Sample Campaign Statement: Building and Keeping the Peace

*Canada has historically played a central role in UN peacekeeping missions, providing funding, logistical support and personnel. Though the scope of peacekeeping operations had declined in the early 2000s, these operations have seen an increase in recent years.*

*Canada continues to play an important role in shaping peacekeeping operations through the 2000 Brahimi Report which founded the Peacebuilding Commission and the New Horizon Process. Currently, Canada is ranked 61 in the world in UN peacekeeping contributions.*

*To meet the challenges of contemporary conflict peace operations, Canada has engaged in "robust peacekeeping" which requires the consent of authorities or main parties to the conflict. In accordance with post-Afghanistan security strategy, Canada aims to reorient and re-energize its commitment to United Nations peace operations.*

## 2.2 STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION TASK FORCE (START)

Fragile states and conflict-situations constitute major challenges for the international community, including Canada. According to DFATD, crises and fragility affect approximately 1.5 billion citizens around the world. Conflict-affected states lose \$39 billion annually in GDP, and cost the wider international community up to \$237 billion per year. Of all ODA given by donor governments, 30% is spent in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.<sup>251</sup>

<sup>251</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Why We Work in Conflict Affected and Fragile States."

Since 1948, the UN has mandated over 60 stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction missions with the majority initiated in the post-Cold War period.<sup>252</sup> To assist in peace building and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives in failing and conflict-affected states, Canada established the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) in 2005.<sup>253</sup> Through START, Canada deploys expert civilian personnel in fragile states to build peace and security, support long-term resilience and offer assistance during natural disasters and assist in transitional justice and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. These activities entail assisting in infrastructure development, strengthening juridical and governance systems and aiding in the training of local police and military forces.<sup>254</sup>

The current priority regions of START are Columbia, Guatemala, Haiti, Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the West Bank. Since 2009, Canadian civilian experts have:

- Helped to facilitate disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes for ex-combatants in Columbia;
- Helped to develop the rule of law to protect the rights of vulnerable populations in Guatemala;
- Provided more than \$80 million for stabilization projects in Haiti;
- Helped to train the Afghan National Forces and build peace by facilitating intrastate and regional diplomacy;
- Supported the three UN missions in Sudan and South Sudan (UNAMID, UNMISS and UNISFA);
- Taken a leading role in post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Congo, training local police and armed forces, strengthening the government's capacity for resource management, assisting in the mediation of land disputes and working to prevent child exploitation and gender-based violence; and
- Helped in the Middle-East Peace Process by strengthening the capacity of Palestinian Security Forces through training and improving coordination and planning capabilities.<sup>255</sup>

As global trends indicate, instability is likely to pose greater, and perhaps more numerous, challenges in the years to come. The impacts of climate change have the

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<sup>252</sup> US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles For Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 1.

<sup>253</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "About the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force." START is funded by the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF), a component of the DFATD, which, based on the 2011/2012 fiscal year, amounted to \$149.9 million.

<sup>254</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "What we Work On."

<sup>255</sup> Government of Canada, DFATD, "Where we Work."

potential to exacerbate existing social and economic tensions, especially in regions of the developing world.

START has been a successful initiative and it is recommended that Canada enhance the capabilities of the task force. Given Canada's expertise in peacekeeping, police and military training, nation building and diplomacy, a stabilization initiative like START can be one of Canada's main contributions to international peace and security. With new military capabilities, Canada can fill in the rapid deployment void with a more robust START and put military, diplomatic and expert civilian personnel in place after the first few weeks of conflict. To develop this stabilization specialty, it is recommended that the government:

- Increase the military budget to meet the 2% of GDP required by NATO membership. This would ensure that Canada has the necessary capabilities to engage in robust operations;
- Increase the budget of START;
- Increase coordination with key partners, including the Stabilization Unit (UK), the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (US) and Civilian Response Teams (EU);
- Increase coordination with international and regional organizations, including the UN and UN Peacebuilding Commission, NATO and the African Union.

This specialty can be a part of Canada's international security strategy post-Afghanistan. This addition also has considerable benefits:

- Participation in stabilization missions would support peacekeeping operations as it becomes the tool of choice for protecting civilians and could help to strengthen the mandate.
- These missions provide Canada with an opportunity to engage with the top contributors of police and peacekeeping forces from the global south. This can help to foster stronger political and security ties.
- These missions also support Canada's advocacy for the development of a UN Emergency Peace Service as a part of the Sustainable Security Agenda.



## Sample Campaign Statement: Responding Responsibly

*The Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) is Canada's response to failing and threatened states, providing military, diplomatic and civilian support. START is funded through the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) managed by Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, receiving \$149.9 million in 2011/2012.*

*Canada is actively working to maintain the military capabilities necessary to support START through the purchase of new ships and helicopters and the maintenance of existing assets like heavy-lift planes. This work will continue in the future under the current Department of Defense budget structure.*

*Canada will continue the growth of the START program by adding incrementally to the GPSF, and by refocusing development funding directed towards Afghanistan over the last decade towards other failing states.*

### 2.3 THE DISASTER ASSISTANCE RESPONSE TEAM (DART)

The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) is a multidisciplinary military organization that is designed to deploy on short notice anywhere in the world in response to situations ranging from natural disasters to extreme humanitarian emergencies. It is deployed only by formal request from the affected country or the UN. DART is deployed for up to 40 days to bridge the gap until national and international aid agencies provide relief support. DART is comprised of over 200 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel, including a medical platoon, a basic engineering platoon, a logistics platoon and a defense and security platoon.<sup>256</sup> These multidisciplinary professionals are trained to support in three areas of critical need: the provision of safe drinking water, non-surgical medical care and engineering help. Since it is only a small organization, the team receives less funding than any other unit in the CAF, with an annual budget of only \$500,000.<sup>257</sup>

DART was created after the deployment of two Canadian field ambulances to Rwanda in 1994, in response to a massive cholera epidemic throughout the refugee camps. As the team arrived after the peak of the outbreak, the Canadian government recognized the need for a rapid-response capability unit to supplement Canada's commitment to emergency relief operations. Since Rwanda, DART has been deployed to Honduras (1998), Turkey (1999), Sri Lanka (2005), Pakistan (2005), Haiti (2010) and the Philippines

<sup>256</sup> DFATD, "Where we Work."

<sup>257</sup> CBC News, "Disater Relief: Canada's Rapid Response Team." *CBC News*, January 13, 2010.

(2013).<sup>258</sup> DART reinforces Canada’s commitment to human security and the provision of humanitarian aid.

It is recommended that the government enhance DART’s rapid deployment capabilities to more effectively respond to future humanitarian disasters. This measure is a cost-effective initiative because DART’s deployment capabilities can prove to be useful if coordinated with START and UN peace operations. It would support the development of the proposed stabilization specialty.

#### Sample Campaign Statement: DART

*Canada's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), founded following actions in Rwanda in 1994, addresses issues of human security by providing humanitarian aid. Since 1994, DART has been deployed to the Honduras (1998), Turkey (1999), Sri Lanka (2005), Pakistan (2005), Haiti (2010) and the Philippines (2013). Through DART, Canada is able to assist in the stabilization of crises' at multiple stages, beginning with initial response services before long-term government and aid agencies arrive.*

*In accordance with the changing mission and gradual purchase of DART-related assets by the CAF, Canada will continue to improve DART in terms of its size and capabilities in rapid deployment. Most importantly, DART's global engagement with other international and state bodies opens opportunities for increased multilateral action in the hopes of further contributing to global security.*

## 2.4 CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES

Historically, Canada has been active in international environmental negotiations. Canada played a major role in creating the normative frameworks for many environmental bodies and conventions, including the UN Environmental Programme and the Montreal Protocol. Canada’s climate change policy, however, can be characterized by a series of ambitious, but unfulfilled commitments. For example, in ratifying the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, an international binding agreement under which industrialized countries agreed to reduce their collective greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 5.2% by 1990 levels, Canada undertook perhaps the most ambitious commitment among all parties. Although it was only required to reduce its emissions by 6% below 1990 level between 2008 and 2012, policy-makers understood that in order to comply they would need to ensure a 30% reduction below

<sup>258</sup> Department of National Defence, “The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART).”

projected GHG emissions by 2010.<sup>259</sup> However, by 2009, Canada's emissions were 17% greater than in 1990.<sup>260</sup>

This trend has continued under the current government, which has not halted Canada's emissions growth nor attempted to deliver reductions in GHGs. This is made clear by the current climate policy, outlined in the 2008 Turning the Corner report, which calls for a reduction in greenhouse gases by 20% compared to 2006 levels by 2020 (this is equivalent to 3% when compared to 1990 levels).<sup>261</sup> In addition, Canada is the only country to leave the Kyoto Protocol and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification. Furthermore, the promulgation of the C-38 Omnibus Bill for the Jobs, Growth and Prosperity Act allows the federal government to overlook the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. This allows the current government to make changes to environmental policies and initiate projects with potential negative ecological consequences without environmental risk assessment.

The current government has created some programs to help achieve real reductions in GHG emissions, while maintaining a strong oil sector, such as the ecoACTION and ecoENERGY initiatives. These two initiatives are a combination of research, development and demonstration programs that seek to find more efficient and clean ways to produce energy.<sup>262</sup> While this may be a step in the right direction, greater effort is required to develop Canada's climate change policy.

Climate change is the one of the most pressing contemporary issues. The consequences of climate change are numerous and include: water scarcity; decline in food production from the disruption of agriculture; rising sea levels and inundated coastal zones; disappearance of sea-ice; accelerated terrestrial and marine species extinction; and massive waves of environmentally-induced migration. Moreover, the potential economic consequences of climate change are overwhelming. According to the 2007 Stern Report, under a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, climate change can reduce global GDP 5-20% annually.<sup>263</sup> In 2009, the World Bank concluded that the cost of climate change between 2010 and 2050 is in the range of US\$70-100 billion a year.<sup>264</sup> The cost of mitigating

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<sup>259</sup> Harrison, Kathryn, "The Struggle of Ideas: Ideas and Self-Interest in Canadian Foreign Policy" in *Global Common Problems, Domestic Decisions: The Comparative Politics of Climate Change* ed. Kathryn Harrison Lisa McIntosh Sundstorm (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010), 169.

<sup>260</sup> Environment Canada, "National Inventory Report 1990-2009: Executive Summary."

<sup>261</sup> Harrison, "The Struggle of Ideas," 187.

<sup>262</sup> Government of Canada, Natural Resources Canada, "ecoACTION."

<sup>263</sup> Stern, N. *The Economics of Climate Change*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2007), X.

<sup>264</sup> Narain, Urvashi, Sergio Margulis, and Timothy Essam, "Estimating Costs of Adaptation to Climate Change," *Climate Policy* 11 (3): 1007.



greenhouse gas emissions is estimated to be between US\$10-200 billion a year.<sup>265</sup> These consequences will have a direct impact on Canada's economic stability and national well-being.

As a northern nation, addressing climate change is important for Canadian security. Climate change poses a threat to: the Arctic, prairie soils, fisheries, forests, shorelines and urban areas. Given that Canada is a primary resource-exporting nation, it requires a healthy resource base. This campaign recommends that the government make a concerted effort to enhance its climate change policy. These efforts include:

- Setting concrete emissions targets. Abandoning the intensity-based approach to emissions reduction in favour of real emissions targets. Intensity-based reductions cannot be integrated into carbon markets because they are set up to buy and sell true reductions.
- Engaging the private sector to develop clean and renewable energy sources.
- Investing in clean energy programs like as ecoACTION and ecoENERGY.
- Continuing to invest in carbon capture and storage technology. For example, Alberta has invested \$2 billion in carbon capture and storage projects in 2008 with the goal of reducing emissions by 2.76 million tons annually by 2015.
- Providing more funding for climate change research.
- Playing a more active and constructive role in climate change negotiations. This includes facilitating the adoption of the new international environmental treaty at the 2015 Paris Summit.<sup>266</sup>

Developing a robust climate change policy will benefit Canada in a number of ways. Investing in alternative and renewable energy has the potential to produce hundreds of thousands of new jobs, diversify Canada's economy and reduce its image as a detrimental global environmental actor. At the political level, climate change is a top priority for many countries, especially developing countries. By playing a constructive role in climate negotiations, Canada will foster closer ties with states most affected by the impacts of climate change. Lastly, environmental security is a fundamental component of the Sustainable Security Agenda. It is therefore crucial for Canada to revise its climate change policies, assist in finding viable solutions to global environmental problems and work toward becoming an active and constructive member in international climate change negotiations.

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<sup>265</sup> Robert T. Watson and Andre R. Aquino, "The Road Forward." in *Climate Change Science and Policy*, ed. Stephen H. Schneider, Armin Rosencranz, Michael D. Mastrandrea, and Kistin Kunta-Duriseti, (Washington: Island Press, 2010), 428-429.

<sup>266</sup>Government of Alberta, Alberta Energy. Key Initiatives. Carbon Capture and Storage. Edmonton, Alberta, 2008.

## Sample Campaign Statement: Climate Change

*Canada understands the immediate and long-term threats of climate change and environmental degradation. Canada also recognizes how climate change will directly affect the UNSC in the coming years when it becomes increasingly difficult to protect borders against the influx of environmental refugees.*

*Currently, Canada engages actively in several international environmental agreements such as the Montreal Protocol, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity. Domestically, Canada has also initiated test projects for carbon capture and storage in the Alberta oil fields.*

*Canada will:*

- *Enhance its activity in international environmental negotiations;*
- *Promote the use of innovative and technology-driven solutions to global environmental problems through increasing investments in CSS and various clean energy projects; and*
- *Promote greater research in the development of clean energy projects for developing countries.*

## 2.5 INFORMATION, TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE TRANSFER (ITS)

The new and vexing transnational problems posed by climate change, resource conflicts and pandemic disease are rooted in science and driven by technology. Likewise, their solutions require research, collaboration and information, technology and science transfer (ITS). The latest State of Science and Technology in Canada identified key clusters of Canadian science and technology strengths as judged against international standards:

- Clinical Medicine;
- Anatomy and Morphology;
- Business and Management;
- Dermatology and Venereal Diseases;
- General and Internal Medicine; and
- Information and Communication Technologies (ICT).<sup>267</sup>

The Canadian government continues to support private sector growth in these areas through the Economic Action Plan (EAP) initiatives, but can do more to ensure that Canada

<sup>267</sup>Science, Technology, and Innovation Council. "State of the Nation: Canada's Science, Technology, and Innovation System: Aspiring to Global Leadership." *Science, Technology, and Innovation Council*, 2013.

retains its competitive advantage. Moreover, Canada is in a position to capitalize on its leadership in these fields in support of the global development agenda.

With the majority of Canada wired to the World Wide Web, Canadians have made important contributions in the creation and proliferation of e-health, e-commerce, e-government, online banking and online education tools.<sup>268</sup> Canada has become a leader in digital technology, and has used this position to both benefit economically and generate economic prosperity. For example, Datawind builds tablets and sells them to Indian schools for \$37. Sierra Wireless is one of the first companies to bring mobile devices to emerging markets and now provides devices to customers in 130 countries. Sendum Wireless has created low-cost GPS technologies that improve the transportation of food and pharmaceuticals. Canadian telecommunications companies have contributed to the development of mobile technologies for long distance communication between patient data and patient treatment.<sup>269</sup> By facilitating the production of high tech products, Canada continues to offer affordable and reliable solutions to global development goals.

The Information Technology Association of Canada (ITAC) represents Canadian information and communication technology companies. By strategically utilizing and implementing technological developments in the Canadian economy, Canada's innovative capacity has grown and opportunities have emerged for increased productivity and efficiency in the marketplace. ITAC is comprised of more than 30,000 businesses and is responsible for creating \$155 billion in revenues. It contributes \$67.2 billion to the Canadian GDP and generates more than 500,000 jobs.<sup>270</sup>

Canada can work with emerging markets by focusing on technological innovations, research and training partnerships in order to promote global economic prosperity. The goal is to encourage technological initiatives that create stable markets which foster growth, development and strong partnerships. Canada can and should assist in bridging the digital divide by providing various states with greater access to innovative technologies and infrastructure, such as machine-to-machine technology that enable socio-economic development abroad. Canadian private sector companies have already done a lot to bridge the gap in information technologies between the developed and the developing world. For example, low cost computers have been developed to assist in bringing healthcare information to those who previously did not have the means to do so.<sup>271</sup> This campaign recommends that Canada continue to increase its information technology partnerships in emerging markets.

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<sup>268</sup> ITAC, "Canada's Network Infrastructure: Connection us, coast to coast to coast."

<sup>269</sup> Canadian Academy of Health Science, "Canadians Making a Difference," *Canadian Academy of Health Sciences* (2011): 23.

<sup>270</sup> Canadian Academy of Health Science, "Canadians Making a Difference," 23.

<sup>271</sup> Canadian Academy of Health Science, "Canadians Making a Difference."



Certain risks associated with these initiatives include economic crashes and falling behind in the quickly changing science and technology sectors. One recent change that is worth noting is the power that the National Security Agency (NSA) possesses over U.S. companies. As a strong advocate of cloud computing, Canada is attempting to attract major companies to store their data in Canada. Canadian companies have the capacity to provide greater security to companies seeking to keep important data out of the hands of the U.S. government. As it is harder to protect individual and corporate privacy in the twenty-first century, Canada can utilize this industry to build a secure and appealing marketplace for large corporations.

In fitting with current Canadian priorities, initiatives such as these will expand and diversify commercial relationships and allow for further access to emerging global markets. Pursuing innovations in information technology is fundamental for economic growth in Canada. According to the EAP 2013, one priority is “the consolidation and standardization of software procurement for end-user devices for federal employees, resulting in annual savings of \$8.7 million beginning in 2014–15.”<sup>272</sup> Canada can save millions of dollars by consolidating and standardizing software procurement.

There are many benefits to an approach that projects Canada’s comparative advantage in ITS into its foreign policy:

- It appeals the majority of the global population—the five billion people of the developing world, which comprise the bulk of the UNGA;
- It reinforces existing trade relations and builds new networks in emerging economies;
- It fosters diplomacy—science has a shared culture that is understood universally; and
- It contributes to the international community’s Millennium Development Goals (MGDs).

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<sup>272</sup> DFATD, “Government Information Technology.”

## Sample Campaign Statement: Information, Technology, Science Transfer

*Canada has fostered private sector growth in the innovative technology sector. Government issued grants have enabled the creation of high risk, high reward products that have changed the manner of tackling development goals abroad. The infrastructure of Canadian information technology systems have enabled economic growth and can serve as an example for nations attempting to develop similar infrastructures.*

*Currently, Canada's private sector is being encouraged to further engage with various international organizations that seek to find innovative and efficient solutions to global development issues. Canadian initiatives, such as mobile health care and educational technologies, have helped to facilitate the betterment of human security worldwide.*

*Canadian companies will continue to engage with international organizations to help facilitate development goals abroad. Canada will also focus on developing cloud computing services that will offer a newfound form of cross-border cyber security. In time, Canada hopes to play a substantial role in the global efforts to eradicate the digital divide.*

## 2.6 KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY

Knowledge shared across borders can lead to social and economic innovation on both sides that resonate strongly with the ideas of pluralism and collaborative innovation. To this end, Canada has developed the EAP, which advocates the value of a knowledge-based economy (KBE). The success of a KBE is a reflection of the need to invest in education, and Canada has stepped forward as an international educator, with international students spending \$8.0 billion in Canada.<sup>273</sup> When the value of educational services provided in Canada to international students is compared to the

% of Canadian Imports That Countries on Education	
Country	% Spent on Education
Saudi Arabia	44%
India	27.9%
South Korea	19.1%
France	14.2%
China	13.9%

<sup>273</sup> DFATD, "Economic Impact of International Education."

value of the more traditional goods that Canada exports, the impact for some countries is even more striking.<sup>274</sup>

Canada is focused on building an economy in which ideas and innovation go hand in hand with job creation and economic growth. This is an idea with international appeal. The Edu-Canada initiative, a pilot program launched in 2007 by DFATD as part of the Global Commerce Strategy, has been successful in achieving many of its program objectives. The Imagine Education in Canada brand was created in partnership with the provinces and territories through the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada (CMEC), to reach a better understanding of existing quality-assurance mechanisms for international students.

A plan was released in June 2011 called *Bringing the World to Canada: An International Education Marketing Action Plan for Provinces and Territories*.<sup>275</sup> This plan advocates for better coordination between provinces and territories and closer collaboration with the federal government (DFATD and Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC]) to attract a larger number of international students to Canada and to create more opportunities for Canadian students to study abroad. Under this plan, numerous provinces contribute significant marketing funds to international education and are developing more fulsome international education strategies; one of which is British Columbia's International Education Strategy. In addition, associations such as the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC), the Association of Canadian Community Colleges (ACCC) and the Canadian Bureau for International Education (CBIE) have been actively supporting their member institutions to prepare them for the international market and assist them in developing relationships with institutions in priority markets. However, the institutions themselves have shown the greatest investment by maintaining long-term marketing initiatives, foreign representatives and offices, and by developing partnerships with foreign institutions that support joint research and education.

Canada's International Education Strategy calls for a set of recommendations categorized into five themes.<sup>276</sup> First, *target for success* focuses on the growth of international student numbers, as well as an increase in international study abroad opportunities for Canadian students. Second, *policy coordination and ensuring sustainable quality* is one of the greatest challenges in the promotion of international education. It requires coordinating the efforts of various partners and stakeholders. Third, *promotion of education in Canada* explores the practical issues related to education promotion efforts, including selecting priority markets in which to focus Canada's efforts, honing Canada's

<sup>274</sup> DFATD, "Economic Impact of International Education."

<sup>275</sup> Provincial and Territorial Ministers of Education and of Immigration, "Bringing the World to Canada: An International Education Marketing Action Plan for Provinces and Territories," June 2011.

<sup>276</sup> DFATD, "International Education: A Key Driver of Canada's Future Prosperity."

brand and ensuring Canada is effective and successful in its usage of new media. Fourth, *investments* examine the need to be strategic in how Canada packages its scholarship offerings. As the strategy seeks to attract top talent, Canada must be competitive in recruiting the best and brightest international students. Scholarships are a key means to promote Canada's culture of excellence. Lastly, *infrastructure and support* sheds light on the promotional efforts that must occur in alignment with the issuing of visas allowing study in Canada.

This campaign recommends that Canada continue to play an active role in shaping today's global knowledge society. A current vision for 2017 calls for a Canada that is known as the "Northern Tiger" due to Canadian prowess in productivity and innovation. Canada looks forth to building a KBE, an economy directly based on the production, distribution and use of knowledge and information.

#### Sample Campaign Statement: Spreading the Knowledge

*Canada has a role to play in the proliferation of knowledge around the world through education initiatives like Edu-Canada and the International Education Strategy, becoming a "Northern Tiger" and sharing a well-earned wealth of experience in productivity and innovation. Canada is focused on building an economy in which ideas and innovation go hand in hand with job creation and economic growth. The spread of knowledge to global partners is fundamental in the sustainability of this growth.*

*Through non-governmental partners such as universities, colleges and teacher's associations, Canada can connect with a number of nations to share expertise and ideas.*

## 2.7 DEVELOPMENT

As a part of Canada's Aid Effectiveness Agenda, the Harper government announced that DFATD would focus 80% of its bilateral aid on 20 countries.<sup>277</sup> The countries of focus are from five regions: The Americas (Bolivia, Caribbean Regional Program, Columbia, Haiti, Honduras and Peru); Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan and Vietnam); Eastern Europe (Ukraine); North Africa and the Middle East (West Bank and Gaza); and Sub-Saharan Africa (Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Sudan, South Sudan and Tanzania). These countries were selected using three criteria: (1) need; (2) ability to benefit from Canadian assistance; and (3) alignment with Canadian foreign policy.<sup>278</sup> In

<sup>277</sup> DFATD "CIDA's Aid Effectiveness Action Plan (2009-2012)."

<sup>278</sup> DFATD "CIDA's Aid Effectiveness Action Plan (2009-2012)."

addition, the Official Development Assistance Accountability Act (ODA AA), which came into force in June 2008, ensures that all Canada's Official Development Assistance (ODA) focuses directly on poverty reduction and is consistent with Canadian values.<sup>279</sup> In addition to bilateral aid, Canada works with 18 key multilateral organizations and institutions, including the United Nations World Fund Programme (Canada is its' third largest donor at \$366 million as of March 2014), to address international humanitarian needs and development challenges.<sup>280</sup>

As of 2012, Canada is the sixth largest donor of international aid in the world, delivering \$5.65 billion in aid.<sup>281</sup> Of this aid, an estimated 40% is directed to the African states, with an increase of over 15% since the 2000-2001 fiscal year.<sup>282</sup> Currently Canada's ODA ratio is 0.32%, remaining short of the 0.7% target, but is a 0.07% increase since 2000.<sup>283</sup>

As a part of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda, the Canadian government has committed itself to aid accountability and transparency. Since 2011, the government has participated in various aid transparency partnerships, including the International Aid Transparency Initiative and the Open Government Partnership, and has launched an Open Data website, a public online source that has up-to-date statistical reports on Canadian and international development aid.<sup>284</sup> Canada has made significant improvement in terms of aid transparency. As of 2013, Canada ranked eighth out of 67 donor countries and organizations, up from 32<sup>nd</sup> in 2012.<sup>285</sup>

Canada's development policy is centered on three crosscutting themes: increasing environmental sustainability, advancing gender equality and helping strengthen governance institutions.<sup>286</sup> These three themes represent three policy focus areas.

### **INCREASING FOOD SECURITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES**

Canada's food aid strategy focuses on food assistance, nutrition, sustainable agricultural development and research and development. To maximize the value of Canada's international assistance, the government decided to untie all food aid in 2008, 50% of which had previously been tied and all other goods and services delivered through Canadian aid programs in 2013, a third of which had also been tied. In 2009-2010, Canada

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<sup>279</sup> DFATD, "The Official Development Assistance Accountability Act."

<sup>280</sup> DFATD, "Key Partners."

<sup>281</sup> DFATD, "Statistical Report on International Assistance 2011-2012."

<sup>282</sup> DFATD, "Statistical Report on International Assistance 2011-2012."

<sup>283</sup> DFATD, "Statistical Report on International Assistance 2011-2012."

<sup>284</sup> DFATD, "Open Data."

<sup>285</sup> DFATD, "Canada Recognized for its Aid Transparency and Accountability."

<sup>286</sup> DFATD, "Aid Effectiveness Agenda."

provided \$330 million in funding for food assistance, funded over 70 international development projects having a nutrition component in 78 countries and contributed \$1.18 billion for sustainable agricultural development.<sup>287</sup> In addition, the government has supported research on national and regional agricultural systems in developing countries such as the Canadian International Food Security Fund.<sup>288</sup>

Canada has been a prominent international actor in initiatives focused on food security. Canada was the first G8 country to meet its L'Aquila Summit commitment and disburse \$1.18 billion for sustainable agricultural development.<sup>289</sup> Most recently, Canada chaired the negotiations leading to the Food Assistance Convention, which defines the global rules for food assistance by major donors. It is the only international legal agreement that requires members to provide a minimum amount of food assistance, demonstrating an important commitment among donor states in addressing world hunger.<sup>290</sup>

### **SECURE THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES**

Improving the health of mothers, children and youth and reducing the number of preventable deaths are central to Canada's international development policy. In November 2010, as part of its G8 presidency, Canada led negotiations on the Muskoka Initiative for the improvement of maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH).<sup>291</sup> Under the programme, countries committed a total of \$7.3 billion to mobilize global action to reduce maternal and infant mortality in developing countries. Canada agreed to contribute \$2.85 billion to the Muskoka Initiative. In addition, the government launched the Muskoka Partnership Program, which mobilizes and coordinates the efforts of 28 Canadian organizations with multilateral institutions to reduce maternal, newborn and child mortality rates over the next three years in order to strengthen health services at the community level, improve nutrition and reduce leading diseases and illnesses.

### **STIMULATE SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES**

The government has developed a sustainable economic growth strategy to assist developing countries in building a secure foundation for economic growth; support the growth of competitive and productive micro, small and medium enterprises; and invest in employment potential through skills development and training.<sup>292</sup> Twelve of the 20 countries of focus have sustainable economic growth as a focus in their country's

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<sup>287</sup> DFATD, "Aid Effectiveness Agenda."

<sup>288</sup> DFATD, "Aid Effectiveness Agenda."

<sup>289</sup> DFATD, "Canada's G8 2009 L'Aquila Commitment for Sustainable Agricultural Development."

<sup>290</sup> *Food Assistance Convention*, London 25 April 2012, C.N.215.2012,

<sup>291</sup> DFATD, "Maternal, Newborn, and Child Health."

<sup>292</sup> DFATD, "CIDA's Sustainable Economic Growth Strategy."



strategies: the Caribbean Region, West Bank Gaza, Indonesia, Tanzania, Bangladesh, Mozambique, Vietnam, Bolivia, Columbia, Ukraine and Peru. In 2009-2010, the government disbursed \$741.4 million (22.3% of total aid) for implementing the sustainable economic growth strategy. More than 30% of this was given to four of these twelve countries (Haiti and Afghanistan were also included).<sup>293</sup> A recent review of the former CIDA's bilateral engagement indicated that Canada's commercial interests are key considerations when selecting which developing countries should receive aid.<sup>294</sup> The country-specific details of the report, outlining economic priorities of the country and opportunities for Canadian investment, coincide with the second category of the recent white paper, the *Global Markets Action Plan*.<sup>295</sup>

Canada's current approach to development emphasizes Aid Effectiveness—an objective consistent with global priorities surrounding development assistance (as demonstrated by the 2005 Paris Declaration). This approach can be refined to contribute more effectively to global development priorities while simultaneously serving Canadian interests. This campaign proposes:

- A legally enshrined development framework that establishes long-term development objectives which are clear and measurable and distinguishes these objectives from commercial interests;
- A desk under DFATD that addresses the issue of policy coherence.

A further concern with regards to Canada's current aid effectiveness agenda is the issue of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). PCD refers to: recognizing that non-development policies often have a greater impact on development outcomes than direct aid.<sup>296</sup> The Paris Declaration of 2005 attests to the growing significance of enhancing policy coherence for development among DAC member countries. The summit's principles'—widely endorsed by the UNDP, World Bank and the European Commission—focus on enhancing the efficacy of aid through strengthening collaboration among DAC member countries and streamlining development policy to make it more accountable and transparent. Canada's current Aid Effectiveness Agenda falls short in effectively addressing

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<sup>293</sup> Tomlinson, Brian, and Fraser Reilly-King, "The Elusive Quest for Pro-poor Growth?: An Analysis of CIDA's Sustainable Economic Growth Strategy." *CCIC Discussion Paper*, December 2011, 6.

<sup>294</sup> Mackrael, Kim, "Read Government country-by-country report on who should receive foreign aid, *Globe and Mail*, January 10, 2014.

<sup>295</sup> DFATD, "Global Markets Action Plan."

<sup>296</sup> Anni-Claudine Bulles and Shannon Kindornay, "Beyond Aid: A Plan for Canada's International Cooperation," *The North-South Institute*, May 2013, 5

the issue of PCD as it only addresses a small portion of Canada’s engagement with the developing world: aid.<sup>297</sup>

To facilitate PCD it is recommended that the government create a specific body to achieve this purpose. This body would coordinate Canada’s Development Department and the various branches of foreign policy to enhance the efficacy of Canadian development aid. Effectively implementing a PCD department would entail including the notion of PCD as a clause in the aforementioned development framework. PCD would thus become a legal obligation further enhancing accountability. Furthermore, a PCD department offers the opportunity for multinational collaboration with various governments to contribute to a more coherent development policy at the global level contributing to a full implementation of the Paris Principles.

All things considered, these policy recommendations will provide Canada with a more robust and balanced international policy. They enhance Canada’s technical capabilities and entrepreneurial capacities; prepare Canada for the uncertainty and challenges of the twenty-first century; and ensure that Canada has the capacity to shoulder its responsibilities for the management of international affairs. These policies will maximize Canada’s hard and soft power strategies and enable Canada to pursue a smart power approach to international relations. These policy recommendations also offer a selection of possible specialties Canada can focus on, and the ways in which to do so, so that it can re-take a collaborative leadership role in the world. Lastly, these policy recommendations support Canada’s United Nations Security Council campaign and its platform: the Sustainable Security Agenda.

#### Sample Campaign Statement: Development

*Canada recognizes that development is a central issue in addressing the root causes of insecurity. As a result, Canada has demonstrated a strong commitment to its development priorities. By applying an interdisciplinary approach, Canada has utilized the private sector as well as civil society in achieving its various development priorities. Canada’s emphasis on Aid Effectiveness channels aid in a manner that maximizes efficacy, thus delivering impactful results in developing nations. Notable achievements of Canada’s development policy include:*

- *Being the first country to meet its L’Aquila Summit commitment of disbursing 1.18 billion dollars for sustainable agricultural development;*
- *Ensuring vitamin A supplementation to 9.3 million children aged 6-59 months through the Micronutrient Initiative; and*

<sup>297</sup> Bulles and Kindornay, “Beyond Aid,” 5.

- *Its role as a founding member and largest contributor to the Pneumococcal Advance Market Commitment, an initiative that has immunized over 10 million children in 30 countries, thus averting over 500,000 Pneumonia-related deaths.*

*Canada seeks to advance its current role in development by building upon its Aid Effectiveness agenda. This involves enhanced Policy Collaboration for Development (PCD) at the national and trans-national level, as well as measures that increase the accountability of Canadian Development Assistance. Canada is certain that concerted global action can deliver long-term results in addressing the root causes of insecurity.*

## 2.8 BRIDGING THE GAP

As a means of garnering support from all states, big and small, Canada should move away from branding itself as a country "representing the small and medium powers of the world." It should instead use its reputation as a valued and respected state to represent itself as a country seeking to "bridge the gap between small and large states", acting as a middle ground instead of a middle power. This position allows Canada to engage equally with small and large states, and places it in a position in which it can always be aware and informed of the various standpoints that exist among UN member states. This image of a bridge allows Canada to straddle the space between small and large states, without siding with one or the other. It also allows Canada to coordinate the interests of all states and places it in a position to help ensure that the concerns of all are heard and understood.

Sample Campaign Statement: Bridging the Gap between Small and Large States

*Understanding the chasm which can arise between small and large powers in the United Nations, Canada is committed to impart upon the UNSC a multi-perspective approach for every security concern. Respected and endeared by larger and small powers, Canada is well situated historically and contemporarily to connect the world in this manner. Altogether, Canada's integrated approach to security accounts for diverse standpoints, allowing for a more dynamic United Nations and Security Council.*

## 2.9 CANADA'S OBJECTIVES ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Canada will use its term on the United Nations Security Council to explore the ways of working with the international community to address long-term challenges to

international peace and security. Canada aims to build upon its previous contributions to global governance and advance the Sustainable Security Agenda. This agenda seeks to consolidate the growing consensus among member states that security and development are interdependent and require a multi-dimensional solution. With this agenda, Canada has a number of objectives that it will bring to the Security Council.

### ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Over the years the UNSC has become increasingly more engaged on both a global and regional scale. Despite its' activity, the Security Council is often described as a reactive body. However, it must seek to become a more proactive body. Canada will therefore bring attention to and promote activity in the following fields:

- **Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding:** Canada recognizes that peacekeeping has been the core function of the United Nations. To meet current and future challenges to building a sustainable peace, peace operations must have a clear strategy and direction, as well as cohesive mission planning. They must also respond responsibly and effectively and have faster deployment. Canada will continue to work with the Security Council, other member states and relevant stakeholders to implement the recommended reforms outlined in the New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping. Canada will specifically look to develop a framework for a United Nations Emergency Peace Service, a rapidly deployable first-responder designed to assist in preventing conflict and threats to human security and human rights. It would also offer secure emergency services to meet critical human needs, maintain or reinstate law, order and legitimate judicial processes with high fairness and equality and initiate peacebuilding processes. Canada will seek to better integrate peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations so that the root causes of conflict and instability can be addressed early on.
- **Disarmament:** Canada recognizes that there is an inseparable relationship between the enhancement of international peacekeeping and the scaling down of national armaments. Canada will bring greater attention to increased global militarization, specifically to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the trade of small arms. Canada will engage with UNSC members and all relevant stakeholders to devise strategies to reduce the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and small arms; support effective compliance and verification mechanisms; and widen peace-building and conflict prevention policies to include this issue.
- **Climate Change:** Canada will bring attention to the inherent implications of climate change to international peace and security. Climate change is a threat multiplier with the potential to escalate existing conflicts and create new conflicts, especially as food, water and arable land become increasingly scarce.

- **Development and Women:** Canada will also address other important non-conventional security issues, including development and gender inequality. Canada will promote the post-2015 development agenda, the fight against poverty and sustainable development in order to eradicate the root causes of conflict and not simply react to break outs of conflict. In addition, Canada will continue its strong commitment to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. Gender equality and the full participation of women in peacebuilding are essential elements to ensure sustainable security and stability.

### **COLLABORATION AND COALITION BUILDING**

The demands of international peace and security require global collaboration. Canada will work with like-minded states and groups, and consult with a broad range of actors, to advance the Sustainable Security Agenda. Canada will advocate for ways in which the United Nations Security Council can better coordinate their activities with the General Assembly and regional and sub-regional organizations. It will work to facilitate coalition building through meetings, seminars and forums to enable network organizations and member states to express their concerns and explore ways of working together toward sustainable security.

### **TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND INCLUSION**

Canada will support a more effective and responsive Security Council with improved working methods and a greater inclusion of relevant parties for specific issues. With its position on the Security Council, Canada will:

- Advocate for more open meetings;
- Promote the need for more extensive briefings to non-members and the media;
- Encourage non-members to the Security Council to contribute to informal Security Council meetings;
- Seek better coordination between the General Assembly, regional and sub-regional organizations to achieve regional solutions to regional problems;
- Draw more systematically on non-governmental organizations and on global civil society;
- Assist in bringing those who are affected by crises, those who have expertise in this area, or those who have worked directly with the affected communities into the decision-making process; and
- Work toward ensuring that countries and peoples affected by Security Council decisions are included in the decision-making processes.

Canada has demonstrated strong and creative leadership in its previous terms on the Security Council and this active engagement has proven valuable for Canada and for others. Canada has always brought a unique perspective and an open-mind to all forums and has given constructive feedback on issues pertaining to international peace and security. Canada understands that the United Nations needs a Security Council that is attentive and responsive to the broader wishes of its member states. Canada seeks to ensure that the UN has the capacity to take decisive and rapid action when it comes to dealing with global crises. Canada has the capacity to make a difference: as an effective smart power with global influence, as a bridge between small-medium powers and large powers and as nation dedicated to the ideals of the United Nations.

## 3.0 CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN

### 3.1 TIMELINE OVERVIEW

Given Canada's prior engagement with JUSCANZ, in addition to a need to refocus certain aspects of its foreign policy and close the current credibility gap, this campaign proposes 2024 as an ideal date for Canada to run for a UNSC seat. Moreover, running in 2024 will give Canada ample opportunity to publicize its campaign.

This section outlines a timeline for the campaign over the next ten years. In addition to providing a rough timeline of activities, it addresses important strategies to consider throughout the campaign process. The timeframe is divided into three overlapping stages: an initial stage, a middle stage and a final stage.

### 3.2 THE INITIAL STAGE (2015-2017)

#### DECLARATION OF CANDIDACY

Canada should declare its candidature in 2015. Given the policy recommendations mentioned in section 2.1, an early start will ensure that these recommendations can be fully developed by the time of the election. Furthermore, an early declaration provides Canada with time to plan and execute an effective campaign. It provides Canada with ample time to consolidate domestic support, provide for greater opportunities to have its Sustainable Security Agenda platform heard and garner support in multilateral forums.



## CONSOLIDATING SUPPORT AND PUBLICIZING THE CAMPAIGN

The Canadian government should first inform the Canadian public about its decision to run. It should engage the Canadian population through various publicity events and initiatives that explain why a seat on the UNSC is important to Canada. The government needs to articulate how the seat will benefit Canada on the world stage and how it will further Canada's relationship with the United Nations. In addition, Canada should consult with its various stakeholders (private sector, non-governmental organizations and government institutions) to begin working on the practical and logistical issues associated with the policy recommendations.<sup>298</sup>

The initial stage involves extensive promotion. The first recommendation this campaign recommends is the utilization of various forms of public diplomacy to spread awareness.<sup>299</sup> These could include:

- An official website dedicated to the campaign complete with a logo and slogan (Bridging the Gaps, Connecting the World);
- A twitter account that offers the opportunity for the public to interact with government officials and is frequently updated (@CAN4UNSC);
- Discussion about the campaign in Canadian news outlets (CBC and CTV);
- A hashtag with an embedded link to the government's website (#WECAN); and
- A Facebook page.

Digital diplomacy provides a cost-effective and modern method of engaging the public during the campaign process. It provides opportunities to shape and facilitate public discussion that is channeled through social media, correct any errors of fact and interpretation in real-time and build networks abroad and at home. It allows Canadians or others following the UNSC election to participate in the promotion of the campaign. Additionally, these forums ensure that information regarding the campaign is up-to-date and easily accessible.

In addition to digital means, the government should disseminate clear and succinct information about Canada's involvement in the global community and the explain importance of the UNSC seat through print, audio and video media. First, the government should create an official brochure (posted on the official website and given to United Nations representatives) that outlines:

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<sup>298</sup> See Appendix F-H for a list of relevant stakeholders.

<sup>299</sup> Daryl Copeland, *Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 163.

- Canadian values (democracy, solidarity and respect for diversity, social equality and cooperation and collaboration);
- Canada's commitment to the United Nations;
- The core message and themes of the Sustainable Security Agenda;
- Canada's contributions to international peace and security (peacekeeping, human rights, humanitarian assistance, disarmament and non-proliferation, international law, climate change and sustainable social and economic development); and
- Canada's objectives with the seat.

Any public statements on the campaign made by government officials should be recorded through audio and video means and should be posted on the campaign website and shared through social media. In addition, the government should seek support from Canadian academics and foreign policy analysts. Public intellectuals can bolster support for the campaign by writing articles about Canada and the UNSC election, discussing the campaign in radio interviews or podcasts and by appearing on Canadian news outlets. This information should be posted on the official government website and used to facilitate discussion through social media. As a respected group in society, the academic community can have a positive impact in promoting the campaign. Altogether, the wide reach of public diplomacy can provide both the strategic vision and operational momentum that can complement traditional diplomacy.

### 3.3 MIDDLE STAGE (2017-2022)

The promotion strategies outlined in the initial stage should be continued and intensified throughout the middle stage. Additionally, policy-makers should continue promoting the campaign in various multilateral forums, as has been outlined previously.

#### THE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

In the middle-phase period of the campaign, the proposed policy recommendations need to move forward. This will take time to consult relevant stakeholders once more, ensuring support and working out issues relating to policy implementation such as:

- The timeline for completion;
- The amount of personnel/training that will be required; and
- The budget requirements/considerations regarding resource allocation.

Government officials should publicize, through social media and traditional media outlets, successes in policy developments, as well as the positive impact of the prescribed policy changes.

## 3.4 THE FINAL STAGE (2022-2024)

### REAFFIRMING CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES

The final stage is an intensified version of the initial and middle phases. It involves the following:

- Securing written guarantees from foreign delegates (the goal is to obtain 10-12% more pledges than the 128 required to secure a seat);
- Increasing publicity over social media and other forms of media (articles, audio, video). This includes the progress of the campaign and any successful policy initiatives;
- More frequent public appearances and discussion of the campaign by government officials, the Prime Minister and public intellectuals;
- Hosting formal and informal events at the United Nations New York Headquarters; and
- Organizing and coordinating visits of United Nations representatives to Canada.

## 3.5 BUDGET

The conduct of the campaign and the resources allocated to it are essential to a successful bid for non-permanent membership in the UNSC. However, there is a lack of hard evidence about the factors influencing the outcomes of these elections. Without this data, it is impossible to predict with certainty how a campaign will play out, the resources required for it or the staff needed to promote the campaign. Fortunately, the campaign for the 2012 WEOG seat was well documented. Using that information, this section will outline what resources might be required at each stage.

There was a great range of spending between Australia, Finland and Luxemburg in the 2012 election. Australia's campaign was by far the most expensive, costing between \$25 million to \$40 million in 2012 USD.<sup>300</sup> In contrast, Luxembourg and Finland spent €1 million and €2 million on their respective campaigns (roughly \$1.29 million and \$2.58 million in 2012 USD), plus some additional staffing costs.<sup>301</sup> While it is impossible to forecast Canada's campaign costs, the lesson from 2012 is that running a campaign does not have to be an expensive endeavour, especially if pre-existing infrastructure is in place.

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<sup>300</sup> John Langmore, "Competing for Security Council Membership."

<sup>301</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Finland. "Taking Stock, Moving Forward," 5.

A long campaign need not be expensive. Luxembourg took advantage of its early announcement for candidacy (in 2001) by using the years leading up to the election to build its reputation when presented the opportunity, with little additional cost to its budget.<sup>302</sup> When this early campaigning shifts towards a more actively managed campaign, it is critical that Canada begins early, so as to gain an advantage over the competing states—a mistake critical to Finland’s 2012 defeat. This period of active campaigning will require a greater allocation of staff and funding than the previous period, but is essential to winning the election. The most intense period of activity will occur in the months immediately preceding the election, with diplomatic activity often involving senior staff and politicians. For Canada's 2024 bid, the lesson from the 2012 UNSC election campaigns is that a cost-effective, long-term campaign is possible with the greatest allocation of resources and personnel intensifying towards the end of the campaign.

While the allocation of resources varied amongst the campaigns, based on a number of similarities, there is a short list of recommendations of where one could expect to see campaign finances allocated:

- Creation and hosting of a campaign website for easy public access to Canada's message;
- Creating and distributing of campaign brochures to the United Nations General Assembly;
- Hiring, training, and financing a team to promote the campaign. (For 2012, these varied in size with Luxembourg and Finland making use of already existing staff with some additional personnel and Australia increasing its staffing considerably.);
- Travel costs of having public officials (such as the Foreign Affairs Minister, Prime Minister and/or Governor General) speak for the campaign at the General Assembly and international conferences; and
- Seminars, conferences and meetings hosted by Canada, likely in 2022/2024. (For example, Finland organized two seminars in Finland for the summer of 2012 with roughly 70 delegations.)<sup>303</sup>

While this list is not intended to limit the options available to Canada to support its 2024 bid, it does give an idea of what other countries have done in past elections, and where the resources for a future Canadian election may be distributed.

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<sup>302</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Finland. “Taking Stock, Moving Forward,” 5.

<sup>303</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Finland. “Taking Stock, Moving Forward,” 5.

## 3.6 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

### STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Strengths	Weaknesses
<p><b>Adaptability:</b> This campaign correlates with current Canadian foreign policy, but is malleable enough to continue with a future government and policy. This makes it more of a “Canadian Campaign” rather than one associated with a particular party or government.</p>	<p><b>Changes to the System:</b> The success of this campaign is linked to Canadian foreign policy. There is no control over how international relations will develop and how they may affect Canadian foreign policy.</p>
<p><b>Consistency:</b> The success of this campaign relies on Canada’s actual engagement in the security issues of the world. The benefits are thus long-term and transcend the campaign, making the Sustainable Security Agenda a valuable niche approach to contemporary and future international policy.</p>	<p><b>Too Much Talk:</b> For Canada to promote the Sustainable Security Agenda, it requires a robust international policy. If the Canadian government does not adopt the policy recommendations or work towards implementing them in full, it will give the impression that Canadian policy does not match its government’s rhetoric.</p>
<p><b>Feasibility:</b> As the campaign basis is innovation inspired by Canadian traditions, it utilizes already existing institutions and mechanisms of Canadian foreign policy. The goal is not to revolutionize, but rather to address pressing security issues today and the root causes of future security threats.</p>	<p><b>Seat grabbing and Misrepresentation:</b> The campaign message is very broad and may give the impression that Canada is trying to please everyone simply to secure votes.</p>
<p><b>Global Appeal:</b> The campaign message is global in nature. Everyone benefits from a more secure world and a sustainable approach to security requires multilateral cooperation to address insecurity.</p>	<p><b>No Time For Change:</b> The policy recommendations will involve a greater deal of resources and time to implement than anticipated.</p>

<p>Domestic Appeal: Global security ensures national security. This campaign also addresses the need to enhance certain aspects of Canadian foreign policy that will directly involve and benefit Canadians at home.</p>	<p>Too Radical: Sustainable security is a shift from traditional approaches to security that is characterized by the control-security paradigm, which is the dominant practice and view on how security should be addressed.</p>
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### SIGNIFICANCE OF CAMPAIGN

The evolution of Canada’s foreign policy has mirrored its changing role in the global community. From the establishment of Department of External Affairs to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Canadian policy-makers have continued to work at creating a mature and sophisticated foreign policy that is capable of “punching above its weight.” This campaign is a part of this transformation; it represents a new role in international affairs and the change Canada sees in the world. It marks the transition from Canadian internationalism and its middle power association to innovative internationalism and a smart power approach to international relations. It shows Canada’s capacity for innovative and collaborative leadership and its ability to think clearly when it comes to dealing with world affairs.

This campaign is also a representation of the change that Canada sees in the world. Canada has been one of the most consistent and dedicated members to the United Nations since its founding. Canada has a record of encouraging new ideas and new thinking in international relations. Since the 1950s, when Lester Pearson championed the idea of peacekeeping to recent decades when Canadians sponsored the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and introduced the important concept of the Responsibility to Protect, Canada has remained an active player in world affairs. The Sustainable Security Agenda is the most recent iteration of Canada’s global engagement. As part of Canada’s foreign policy, it is an expression of both Canadian values and interests. It represents the Canadian beliefs and practices of multilateral cooperation, tolerance of diversity, social justice, sustainable economic development, democratization, the protection of human rights and ecological protection. With the Sustainable Security Agenda, the intention is to consolidate the growing consensus of international security within a multidimensional framework that subsumes and integrates both conventional and non-conventional elements of security. Altogether, this campaign is a short-term goal in a long-term process. The campaign will signify Canada’s return to eminence in world affairs. Even if Canada is not successful at the United Nations Security Council elections in 2024, this does not denote that it has failed in its endeavor; the seat would be a stamp of confirmation, but it is not an indictment of Canada’s effectiveness in world affairs.



Regardless of the outcome, Canada will continue to shoulder responsibilities in the management of world affairs. Canada can win without boasting and lose without excuse.



# SECTION IV:

## CONCLUSION

## FINAL THOUGHTS

The campaigns presented in this report take on the significant task of trying to get Canada elected to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2024. Each proposal puts forth a fundamentally different vision of the challenges that Canada's foreign policy makers face and the changes that they need to make in order to address these problems. In some respects the campaigns both begin from the same starting position: the UNSC electoral defeat of 2010. However, the implications to be drawn from that defeat are varied and often contradictory. This report sought to distill those implications into two main categories, each of which grew into the campaigns presented above.

The first of the two campaigns takes the approach that the fundamentals of the foreign policy pursued by the government of Prime Minister Harper should be able to secure election to the UNSC, provided that certain modest changes are applied. These changes are not solely stylistic. The campaign's platform of "Partnership, Prosperity and Protection" puts forth its' own policy recommendations, but these have been carefully developed to fit within the general trajectory of current Canadian foreign policy.

The second strategy, with its program of innovative internationalism aimed at transforming Canada into a smart power, reflects a considerably different vision. This campaign puts forth recommendations across a wide range of policy areas, each of which demands not only changes in the fundamental conduct of Canada's foreign affairs, but in the ways in which the global system itself is understood and approached.

However, while each campaign has its own conception of the problems with Canadian foreign policy and the appropriate solutions that those problems demand, they also share a set of basic assumptions. At the heart of these assumptions is the understanding that Canada and the United Nations can offer much to one another. The United Nations remains one of the most significant international organizations in the world today, and a non-permanent seat on the UNSC, its' most powerful organ, is a valuable opportunity for any country. Canada, a state with enormous economic, political and social resources—and perhaps still greater potential to develop those resources—should do its utmost to take advantage of that opportunity. Any campaign that can successfully bring these two actors together will do so to serve Canadian interests, but in doing so, can ultimately serve those of the greater global community as well.



# SECTION V:

## ACRONYMS

ACCC: Association of Canadian Community Colleges

ACLANT: Allied Command Atlantic

ACT: Accountability, coherence, and Transparency

AUCC: Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada

BAU: Business-as-Usual

C-NAP: Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security

CANZ: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand

CBIE: Canadian Bureau for International Education

CERF: United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund

CIC: Citizenship and Immigration Canada

CIDA: Canadian International Development Agency

DART: Disaster Assistance Response Team (Canada)

DFAIT: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)

DPKO: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

EE: Eastern European Group

EU: European Union

FEWO: House of Commons Standing Committee on the Status of Women

FIPA: Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement

GA: General Assembly

GCI: Gwich'in Council International

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GFCAC: Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict

GHG: Greenhouse Gases

GRULAC: Latin American and Caribbean Group

ICC: International Criminal Court

ICT: Information and Communication Technologies

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force

ITAC: Information Technology Association of Canada

ITS: Information, Technology and Science Transfer

IWFA: Special Committee on Violence against Indigenous Women

JUSCANZ: Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand

KBE: Knowledge Based Economy

MDGs: Millennium Development Goals

MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MNCH: Maternal, Newborn, and Child Health

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSA: National Security Agency

OAS: Organization of American States

ODA: Official Development Assistance (Canada)

ODA AA: Official Development Assistance Accountability Act

P5: Permanent Five United Nations Security Council Members

PBC: Peace Building Commission

PCD: Policy Coherence for Development

SCSL: Special Court for Sierra Leone

SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals

START: Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force

TCC: Troup Contributing Countries

UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UN: United Nations

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

WEOG: Western European and Other Group

WFP: World Food Program





# SECTION V:

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